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ABSTRACT 
This ~csis dcs~ribcs an invcstigat[on of information systems development and practice 
in a privatised state owned enterprise (North-West Cement Company Limite<l or 
NWCL) in Sri Lanka between 195!!-2000. The objectives of my ~tudy were: (1) to 
understand the apprcrnchcs used by NWCL for information systems development; (2) to 
understand how these approaehcs relate tu the organi s11tional, socio-cultural, economic 
nnd political realities of organisaiions in Sri Lanka; (3 J to outline a theory to better 
understand information systems de11clopmcn! and practice for organisations in Sri 
Lanka; and (4) to make recommendations which could be used to improve infonnation 
systems development and practice for organisations in Sri Lanka. 
Five research questions were examined. ( 1) What impact did the state control policies 
have on i,nfonnation systems development and practice within NWCL, particularly in 
the conte~t of organisational socio-cultural lifcworlds? (2) What impact did the nco· 
classical iconomic policies introduced by the government have on information systems 
development and practice within NWCL, particularly in the context of organisational 
socio-cultural lifcworlds? (3) What approaches were taken into consideration by 
NWCL management when developing and using information systems in the 
organisation? (4} How much were cultural, social, economic. and organisational 
contt:xts taken into consideration by NWCL management in information systems 
development and practice in the organisation? And why? (5) How can such findings in 
the above areas contribute to the theory and practice of information systems 
development? 
To study the social phenomena, contextualised, interpretive one, with critical case study 
methods congruent with Habennas's critical social theory perspective has been 
employed. This study is a holistic one in that ten episodes of information systems 
development are critically examined within the historical context of institutions in Sri 
Lanka. I have made observations by iterating theory with empirical data and by 
reflecting on each episode in an endeavour to gain an in-depth understanding and 
meaning. 
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.; ~\ 
PkD Thesi.s Ab.flra~I 
The research reveals that infonnation systems development at NWCL cx.istcd within 
broadly related hut inK'l'locking socio-cuhural, economic, ond political and 
administnitivc structures in Sri Lanka. These social structures both influenced and were 
influenced by information systems development ot NWCL and thus shaped !he 
org11nisalion's renlity. 
Both state controlled policies and neo-classical economic policies impacted on 
information systems development and the engendering of the socio-cultural lifeworlds 
of employees. !nfonnation systems development followed a positivist approach with 
values embedded in Western society. The techno-scienlific, instrumental, strategic, 
economic and purposive rational approaches logcthcr with a highly institulion111iscd 
bureaucracy and r,olitical apertures arc shown to be in conflict with the social reality of 
NWCL and this has hampered information systems development. As a result, NWCL 
was largely unable to develop iJUtovativc infonnation systems to better the organisation. 
Infonnation systems development requires representation of socio-cultural norms, 
values, and expectations which are used to guide the thinking process of people in a 
~untry. Such elements arc integrated in employee lifcworlds and embody tacit 
understanding and knowledge. If infomiation systems arc developed including such 
tacit knowledge, employees, management, NWCL itself and the wider society benefit 
together. Such a process can be achieved through increased use of communicative 
action in information systems development. Such findings would enhance the theory 
and the practice of information systems development in NWCL and other organisations 
in Sri Lanka. The central message of this thesis is that communica,ivc action remains as 
an attnlctivc option for NWCL trnnsfonnation. 
··\, 
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1.0 Introduction 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
Human actions based on misinterprc!ation and misguided perceptions of what is "right" 
for a group of geographically, socially or politically connected people, are part of the 
core study ofmy work. An exploration of the symbolic structures and tbemes, coupled 
with interpretative research aimed al realising the potential of improving mutual 
communication and influence, through the political activities and interests in the Sri 
Lankan context, are integral factors in this discourse. 
I attempt to investigate the balance between individual and collective interests, and how 
the application of instrumental and strategic actions can detriment, or compliment, 
communication, meaning and purposes of socio-cultural, economic, and political 
contexts in which the chosen information systems function. 
Jn this chapter, beginning with a description of some of the key terms, I give an 
overview of this work by reflecting on research conducted by Williams and Gunatunge 
(1999a). Following is an explanation of the overall statement of the research problem 
with description of the specific research. A description of the significance of the 
research is provided, followed by an explanation of the objectives of the study and a 
structural outline of the thesis. 
2.0 Definitions of Key Terms 
The following operational definitions ofkey tenns are used throughout this work. 
l. Information Technology 
' 
The term "infonnation technology" in this research refers to the computer-based 
technology used for acquisition, processing, storage and retrieval, presentation and 
dissemination uf information, and includes computers, telecommunication and digital 
electronic technologies. 
2. Information Systems 
The term "infonnation systems" is used to describe all different sorts of infonnation 
systems from payroll to group-decision support sy:,~s (Lyytincn, 1992, p. 160). 
Information systems in this study is defined as "a computer-based organisational 
information systems, which provides information support for management activities 
andfimctions" (Ives, Hrunilton & Davis, 1980). 
Infonnation support broadly includes infonnation storage, transmission, manipulation 
and deliveiy of symbolic representations that are relevant to, or shape, organisational 
action. Management activities and functions are assumed to apply to all organisational 
participants whether or not they are called managers. The focus and problem 
formulations of infonnrition systems are generally associated with the idea of 
technological change in infonnation systems and generic problems of information 
processing (Lyytinen, 1992, p.160). 
3, Information Systems Develo!}mcnt 
3 
Information systems llcvclopmcnl is a .1·ocial actfrity that operates within social 
contexts as a social procl.'ss (Newman & Robey, 1992; Hirschheim, Klein & Newman, 
1991; Hirschhcim & Newman, 1991) of shafCIJ learning. Social contcxt includes 
organisation, {ifewor/ds, nnd economic and political contexts of a country. 
The information system can be either an in-house developed system or an out-sourced 
information system. An in-house developed system is one that has been developed by 
staff employees within the organisation. An out-sourced information syst~m is one that 
moderates its systems features to suit the information requirement of the organisation is 
also considered as a social actil'ity that operates within the social contexts as a social 
process. Within this interpret3tion 'lifeworlds' is defined as the world of consciousness 
and humanly created meaning. In '\ifoworlds' conte:ii:ts, people create and attach their 
own meanings (self-understanding) to the world around them and to the behaviour they 
manifested in that world (Habermas, 1987b, 1979). 
4, Social Process 
\:, 
The social process of information systems de•,~!opment consists of certain kinds of 
activities that go into information systems solutions to solve organisational problems. 
These activities consist of effective deign, delivery, and usage of information systems in 
organisations and society (Keen, 1980, p.10). !n this social process the goals, strategies, 
policies, methods, procedures, resources, norms, motives, and values of infonnation 
systems and development activities need to be openly discussed by al! the participants. 
This occurs through communicative interacti011, which is genuinely oriented to reaching 
an understanding as a process of shared learning in a distortion free group discussion. 
4 
5. Participants 
The participants of information systems <lcvclopment arc considered as intelligent 
social or organisatio1wl actors who critically assess whatever infonnation they receive 
through the communicalive actions in the activities of the information systems 
development process. These participants can include a person or 1,>Toup of persons 
(stakeholders) (e.g. politicians, managers, employees, customers, community members' 
etc.) who directly or indirectly may have communicative interests in the infonnation 
systems development process and the outcome of information systems projects. 
The discussion of information systems development activities is oriented towards the 
critical reflection by each participant about the inter-subjectively and shared knowledge 
of the activities of information systems development process. Jn this self-reflection, 
participants draw meanings from the '!ifcworlds' as cnntexts for their commw1icalil'e 
actions and communicative interactions. The emergent information systems solution ns 
n result of this interaction is defined as the communicative rationality of information 
systems development. This commrmicative rationality is based on the communicative 
interests of all the participants, thnt would lead to success of information systems 
solutions for organisational problems, otherwise failure of both information systems 
development and information system use would result. 
6. Tcclmlcism 
Technicism is an over-emphasis on teclmica/, in~rrumental or strategic techniques or 
actio1is to the detriment of wider human communication, human values or human 
purpose (Adorno & Horkhcimcr, 1990; Dryzck, 1990; Ellul, 1990; Habcrmas, 1987c; 
Mnrcuse, 1969,1964). Persons thinking in tcclmicist ways wo.:!d tend to define all 
human problems in terms of rational and technical solutions, thus leading to an undue 
emphasis on the science. In more general contcxL~. this way of thinking is referred to as 
an insln1men/a/ rationality (Adorno & Horkheimer, 1990; Dryzek, 1990) or a strategic 
rotionaltty (Habennas, 1987c). It can also be referred to as technocratic consciousness 
or technocratic rationality (Habennas, 1987b, 1987c). 
In this context technology encapsulates a form of making and conlrol!ing as well as the 
mechanics used in these processes (Habennas, 1987b, 1984). Scientism means 
knowledge defined by what the sciences do in the methodological analysis of scientific 
procedures an institutionalised form of reasoning, and pr1rposive rationality, rationality 
with regard to purposes or ends (Habcrmas, 1987b, 1984). Instrumental and strategic 
actions are two basic instances of a more general action type, which Habermas calls 
purposive-rational. 
7. Purposive Rational Actions 
Purposive-rational action is action directed at attaining only rationally detennined 
objectives. Here the actors, or participants, attempt to achieve measurable objectives, 
and measure the success of their actions by how they achieve, or nearly achieve, their 
objectives and how efficient were the means deployed. Purposive rational action 
applies technical rules that have satisfied some empirical test of the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the means (Lyytinen, 1992). 
6 
8, Communicative Rationalities 
Habermas (J 987b, 1987c) provides a useful categorisation of instrumental, slratcgic and 
communicative rationalisations, which can be listed as: 
(1) Instrumental rationality - a technical or instrumental knowledge used to control 
nature 
(2) Strategic rationality - the inappropriate use of instrumental rationality in social 
situations by persons or groups to control others by manipulation, coercfon, 
propaganda, threat or by raw power 
(3) Communicative rationality - a self-reflexive, inter-subjective and consensual 
apnroach /o obtaining what is true or just or free, based on freedom from both inner 
an~ external coercion or unjust authority. Communicative rationality is ori~(~ to 
\\ ,, 
inter-subjective understanding and the achievement of true consensus through fr~~. \\ 
open dialogue with honesty and respect shown by all participants in communicatil 
~--
interaction. 
Habennas's (1987b, 1987c, 1984) use of the tenn, communicative rationality is a 
mindset or way of thinking that is most clearly demonstrated in language and 'Self-
reflection, especially of an ethical or moral character. There is a common concern with 
justice for all participants involve in the communicative interaction and freedom from 
internalised or outer coercion or unjust authority. 
9. Communicative Actions 
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Habcrrnns ( 1987b, 1987c, and ! 984) categorises human action in the following ways: 
(I) Instrumental action as a human activity oriented towards success or control over 
objects in nature, mainly for the technical interest. It stems from instrumental 
rationality 
(2) Strategic action as a human activity or interaction oriented to instrumental success, 
control or domination over other people by manipulation, coercion, propaganda, 
threat or raw power, mainly for the technical interest. It springs from strategic 
rationality 
(3) Communicative action as a human activity oriented to reaching an understanding in 
an. inter-suajcctivity shared communicative interaction, mainly for the practical and 
emancipatory interest. lt emanates fonn communicative rationality. 
10. Human Knowledge Interests 
Habennas 1987b, 1984; Outhwaite, 1987; Pusey, 1987) categorise human interests as: 
(I) Technical human interest seeking technical or instrumental knowledge of human 
actions for controlling the nature using the knowledge generated by empirical 
natural sciences. It is mainly manifested in work. 
(2) Practical human interest aims to gain practical knowledge whkh is oriented towards 
henncneutic or historical understanding of human actions from the meaning 
ascribed by social actors. It is manifested in language 
(3) Emancipatory interest, which is mainly manifested in self-reflection and self-
understanding of human actions. It concerns with the emancipation from intemali~cd or 
outer coercion or unjust authority. lt orients towards truth, freedom and justice of 
human existence. The self-understanding means a person or group's own interpretation 
of its motives, norms, and goals (Habermas, 1987a, p. viii). 
" 
3.0 Overvlew•Reffcction on n Study 
I use a r~'Search paper (Williams & Gunatunge, 1999a) presented nt the 4th Global 
Alliance for Transnational Education conference held at Melbourne in Australia in I 999 
and subsequently published in Higher Education in Europe (Vol. XXV, Number 3, 
2000b) to txpound the background of this research study. 
I perceived a dominating technicism or instrumental actions in the information systems 
development process when the Head of a School of Management in a university in Sri 
Lanka attempted to design a database system for recording students' personal data. The 
aim of the database development, as explained by the Head of the School, was to 
respond rapidly to students' queries and to better control of students within the 
university. The attempt failed because students did not support the Head of the School 
in the requirement identification stage of the development 
The students interpreted the database as an instrument through which the school 
endeavoured to control their behaviour within the university. They resisted this control 
of their behaviour by the government's effort to privatise universities with the support 
of the World Bank. For example, students argued that the school attempted to introduce 
recent educational reforms of the government through the database. They suspected that 
the recorded information in the database system would be directed to the authorities in 
the government and that the government would seize their benefits (Williams & 
Gunatunge, 1999a). 
The database development project failed due to an overly technical approach taken by 
the Head of the school He considered students as passive objects who could be 
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controlled through the database design to achit:vc his rational objectives. Habermas 
(1987n, p. 57) u~es the term "technology" to mean situations like this sci<.'fltifically 
rationalised control of objectified processes. From a Jungian perspective, Scgaller & 
Bergman (1989) assert that: "life is very widely dominated still by the belief that 
rational solutions exist for all problems, and that problems which don't respond to 
reason cannot be real" (p. 38). This is a facet oftechnicism taken up by Bowers (1988) 
" when he asserts that persons influenced by technicism: "view al! aspects of human 
experience in terms of problems that require technical solutions" (p. 8). 
The result of a technicist way of thinking is a naive faith that science and technology 
can solve all problems, opening the way to utopia. Persons under the influence of 
technicism come to an over-emphasis on technique and a naive trust in the science and 
technology of modernism - to the detriment of human values, and human purptlse, and 
meaningful communication (E\lul, 1990). 
The Head of the School over emphasised the application of instrumental and strategic 
actions to the detriment of communication concerning meaning or purpose or socio-
cultural, economic, and political contexts in which the information systems 
development process was embedded. There was neither significant dialogue nor open 
communication with the students in regard to the database design. There was no 
opportunity for students to self-reflectively understand the objectives of the database 
design. Moreover, no alternative perspectives and approaches were considered in the 
development process. 
The Head of the School did not examine the social context of students' .social 
behaviour. He did not understand that the social behaviour is determined as a result of 
JO 
the interaction between the students' and the context that they draw meaning for their 
social actions. In other words, he did not examine the subject mater of the database 
design, the students' 'lifeworlds' or other contexts within which communication 
functions. For example, the Head of the School did not examine, why and how students 
interpreted database design as an instrument to control their social behaviour within 
university. 
Students opposed the database design, drawing meanings rrl~inly from broader social 
contexts such as: 
(I} Their poor living conditions within the university (the majority of students who 
come from poor families receive government bursaries, although !he amount is not 
.... sufficient to balance their day to day living expenses) 
(2)/I'he government's attempt (through recent educational reforms) to run the university 
'~s a market place treating students as commodities in that market 
(3) Withdrawal of freedom to freely exchange their views with university 
administration. 
A narrow technical interest in database design was concerned with the efficient 
techniques and methods used in the development process to achieve predetermined and 
rigidly set goals of the Head of the School, to control and to dominate ~tudents' 
behaviour within the university. The instrumental rationality, unbalanced by 
communicative rationality, dominated in the database design attempt in the human 
capacity for reasoned thought and action. Cor.scquently, economicaliy rationalistic 
attitudes and managed instrumental rationality surfaced in the actions of the Head of the 
school as he attempted to dominate students' 'lifeworlds' through the database design 
(Williams & Gunatunge, 1999a, 2000b). 
JI 
1bis database example illustrates the need for the focus of this research; a quest for a 
better model that could improve infonnation systems development and use practice in 
organisations, particularly in Sri Lanka. Habermas' s ( l 987a) thesis ... "how can the 
power of technical control be brought within the range of the consensus of acting and 
transacting citizens?" (p. 57) stimulated me to start my research with the implicit 
supposition, that "information systems development should be considered as a social 
activity of shared learning by the participants". Therefore, I reviewed the literature to 
look for approaches alternative to the existing technical approach. 
Readings of Myers (1997), Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991), and Chua (1986) helped me 
to find out usefui schema for categorising research approaches to information systems 
development and practice in organisations. Their main categories arc the positivist 
approach, the interpretative approach and the critical social theory approach. 
On further reading of such authors as Avision, Wood-Harper, Vidgcn & Wood, 1998, 
Myers & young, 1997, Wilson, 1997, Hirschheim, Klein & Lyytincn, 1996; K,lc,in & 
Hirschheim, 1996; Walsham, 1995; Walshmn, 1993; NgWenyama, 1991; Hirschheim & 
Klein, 19119; Habcnnas. 1987a, 1987b, 1987c, 1984, 1979, 1975, 1973; Lyytine~1_;.& 
Klein, 1985; Klein & Lyytincn, 1985), I realised fuat fue positivist approach (technical 
approach) can be flawed when using overly narrow technical interests based on 
instrumental and strategic rationalisations. 
Drawing rules of Jaw for social sciences from the natural-science model, positivistic 
infonnatioo systems development approaches have shown to be repeatedly flawed in 
their application to the infonnation systems development within the contexts of 
' ,, 
(r' 
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'lifoworlds' in orgar.l~ations (Avision et al., 1998; Wilson, 1997; Myers & Young, 
1997; Nb>wcnyamn ;~ I.cc, l 997). 
In my jOumcy of searching for a better model for information systems development, I 
perceived that many systems development projects were abandoned, or failed, due to 
little or no communication with the social actors or participants. There was a failure to 
achieve consensus due to misunderstandings or mistrust about the development process 
(see Williams & Gunatungc, 2000b, ! 999a; Klein & Hirschheim, 1991, 1989; Lyytinen 
& Hirschheim, 1987). For example, Gibbons (1987, p. I) states that "the concepts 
present in the language of the positivist research philosophy cannot reflect the everyday 
\a.,guage usage of the study partir.ipants, as these arc considered too ambiguous and 
subjective. l realised that irreducible values underpin the 'lifowor\ds' contexts within 
which social practice of information systems development functions. The understanding 
of social reality in social actions requires understanding of bow practice and meanings 
are fonned and informed by the language and tacit norms shared by humans workirlg 
towards some shared goals (Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991 ). 
Recognising the limitations of the strict application of the natural science model to 
information systems development, I further examined the interpretivist research 
' perspective as an alternative approach to the positivist research tradition (See Klein & 
Myers, 1999; Myers, 1994; Walshnm, 1993; Orlikowski, 1993; Orlikowski & Buroudi, 
1991; Chua, 1986). The interpretative tradition explicitly addresses information 
systems development issues in the contexts of 'lifeworlds' so as to come into a mutual 
understanding, a shared consciousness among actors in human communication. 
I 
IJ 
., 
1, 
The aim of the intetllretntivc research is to firstly understand how members of II social 
group, through their participation in social processes, enact their particular realities and 
endow them with meaning. Secondly, to show how,"- these m'!anings, belief~ ,111d 
intentions ofthe members help to constitute their socia1,·action (Orlikow5ki & Baroudi, 
1991). The interpretative perspective attempts ,:io understand the inter-subjective 
meanings embedded in social life ... to ex'plain why people act the way they do" ,, 
(Gibbons, 1987, p. 3). The understanding of ..:--0mmunicative acts are enhanced by 
interpreting the meanings of actior.s. •. 
'-'-, 
"'<· 
--~ 
., \:,.... 
However, the interpretative approach does not· address the -i~~l!CS that underpin 
'\ 
distortions in understanding and communicative interactions arising &o):,: 
\\ ' 
I. Socio-politico-economic forces which are often external and whi~h giveft~se to \~..)/ 
certain meanings and experiences 
2 . .'Jnintended consequences of actions which shape social reality 
3. Structural conflicts within society and organisations. 
- . 
II 4. Historical construction of social reality in organisations. (Fay, 1l~~7.-cp. 92). The 
,_., 
interpretative approach does not address the question: "how can human actors free 
themselves from understandings arising from distorted communicative 
interactions?" 
After reading critiea\ so,,;ial theory literature, I decided to employ Habermas's theory of 
communicative action to research information systems development and practice by 
organisations for the following reasons. 
I°', Ha berm .. as' s thinking is considered to have more relevance and impact on the 
.. 
\' 
\I, 
,. information systems discipline than any other criticill school of social theory 
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(Ngwenynma & Lee, I 997). The theory is a powerful framework to understand 
information ~ystems dcvc\opmcnl and prnclicc as a social activity and process 
(Newman & Robey, l 992; Hirschheim & Newman, 1991 ). Habcrmas's theory has a 
broad and encompassing nature, which makes it seem capable of subsuming most 
other social theories within itsclf{Lyytincn & Hirschhcim, 1988). 
2. Hnbennas's model enrib!es an understanding of how technical systems, such as 
management information systems (MIS), tend to dominate the prominent social 
systems. Habennas argues for a need for exposure to both concepts and their 
• interrelatioru;hip, in any given context. (Laughlin, 1987). 
3. Habennas's model provi,des a detailed process, different dimensions, human 
[subjective world], social [inter subjilctively shared world] and technical [objective 
world], which are all interrelated. These allow not only an understanding about the 
nature and interaction of social, human, and technical systems but also the 
possibility to engender change and development in these systems (Laughlin, 1987). 
4. Habennas's model enables a theoretical and practical understanding of the 
appropriateness of particular changes, such as privatisation policies on 
organisations and information systems within a broader spectrum of societal 
development (Broadbent, Laughlin & Reed, 1991; Laughlin, 1987). 
5. Habermas's model has an openness with which critical appraisal can be undertaken. 
As Giddens (1982, p. 332) points outs "enlightenment is not joke" implying that the 
enlir.htenment project of transferring the world to be more just and democratic is 
not to be laughed at. Broadbent et al. (1991) asserts that modem world could 
" 
become more calightcncd with llabcrrnas's thinking of societal development [than 
any other critical soc.:ia! theory perspective). 
Habcrrnas's ( 1987b, 1984) theory of communicative :ictions is concerned with values, 
meaning or purpose that makes more conscious and explicit the process whereby 
relevant personal beliefs, personal concepts and ideas, metaphors, feelings, emotions, 
personal values and goals are openly communicated in a process of information systems 
development in organisations. Thus, it is part of the self-reflective process by which 
social actors come to understand each otl,er's actions and interactions as a process of 
shared learning . 
. , . 
. ,-,_ 
4,0 Statement of the Research Problem 
In developing countries, one broad but important phenomenon that needs to be 
investigated is the interaction between development policies of governments and 
infonnation systems development practice in organisations. Sri Lanka, as a developing 
country, gained independence in 1948. Until 1977, Sri Lanka followed state-controlled 
policies and approaches for industrialisation based on public ownership. State owned 
enterprises (SOEs) were introduced as major development programs following the 
industrialisation policies of the government (see chapter four). Infonnation systems 
were introduced as steering medin (techniques and strategies) in some SOEs for 
improving efficiency and effectiveness. These infonnation systems had tremendous 
impact on socio-cultural 'lifeworlds' in these organisations. 
!n 1977, Sri Lanka opened its frontiers allowing neo-clnssical development policies to 
be operated. Neo-classica! policies have provided market-driven approaches such as 
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privatisation of S'OEs and economic libcralfaation (Colombagc, 199.1; Knrunatillcke, 
1993). The primary objective of such libcralisc<l approaches was to introduce 
i.:0mpctit1on in the hopt: of reducing cost and improving the productivity of 
organisations (Kc\cgama, 1993), and accelerating economic development towards 
improving the living conditions of people (Rondinceli, 1993). 
These approacbes have had profound effects on both processes and structures in 
organisations in thl!se countries. For instance, when SOEs in developing countries are 
privatised, organisations usually have to introduce new business visions, objectives, 
strategies, policies, structures, decision making processes, and management control 
systems (Wickramasinghe, 1993). 
Computerised infonnation systems (computerised infonnation systems) are some times 
introduced as steering media to direct these organisations (Myers & Young, 1997; 
Broadbent et al., 1991). These newly developed infonnation systems can become one 
of key instruments by which senior management can achieve the desired objectives of 
the government's reforms. Such situations can be complicated particularly, due to the 
culturally and socially s.pecific imperatives in these countries (Myers & Young, 1997; 
Kelegama, 1993; Broadbent et al., 1991). These provide rich contexts for infonnation 
systems development research in organisations in Sri Lanka. 
Sri Lanka is considered as a low-income economy (World Bank, 1990; IMF, 2000). In 
this country, policy makers have introduced market oriented development approaches 
in 1977. Sri Lanka was expected to gain newly industrial county status in the year 2000 
(lndraratne, 1993). One of the striking policy measures embraced by recent government 
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induced reforms is increased privatisation programmes. Al the end of 1998 about 60 
SO Es have been privatised with the agenda to increase ctlicicncy and effectiveness. 
It is reported that many of these privatised compw,ics in Sri Lanka are equipped with 
newly introduced information systems to help them cope with competitive markets 
(Samarnnayake, 1999, 1989). These systems have been developed following Western 
prescriptions and are considered to be technical and rationalistic follwing a Western 
thought and mindset (Avgerou, 1996; Kirlidog, !996). These information systems 
could be at odds with the organisational and the socio-cultural reality of Sri Lanka. As a 
result, a number of organisations have realised that these systems need to be considered 
within broader organisational, social, cultural, economic contexts that reflect the 
specific characteristics of Sri Lanka (Gray, 1991). 
Case studies in infonnation systems development in Sri Lankan organisations could 
help lo throw light on the issues of broader organisational, social, cultural, and 
economic contexts. Therefore, the proposed study is based on five fundamental 
research questions. 
4.1 Research Questions 
Based on a single in-depth case study ofa Sri Lankan organisation: 
I. What impact did the state control policies have on information systems 
development and prncticc in the organisational socio-cultural 'lifeworlds?' 
2, What impact did the neo-classical economic policies have on information systems 
development and practice in the organisational socio-cultural 'lifeworlds?' 
'" 
3. What approaches did the management take into consideration WhL'11 developing and 
implementing infonna!ion systems in the organisation? 
4. How much were cultural, social, economic, and organisational contexts taken into 
con~ideration by the management in infonnation systems development and practice 
in the organisation and why? 
5. How did such finr!ings contribute to the theory and practice of iilformation systems 
development? 
4.2 Limitations o£the Study 
The first limitation of this thesis is the time frame studied. Though I examined 
infOrmation systems development and practice within an historical context, data 
description and analysis was carried on after 1958 and due to the (NCCL's) long 
history, it was unable to trncc back data prior to the l95B. 
The second !imitation of this thesis pertains to the information gathered through the in-
depth interviews with the participants {see section 5.3.2 of chapter five for the number 
and the type of participants interviewed) of a privatised industri."a! organisation (NCCL). 
:[ 
The historical construction of the data gathered rest on the int~~ty and knowledge of 
II 
I\ the interviewed participants. '\\ 
··,·,, 
,,., 
The third limitation of this thesis involves a lack of focus on freeing and changing the 
social attitudes of participants. The use of Habermas's communicative actions in 
research involves not only to reveal empirical evidence and interpretive understanding 
of information systems development and practice but also to free social actors who arc 
constrained. This involves revealing constraints, thereby motivating participants to 
engage in conscious political actions in systems development. Moreover, it involves 
I 
/I 
" 
liberation of repressed seeking through dialogue to make social participants aware of 
oppressive structures. It also involves changini.; social attitudes of participants to make 
, them awafe of the problems of the current practices. Time and distance cunstrnincd in 
engaging in such a critical study. However, [ engaged in critical discussions with 
managers and other employees. I made them aware the present problems and reasons for 
failures of information systems development and practice at NCCL. 
The fourth possible [imitation is related to the participants interviewed. This study is an 
in-depth in the subsidiary (NCCL) based on data produced by internal participants of 
NCCL and few out side participants (sec section 5.3.2) for soci0-cu!ture, economic and 
political contexts, government involvement, single owner and the multinational 
Company. Key owners of Goldembank located in the Company head quarters, 
customers, suppliers and competitors were not interviewed. 
The fifth limitation of this thesis is that it was conducted using national socio-culture as 
wtique phenomenon throughout the history of Sri Lanka. However, the study casts 
doubt upon the notion of cultures being a national concept. For example, Sri Lanka had 
been ruled by foreign dominations over five and half centuries (see section 4.3 of 
chapter four). The impact of this foreign language, religion, arts, administtation, 
technology was to have a tremendous impacts on changing socio-cultural attitudes of Sri 
Lankans. Had this study been focused and conducted on ethnic and religious basis, then 
the results would have been different. A more detailed study focusing on language, 
religion, and ethnicity within original communities may well have revealed segments of 
socio-cultural values, economic and political contexts between families, political 
groupings which might have impacted on the modem Western cultural values, rather 
than the reverse, 
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The sixth limitation is that the whole research, its findings, conclusions and 
recommendations arc based solely on a Sri Lanknn context even though parallel 
d\\cussions arc developed and analysed (sec chapter four) within the contexL~ of 
developing countries. 
5.0 Significance of the Study 
,,, 
The present study is relevant to both developed and developing countries alike as they 
introduce market oriented economic reforms into SOEs (Evaristo, 1998; Myers & 
Young, 1997; Broadbent et al., 1991). The then government of Sri Lanka introduced 
liberalised economic reforms in 1977. These economic reforms have resulted in 
significant expansion of the private sector, a reshaping of hierarchical structures, and 
transition ofSOEs to the private sector. 
One fundamental but important phenomenon in this transition is the change of 
ownership, which frequently leads to a change of infonnation systems. Onl'. of the 
problems in the change process is the need to face a competitive environment 
incompatible with the older socio-culture of the organisation (Evaristo, 1998). 
Therefore, how change of ownership impacts on change of information systems 
development provides a fruitful context for empirical investigation. In order to fully 
understand the current practice of information systems development in organisations in 
Sri Lanka, this study investigated the changes resulting from the introduction of 
information systems that occurred before and after privatisation of a state owned 
industrial enterprise; namely, NCCL in Sri Lanka. 
" 
The intentions and actions of key participants in systems development processes were 
examined to understand their impact on the development and practice of infonnation 
systems. The social context into which policies were being imp!cmcntcd, and the 
change processes enacted within wider contcxt.'l, has also been investigated. A critical 
social theory, particularly works of Habcnnas communicative actions. has been used as 
the major theoretical framework of this study. 
Infonnation systems development has been studied within a social setting using critical 
social theory by various researchers at organisational level in developed countries but 
no! in developing countries (see section 2.5.3). Sri Lanka as a dctJcloping country 
prO\·ides rich contexts for infonnation systems research (sec chapter four). The 
literature on the Hahermas's critical social theory in infonnation systems, thounh 
growing in quantity and depth, has mainly adopted critical theory as it is 'received' in 
the philosophical literature (Lyytincne, 1992). Moreover, many of works an:: 
fragmentary (Lee, 1990; Ehn, 1988; Flensburg, 1985). Most research studies in the 
infonnation systems field use critical theory in a rather mechanistic way by reiterating 
the key atguments of Habcnnas's thinking (e.g. Lyytinen & Hir:schl1cim, 1988; 
Lyytinen & Klein, 1985). Jn these studies, authors often merely offer Hebennas's 
actions· typology/human interests to organise and evaluate research in infonnation 
systems. 
While these researches can be illuminating, they fail to look at infonnation systems 
development issues in their totality. These studies often ignore the exploration of 
concrete situation; in real world problems and studying how infonnation systems 
actually function within a broad social context of a country. 
" 
Only n few studies have focused on how broader social issues, ~uch as privatisation 
policies, intlucncc informntiun systems dcvclopmcrt (sec for example, Myers & 
Young, !997). Even in this study, authors did not study infom1ation systems 
development within a historical framework. Ck:ncrally, Haberrnas's concerns about 
societal development within a broader socio-economic and political context, have been 
partially neglected by information systems researchers both in developed and 
developing countries. 
Focusing on organisational and information technology contexts alone fails to 
acknowledge the degree to which information systems development plays a role in 
social transformation in organisations. For example, how different social settings 
engenders certain kinds of government policies such as privatisation and how and why 
these changes in tum reinforce or transform structural configurations over time bas 
scarcely been examined in the literature. In other words, research studies have largely 
failed to locate information systems dovclopment within broader socio-cultural, 
economic, and political contexts of the country within which it is embedded. 
For example, in critical theory, the understanding of tho society must embrace the 
totality of objective and subjective worlds before analysing elements of organisations 
(Murray & Ozenne, 1991; Held, 1980; Burroll & Morgan, 1979). One curront hindrance 
in making critical theory a more credible research area is the lack of empirical studies 
that emphasisos the societal totality (Lyytinen, 1992). The emphasis of totality in 
research emerges from the idea that facts can not be scparatod from values in the 
process of social development. Therefore, the presont research has si!,'llificant 
implications for information systems research and it addresses this lacuna hy examining 
it in a Sri Lankan context for information systems development. The study examines 
2) 
real-world L'J}isodes to gain an understanding about real-world i~sues in relation to 
information ~ystcms development in developing countries such as in Sri Lanka. 
6.0 Objectives of the Study 
,,;: ,, 
Information systems development in most organisations in Sri Lfjnka lacks a llieoiy, 
which guides information systems teve!opment practice. Systems professionals and 
management still follow the positivist approach in information systems development 
' i.:(Williams & Gunatunge, 1999a, 2C00a, 2000b; Gunatungc & Williams, 2000). This 
po:~itivist approach to systems development is often inconsistent with the social rnd 
organisational reality (sl-e Tinker & Yuthas, 1994). lhey do not take into consideration 
broader social, cultural, economic, and political aspects of a country within which 
information systems development is entrenched. As a result, many efforts to transfonn 
organisations through infonnation systems development, not only in developing 
countries but also developed ones, have failed (Williams & Gunatunge, 2000a, 200Gb, 
1999a; Gunatunge & Williams, 2000). 
, Organisations in Sri Lanka have experienced massive failures in information systems 
.development and implementations. However, there appears to be no declared 
commitment to address these issues in an empirical research. Therefore, there exists a 
wide knowledge gap in the literature between the desired and existing states of 
information systems research. The present research study is built on the above 
consideration by using Habermas's critical social theory. It aims (o reveal empirical 
and interpretative understanding of infonnation systems development and practice at 
NCCL in Sri Lanka. More specifically the objectives of the study are: 
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I. To understand the approaches llst:d by organisations in Sri Lanka for information 
systems development. 
2. To understand how these approaches contradict with organisational, socio-cultural, 
economic, and political realities of organisMions in Sri Lanka. 
3. To provide a theory to understand information systems deve!opment for 
organisations in Sri Lanka. 
4. To mnke recommendations for successful information systems development an~. 
practice in organisations in Sri Lanka. 
7.0 Organisation or Cha piers 
In this chapter, definitions for key terms used in this research have been given. An 
overview is provided reflecting on a failure of the data base system development in a 
University in Sri Lanka. Reflection on this research compelled me to investigate 
alternative approaches to information systems development in organisations. 
Chapter two provides an in-depth examination of three approaches to information 
systems development practice using the framework of Orlikowski & Baroudi (1991). 
Orlikowski's & Baroudi's (1991) three approaches arc the positivist, the interpretative, 
and the critical social theory. Recognising the limitations of the positivist and the 
interpretative approaches, I use Habennas's critical social theory in this study to 
understand infonnation systems development practice in organisations in Sri Lanka. 
Chapter three describes the theoretical framework uses in this study. Critical social 
theory in general and Habcrmas's theory of communicative actions in particular is 
" 
explained. Habcnnas's approach requires an understanding of the social phenomena 
within broad socio-cultural, cconomk, aml political contexts of a country. 
A critical review of sodo-culturnl, economic, ancl political contexts; the social context 
of Sri Lanka, for information sy~!cms dcvdopment is provided in chapter four. An 
explanation is given about how information systems development in organisations is 
si.tuated within a broad social context. This requires understanding of information 
systems development within a holistic framework. 
Chapter five explains the research methodology used in the study. In line with the 
critical social theory, I cxpbin how in-depth critical case studies provide a rich 
understanding about information systems development in organisations. Jn particular, I 
explain how an in-depth single case study can be used to understand the totality of 
infonnation systems development and practice to generate knowledge closely related to 
the research participants and how that knowledge can link theory with empirical 
evidence. 
Chapter six provides the case description and analysis at NCCL. The theoretical 
constructs and social contexts in Sri Lanka are used to describe and provide context to 
the analysis of empirical data. In line with critical social theory, the study is conducted 
within historical contexts of the evolutions of institutions in Sri Lanka. Thus ten 
episodes ofinfonnation systems development are examined and analysed. Reflection on 
each episode is given at the end of.1,:ach episode. 
(,'. 
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Finally, chuptcr seven provides a summary of each episode. I then reflect on current 
practice of information systems development at NCCL. Major research findings from 
the case analysis arc discussed. 
Theorisation of information systems development from the theory of communicative 
actions is given incorporating literature from several disciplines. Problems regarding the 
application ofHabermas's communicative actions to organisations in Sri Lanka arc then 
discussed. Finally, the chapter provides recommendations for successful information 
systems development in NCCL, conclusion for each research qucstil':1, and overall 
conclusions of the thesis with some recommendations for future research. 
1F· 
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2.0 Introduction 
CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
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Since the pioneering work of Hirschhcim and Klein (1989), there has been increasing 
interest in philosophical assumptions underlying Information systems development 
approaches (see Hirschheim, !ivaii & Kicin, 1997; Iivari & Hirschhcim, 1996; 
Hirschheim, Klein & Lyytinen, 1995; Hirschheim & Klein, 1992; Orlikowski & 
Baroudi, 1991; Iivari, 1991). A common finding of Hirschhcim and Klein (1989), 
,, Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991 and Iivari (1991 ), was the identification of a single set 
.',i 
of dominant philosophical assumptions about the nature of information systems 
development and what constitutes valid knowledge about the phenomena to be 
associated with information systems development and practice (livari, Hirschheim & 
Klein, 1998). 
In this chapter, I present a review of existing liternturc in information systems 
development and practice in organisations referring to the framework outlined by 
Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991) based on the underlying research epistemology which 
guides the research. This framework is developed following Chua's (1986) works in 
classifying research epistemology in the accounting field. Orlikowski and Baroudi's 
(1991) research in information systems posit three perspectives: 
I. The positivist approach 
2. Te interpretative approach 
~--------------------
3. Tc critical social theory approach. This framework has been used by Myers ( 1997) 
to classify qualitative research in information systems and Ngwcnyama and Lee 
(1997) to study C!1mmunication richness in electronic mail. 
The use of Orlikowski's and Baroudi's (1991) framework in this research will guide the 
study of various assumptions about knowledge made by researchers during information 
~ystems development in organisations and will facilitate understanding of the ways 
such knowledge can be obtained (Hirschheim, 1992). I discuss each approach in light of 
its ontology, epistemology and the relationship between theory and pmctice, together 
with information systems research conducted within each perspective. The chapter is 
organised as follows. 
Firstly, underlying assumptions in information systems development and practice are 
examined. Secondly, the positivist perspective is examined. Thirdly, the interpretative 
perspective is examined. Finally, the critical social theory approach is examined. For 
each I discuss on the underlying assumptions oriented to infonnation systems 
development and practice and the problems inherent in the approaches themselves. 
2.1 Underlying Assumptions in Information Systems Development and Practice 
2.1.1 Ontological Assumptions 
Ontology is concerned with the structure and properties of "what is assumed to exist", 
the basic building blocks that make up the phenomena or objects to be investigated 
(Iivari et al., 1998). Ontology refers to the nature of the world around us; in particular, 
that slice of reality which the researchers choose to address. Rcse~rchcrs ontologically 
assume that the objective in any social science research, including the infonnation 
systems filed, is to discover the underlying social realities (Orlikowski & Baroudi, 
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1991 ). Such a discovery becomes the output of the research and is presumed by the 
researcher prior to the discovery. The researcher has a general understanding about 
what really exists in social systems and how this reality affect the status of research 
outputs (livari et al., 1998; Burrell & Morgan, 1989; Chua, 1986). Such assumptions or 
belief-structures arc philosophically termed "ontological assumptions". These vary 
between the various theoretical frameworks. 
2.1.2 Epistemology 
While ontology deals with the reality of knowledge, epistemology concentrates on how 
such knowledge is obtained. Generally, epistemological assumptions are concerned 
with the nature of knowledge and the proper methods of inquiry (livari et al., 1998). In 
other worlds, epistemology is concerned with the ways and means by which we can 
obtain knowledge (Hirschheim, 1992). With the determination of the ontological 
position, it is necessary to design a consistent mode of obtaining knowledge about the 
assumed reality. The way in which knowledge is obtained is philosophically termed 
epistemology and consists of concepts of the researchers' knowledge discovery, 
research methods, and the nature of data (Orlikwski & Baroudi, 1991; Burrell & 
Morgan, 1989; Chua, 1986). As in the case of ontology, epistemological positions vary 
between researchers. 
2.2 Positivist Approach-Underlying Assumptions in Information Systems Development 
and Practice 
Positivist perspectives to information systems development reflect much of empirical-
analytic research agenda bas,.rl on the views of positivi~m, with a focus in the 
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fimctionalist paradigm of objective worldvicw of society (Hirschhcim et aL, 1995; 
Orlikowski & Barou<li, 1991; Hirschhcim & Klein, 1989; Chua, 1986; Burrell & 
Morgan, 1979). The term empirical-analytic refers to an organisational sriencc based 
on the natural science approach, the aim of which is to "establish general laws" which 
can serve 3.'l instruments for systemntic explanation and dependable prediction (Nagel, 
1979, p. 450). 
2.2.1 Ontological Assumptions 
Ontologically, positivist approaches to studying the social world rely on objective 
views of the world. The position adopted by the positivist is realism, which postulates 
that the universe is comprised of objectively given immutable, objects and structures. 
These objects and structures exist as empirical entities, on their own, independent of the 
observer's appreciation of them. For oxamplc, positivist information systems 
researchers assume that there exists an objective physical and a social reality 
independent of human and whose nature can be relatively easily understood, 
characterised, and measured. Within this perspective, people arc viewed as passive 
objects that can be studied using the laws of natural science (Negwenyama & Lee, 
1997;Chua, 1986, p. 604). 
This approach assumes that organisations have structures beyond the reality of the 
actions of who make lhe reality. Therefore, the role of researcher is to discover this 
objective and social reality that exists external to the creators of such reality, who have 
a passive role in the phenomena being investigated {Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991; 
Orlikowski, 1991; Chua, 1986; Mingers, 1980; Bourrell & Morgan, 1979). 
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2.2.2 Epistemologic11I AsSl1mptlons 
Epistemological!y, the positivist approach is based on reductionism, It is concerned 
with the empirical testability ofthcorie~ to be verified or falsified through the logic of 
hypothetical-deductive reasoning of the phenomena being investigated. 
Methodologically, research methods such as !argc-sca!c sample surveys and laboratory 
experiments and sometimes descriptive case studies (whose purpose is to formulate 
hypotheses) are used for the gathering of valid empirical evidence. It is assumed that 
valid knowledge can be obtained following these methodologies. Dm'a analysis is 
preceded referring to inferential statistics whose objective is to discover causal laws. 
The result of the analysis is used as true knowledge (considered as rational knowledge) 
for the explanation of the behaviour of human affairs of the world. 
Accordingly, prediction and control of physical and social reality can be made from the 
Research results of {Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991; Orlikowski, 1991; Chua, 1986). 
The assumption is that scientism and its nomothetie (reference In laws or nlies that 
pertain lo the general case, rather than the individual) belief in the scientific methods 
arc necessary and sufficient for discovering the truth (lntrona & Whitley, 1997; 
Feyerabend, 1993). 
Positivists often claim the positivist approach is the only form of valid knowledge and 
the only rational knowledge. In the last century, rationality and reason came to be 
identified with scientific knowledge and understanding. This empiricist-analytic form 
explicitly rejects value-judgements in the interest of objectivity. It is assumed ends are 
value free and limited it to technical questions; value questions become detached from 
scientific thinking (Habcnna.~, l987b, 1984). If practical questions concerning nonns, 
values, and objectives urisc they arc considered as irrational and eail not be resolved 
scicntificolly and that rcsenrchcrs should not get involved in moral judgements. For 
example, DeMarco ( 1979) writes, "political problems aren't going to be solved. The 
most we can hope for is to limit the effect of disruption due to politics" (p. 13). 
Posithist researchers strive to be fully independent from the actual situation of the 
study. Moreover, it is a widely held belief that researchers can objectively evaluate 
social actions or social processes. Attempts to deal with practical problems (or 
conflicts) in research often in some arbitrary methods such as using strategies (as 
means) in the fonn of appropriate controlling systems to achieve desired goals in the 
most efficient manner (Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991; Chua, 1986, p. 611; Mingers, 
1980, p. 42). 
2.3 Information Systems Development Research within Positivist Approach 
Initially, systems development methods were concerned with mainly technical issues of 
the systems development process, programming, design, and the detailed analysis of 
data and functions to be handled by the technical system (Reijswoud, Mulder & Dietz, 
1999; Doherty & King, 1998; Wilson, 1997; Avgerou, 1996; Hirschheim et al., 1995). 
Examples of this approach arc Gane and Sarson, (]979~ DeMarco (1979), Weinberg 
(1980) and Yourdon (1989). In this approach, infonnation systems development and 
practice were thought of as mechanistic views within organisations (Spaul, 1997, p. 
79). 
Using mechanistic views, the infonnation systems development and prac,1.icc i,· viewed 
as II technical proces,1:s in which systems arc built from the requirements clicitcd by the 
systems analyst from the users through a variety llf approaches. The user requirements 
nre generally considered to be straightforward processes in which users simply state 
their needs (Hirschheim et al., 1991, p. 588). Systems development approaches hased 
on this way are referred to as "classical approaches" (Hirsehhc1m L't al. 1991), "second 
c.~ third b'Cneration systems development approaches" (Hir~chheim, Klein & Lyytinen, 
1995; Couger, 1982), "traditional approaches'' \Wood-Harper & Fitzgerald, 1982), or 
the "positivist approach" (Myers, 1997; Orlikwski & Baroudi, 1991 ). Jn this study, ! use 
the term "positivist approach". 
Some research studies using positivist approaches recognise behavioural consequence 
of system development processes and describe the actual use of information systems 
(Lyytinen, 1992; Hirschheim et al., 1991). Many of these studies have relied on 
established sociological schools to study organisational life (Kling, J 980). In these 
studies, behavioural elements were managed using a variety of strategics such as 
implementation ar.d counter-implementation techniques (Keen, 1981). Issues such as 
wer-friendly interfaces and ergonomically sound design became key concerns of 
development in these approaches. 
Following the behavioural consequences in systems development process, some 
structured ap11roaches include tools for promoting user involvement (Hirschheim et al., 
1991, p. 588). Consequently, socio-technical methodologies of Bostrom and Heinen 
(\977), Mumford and Weir (1979), Oppelland and Ko!f (1980), Mumford (1983), and 
Mumford and Beckman (1994) attempted to include substantial user participation in 
the systems development process (Hirschheim et al., l 99l ). 
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Research using positivist perspectives to infonnation systems development und practice 
appears overwhelmingly concerned with rational image to information systems (sec 
Steinmuller, 1984; Kling & Scucchi, 1982; Shneiderman, 1981). In most infonnation 
systems research, infonnation systems development is regarded ns a means for making 
the data processing tasks of an organisation more efficient and effective (see Senko, 
1975, pp. 3. \J). Engine~ng the information systems dcvc!oprncnt activities in order to 
achieve organisational goals by influencing the responses of members of the 
organisation were seen as instrumental and strategic actions (Kendall & Kriebel, 1982; 
Bariff & Ginzberg, l 982). 
Research using positivist perspectives usually assume that the information systems 
development process embodies a set of efficiency-maximisation imperatives 
determined by managers' perceptions of market forces. The concentration on efficiency 
and effectiveness stress from the ideological legacy of the 'enlightenment', which 
sustains the general belief that things can always be made more efficient (Probert, 
J 997). For example, management infonnntion systems in general focuses on the 
instrumental approach to design and development of computer basd itifonnation 
systems to realise mana~cment goals that are rational to the point of excluding non-
rational behaviour of human experience (see Gordon & Gordon, 1999; Davis & Olsen, 
1985). 
Much of management information systems research is technical, combing the 
theoretical work of computer science, management science and operational research 
with practical orientation toward building systems and applications (Laudon & Laudon, 
1998; Foster & F\ynn's, 1904). These models are mech1U1istical\y and technically 
oriented {Avgcrou & d Cornford, 1995) and do not take count of any coomcts of 
interest between participants in the systems development process (Klein & Hirschheim, 
\991,1989; Lyytincn & Hirschheim, 1987). More generally, in these approaches, 
rationality is instrumentally interpreted through the instrumental actions of actors in 
organisational events {Klein & Hirschhcim, 1991, 1989). 
The !~dmical and instrumental apprnachcs almost always emphasise mathematically 
sound, normative systems to study infonnation systems as well as the physical 
technology and fonnal capabilities of the systems using discrete entity models 
(Walsharn, 1993). For example, discrete eotity models focus otJ explicit economic, 
physical and infonnation processing features of the technology (see Kling, 1987) being 
heavily based on scientific methods that attempt to derive "law-like generalisation" 
(Hirschheim & Klein, 1992; Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991). 
Technical ways of thinking about associated nomothetic techniques and methodologies 
has dominated the infonnation systems discipline since its technological inception 
(lntrona, 1996, p. 20). An almost universal assumption over the last 30 years is that an 
increase in scientific, natural, and social knowledge could be applied in an instrumental 
and technical manner to infonnation systems development and practice (Wilson, 1997, 
p. 187). For example, structured analysis, structured design, structured programming, 
object oriented design and programming has resulted in a logical progression in 
information systems development methods that have roots in the engineering discipline 
and technical rationality (Avison et al., 1998, pp. 124-5). 
What is common in the field of infonnation systems development including up to the 
present is the emphasis on teehn.ical-rational methodolOb>ies such as infonnation 
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engineering and computer-aided sofiwarc engineering (!ntrona, J 996, p. 20). However, 
this technical rational approach creates problems when applied to development and 
practice of informatinn systems in dynamic and emergent contc:ds, because the systems 
arc often not flexible enough to cope with change (Hirschheim et al., 1995). 
2.3.1 Problems of Positivist Approach 
i'. 
The limitations of the positivist approach to information systems development and use 
are widely discussed in information i;ystems Jito!fature (see for example, Avgerou, 2000; 
Torvinen & Jalonen, 2000; Avison et al., 1998; Standing, 1998; Wa\sham, 1995, 1993; 
Westrup, 1994; Orlikwski, 1993; Hirschheim & Klein, 1992; Orlikowski, 1991; 
Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991). Eas•:m (1988) notes that structured design methods are 
devoted to the design of technical systems and give little recognition to the range of 
organisational changes that arc also to be designed. Concurring with Eason (1988), 
Homby, Clegg, Robson, McC\arcn, Richardson and O'Bein (1992) point out that these 
methodologies are still very technically oriented and they ignore the inclusion of 
humans in the development process. According to Hirschheim and Klein (1992), the 
ontological and epistemological background of information systems development 
methodologies often reflect the positivistic paradigm in that the world is seen as an 
objective reality characterised by order rather than a conflict. From this perspective, 
social structures of reality are found, observed or modelled rather than interpreted or re-
created (Torvinen & Jalonen, 2000, p. 16). 
Moreover, it is a wide1y held belief among systems professionals that organisational 
issues are not of concern to them (Homby et al., 1992; Newman, 1989). These 
positivist approaches tend to disregard the interaction and actions of key players, the 
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process by which new systems are implemented and used and the soda! and contextual 
aspects within which such events occur {Avison et al., 1998; Orlkowski. 1993). They 
often ignore historical and contextual conditions as possible influences on human action 
(Orlikowski & Bnroudi, 1991, p. 12). The everyday language usage of the study 
participants are not included in the development process (Gibbons, 1987, p.l) and 
people arc generally discounted as self-interpretative beings whose input into these 
structures is not important (Habcrmas, 1987b). 
Technical approaches can lead to an over emphasis on the design and constructions of 
computer-based activities (Avison et al., 1998, p. 125), whilst ignoring the social ar.d 
organisational dynamics of system development (Westrup, 1994). For instance, 
mechanistic view of organisations often tends to consider infonnation as a way of 
scheduling and automating procedures. Their application leads to systems development 
being overly formal and rational, placing little reliance on human intuition, judgement, 
politics and social processes. Politics is seen as irrational as it interferes with maxima! 
efficiency or effectiveness (Hirsehheim & Klein, 1989). 
Researchers who acknowledge the existence of politics in infonnation systems 
development view these systems as instruments for supporting the exchange process of 
comrol and co-ordination within an organisation (see Ciborra, 1984, 1981). They have 
not understood the actual functioning of information systems development within 
organisations and the interactions between such organisations and socio· cultural, 
economic and political context of the society (Gunatungc, 1998). These mechanistic 
and bureaucratic approaches originated systems development frameworks through 
"academic assumptions" but not through "real" social controversies (see Tinker & 
Yuthas, 1994). 
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Habcrrnos criticised the accepted knowledge of science and its justification for what is 
being "truth". For Habennas, the principle tenant of science is the accepted view of the 
world and it is based on the reductionism, the logic of control and prediction based on 
the empirical facts. In thts way science establishes its grounds on knowledge generation 
and the purpose of which is to formulate truth about the natural world (Scheffler, I 967, 
p. 8). Habennas ( 1979), observing the way that science seeks to establish rationality 
~1d truth of knowledge, suggests that science legitimatcs official inteivention by 
introducing neutrality into political action. The positivist form of inquiry dominates 
reasoning in practical questions and thus reduces the intentional human actions of 
subjective actors to technocratic reasoning (Haberrnas, 1979). 
Habermas (1987b, 1987c, 1984) suggests that the technical approach, emphasising 
instrumental action, is too narrow and not sufficient for the helpful intervention of 
social situations, thus tending to create rigid and inflexible systems which are ill suited 
to the need of adapting to changing circumstances (Wal sham, 1993). The rationality 
inherent in this approach is guided by the purposive-rational or instnunenta\ and 
strattgic action (Klein & Hirschheim, 1991; Habermas, 1987b, 1987c, 1984, 1979). 
The instnunental rationality of information systems methodologies tends to ignore 
conflict situations and social debate on the ambiguous goals of systems development 
activities, because most information requirement analysis methods have an inherent 
bias to preserve the status quo. This is a beneficial outcome for those who already 
possess power (Robey & Markus, 1984). Moreover, the assumption is that any conflicts 
are solved through the use of managerial power (Newman & Noble, 1990; Lyytinen & 
Klein, 1985, p. 227). Much of the rescarcl.• that takes a positivist view about 
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infonnation systems development and practice, reflects a techno-scicntific and 
economic rntionnlity of organisational processes and social issues (Walsh am, ! 993). 
lnforr.,.:ti<m systems have been overly dominated by technological and technical 
consideration at the expense of recognition of the human context in which information 
systems arc used (Mingers, 1994). 11te most commonplace rationality is that of an 
objective reality of the world that exhibits cause and effect relationships, which can be 
discussed by structured objectives (Lyytinen & Klein, 1985). Kraemer and King 
(1990) state that 
Supply-push view of technical development, coupled with a ratiorml 
economic interpretation of managerial behaviour has dominated in 
management information systems research. These explanatory 
perspectives have considerable power, and have yielded u.seful results. 
However, they do not explain the variance observed in the patterns and 
process of adoption and routinization of information technology in 
various tasks, or the differences in successful use of the technology 
across organisations (pp. 582-3). 
Historically, the development of technology and organisation alike has reflected the 
increasing pervasiveness of objective forms of knowledge, as part of the Enlightenment 
of the rationalisation of society. The fundnm-;intal principle in II modern Western society 
is the belief that the human condition can be improved by reason alone (Touraine, 
1995). Technology has long provided a model for the pursuit of objectively efficient 
forms oforganisation (Corbett, 1992, p. 18). The key issue is the extent to which this 
growth of technical expertise and use of computer-based technologies leads to a 
rationale which places too much emphasis on technocratic modes of organisational 
control (Habcrmns, 1979). For example, the "term office automation" is commonly 
used to describe the ?~~ess of introducing computers and computer based information 
systems into offices. However, the current success of such automation is limited. A 
dctaikd understanding 1Jf social and organisational context is now widely recognised as 
essential companion to the technical view of the orgunirn1ional dynamics (Hirschhcim, 
1985), The solutions to problems in orgunit111tions' infonnation systems oHcn have far-
reaching consequences within organisations and society (Probert, 1997, p. 23). 
Lyytinen (1987, 1985) criticises the exclusive use of scicntism that focuses on laws 
based on natural science and the application of engineering and technical knowledge to 
designing social systems problems such as infonnation systems. Lyytinen (I 987, 1985) 
argues that in order to obtain a better undr.rstanding of the context of infonnation 
systems, a move away from the technical view of infonnation systems and a rational 
decision-making view of the organisation is essential. This is because successful use of 
the appn•ach itself depends on a broader tacit understanding of the worldvicws of 
p<1rticipants in the development process ([ntrona & Whitley, 1997, p. 31 ). 
The strict application of a natural sdence modt:l to infonnation systems tends to ignore 
the human dimension sm :, as 'lifoworlds' and social contexts within which 
communicative interaction functions (Ngwenyar.m & Lee, 1997, p. 5). Habennas 
(1979) argues that the exercise of power in this process can prevent the open and free 
discussion necessary for the success of human relationships. Therefore, the emphasis 
in decision-making &bout how t'J manage and organise human and material resources 
would benefit from broadening the focus from that usually employed positivist 
approach in infonnation systems research (Alvesson & Willmott, 1992a, p. 437). 
A broad social process allow researchers nnd practitioners to anticipate, explain, and 
evalu~tc difiCrent experiences and consequences following the introduction of new 
' 
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technologies, such as new infonnation systems, in trganisations (Orlikowski, !993, p. 
26). 
Despite the growing importance of the nature of information systems development as a 
social activity, few have attempted to define them in explicit terms (Clegg, Warr, 
Green, Monk, Allison & Lansdale, !989; Eason, 1988). Even those who have altemptcd 
to define them explicitly did not properly addrcsse<l them in the information systems 
development process (Homby et al., 1992; Clegg et al., 1989; Eason, 1988). The 
systems dc"clopment within a complex, intertwined set of social and political 
interactions bas been generally ignored (Myers, 1994, p. 188; Klein & Hirschheim, 
1991,p.158). 
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UKAIS (1995, p. 3) argues that "the study of information systems and their 
development is a multidisciplinary subject which addresses the range of strategic, 
managerial and operational activities involved in the gathering, processing, storing, 
distribution anci' use of information and its associated technologies both in the society 
and the organisation. For Keen (1987), the mission of infonnation systems research is 
to study ''the effective desig11, delivery, use, and impact of information technologies in 
organisations and society". However, there is only a few research studies which address 
the social, organisational, political and economic contexts, processes and their 
interaction and implications for systems development as a process of shared learning 
(see Torvinen &Jalonen, 2000; Beynon-Davies, 1994; Newman & Noble, 1990). 
The neglizcn.:c of social and organisational context contributed to the following: 
1. Systems failures, undesimblc results and the abandonment of infonnation systems 
development activities (see Williwns & Gunntunge, 2000a, 2000b, 1999a; 
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Lyytincn & Robey, 1999; Lchaney, Clarke, Kimberlee & Matthews, 1999; Ahn & 
Skudlnrk, \997; Hayes, 1996; Myers, 1994; Ewusi-Mensah & Prlasnyski, 1994, 
1991; Hornsby et al., 1992; Lyytinen et al., !991; Kclin & Hirschheim, 1991; Clegg 
et al., 19S9); 
2. Poor pcrfonnancc of systems (Poulymcnako & Holmes, 1996) 
3. Difficulties in implementation of information systems in real world situations 
following institutional forces which inhibit dramatic changes in existing work 
habits (Olesen & Myers, 1999, p. 331) 
4. Lack of acceptance by the organisation's management and/or employees (Headrick 
• & Morgan, 1999, p. 20) 
5. User dissatisfaction, stress, quality of work life and other work-related outcomes 
significant to the productivity and efficiency of operations (Ryker & Nath, 1995; 
Robey & Azevedo, 1994; Kidwell & Bennett, 1994; Keen, 1991,; Nelson, 1990; 
Newman, 1988; Markus & Robey, 1983; Alter, 1980; Bjorn-Anderson & Hedberg, 
1978). For example, these researchers delineate the fact that the information systems 
development process is socially bound so that organisational performance are not only 
a consequences of technical validity of the systems but are a!so an outcome of social 
and organisational interactions with the systems (Joshi & Lauer, 1998; Markus & 
Robey, 1983). 
Hirschheim et al. (1996) argue that the changes associated with systems developments 
are emergent, historically contingent, socially situated and politically embedded. The 
design and use of information technologies in organisations is essentially entrenched in 
social contexts, marked by time, locale politics, and culture (Hirschheim et al., ! 996, 
Orlikwski & Baroudi, 1991; Hirschheim & Klein, 1989). Hence the basic assumptions 
about the rationality of the participan\5 and the social process they eng .. g,;; in need to be 
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critically npprai~ed (Hirschhcim & Newman, 1991, p. 29). This is not to say that there 
is no place for technical rationality in information systems development. For example, 
Fitzgerald ( 1996, p. 5) identified a number of arguments for fonnaliscd information 
systems development methodologies. Avison et al.(1998, p. 125) argue that the 
technical desire to reduce the complexity and uncertainty of information systems 
de~clopment is understandable, however, there is a dan1:;cr tlmt the information sys!~'lt15 
1·1 
req,'1ircmcnts of the organisation are displaced by the information systems development 
methoC: as the focus of attention (ibid, p. 125). In such situations, practitioners can 
avoid making a real engagement with the problem (Wastcll, 1996, p. 34). 
The idea of information systems development as a social activity within organisations 
requires a reconstruction o:"the knowledge that provides a social re-conceptualisation 
of information systems. Therefore the theories, methodologies and techniques of 
systems development need to be changed through this re-conceptualisation (lntrona, 
1996, p. 20). These changes gives practical form to what Mumford refers to as the 
philosophy of humanism, by providing employees with an opportunity to influence 
the work systems that surround them (1997, p. 309). 
2.4 Interpretative Approach-Underlying Assumptions in Information Systems 
Development and Practice 
The interpretative approach asserts that the positivist approach generally attempts to 
increase the predictive understanding of human behaviour through testiag theories in a 
hypothetical-deductive manner, conceiving the world ns a fixed construct by which to 
make sense of reality. Positivist approaches attempt to apprehend, characterise, and 
measure organisations, groups, and social systems in some objective way to discover an 
objective reality lurgcly independent of human subjectivity. lnlcrprctivist researchers 
reject this objective or factual interpretation of events and situations (Klein & Myers, 
1999; Lee, Licbenau & DcGross, 1997; King, 1997; King, 1996; Orlikowski & Baroudi, 
l991, p. 5; Hirschheim & Klein, 1989, p. 1205). 
In contrast to the positivist views, the interpretative approach attempts to understand 
human behaviour through social constructions such as language, consciousness and 
shared meaning from the participants who assign meaning to phenomena (Myers, 1997; 
King, 1997; Deetz, 1996; Boland, 1991, 1985; Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991 ). According 
to.Klein & Myers (1999, p. 69) " ... our knowledge of reality is gained only through 
social constructions such as language, consciousness, shared meanings, documents, 
tools and other artefacts". Interpretative research docs not generally predefine 
dependent and independent variables in a tight research design, but tends to focus on the 
cc,mplexity of human sense-making as the situation emerges (Kaplan and Maxwell, 
1994). This view of interpretative approach to study social phenomena is consistent 
with many researchers (see Walsham, \.'}95,1993, 199!; Lee, 1991; Boland, 1991; 
Chua, 1986; Linc\n & Guba, 1985; Burrell & Morg1m, 1979; Berger & Luckman, 1967). 
For Burrell and Morgan (1979), interpretativism seeks an explanation within the realm 
of individual consciousness and subjectivity. Within this frame of reference "social 
roles and institutions exist as an expression of the meanings which men attach to their 
world" (Silverman, 1970). 
,.The interpretative approach explicitly recognises the subject matter of inquiry, the 
'lifeworlds' contexts. The social phenomenon is examined in a natural setting to 
discover a mutual understanding among participants in human interaction and action 
(Ngwenyama & Lee, 1997, p. 6). Practitioners can usually better relate to interpretative 
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research as the research is close to prn.::ticc, involves actual case studies, involves real 
people in real situations, and is undertaken in real world settings (Klein & Myers, 
1999). A collection of information systems research conducted using interpretative 
approach can be found in Myers (1997). 
The interpretative approach is often aimed at understanding the inter-subjective 
meaning embedded in social life to explain human behaviour and takes into 
consideration the everyday language of human communication {Gibbons, 1987, p.3). It 
is assumed that reality should be understood from the perspective of the participants 
who make sense of situations and that social reality is interpreted by the researcher wl:u 
examines it. The interpretative approach asserts that human knowledge of reality, 
including the domain of human action is a social construction by human actors and that 
this applies equally to researchers (Walsham, 1993, p. 5). Consequently the social 
reality is conceived ns an emergent social process, as an extension of human 
consciousness and subjective experience (Burrc1! & Morgan, 1979, p. 253). 
2.4.1 Ontological Assumptions 
The ontological position adopted by the interpretative tradition of research is based on 
the premise that reality is a subjective construction of the mind. Jnterpretivism is Jinked 
wltlt the idea that as socially transmitted concepts and names direct how reality is 
perceived and structured, reality therefore varies with different languages and cultures. 
The question posed is ''what is objective reality when experience is necessarily 
subjective, being apprehCnded through the observer's mind? (Chua, 1986) The actor 
"intrinsir.ally endows human actions with si.tjectivc meaning and, always intentional, 
'" 
actions cannot be understood without reference to their meaning and intention that arc 
grounded in social and ]1istorfoll prneticc" (ibid, p. 613). Interpretative approach 
focuses on the idea of participants as intelligent human being.~ who create and recreate 
their reality through their interpretation and interactions of symbolic action in the 
process of reality construdion (Mingers, 1984, p. 85; Morgan, 1983, p. 396). Humans 
reinforce this social reality through their action and interaction (Orlikowski & Baroudi, 
1991, p. 14). Research in this tradition concentrate on the study of ways in which social 
reality is meaningfully constructed quo (Klein & Myers, 1999; Burrell & Morgan, 1979, 
p. 254). 
2.4.2 Epistemological Assumptions 
Interpretative approaches generally operate from an epistemology that understanding of 
social processes involves getting inside !ho world of those involved it. The approach 
asserts that there is a relationship between everyday social practice and the every day 
language in which social practice arc embedded. Therefore, understanding of social 
reality requires an understanding of how practice and meanings are formed and 
infonned by the hmguage and tacit norms shared by humans working towards some 
shared goals (Klein & Myers, 1999; Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991, p. 14). 
Research methods such as in-depth field studies (case studies, ethnographic studies, and 
J,'articipant obseivation) are used to generate knowledge. The researcher talces an 
actively involved role in the research process to derive meanings of human actions and 
human interaction to understand the social reality (Wa\sham, 1995). 
\ 
47 
The interpretative npproach recognises the questions of value-judgements in the procl.$!>' 
of human communication. and that value question becomes implicated in the process of 
inquiry (Ngwenyama & Lee, l 997). The researcher begins with understanding 
assumptions, beliefs, values, and interests, which shape the process ofinvcstir;:ition. The 
researcher's assumptions and values are generally thought to be deeply involved in the 
rescari::h phenomenon {Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991). 
Interpretative knowkdge can be used to reveal to people what they and others are doing 
when they act and speak as they do (Fay, 1987, p. 88). By highlighting the symbolic 
structures and taken-for-granted themes that pattern the world in distinct ways, 
interpretative research aims to enrich participants' understanding of the meanings of 
their actions, thus increasing the possibility of mutual communication and influence 
(Chua, 1986, p. 615). 
2.4.3 Problems of Interpretative Approach 
Several authors pointed out the limitations of an interpretative approach whilst studying 
information systems development and information system use in organisations (see 
Probert, 1997; Ngwenyama & Lee, 1997; Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991, Hirschheim & 
Klein, 1989; Gibbons, 1987; Fay, 1987; Chua, 1986; Minger, 1983; Burrell & Morgan, 
1979; Giddens, 1979; MaCarthy, 1978). For example, Maccarthy (1978) suggests that 
the interpretative agenda is as suspect as the natural science approach because it, too, 
employs a monological form of reasoning of phenomena, which may exe\ude certain 
topics of discourse. The subjective approaches are especially vulnerable to bias implicit 
in the culturally conditioned perspective of the research (Steffy & Grimes, 1986, p. 
323). 
Habcnnas (1979) contends that the interpretative approach seeks to understand 
organisational Jaws through some fonn of "pure subjectivity", free from cognitive or 
motivating interests. The interpretative approach is unable to evaluate critically the 
fonns of life which stl!e observes and is therefore unable to analyse fonns of false 
consciousness and domination that prevent the actors from knowing their true interest 
(Habennas, 1979). Moreover, it fails to be an "inquiry of change" (Habcrmas, 1979; 
McCarthy, 1978). For example, in the interpretative approach, the systems analyst 
reproduces a causal reflection of his internal perceptions of his own will rather than 
critically understanding the ~ituations being studied (Probert, 1997, p. 48). In this 
sense, the interpretative approach resembles a natural science approach (Steffy & 
Grimes, 1986, p. 325). Thus, both natural science and interpretative approaches assume 
some dominant fonn of reasoning (Dallmayer & McCarthy, 1977). 
The interpretative approach can easily ignore political activities and interests attempt to 
destruct a balance between individual and oollective interest (Hirschheim & Klein, 
\ 989, p. 1206). For example, interpretative research generally avoids conflicts in goal~ 
and attempts to achieve consensus among participants in the process of infonnation 
systems development (Hirschhcim & Klein, 1994). Such an attempt is considered as a 
"naive consensus" because the process docs not look at how human understanding is 
distorted through false consensus, manipulation, and domination (Habennas, 1984). 
The infonnation systems development process within interpretative approaches is 
uncritical in that certain groups such as management, can manipulate and distort the 
communication to realise hidden objectives. Distortions in information systems 
development can arise from biases and the limits of language use because "our implicit 
beliefs and assumptions cannot all be made explicit" (Winograd & Flores, 1986, p. 32). 
Interpretivists generally fail to suggest what to do or how to improve matters in 
practice. Consequently, mutual understanding in the interpretative research tradition 
does not usually lead to improvements in social problems (Gunatunge, 1990). For 
example, interpretative approach generally fails to recognise the limitations and barriers 
to the improvement of the quality of the human conditions. 
Fay (1987, p. 92) recognises four weaknesses in the interpretative research tradition. 
I. It does not examine external conditions, which gives rise to certain meanings and 
experiences 
2. It fails to explain unintended consequence of human action, such as action which 
reinforces the actions, roles, beliefs, and relative power of members of a group in 
order to sustain the structure and practice of that group as a whole over time 
(Giddens, 1979) 
3. The interpretative approach does not usually address the structural conflicts that 
exist within society and organisations, thereby often ignoring endemic issues 
related to social sysl<:ms (Alvesson & Willmott, 1992a) 
4. It neglects to explain historical change such as how a particular social order came to 
be, what it is and how might vary over time. Thus, an interpretative flpproach can easily 
overlook the possible structures of conflicts within a society, and the symbolic 
structures that would generate change through the symbolic interaction of participants 
(Fay, 1987, p. 96). 
2.5 Critical Theory Approach-Underlying Assumptions in Information Systems 
Development and Practice 
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In contrast to both positivist and interpretative approaches, the critical social theory 
perspective attempts to understand socfol contradictions and conflicts inherent in 
existing social structures of organisation and society through self-reflection in the hope 
of human emancipation (Alvesson & Willmott, 1992a, p. 434; Orlikowski & Baroudi, 
1991, p. 19). It assumes a non-objectivist understanding of ontology and epistemolo1,,y 
(Burrell & Morgan, 1979). Critical social theory asserts that established systems of 
domination, which alienate people from self-realisation, restrict human potentiality 
(Chua, 1986, p. 619). It takes into account the human construction of social fonns of 
life and the possibility of their recreation in a historical context (Ngwenyama & Lee, 
1997, p. 5; Ngwcnyama, Truex & Davis, 1997, p. 2; Ngwenyama, 1991, p. 268). It 
aims to lay the foundation for explorations in an interdisciplinary research context of 
questions eonccmir:ig the conditions which make possible the reproduction and 
transformation of society, the meaning of culture, and the reldtion between the 
individual, society and culture (Held, 1980, p. 16). 
Research using this perspective to social science phenomenon contains both an 
empirical-analytic and interpretative component, however each is placed within a 
reflective system of epistemic inquiry (Steffy & Grimes, 1986, p. 325). Neither 
approach adequately analyses the actuality of information systems practice (Probert, 
1997, p. 48). For er.ample, referring to information systems research, Ngwenyama and 
Lee (1997, p. 7) identify four 9erspectives, differing from the positivist approach that in 
critical social theory is: 
SI 
I. Sensitive to the 'lifcworlds' of the organisational participants and is oriented to 
interpreting and mapping the meanings of their actions from their pcrspr,ctives 
2. Adopts pluralistic methods of inquiry such as participation, observation, and the 
analysis of contextual data 
3. Does not separate the subjects of inquiry from the organisational context within 
which they arc situated 
4. Recognises that the organisational context is not only important to meaning 
construction, but to social reality as well. Moreovcr, unlike the interpretative research 
approach, researchers in critical social theory endeavours to emancipate organisational 
participants from false or unwarranted beliefs, assumptions, and constraints in addition 
to the research quest for mutual understanding (ibid, p. 7). 
Critical theory aims both to critique ideology in social theory and method, such as the 
ide_11tity of scientism and to develop an organisation science capable of changing 
organisational processes through dialectical approach (Adorno, 1973) or 
communicative interaction (Habennas, 1987b, 1984). [ts main tasks arc to bring to 
light the restrictive and alienating conditions of the status quo and to help to eliminate 
the causes of alienation and domination (Myers, 1997, p. 5). It explicitly states its 
purpose is to minimise the "objectification of organisational actors" life through 
restrictive conditions (Habermas, 1987b). Critical social theory focuses on the 
liberation of people from unnecessarily restrictive conditions, ideologies, assumptions, 
power relations and identity formation that inhibit or distort opportunities for 
~"tonomy, or clarification of genuine needs and wants. It hopes to contribute to greater 
/ / 
~, ... ' 
and lasting satisfaction (see Fay, 1987; Habennas, 1987b, 1984; Held, 1980; Marcuse, 
1964). 
)J 
" 
2.5.1 Ontologicnl Assumptlnns 
Ontologicnlly, critical social theory asserts that social reality is historically situated and 
that reality is produced nnd reproduced by people through their interaction (Myers, 
1997, p. 4). Unlike the positivist approach, critical theory docs not assume that socidl 
relations are stable and orderly but are w,derb>oing constant change (Habermas, 1987b). 
Human actors are not se~n to be restricted to exist in a particular state and thus their 
being and their object world (material environment) nre not cxl1austed by their 
immediate circumstances (Held, 1980, p. 234). Instead, human participants have inner 
potentialities which arc alienated through various forms ofrestrictiw mechanisms such 
as social, economic, and political domination (Chua, 1986). Therefore, the material 
environment can only be understood through a study of their historical development 
and change within the totality of relations (Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991). 
Critical theorists understand empirical reality as characterised by objective, real 
relations, which are transfonned and reproduced through subjective interpretation of 
human participants (Burrell & Morgan, 1979, p. 298). Human intention and rationality 
is critically analysed because of a commitment to understand in false consciousness and 
ideology. Critical theory assumes that fundamental opposition, conflicts, and 
contradictions are endemic to contemporary society. These conflicts arise "because of 
injustice and ideology in the social, economic, and political domination, which obscure 
the creative dimension in people" (Chua, 1986, p. 622.). 
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2.5.2 Epistemologicnl Assumptions 
Epistemologically, critical theorists generally assume that knowledge is inter-
subjectively shared and context bound and that knowledge is grounded in social and 
historical practice (Orlikowski & Baroudi, l991, p. 20; Chua, 1986, p. 620). The belief 
that the knowledge and social reality is grounded in social and historical contexts, 
historical, ethnographic research and in-depth case studies are more commonly used to 
identify the social reality. In this way, knowledge about social reality is obtained and 
analysed critically through the particular theoretical framework adopted by researchers 
to.conduct their wcrk (Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991, p. 21). For example, researcher 
needs to critically examfr1c how power structures and knowledge interests are affected 
by information technology (Ngwenyarna et al., 1997, p. 2). 
In critical social theory, theory has a critical imperative in that the identification and 
removal of domination and negative ideological practice is highlighted in existing 
social orders of societies and organisations (Chua, 1986, p. 622). Ngwenyama et al. 
(1997) slates that: 
Critical theorists seek to improve human conditions and they should not 
limit themselves to critiquing the idcolog'y behind certain styles of 
information systems research. Rather, they need to become involved with 
real life situations where power is manifested, for example, issues of 
power may be observed in situations ofinfonnation systems development 
orinfonnation use. (p. I) 
Four basic assumptions of critical social theory are generally recognised. 
1. It is assumed that people can change their world and that organisational participants 
and/or researchers have the capacity to transform organisational situations 
" 
2. All social knowledge is ·~slue laden, and all scientific knowledge !s a social 
construction 
3. Reason and critique m-e inseparable and arc reflective in practice. 
4. 1beory and practice must be interconnected (Ngwi~yama, 1991 ). 
Habermas (1973} diOCrentiatcs bctw~cn the use of critical theories to iniiiatc a process 
of self-reflection among human participants, as compared to the actual sdcctio:i of 
appropriate po!itic:il action. His critical social theory, the theory of communicative 
\ action, can be fruitfully used to elucidate social phenomena in practice through critical 
;; 
reflection. Habermas (1973) asserts that the critical researchers can be responsible for 
initiating a proccs!I of self-reflection but that only participants in the community can 
carry out the m:ceS'sary political action to change the existing structures ((~!Ja, ,, 1986; 
McCarthy, 1978). 
,: 
The foli'.:>wing section outlines infonnation systems development research co~ducted 
using Habennas's approach. In order to avoid the duplication of work, section 7.~ in 
\'.-
chapter seven provides critical reflection on problems and limitations of applying 
Habermas's critical social theory to sys\f.ms development in organisations. 
\ 
" 
2.5.3 Haberf?,1as's Critical Social Theory in Information Systems Development 
The application of Habennas' critical theory to information systems development in 
organisations is becoming increasingly popular. For example, Williams and Gunatunge 
(2000a, 2000b, 1999a), Gunatunge and Williams (2000), Myers and Young (1997), 
Ngwcnyarna et al. (1997), Hirschhcim et al. (1996), Kelin and Hirschheim (1996), 
Hirschheim et al. ( 1995}, Hirschheim and Klein ( 1994), Truex ( !993), Lyytinen '(; 992, 
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1986), Hirschhcim and Newman (1991), Lyytincn, Klein an<l Hirschhcim ·(]991), 
Ngwcnywna, (1991), Lyytincn et a!. (1991), Hirschht.'im and Klein (1989), Lyytincn 
and Hirschhcim (1988), Klein and Hirsch.bcim (1987), Lyytinen and Klein (1985), 
widely discuss the use of Habcrrnas's critical social theory perspectives in information 
systems development, and their \mplicathms to organisational life. 
Several authors (Lee, 1990; Ehn, 1988; Ngvenyama, 1987; Lyytincn & Klein, 1985) 
use Habermas's critical ~Ocial theory in discussing and evaluating the positivist research 
perspective. Most of this work emphasises that the practical interest in mutud( 
understanding is necessary if one wants to grasp how organisational agents actually use 
information systems in making sense of their cnvirorunent (Boland, 1980). Until 
recently, there bas been little discussion on work place autonomy and the empowerment 
of the employee in information systems development Lyytinen, 1992). 
Lyytinen and Klein (1985) use critical theory to take into account the 'lifeworld',,:i."1<'1 
the social context in which infonnation systems development and practice is situated in 
organisations. These authors ao,;crt that mosi information systems focus on the 
technical aspects of systems design, seeing the outcome of the design merely as the 
delivery of a teehniccl system without considerations of necessary organisational 
change. It would therefore be said that most information systems devekipment and 
practice come under a model of purposive rationality in Weber's (1978, pp. 24-6) sense. 
Most of the infonnation systems research follows scientific research, which ttmds to 
ignore the social context ofinfonnation systems development because these approaches 
arc based on purposive-rational actions (Habennas, l 987b, 1987c, 1984). 
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Lyytineo and Klein (1985) contend that the narrow technical approach is airr,•.xl at 
increasing efficiency am! effectiveness, al the expense of general human concerns to 
l(·~·c;rthc vested interest !'f certain b>TOUp~ in power. from a narrow technical approach, 
··infonnation systems become purl of the rational-technical approach to our society, 
which is derived from the ideology of sc;cntism {McCarthy, 1978, Habcrmas, 1973). 
Therefore, it is necessary and important to look at information systems as means of 
h'..::reasing human under£tanding by foster criticism and reflection and as means to frei.l'· 
people from undesirable constraints, distorted communication, misapplied power, and 
repressive domination (Lyytincn & Klein, 1985, p. 219). 
Critical social theorists contend that for particip:lllts to come into a shared 
understanding should base rationality on communicative interaction, through the "force 
of better argument". Moreover, human '\ifcworlds' influence the forms of 
communicative rationality in the information systems development process 
(Ngwenyama et al., 1997, p. 2). Such an approach tries to reflect and critically examine 
the conditions and scope of our practical "tacit'' knowledge of how to engage in 
organisational conversations and constitute our social world (Dietz & Lyytincn, 1998, 
p. 2). It emphasises what people do while communicating, how they create common 
reality by means of language and how communication brings about the co-ordinatio'n of 
their activities (Reijswoud et al., 1999, p. 118; Kdin & Hirschheim, 1991, p. 166}'.,1 
Central to communicative rationality (Klein & Hirschheim, 1991, p. 166) is mutual 
understanding and consensus formation in the form of symbolic interaction. 
Information systems form constitutive elements in organisation?\ conversations in 
which actors establish shared social worlds (Thompson, 1982, p. 123) and represent 
themselves to others and themselves (Dietz & Lyytincn, l 998,.rd). 
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The communicative process is one in which any knowledge daim of partit..ipants is 
open to challenge {Spaul, 1997, p. 83). In this reflective inquiry, participants achieve a 
therapeutic self-understanding which also contributes to improving knowledge, feeling, 
and practice (Lyytinen & Klein, 19)!5, pp. 229-30). 
Hirschheim and Kelin (1989) discuss four roles of the information systems analyst as 
systems expert, facilitator, labour partisan, and emancipator. The first of these relates to 
' the purely technical role of the systems analyst in developing systems to agreed 
specifications. The second role of the analyst as facilitator is an approach which would 
be. natural when using methodologies such as effective technique and human 
implementation of computer systems (ETHICS) and consensual versions of soft 
systems based methodologies (for example, Checkland, 1981 ). 
From this perspective, Hirschheim and Kclin (1989) assert that any system that then 
meets with the approval of the affected parties is legitimate. Jn the third role, the 
systr,ms developer acts as an advocate of labour to redress the balance of power 
between management and labour. This third role can be argued as a mornlly superior 
course of action. The need for a labour partisan aspect of analyst's role is explained in 
some of the infonnation literature (Newman & Noble 1990; Robey & Markus, 1984). 
The final role of the analyst fo that of emancipator. In the role of emanicpator, the 
analyst makes an effort to create conditions for free and open discussion that lead to 
shared understanding. This discussions must include a critical examination of existing 
barriers to emancipation such as authority and illegitimate power, pe1."r opinion 
pressure, social diffcreTitiation, ~nd the bias and limitation of language use (Hirschheim 
& Kelin, 1989, p. 1208_). 
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Lyytinen et al. (1991) argue for a social action perspective to understand office 
information systems development. These authors suggest that most of the existing 
office information systems and development methodologies assume that system 
development is a sequc1,ce of inslrumcntal actions to achieve predefined ends. Thus, 
they propose that "office information systems should be analysed as social action 
systems, the behaviour of which is strongly affected by social detennined forces and 
constraints such as the behaviour-channelling influences of authority, norms, customs, 
habits and precedence" (p. 56). 
Hirschheim (1985) desires to see information technology adopted in the office, with a 
focus on a plurality of benefits demonstrating social and ethical responsibility. 
Hirschheim contends that ~n authentic consensus can be achieved in its proper use and 
objectives if a participato~J approach is used during design and implementation of 
information systems. 
Lyytinen et a!. (1991) analyse office information systems referring to Habennas's 
classification as social actions of instrumental, strategic, communicative, 1md 
discursive, in the context of technology, language and organisation. Further, these 
authors propose that, in order to be successful, office information systems must handle 
the informal nature of office activities, which include conversations, friendly and 
adversarial social relationships, spontaneous interaction, and organisational culture 
which embraces myths and rituals in a distortion free environment. Lyytincn et al. 
(1991) assert tliat the informal nature of office activities result "spontaneous social 
interaction that contributes to creativity and lcaming"(p. 42). These authors argue that, 
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by adopting 1hc social action perspective of I labcrmas, a better understanding of both 
the otlicc and oOicc information systems <lcvc]npmcnt is possible. 
Klein and Hirschhcim ( ! 987) call for the explicit use of emancipatory research that 
focuses on human well being and emancipation in infonnation systems development 
and use in organisations. Hirschhcim and Klein ( l 994) argue for a plurality of rational 
argwnents in the infomiatinn systems development process suggesting that traditional 
infonnaticm systems development practices are too functionalist concentrating merely 
producing designed systems (sec Burrell & Morgan, 1979) for their theoretical basis 
(Hirschheim & Klein, 1989, pp. 1203-4). 
Hirschheim and Klein (1989) suggest that relying solely functionalism fonn positivist 
perspectives promote the ideals of efficiency and effectiveness in infonna)\on systems 
development. lr'"1nnation systems development comes to be seen as instrumental 
reasoning of human behaviour making organisational We overly rationalistic. 
Rationalism leads to merely choosing the best instrumental means as the primary 
emphasis for achieving given ends. Jnfonnation systems development approach follows 
the rules of scientific method, which ideologically attempts to improve a technical 
solution on complex human problems (pp. 1203-4). Moreover, the systems analyst 
adopts inappropriate value neutrality with regard to goals. The design system becomes 
one of concealed use of power in the development process by certain groups to realise 
their often concealed objectives, particularly narrow economic objectives at the expense 
of other participants (Myers & Young, 1997). In contrast to the functionalist approach. 
neohumanistic approach takes into consideration human values, nonns, and perceptions 
'" 
of all the participants in a free and open discussi'ln that Jcads to shared understanding 
(Hirschhcim & Klein, l-994, 1989: Burrell & Morgan, 1979). 
Consistent with these ar!!umcnts, various methodologies have been proposed in systems 
design. For example, Flood and Jackson (1991) identified the "critical systems 
heuristic" as a means of opening up and making tr:msparcnt the manner in which 
systems practitioners ITamc and manage problems in social systems design. !n 
information systems development methodologies such as institutional democracy 
design (Hirschheim et al., 1996), consensual communication development (Hirschhcim 
&.Newman, 1991), rational argument design (Klein & Hirschheim, 1996; Hirschhcim 
& Klein, 1994), and participatory approach (Hirschheim and Klein, 1989; Hirschhcim, 
1985) have been proposed. 
Fundamental to all these rOethodologies is that their focus on reducing barriers to 
emancipation such as distorted communication, power and psychological compulsions 
and social constraints. They also deal with change and emancipation of human 
potential. These methodologies stress the role that different social and organisational 
forces play in understanding change through the effective development of information 
systems in organisations {Wilson, 1997, p. 103). 
2.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I present research accounts of the thrc<! approaches to studying 
information systems development and practice in organisations. The positivist approach 
is premised on the assumption of objective worldvicws to design information systems 
for controlling hum,m behaviour through instrumental and strategic actions in the 
" 
development process. The social conlext, within which infommtinn systems 
development functions, is often ignored. The interpretative approach is based un 
subjectivist understanding of human behaviour in organisations. This approach 
recognises the 'lifcworlds' context in information systems development and practice. 
,1 
_/ The interpretative approach is aimed to reaching mutual understanding among 
participants in an inter-subjectively shared worldvicw of participants. However, the 
approach lacks critical bite. Finally, the chapter discussed the ontological and the 
epistemological positions adopted in critical social theory approach to information 
systems development and practice. 
Critical social theory approaches attempt to understand social contradictions ancl. 
conflicts inherent in existing social structures of organisation and society by including 
self-reflection while taking non-objectivist understanding of ontology and 
epistemology. Human construction of social reality of human life and the possibility of 
their recreation in a historical context are taken into consideration. A further account of 
critical social theory and Habermas's theory of communicative action is presented in 
chapter three. 
62 
CHAPTER THREE 
CRITICAL SOCIAL TIIORY-THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
3.0 Introduction 
The chapter d~scribes the theoretical framework used in this research. The chapter 
begins with an general ex.position of critical social theory perspective in referring tv the 
work of the members of Frankfurt School of social research. Secondly, is an explanation 
of the major theoretical underpinning expounded by Jurgen Habermas in his theory of 
communicative action. He describes the major themes of 'lifeworlds' and systems, 
colonisation of lifeworlds, human cognitive interests, human conscious rationalities, 
human actions, universal validity claims of spcc.::h acts, ideal speech situation, 
breakdown of communication, and rational society through communicative interaction. 
A final concluding chapter ties these th~ories anad concepts together as whole. 
3.1 Critical Social Theory 
Critical social theory refers to the work of members of the Frankfurt school of social 
research. The most prominent figures in this tradition arc Max Horkhcimer (1895-
1973), Theodor Adorno (1903-1969), Erich Fromm (1900-1980), Herbert Marcuse 
(1898-1979) and currently Jurgen Habcrmas (1929-) (sec Held, 1980). Their concerns 
have been to better understand and provide meaning for human conditions taking 
different positions to mainstream traditional social theorists, whose ideas arc, especially 
these based on positivism. Haberrnas convincingly argues that positivism is not, as it 
claims, the one and only non-biased' application of CO!:,'Tlitivc mental filnclions tri the 
knowledge and control of nature in order to obtain human betterment and progress 
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(Habcrmas, 1987c). The critical social theory focuses on umlcrstanding human social 
actions within a bron<l social contcx:t extending observation into a reflective viewing of 
unwarranted and inequitable conditions of social situations from which people stck 
relief(Ngwcnyamn & Lee, !997; Orlikowski & Baroudi, 199J;Hirschheim & Klein, 
!989). 
The adjective "critical" refers more to self-reflective examin;,.tion and an unmasking of 
pretences rather than to that which is critically important or to criticism as such 
{Habcrmns, 1987c, p. vii)). The concern of critical social theory has been to understand 
and help better a twentieth century plagued by mass war, cruel totalitarianism, 
technocratic exploitation, vast inequality and, now, ccologica! collapse. They have 
provided powerful insights by advocating critical self-examination, by constantly 
unmasking unexamined pervasive ideologies in capitalism and communism and, more 
recently, especially in the work ofHabennas, by evaluating the social importance and 
fr•undation of everyday language. For example, it can be argued that the "free market" 
is profoundly not free, "rational bureaucracy" has an instrumentally unbalanced 
rationality, and "democracy" is not only partial and fragmentary but increasingly 
determined by technology and mass media (Park, 1991, p. 174). They have worked 
together from the 1930s to produce a viable alternative secial theory to fascism, 
authoritarian socialism and capitalism. Their shared concern has been to provide a new 
way to use reason, a liberating reason, to promote equity, freedom and an outworking 
of the good in human affairs. As such their social project is still basically within that of 
the enlightenment project of creating a bell er society through the :ipplication of reason. 
At the inaugural address of the opening of the Institute for Social Research, 
Horkheimcr (1937) outlined the goals of critic:il social theory as follows. 
The critical theory of society on the contrary [to the positivist views of 
socidl science] has its objects men as 1hc producers or their total 
historical forms of life. The Cllnditions of reality from which science 
starts <Jilt, appears to it not as given lo be established an<l calculated 
purely on the basis of laws of probability. What is in each case given, 
depends not solely upon nature but also upon perception, the statement 
of the problem and the interpretation of the answers are created from 
human activity and the dq,'fcc of its power (cited in Ngwenyama, 1991, 
p. 268). 
Following insights from Marx and Hegel, critical theory contends that the domination 
of nature and people through scientific consciousness was at the heart of the intellectual 
world of the enlightenment (Held, 1980, pp. 151-2). They ar1,,ued that the 
enlightenment was associated with the various intellectual movements, which 
contributed to and infonncd political fennents, such as the French revolution, in 
Europe, the !ate eighteenth century. In Dialectic of E'nlightcnmcnt Adorno and 
Horkheimer explored why the enlightenment project, with its scientific agenda, has 
created "a new kind of barbarism" instead of "a truly human condition" (Adorno & 
Horkheimer, 1992, p. xi). They understand magic, Olympian Greek mythology, and 
certain ways of understanding Judaco-Christian religion and elements of the 
Rcfonnntion and the Renaissance, as early expressions of the unbalanced dominance of 
instrumental rationality. 
This unbalanced instrumental rationality became a strategic rationJlity 
ii 
let(ding to 
coercion and social manipulation for ulterior purposes of certain dominant persons or 
classes. Although initially liberating from superstition and repression, the seeds of 
,, 
totalitari~ism and repressive orthodoxy were located within this instnuncntnl 
rationality and universal teclmocratic consciousness which came to dominate an 
increasing number of areas of everyday life. 
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A common tenet of critical social thought has been that the vulucs associ11tcd with 
instrumental rationality have increasingly and destructively dominated business, 
industry, government and education in modernity (Agger, 1991; Held, 1980). Adorno 
characteristically illuminates the kernel of instrumental rationality in his famous essay, 
"Education after Auschwitz"; "First, men become th,~ kind of persons who make 
themselves in some degree the same as a thing. Then, if it is possible, they make others 
into things, too" (cited in Young, 1989, p. 60). 
Horkheimcr nnd Adorno (1972) related instrumental rationality to n!I forms of 
positivism and even empiricism, which they claim simply accept the societal status 
quo. There is no critical self-reflection in this acceptance which serves and endorses the 
radica\Jy diseased instrumental domination of modernity. Civilisation bas thus been 
threatened by the cancerous growth of a technology driven by the instrumental 
rationality of the empirical sciences with declining discourse on human values. Adorno 
spoke of the rise of instrumental. or "means-end", rationality as a part of standardised, 
opaque, and overpowering social processes (Held, 1980, pp. 65-70). Marcuse likewise 
asserts that; "Not only the application of technology but technology itself is domination 
(of nature and man) - methodical, scientific, cali.::ulated, calculating control" (Marcuse, 
1969, p. 223). 
Instrumental rationality· abstracts persons from the world and from others, it blocks 
them from truly experiencing life to the extent lo which it is adopted. Zlauddin 
Sardar, speaking of Western domination of other cultures, asserts that instnuncntal 
reason: "unleashed ruthless violence, in the shape of instrumental science, capitalist 
tecltnologics, agribusiness and instrumental nation-states, at trnditional societies" 
(1993). 
!I 
" 
However, there is a common hope in the work of! lorkhcimcr, cert11inly Marcusc and 
even Adomo, that there is a "possibility of a fully liberating reason" (Held, 1980, p. 
157). Although reason bas been used as a capitalist weapon of social control (Adorno & 
Horkheimcr, 1992), there is a way open for the destructive domination of instrumental 
rationality to be tempered and even balnnccd by critical reason. Within this usscrtion, 
Habcnnas's theory of communicative action (1987b, 1984) builds a fruitful theoretical 
foundation for empowering human communication lo enable what he tenns a "countcr-
factua! reconstructed practical rationality." This is u type of balanced rationa!ily, a fully 
liberating reason, in which technical, ethical and emancipatory human interests arc 
appropriately balanced through a free interpretation (in unrestricted social interaction) 
of situation under consideration (Pusey, 1987, p. 92). 
3.2 Habermas's Theory of Communicative Action 
A fruitful platform for thinking of information systems development practice in 
organisations is provided by Jurgen Habcrrnas's theory of communicative action 
(1987b, 1984). Habermns's theoretical approach is derived from his theory of social 
evolution. Habermas's critical theory is most succinctly defined as nn empirical 
philosophy of social institutions (McCarthy, 1978). As the lending contemporary 
thinker in critical social theory (Held, 1980), Hnbermas argues that, with the growth of 
industrial society in science, technology and rigid bureaucracy, reason itself is now 
used in a narrowly instrumental manner. Reason is no longer liberating, as it was during 
the enlightenment when thinkers used reason to expose the oppression and debased 
authoritarianism of the decadent European monarchies and institutional religions (Park, 
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199!, p. 174). Reason, Habcrmas contends, is no longer usc<l for discovery, or to 
gcncrutc meaning or values. Rather, reason is used 11s a means of a new oppression and 
authoritarianism with modernity characterised by positivist scit.'t1cc and dominating 
technocratic consciousness {1987c). Thus it is untenable to suggest that facts and values 
can be rigidly separated, as the case in positivist philosophy, and that science can be 
apolitical and value-free-truth. The truth and knowledge arc interwoven with political 
context and can emerge only from freedom to dialogue and exchange ideas 
(Abercrombie, Hill, & Turner, 1984, p. 87). 
H~bennas contends that only by using open, free and uninterrupted dialogue can valid 
knowledge come about in a balanced rationality, which takes account of all areas of 
human interest and action (Abercrombie et al., 1984, p. 99). In his recent work (1987b, 
1984), Habermas develops his notion of a liberating reason by giving fundamental 
insights into the unconsciously understood 'lifeworlds' and into the nature of an 
undistorted communicative action (Dews, 1986, p. 151 ). The use of balanced reason in 
human affairs can be freed from its overtone~ of complicity in positivist, technocratic, 
bureaucratic, hegemonic domination. 
Habennas understanding was that positive and constructive change could only occur 
through social movement~. He asserts tliat the current major social problems lie in areas 
of cultural reproduction, sociaiis.ation, and social integration con,.;e!!ling "the grammar 
of forms oflifc" (Habennas, 1987b). 
Habcrmas provides a fruitful theoretical position for this discussion of the politico-
socio-economic and cultural context for information systems research within 
modernity. He understands his task as developing foundational theory on which can be 
,,s 
based specific practice Ill help marginalised people free themselves from domination 
(Held, 1980, p. 250) and in helping deal with social problems isuch as "social 
reproduction of society". 
The basic question that Jfabcnnas has grappled with, has been how to understand 
modernity (in panicular the capitalist modernisation of society) by dr:iwing jointly on 
the resources of philosophy and 1he social sciences. Habennas is a rationolts1 in that his 
project is to ground a balanced practice of reason in inter-subjectivity, notably applied 
to truthful communici:,rion, rather than in the individual subject. By balancing 
. . 
,, 
instrumental rationality wiili intersubjectivc communicative interaction, his project has 
c> 
, been to provide a positive platform from which to apply _social theory. 
0 
Crucial to critical lhetJ!)" .;:' reflection and self-understanding. Haberm.rJ commends / . . u . 
self-reflection as this "leads to insight du~ tc/the faCt ~at wliat has p,eviously }"/{ 
_.,. 
unconscious is made conscicus in a manoer rich in consequences.' .. "(19i3~ p: 23). 
. \'i I 
He for sees a .situation in which a balanced ratioil.i.lity, or liberating re.?.son, can occuf: · 
In this1_ C()mmunication is free of domination; Self-reflection and practical itction 
fruitfui\y combine in democr~t,ic political awareness and action; pco,ile think and act in 
a balanced rational way to deter 1ine the shape of their own lives individually and in 
'•,\ 
co,;;munii.'); in·, a fully intcr-subjcc!i\'e way. Thus communicati\'c action that 
.,, ,. 
,, , •I 
complements instrumental action as people, gro~"'·'·a'11ld nations discourse and act\\ a 
_lbalanc~, rational approach through communi~ti\'e interaction, throu~ action that is 
1·· ' •"• 
' . gCnuin'ely o~cntcd to reaching an undcrst~ding (Pussey, 1987, p. 120). 
Haberrnas's theory attempts 10 resurrect a major theme of the enlightemncnt - tlint of 
•· providbg a potentially empowcri:1g thcnrclica\ framework for a balanced rationality 
,' ,. 
,, 
'i 
within public debate. This could, he hopes, he part of the process of enabling 
individuals, groups and whole commu:1itics lo free themselves from coercion, 
- l /.' 
oppression and domination by destructive hegemonic ideologies. Such an ideology is 
technocratic consciousnes, in advanced capitalism marked by technocratic and 
instrumental solutions. 
/, 
,, 
Questions of justice, or of freedom, or of truth ~ccrn increasingly unreal as economic 
rationalism defers to technical solutions to guarantee minimum welfare, manage the 
economy and sustain economic growth. The end result of technocratic consciousness is 
a society autonomousiy governed by technical cybernetic systems control mechanisms 
concealing the dominating interests of certain groups and classes (Held,! 980, pp. 64-5). 
The notion of discourse, within communicative interaction, in the context of\ifeworlds 
is centrally important in his theory. This is part of his 'linguistic tum' to address, along 
,, 
with most eontemporruy social theory, the problem of lan!:,>Uage rather than the flawed 
problem of consciomness (Held 1980. pp. 132-3). Discourse is undei;tood as that 
acfr:!ty in w~ich humans commuoicatc with an expectation of umlerstanding and with 
the hope of reaching a genuine consensus. 
Inherent in this is attentive listening am! opens an explanation of, both verbal and non-
verbal, of outer observation and inner values, goals and und:_.'fll1~ndings. The overall 
goal is nan inte-rsubjcctive mutuality of reciprocal understanding>~\are<I knowledge, 
mutual trust, and accord with one :mother" (Held, 1980, p, 3/1), Human 
cowmunication can be distorte<I by communicative incompetence, by dominati~'q or by 
,, '\. 
' \~ 
unbalanced ·~trateg;,c imcrnction' of indoctrination and propaganda. ln the ideal, 
i,' 
' 
10 
agreement should be rcacl'.cd by an acceptance of the position that has the bet!cr 
argument (Held, 1980, chapter 12). 
3.2.l 'Lifeworlds' and Systems 
Central to Habermas's theory of communicative action (1987b, 19!14) i5,.'lifeworlds' 
nnd systems. Every human group has its 'lifeworlds'. 'Lifeworlds' contain the 
background knowledge that is share,! by the members of a group. lt is the background 
L'Onsensus of everyday life and often the storehouse of knowledge that is passccl from 
I' 
ol!e generation to the next. This includes common understandings - "what every~ne 
knows". as well as common beliefs ancl feeiiilgs. Language is a part of •ijfoworlds'. 
Particular colloquialisms can be part of group 'lifcworlds. For Habennas (1984) a 
lifoworlds is: 
' // 
Anjimplicit knowledge that can not be represented in an infinite 
number of propositions; it is a holistically structured knowledge, the 
basic elements of which intrinsically define one another; and it is a 
knowledge that docs not stand at our disposition, inasmuch as we can 
not make it conscious and place it in doubt as we p\c:isc". (p. 34)' 
Every humar. has 'lifoworlds' understandings, which may differ from group to group. 
Even to be vcrba!!y understood in a group means that some 'lifcworlds' understandings 
mus\ be common. To 
1
be fully accepted by a group one must share 'lifcworlds' 
understandings. Furthermore: 
Each actor draws from a common stock of ki,ow\cdge, which is 
provided by a cultural tradition shared witl1 others. It is this 
background-knowledge which represents the context of the lifcworlds, 
and in which any communicative interaction is cmhcdded 
(Hahcrmas, 1980, p. 129) 
•:, 
" 
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For Hnbennas, the 'lifoworlds' is the context within which communicative actions 
occur and the horizon within which pl:oplc refer to aspects of the three worlds as an 
interpretative framework for their situation definitions of communicative interactions. 
;, 
' 
\\·~·~They are the objective, the inter-subjectively shared social world and the subjective 
world of individuals and other collectives. Habr,rmas ( l 984) contends that: 
It comprises more or less diffuse, always unproblematic, background 
convictions which serves as a source of situation definitions that are 
presupposed by participant as unproblematic and it also stores the 
interpretive works of preceding generations. (p. 70) 
In its border sense, 'lifoworlds' are the communicatively formed (overtime) life 
experiences and beliefa. (consciousness and humanly created) which guide attitude, 
behavior and action (Broadbent et al., 1991; Myers & Young, 1997; Ngwengania & 
Lee, 1997). In Haberrmrrsian term, lifeworlds is a type of cultural space, which gives 
meaning and nature to social life (Laughlin, 1987). It is the context in which social 
actions and social structures are manifested (Pusey, J 987, p. 59). 
In modem society, the 'lifeworld~' is undergoing a profound process of rationalisation 
in the spheres of culture, society and perso11ali1y. Thompson (I 983, p. 285) interprets 
,,: 
these as the 'symbolic space', as it were, within which cultural tradition, social 
integration and personal identity are sustained and reproduced. Habermas (1987b, p. 
138) understands the three elements of 'lifoworlds' as follows. 
The term culture for the s\ocK oi knowledge from which participant~ in 
communication supply themselves wilh interpretations as they come to 
an understanding about something in the world .... the term society for 
the legitimate orders through which participants regulate their 
membership in social groups and thereby secure solidarity. [111e term 
personality for] the competences th,it make a subject capable of speaking 
and acting, that put him in a position lo take part in a process of reaching 
understanding and thereby lo assert his own identity. 
n 
The cultural reproduction of the 'Jilcworlds' ensures that newly arising situations are 
connected up with existing conditions in the world in the semantic dim~nsion. It 
secures a c/Jntinuity of tradition and coherence of knowledge sufficient for daily 
practice. Continuity and coherence arc measured by the rationality of the knowledge 
accepted as valid. If not situation would be created disturbances of cu\turnl 
reproduction leading to loss ofmeming {Habcnnas, 1987b, p. 140). 
The social inti;:gration of the 'lifeworlds ensures that newly arising situations arc 
conne1:tcd up with existing conditions in the wo~ld in the dimension of social space. It 
takes care of coordinating actions by way of legitimately regulated interpersonal 
relations and stabilises the identity of groups to an extent sufficient for everyday 
practice. The coordination of actions and the stabilisation of group identities arc 
measured by the solidarity among members. If this docs not happen, situation would be 
the disturbances of social integration, which manifest themselves in anomie and 
.,._ corresponding conflicts (Habcrmas, 1987b, pp. 140-1). 
' !:' 
The socialisation of the m~mbers of a 'lifcworld' ensures that newly arising situations 
' 
arc connected up with cx.isting situations in the world in the dimension of historical 
time. It secures for succeeding generations the acquisitiun of generalised competence 
for action and sees to it that individual life histories are in harmony with collective 
forms oflifc. Interactive capacities and styles oflifc are measured by the responsibility 
i\ ~ 
'Gf persons. If not this happen situation would be the disturbances of socialisation .. 
ii ,, 
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process, which arc manifested in psychopathologics and corresponding phenomena of 
alienation (Habennas, 19H7b, p. 141). 
The systems emerge from the 'lifoworlds.' These systems are expressions of 
'lifcworlds' as functionally definable, tangible organisations. According to Habcnnas, 
the principle systems are ll1e economic and administrative systems. The behaviour of 
these economic and administrative systems is guided by 'lifcworlds.' They arc tangible 
expressions of the cultural 'lifewor!ds.' These systems are held together and 
coordinatec! by steering media such as money and power, which take over areas of the 
'lifeworlds' and then reconstitutes them as the objects of control. " It is these two media 
(money and power) that shape and extend the technocratic consciousness over 
lifeworlds" (Pusey, 1987, p. 107). Acr.ording to Habermas (1987a), that: 
The technocratic consciousness reflects not the sundering of [particular] 
ethical situations but the repression of 'ethics' as such as a category of 
life. The common positivist way of thinking renders iner1 the frame of 
reference of interaction in ordinary language ... as the refined models of 
the sciences migrnle into the socio-callural lifoworlds and gain objective 
power over the latter's self. understanding. The ideological nucleus of 
this consciousness is tb.c elimination ,~r the distinction between the 
practical and lh.e technical. ... Technocratic consciousness makes this 
practical interest disappear behind the interest in the expansion of our 
power of technical control. (pp. 112-3) 
Systems as sclf-rcb'l!lating action contexts, which coordinate actions around specific 
mechanism or media become concretely represented in and through defined societal 
institutions (Broadbent et al., 1991, p. 3; Thompson, 1983, p. 285). 
In capitalist society, the economy through money and market and the state through 
power and bureaucracy constantly subjugate the '!ifeworlds' to the colonisation. 
Through the ~ieering media of money and power, socio\ relations in the 'lifcworlds arc 
.,. 
moncturiscd uml burcuucrntiscd and adapted to the functional requirements of the 
sys!cm (Pusey, l987, p. 107). 
However, individuals- develop thci: language skills which enables them to __ diffcrcntiatc 
' .' ,i,; 
of the 'lifeworlds' and systems and the development of both (Lauw:,lin, 1987). 
Habennas undcr,;tands that tlu: societal evolution takes over time through a process of 
increasing diffcrcntiatir:n and increasing discursive skills when the elements of the 
'lifeworlds' develop, leading to shifts in both steering media am) institutional systems. 
3.2.2 Colonisation of 'Lifew<lrlds' 
Central to Habemms's theory of societal development is internal colo11ization of the 
'lifeworlds' (Habcrmas, 1987b, p. 332). This is the situation where what Habcrmas 
calls that the steering media 'get out of hand' and steer the systems into domains, which 
are not locked into, or reflecting 'lifcworlds' demands (Broadbent et at., 1991, p. 5). 
The result will be the appearance of pathological side effects, loss of meaning, loss of 
hope, alienation, depression, stress, anomic and withdrawal of legitimation and these 
become the nonn. Ho.hennas fl987b) noticed the situations in advanced industrial 
societies and state that: 
Modem societies attain a level of system differentiation al which 
increasingly autonomous organisations arc connected with one 
another via ddinguised 'llcdia 'Jf communication: these systematic 
mechanisms-steer a social intercourse lh::.t has been largely 
disconnected from nonns and values, above all in these sub systems 
of purposive rational economic and administrative action . . . have 
become independent of their moral-political foundations. (p. !54) 
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When stccr11lg media begin to colonise suU systcmr l>ccomc more and more complex as 
a result of cupitalist growth and pP.nctrate deeper into the symbolic reproduction of the 
'\ifeworlds' representing society as a social confusion (Habcnnas, 1987b, p. 367). 
,;i 
·;,-· 
Further Habcm13s deeply looked at the colonising tendencies; whether or not the 
steering media is of a "regulative" or "constitutive" character tl,at constitutive form has 
more colonising potential. Rq,,u!alivc rules TC),'Ulate some pre-existing, on-going 
activity whereas constitutive character consists of some form of activity. Regulative 
rules arc c!aimr.d to be "frccdom-guilfnntceing" (Hnbermas, ! 987b, p. 367). They 
moderate systems behaviour to reflect existing 'lifcwor!ds' norms and values. 
Constitutive e!Tccts deemed to be 'freedom-reducing' and actually reflect attempt to 
ir.odcratc behaviour through clmnging the aee~ted norms and guiding 'Hfcworlds' 
(Habermas, 1987b, p. 361). The constitutive rule of Habcr,nas concerns whether the 
steering media can be either amenable to "substantive justificatioo" or can be only 
J:: "legitimised through procedures" (Habcnna~. 1987b, p. 365). White (J 988) summnrises 
this situation as follows. 
[For regulative rule], since law is embedded in the lifeworlds context, it 
is more comprehensible to the average individual and musl be defc;uicd 
by elites on material grounds. [For regulative rule], Jaw becomes far less 
comprehensible and easier to defend purely on the grounds that it has 
been appropriately enacted by competent and responsible elites. (p. 115) 
Broadbent et al. ( 199!, p. 7) suggest that ofiicials or elites will direct all steering media. 
If these arc understandable to "average individual", it wih not need much dctending by 
the elites and they are amenable to substantial justification. If these circumstances arise, 
the particular form of steering media will be following 'lifhworlds' demands. If the 
particular legislation is for less comprehensible with more que,tion., rniscd nbout the 
appropriateness of the elite to formulate the rules, Habermns believes these particular 
media have colonising potential. 
/ Ii 
Habermas (1979) commends that systems world is made up of the abstract sysl~ms that 
I) 
shape human intera~tion is controlled by rational scientific and teclmical dccisioo using 
normative rules, procedures and structures. The defining feature of this growth of 
technical expertise and so much control, which is placing over the faiths of '\ifewor!ds,' 
can be justified rationally. Habennas (1979) argues the c,cercise of power in this 
process limits free and open discussion necessary for human development. Therefore 
human beings have a 'practical interest' for mutual understanding and an 'liberating 
interest' in freeing from constrained imposed them by power structures that results 
human beings seeking processes of participatory democracy to control their own 
sincerity which could genuinely represent their own free-will (Wilson, 1997). 
\,' 
3.2.3 Human Cognitive Interests 
,; 
Springing from 'lifeworlds,' Habermns sees three fundamental human interests arising 
from work and communicative intcrn~tions. It should be noted that thb categorisation is 
,, 
seen as helpful in clucidatiJig his rece\'.t work in ar!,>Uing for a balancing on instrumental 
action with communicative action ·(Habermas, 1987b, i984; Outwait, 1987). Thus 
human i11tcrests can be categorised into three areas - tee/mica/, practical and 
emancipatory. 
11 
TI1c technical interest is based on empirical analytical knowledge, which is aimed at 
prediction and control of cvcn1. The technical knowledge is used to maniptllatc human 
knowledge (Habcrmas, 1973). The practical knowledge constitutes historical 
hermeneutic knowledge ,·,.hich is aimed at achieving inter subjective communicative 
(symbolic) understanding within an ethical aml political dimension. 
The technical and practical interests arc organised as formal knowledge. The 
emancipatroy interest aimed at liberating from act of naturalistic interventions and 
constrains. The emanicpatory interests emanate from imbalance in social relation of 
power, domination and alienation and seek the realisation of autonomy and freedom 
from distorted influences such as distorted communicntion. 
11te emancipatory interests are concerned with the basic morale pursuit of human 
emancipation. As part of methodological approach, it criticises the power and ideology 
ir existing social arrangements that distorts morn\ relations within social interactions, 
unnecessary and non-transparent constrains on human freedom and wdl being, the 
liberating interests. Habennas (1973, p. 22) c;,i;plains this situation as the 
cmanicipatory interests can develop to the degree to which the repressive force, in the 
form of negative e;,i;ercise of power, presents itself present permanently in structures in 
distorted communications- that is to the c;,i;tcnt that domination is institutionalised. 
That knowledge and rationality guided by the technical and practical interests will 
locate reasons it self (Habcnnas, 1987!1). Therefore, there is m1 internal dcmJnd for the 
conditions of free am1 open communication. Habennas (1987c) contends 1hat an 
adequate cpistcmn!ogical understanding of the empirical-analytical sciences must 
include the e;,i;istcncc of open community of self-critical inquires. 
'" 
3.2.4 Human Conscious Ratioonlltics 
Habermas (1987b, l 987,, nod ! 984) provides a useful categorisation of instrumental, 
strategic and communicative rationality. He categorises h~an conscious rationality as 
instrumental, strategic, or communicative. If instrumental rationality, necessary for 
work, is not balanced by communicative rationality people are led into misguided 
strategic rationality to dominate and control people as if they were mere objects. As 
Habcrmas (1973) rather scathingly contends, under the prcs~1rc of unbalanced 
instrumental rationality: 
The hitherto undisputed attempts of the great theories to reflect on the 
complex of life as a whole is henceforth itself discredited as dogma .. 
. the spontaneity of hope, the act of taking a position, the experience 
of relevance or indifference, and above all the response tG suffering 
and oppression, the desire for adult autonomy, the will to 
emancipation, and the happlness of discovering one's identity - all 
these are dismissed for all time from the obligating interest of reason. 
(pp, 262-3) 
Habermas thus conttnds that a consciousness dominated by instrumental rationality 
reduces human reflection, hope, witness and self-discovery. An ideology of 
'technocratic consciousness' becomes dominant which 'not only justifies a pa:;tic11lar 
11 class's interest in domination and represses ano1her class's partial need for 
emancipation, but affects the human race's emancipatory interest as such" (Haberrrills, 
\987a,p. lll). 
// 
(( 
79 
3.2,5 Human Actions 
' Habermas's (1987a, 1987b, 1987c, 1984) emphasis on communication was in response 
to., critique of the philosophy of positivism, which he understood as buttressing and 
reinforcing scientific and technocratic consciousness. For Habcnnas, the nl11eteenth and 
twentieth century's "preoccupation with science and, in philosophy, with an 
examination of its methodology, impaired the underst{nding of the 'meaning' and 
'import' of knowledge" (Hold, 1980, p. 300). In reinstating ~e importance of these·1 
notions, Habcrmas makes the fundamental distinction betwcCii instrumental, strategic 
and',::ommunicative actions. 
3.2.5.1 Instrumental Action 
For Habermas (1987b, 1987c, 1984}, instnunental action is behaviour which treats 
natural objects as instruments to achieve success by accomplishing set goals in the most 
efficient way. For example, the person who uses instrumer:tal action expects to hehave 
o.thers according to his wishes. The objective of this action simation is to control .md 
m~·l1ipulatc human heh:.viour in social situations fur achieving rational goals that will 
serve the actor's sdfintcrcst while ignoring the human qualities (Lyytincn et al., 1991; 
Lyytincn & Hirschhe\m, 1988). People who subject to the instrumental actions attempt 
to enact coherent meaning for th.e action and the action situation and will normally 
refle,.;t upon the contextuality er appropriateness of the action. Fr_r instance, the person 
,, \._ who rer.eives order asks whether the person who has i~sued the order has an authority 
or knowledge to issue orders or actions (Ngwcnyama & Lee, 1997). 
I 
' 
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3.2.5.2 Strategic Action 
For Habennas (1987b, 1987c, l 984) strategic action is an improper use ofiostrumcn\11\ 
,; 
action (purposive rational action) in human communication, which involves II person's 
desire for influencing and transforming the behaviour of others. People who use 
strategic action make use of best strategies to achieve their rational objectives for their 
self-interest or the organisation or the institution concern (Lyytincn et al., 1991; 
Lyytinen & Hirschheim, 1988). 
People who are involved in strategic actions manipulate organisati?nal processes, 
influence policies, and 'rules of the game' to their advantage (Ngwenyama & Lee, 
1997). The type of rationality associated with this model is the "cob'llitivc-instrumcntal" 
rationality of a subject capable of gaining knowledge about contingent environment and 
putting it to dfective use in intelligcntl.v adapting to and manipulating that environment 
(Habennas, 1984, p. xi). 
Strategic actions ma.y be overt or hidden. The well-known eKample for strategic acti~n 
is organisational politics. When actor:; are engaged in strategic actions they make use of 
their personal and other sources of power and status to manipulate the opponents. When 
a strategic action is issued as an order, tho actor being an intelligent person wl10 
receives the order reflects on it claiming its contextual validity. Strategic actions 
· deemed legitimate and valid when it confirms to organisational norms, policies, 
au:hority structures and the unwritten rules of the game. When it does not confirm, the 
)1 .. 
pcrs<in who is subject to the action can conside'i" it 
II 
1.997). 
'dirty trick' (Ngwcnyama & Lee, ,, 
·'' \
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3.2.5.3 Comnmuicativc Action 
Communicative action is n system of reference that cannot be reduced to the framework 
of instrumental action (Habcrrnas, 1987c, p. 137). When instrumental action is used to 
control nature without self-reflection, :.m unbalanced instrumental rationality can 
eventuate. Communicative action springs from communicative rationality. It is oriented 
to reaching understanding while being marked by openness of discussion (no hidden 
agendas), freedom to speak and be heard, and the reaching of consensus through the 
validity of the arguments (Habcnnas, 1987b, 1987c, 1984; Pusey, 1987). Reaching 
understanding is considered to be a P~ces·~:, of reaching agreement among 
communicating partic1pams that meets the conditions of rationally motivated agreement 
to the content of an utterance. 
A communicatively achieved agreement has a rational basis; it can not impose by either 
party (Hnbermas, 1987b, pp. 286-7). The objectively obtained agreement by forcing 
participants or influencing opponents or use of violence is not counted 11s genuine 
agreement. Agreement reached on common conviction (i.e. recognition or rejection of 
speeeh acts vf participants) can be used as rational reasons for potential decisions 
making. Communicative action takes place through language and sign systems in 
genbral (Lyytinen et al., 1991; Lyytincn & Hirschheim, 1988). 
. •• 11 
Communicative interaction is that type of structured human activity involving·language 
and reflexivity necessarily within a moral framework (Held, 198( ~. 259). It embodies 
a moral -=oncem for the rights of· participants to. remain free from coerei"'.O and 
distorting influences while participating in a discourse that aims to attain genuine 
'' 
)! 
,,; 
"' 
·;,, understanding and consensus (Pusey, 1987, p. 81 ). Communicative actions arc drawn 
0
)~p from our shared lifcworlds. They arc".historically slrm;turcd nnd on!y umenahlc tu 
consciousness because it is ever 'behind our backs' (Pusey, 1987, p. 84) . 
.. For Hnbennns (1987b, JC.i°87c, 1984) communicative action is inter-subjective and co-
o~J;1tivc iet1exivity in building mutual understanding and co-operation towards, that, 
,, 
which is true, free, just, and fair. It is the most comprehensively rational fonn of 
communication, which is oriented to redching an undcrslancling across all the three 
dimensions (objcctiw, social and subjective) of the worl<lvicws of 'lifcwor!ds.' The 
understanding is arrived based on the recognition of corresponding validity claims of 
comprehensibility, truth, truthfulness. and rightness . , coming to an understanding 
about something in the world is the pmccss of bringing about an agreement on the 
presuppose-cl basis of validity cbims tha: can be mutually rcr.ob,nisc<l. Coming into a 
fully understanding of aclion situations delimit in the areas nf incomprehension and 
misunderstanding, intentional and involuntary untruthfulness, concealed and open 
discord; and, ... pre-existing or achic·,ed consensus (Habennas, 1979, p. 3). 
So,cia\ actt'.:rs are engaged in communicative action, in every day activi'ties, in social 
context and they communicate with each other about the state of affairs, decision taken, 
organisational events and the like. They use a common language and shared 
understanding fium a background consensus pertaining to those intc:;m,;ations taken 
for granted among particiµants (Habe!lllas, 1979, p. 3). For exnmple, in communicati\'e 
5itu11tion ! when the listener or reader fails to understand the communicative acts of 
senders, the listener would reflect upon it and try to enact so cohcn;:nt meaning for it. 
This process of eu.ic:ing coherent meaning from the 'text' is a crucial reflection cycle in 
which the rcad1:r/!istener ,est the validity claims of comprehensibilitylintelligibi!ity, 
ii 
,, 
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truth, truthfo)m:ss and lcgitinmcy (rightness/upprnpriatcncss) associated with the type 
of communicative action (Ngwcnya1na & Lee, 1997). In ordinary, simple conversation 
these four elnims arc usually taken for grunted, lmwcver they tend to he highly 
problematic when addressing complex social issues such as design ideals for 
iiifonn11tion systems devclopmco1 (Klein & Hirsehhcim, 1996}. 
3.2.6 Uuivl'rsal Validity Claims 
Habermns argues that linguistic meaning is constituted communicatively. Jn every 
utterance :i. speaker milkes entails its own specific validity claims or assessment that is 
raised in speech-acts. With every utterance a speaker makes a tntlh claim relating to the 
\\ ., 
\\ . 
objecl1w._. world of.}\ates of affairs, rightness claim concerning the rightness, 
appropriatcn~ss, or ::',egitimacy of his speech acts in relation to the social world of 
,:, ' 
normatively rcgulate'd .; interpersonal relatlons (i.e. intersubjectivity}. It includes 
truthfulness or sinceriry claims relating to the subjective world of experiences to which 
the speaker has privilege access {i.e .. sincerity or authenticity in regard to the manifest 
expressions of the speaker's inner intentions and feelings in the subjective world 
,~Habennns, 1984). Mingers ( l 995) summarised the validity claims of communicative 
··-, .\ 
actions as follows. 
" 
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Figure 
' 
, The Validity Claims of Communicative Actions (after llabermas. 1984) (Adapted from 
Mingm, 1995, p. 298). 
Habermas says they nre universal formal fcaturei of linguistic wm;nunication. The 
validly that is claimed cannot be restricted to .. validity for the speaker." or '"\'alidity for 
a specific group". Validity means validity for e\'cry subject capahle of speech and 
action (1992, p. ix). Ill ordinary, simple conversation these claims arc usually taken for 
granted, yet th?y l<.:i1d to be highly problematic when addressing complex social issues 
such as designing ideals for information systems for a wider acceptance to interested 
parties (Klein & Hirschheim, 1996). 
In social int~ractir,n situations, when doubt arises about the validity claims of any 
interaction. these validity claims can be contested, criticised, defended nnd revised in 
the hope of reaching to an understanding using reasons or grounds along to gain 
intcrsubjcctive recognition for the validity claims (1-lahcrmas. 1984). The social actor 
tests the validity claims of an issue(s). drawing upon knowledge from the social 
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conteic.t, the particular action situation itself, and the nricntntion of the other person 
whose action is being disputed. In this manner, by critically reflecting on the validly 
claims, the actor can free himself from false or unwarranted beliefs and assumptions 
about the action whilst redeeming the claims through personal reflection (N1a,,wenyama 
& Lee, 1997). 
The task of the self-reflection is to achieve a new definition of the situation, which all 
participants can share. If the actor fails his attempt to free from the action situation, 
then communicative actions do not continue and the action is called into an open debate 
to.regain the validity claims. 
3.2.7 Ideal Speech Situation 
In the context of "ordinary communication", questions are raised when the truth or 
correctness of background validity claims become disputed by speakers lllld when the 
mode of interaction of actors shift to discursive actions whilst testing every word that 
the speaker utters referring to the validity claims of communicative interactions 
(Ngwenyama & Lee, 1997). In the situation of discursive action. actor's agrr!lllcnt 
about a shared background is no longer taken for granted, but various assumptions 
concerning communication background arc carefully examined, clarified and their 
validity tested. In this situation, legitimacy of moral value choice can be checked, or as 
Habenm1s puts it, the claims underlying such choices Cllll be "redeemed". These 
principles relate to rational discourse. 
In relation to information systems, a rational discourse can legitimise the selection of a 
design ideal because it assumes that the arguments of all interested parties are heard 
and that the choice results in nn informed consensus ahout the design idea!. ll is also 
understood that the formal value choice is made hy the force of helter argument (Klein 
& Hirschhcim, 1996). The ultimate idea of such discursive communicatior1 is lo come 
into a common understanding through a critical debate while treating all the parties 
equally. Ab>recment is b,1sed oo recognition of the corresp()nding validity claims of 
comprehensibility (uttering something understandable), truth (giving [the hearer] 
something to understand). truthfulness (making himself thereby understandable), and 
rightness (coming to an undcrsl,tnding with another pcrsou) (Habcnnas, l 987b, p. 120). 
When actors take part in argumentation, they must assume that certain norms hold in 
order to ensure that arguments and discussions have a particular form inasmuch as the 
participants reciprocally assume the right to question the grounds and motives of those 
who affirm contrary positions to their own. In an argument situation, actors arc 
allowed to express fully their opinion and must honour the outcome of open rational 
debate. The situation is defined as "ideal speech" (Kelin j., Hirschhcim, 1996), it 
constitutive of following ru!cs. Klem and Hirsehhcim (1996) outline: 
I. All potential participants in a rational discourse must have an equal 
opportunity to begin a discourse at any time and to continue it by making 
speeches and rebuttals and by questioning and answering. Habcnnas calls 
this an equal chance to use communicative speech nets. 
2. For all participants there must be an equal opportunity to interpret, to assert. 
to recommend, to explain and to justify as well as question to give evidence 
for or against the validity claim of any of these forms of speech. The 
purpose of this condition is to nssure that in the long run. no presupposition 
or opinion can escape from becoming the centre of discussion and criticism. 
3. All participants are presumed to he equally ahlc lo express their attitudes. 
feelings, and intensions. These I lahcrmas calls representative speech acts. 
They serve as a guarantor against self-deceit, illusions, and insincerity of 
members among the speech community towards one another. 
4. All participants arc presumed tu be equally able tu give and refuse orders, to 
pennil and prohibit, \o promise or nsk for promises, to account am! ask for 
11ccounting, ck. Habcnnas refers to these as regu!alivc speech acts. They 
guarantee that the fomial chance of LXJUal distI"ihutinn of opportunity to 
begin or continue a discourse is realised. (l!abermas, 1973, pp. 255-6) 
The debate situation is ncc<lctl to occur in perfcclly symmdrical an<l reciprocal 
rel11tionships between participants who neither <lominatc nor deceiv~ one another. Jn 
such a situation. Ha hennas ( ! 975) writes: 
The bracketed validity claims of assertions, recommendations, or 
warnings arc the exclusive object of discussion; . . participants, 
themes, and contributions arc not restricted except with reference to 
the goal of testing the vali<lity claims in question; ... no force except 
that of the better argument is cxcrcisc<l; and . as a result, all 
motives except that of the cooperative search for truth are excluded. 
(pp. 107-8) 
Jn an ideal speech situation, all participants in the dchatt:. must have an ambition to 
achieve a rationally valid agreement and such agreement is arrived only through the 
consensus. This is a fonn of democratic political decision-making in which all 
decision5 arc made equally, i.e. rationalising decisions is arriv~d at through discussion 
free from domination (Hal:-ennas, 1987h, pp. 7-10). Habcnnas further says that ttwe 
need to bring both attitudes of human actions and motives to a critical <liscussion to 
disclose the mix of basic methodological assumptions an<l action•oricnting sclf-
understanding" (self-understanding means a person's or group's own interpretation of its 
motives, nonns, and goals) (Habcnnas, 1987b, p. 10). This is the area where inter-
subjectively shared backgroun<l knowledge of participants is critically examined. 
In this discussion, the consensus is arrived through shared knowledge and mutual trust 
between participants defining the formal properties of the specific mode and level of 
discourse but not by the domination or cxerei~e of power over one another (McCarthy, 
" 
1978, p. 291). Habcnnas conclu<lcs "we can be .~urc that conscnsu~ about a 
recommendation to accept n nonn . . expresses a 'rational will' in rclnlion to a 
common interest ascertained without deception. The interest is common bccm1~c the 
constrnint free-consensus pcnnits only what all can want (Habcnnas, 1975, p. 108 
3.2.7.1 Brcakd01rn of Communication 
The problems arise when distortions resulting from selfish motives of participants and 
breakdowns of communication occur. Breakdowns of communications can occur due to 
concealed strategic action of a participant who .i~ so assented to instrumental success 
that manipulation occurs. On the other hand, not appreciating the unconsciously 
understood lifeworlds, can also systematically distort reaching an understanding among 
participants in communicative interaction (Habermas, 1987b). Breakdown in 
communication can also occur when an actor in communication fails to observe the 
norms or fails to apprehend the actions of others arising from false, incomplete. 
insincere or unwarranted acts. Habermas's systematically distorted communication 
within a.framework of communicative action can be seen in figure 2. 
In social situations of concealed strategic action, at least one of the participants behaves 
with an orientation to success manipulating others. In unconscious dccep:ion, at least 
one of the participants is deceiving him~elf about the fact that he is acting with an 
,,4;c· ,/ 
attitude oriented to instrumental success and only keeping up the appearance of 
communicative action (Habermas, 1984, p. 332j. 
,, 
ii 
I 
/;,' Communicative Action 
, ,Actions oricmcd m n,uch~g understanding I (( 
I 
Stl'!llcgic Action 
(/\ct!crn; oricnlcd lu succ,:ss) 
" 'l 
' Concealed Slralcgic Action Open S1m1egi~ Ac lion 
._,, 
Unconscious Dcccplion 
(Systematically d i,tortcd 
commur.icalion) 
Conscious Deception 
(Manipulalion) 
Figure 2. Systematically Distorted Communication (Adopted from l[abem1as, 1984, p. 333). 
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Habermas (1979) says that cvtn in the most distorted of communicative situations there 
remains something of the basic impulse behind all utterance: "1he intention of 
communicating a true proposition ... so that the hearer can share the knowledge of the 
speaker" (p. 2). !-labermas says the ideal speech situation could be approximated if we 
can eliminate coercive intentions such as deception or manipulation through discourse. 
Habermas (1984, p. xi) asserts that "If we assume that the human species maintains 
itself through the socially co-ordinated activities of its members and that this co-
ordination is established through communication-and in certain spheres of life, through 
communication aimed at reaching agreement-then the reproduction of the species afro 
requires satisfying the conditions ofa rationality inherent in communication". 
3.2.8 Rational Satiety lh;r,~ugh Communicative lntcraeiion 
As I understand it, li~b~rmas's rationalisation of society through communicative 
interaction in the sphere of 'lifeworlds' context is sehcmalieally depicted in figure 3. 
Habcrmas argues that communicative rationality can only be achieved thro1.1i:;h 
communicative interaction and communicative action that is genuinely oriented to 
reaching an understnnding as a process nfshared learning (sec figure 3). This can be 
achiev1-'li through discussions oriented towards challenging systems rationalisation 
through technocratic cnn~~iousncss and Hfcworld understanding of symbolic structures 
of communication can he expressed through ordinary language arising from 
hennencutic interpretation of the subjective world view of participants. In other words, 
in these discussions, intcrsubjcctivcly shared knowledge of participants is sought based 
on "rational" arguments in a distortion free-environment (middle box in fi&,ure 3). 
In. this discussion have a particular form inasmuch as the participants reL1procally 
assume the tight to question the grounds and motives of those who affirm contrary 
positions to their own. Moreover, the discussion and the level of justification become 
reflective. The interaction 1e~11lts in an emergence of communicative rationality {two 
solid lltTows from the middl~ box to systems and lifeworlds in fib,ure 3); the consensus 
expresses a discursively formed "rational will" for all the participants who have 
msisted distorting factors such as technocratic consciousnr.ss, manipulation, deliberation 
and domination. That communicative rationality can onl~ arise in the 'lifcworlds as an 
achievement of communicative reason. 
Ii 
The communicative reason might eventually, lead to m4)rc "rational structures" as 
alternative to the existing "structures of domination" and to changed organisational 
pri~ciples that would be based on the interests of all and so deserve the genuine 
legitimacy of consensual agreement rcached:.'at the discussion. 
"·'\, 
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Flg,,re 3. Habcrmas's Theory or Societal Development through Communka1ive Interaction (A<.lopled 
from Pusey, 1987) 
Moreover, the newly emerged systems structures have to be re-appropriated through 
communicative action into the 'lifcworlds.' In this manner, the problems between the 
'lifcworlds' and the systems will be resolved through improved adaptation to 
'lifeworlds' demands that reduce distorting influence such as technocratic 
consciousness, deception, domination, illusions, and deliberation (the big arrow from 
systems to Jifcwor!ds in figure 3). 
The communicative rationality that surfaces from 'lifeworld' understanding may, 
through new forms of communicative action, produce new "communicatively achieved 
92 
ngreements" with new "structure-forming effcci:.i" with "motive-forming thought" in 
'\ifcworlds' contexts bringing system and lifcworlds into balance (the big arrow from 
'lifeworlds' to systems in fi~,urc 3) (Pusey, 1987). 
Instrumental and strategic actions usually from a technocratic consciousness exerted in 
the current practice of information systems development could be counterfactually 
restated as communicative rationality, a balanced state of rationality that lakes into 
consideration the bctte!' arguments and wor!dview understanding of participants. This 
communicative rationality is achieved through an increased under~tanding and 
kn_owledge among the participants in an open discussion as a process of shared 
\eaming. 
The "troth" generated in this manner about the systems development process is the 
"true-knowledge" where participants could free (emancipation) themselves from a!l 
forms of constrains such as inflexible bureaucracy, purposive rational actions, distorted 
communication, inner and outer conscious or unconscious distortions, delusion, 
illegitimate use of power and domination. 
In an open, distortion-free communicative interactions people develop on clarity of 
self-reflection whist developing a mutual understanding and trust of each other. This 
situation could be defined as a state of collective autonomy in which the participants 
have the power to determine rationally and freely the nature and directions of their 
collective existence (Fay, 1987, p. 205). Consistent with these arguments, Fay outlines 
three basic claims about human existence that: 
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(a) humans are typically unfrce, dominated by conditions which they neither understand 
nor control, a situation which results in their leading unsatisfactory lives 
(b) human life need not be this way 
(c) An increase in knowledge is the way the oppressed can liberate them and thereby 
better their lot (Fay, 1987, p. 203). 
Habermas holds that an adequate theory of society must integrate philosophy and 
empirical social science to alleviate social problems (Habenm1s 1984, p. ix). Such a 
theory which aims and guides improvement of human conditions is important for 
researchers as they have vested interest in providing solid theoretical foundations for 
societies including the areas of management and use of iofonnation technologies in 
organisations (Zmub, 1995). 
3.3 Conclusion 
In his theory of communicative action, Habermas explains a rational approach to human 
communication through communicative interaction. He introduces communicative 
rationality with communicative reasons as a balanced approach that takes into 
consideration all the major fonns of human interests in human communication. He 
discusses both the problems of technocratic consensus and unconsciously understood 
Jifeworlds in communicative interactions. 
Habcrmas's theoretical f.ramewotk helps solve the problems between technocratic 
consensus and '!ifeworlds' in a manner rich in consequence where an the participants in 
" 
communicative interactions free themselves through critical reflection and 
understanding. 
Habennas's theory of communicative action focuses on freeing participants through 
critical reflection of conditions arising from domination, misapplied power, alienation, 
bureaucracy, distortion in communication and other unequitablc situations within the 
social contexts associated with systems development process. His approach promotes an 
understanding of the systems development process within a distortion free environment 
as a shared learning practice, ·whose aim is to design a system based Ol! th.:: genuine 
consensus of the demands of all fue partir:iriants, in the activities of development 
through communicative action and interaction~· 
Thus the theoretical frame work outlined in this chapter, and the social context of Sri 
Lanka explained in the chapter four, iterate with empirical data developed into an in-
depth cas at NCCL in chapter six. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
SOCIAL CONTEXT: SOCIO-CULTURAL, 
ECONOMIC AND POLJT1(;AL ENVIRONMENTS 
4.0 Introduction 
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This chapter explores the social context for information systems development in Sri 
Lanka in the context of developing countries. This chapter examines ,he role of 
infonnation technology and information systems in conjunction with information 
systems development and practice in developing countries. This is followed with a 
critical examination of information systems research and practice in developing 
countries, accounts of socio-economic, political environments and cultural contexts for 
information systems development in Sri Lanka, with a conclusion about modernisation 
of Sri Lanka through information technology and information systems. 
4.1 Role of Information Technology and Information Systems 
Advan.::es in infonnation technology have played a promin(lflt role in improving 
organisational effectiveness (Robey & Azevedo, 1994). Jn particular, infonnation 
systems in organisations have come to be seen as strategic resources, which provide 
potential competitive advantages (Lauden & Laudon, 1998; Feeny & Willcocks, 1998; 
Earl & Sampler, 1998; DiRomualdo & Gurbaxani, 1998; Ross, Beath & Goodhue, 
1996; Roclcrt, Earl & Ross, 1996; Porter, 1985; Porter & Millar, 1985). 
Infonnation systems can deliver better _quality products, enhanced control, reduced 
costs, and increased flexibility (Odedra-Straub, 1996). They can be used as a strategic 
weapon to defeat or frustrate competition fscc Laudon & Laudnn, !998: Applegate, 
Cash & Mills, 1988). o/gwiisations can helter survive using infonnation systems, and 
hopefully thri'. ~•}nan increasingly r.ompetitivc environment (Doherty & King, 1998). 
lnformation/.systems have profound cOi:cts on organisational structures, processes, 
s;ultur,, ai:id working procedures (Doherty & King, 1998). Moreover, these infonnation 
systems hive ·an impact on most aspects of human lives, especially in' economic 
activities, education, entertain~ :mt and communication. 
i'( The US Labour Department announced in early December 1999, that productivity has 
risen by 4.9% in the third qu,lrter of i 999, its biggest gain in almost seven years (cited 
,,in Splettstoesser & Kimaro, 2000). Consequently, many businesses tend to view 
information systems development as shaping their future (Keen, 1991). Additionally, 
prospects of using new information systems techniques to achieve a grc~ter 
' organisational effectiveness have impacts on quality of work life and )!.en'era\ 
eKpcctations of socio-economic development (Davison, Vogel, Harris & Jones, 2000; 
Robcy&Azevedo, 1994). 
Many nations all over the world, particularly in Western societies have adopted 
infonnation technology for socio-economic development in their countries (Corea, 
2000). Application of infotmation technology is considered as or,e of the most 
significant forces of modernisation (Avgerou, 2000). Computer-mediated 
communication networks, such as the Internet and World Wide Web, offer tantalising 
~orsibilitics of global communications (Ess & Sudweeks, 2000). 
,, 
,, 
,, 
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Information technology has also been inc)(tricably linked with economic prosperity and 
power, exerting revolutionary impact on the way t!H1t the world <foes business and the 
way in which its citizens communicate (Davision et al., 2000). Individuals and 
government~ arc using information technology to gain political and economic advantage 
(Hnwkridge, 1991). It has the potential to narrow the gap between the advanced 
indUSaial nations and those developing, in that developing countries coul!I leapfrog 
developmental stages (Odcdra-Straub, 1996). 
4.1.1 Information Technology and Information Systems in Developing 
Countries 
In the current discourse on national development, there is assertion that policy makers 
and managers in developing countries sl1ould focus on achieving pervasive information 
and communication technologies so that societal benefits will permeate to equivalent 
degrees of saturation as in developed countries (see Talcro & Gaudette, 1995). A belief 
in the direct social and economic value of computerisation (Kling, 1996) presumably 
informs such counsel. 
Most developing countries exploit the potential benefits of use of information 
technology for improved results in productivity, organisational effectiveness, and 
business competitiveness (Avgerou, 1996). Researchers and practitioners both in 
developed and developing countries assume that the use of information technology 
together with information systems lead to improved management decision making in 
productivity, effectiveness, and competitiveness because information available to 
decision-makers reduce uneertJinties that confront managers (Splettstoesser & Kimaro, 
2000). In developed counl!i .. s, usually Western societies, the development and use of 
'" 
information systems is al igncd with their cultures, value systems, norms, capacities to 
a!Tord the technology, and the market dynamics of individual economics (Corea, 2000). 
Policy makers and managers in developing countries focus on achieving socio-
economic development in their countries using information technology applications 
(Bhatnagar, 2000; Wacma, 1996; A vgcrou, 1996). 
Information technology is recognised as a means for offering more efficient socio-
economic development in the least developed countries (Meso & Duncan, 2000). Both 
information technology and information systems are often identified as the key to the 
re-invention of the governments in developing countries in a free market, following 
failures in the state bureaucratic models of socio-economic development 
(Samaranayaka, 1999). For example, information technology can facilitate economic 
development through availing information to make choice of development priorities 
easier and to plan and manage development activities better. 
Information and communication technologies are considered as new possibilities and 
enabling technologies to attack problems of rural poverty, inequality, and environmental 
dcb,radation (Human Development Report, 2001; Bhatnagar, 2000). It is believed that 
development of information systems such as document management, electronic data 
interchange, group ware for computer supported group work, and Internet and intranets 
in thc~e countries, can lead to improve service quality. They make planning more 
effective, and thus become a means of empowering citizens (Bhatnagar, 2000; Kiangi, 
1996; Traunmuller & Lenk, 1996) and "infonnate" employees to play a more 
substantial role in their organisations {Zuboff, 1988). 
I I I 
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4.1.2 Problems of Information Techuology and Information Systems Adoption 
In Developiug Countries 
" 
In contrast to the developed countries that have been steadily capitalising on the rapid 
puce of information and communication technologies, a large number of developing 
countries, particularly low-income countries have failed in the adaptation of these 
technologies. This is mainly due to prevalent constraints in cultural, socio-economic, 
and political contexts (Wacma, 1996; Avgerou & Cornford, 1995). 
Developing countries may be seen to be missing out on the much vaunted potential of 
computer technologies to promote product and service quality (Davenport, 1993), and to 
permit implication in a global economy increasingly penetrated by technology based 
information flow (Odedra-Straub, 1996). Moreover, it is a well-known fact that 
information systems implementation often creates states of flux which challenge innate 
and established ways of functioning in organisations in developing countries (Powell & 
DiMaggio, 1991). 
One of the most important problems of information technology, information systems 
development, and implementation in developing countries is the difference to the 
dominant Western culture (Thanasankit & Corbitt, 2000; Jayasuriya, 1999; Madon, 
1992;Walsham, Symons & Waemn, 1990). For example, culturally formed structural 
human characteristics can inhibit information systems development and implementation 
efforts in most of the developing countries. Avgcrou and Cornford (1995) note that 
various structural and behavioural obstacles restrain many of the information systems 
development and implemcntatioos projects in developing countries. 
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Common obstacles to he found in developing countries arc omcial restrictions for 
security reusons as well us 1he rigidity aml compartmcntalisatio!l of gov..,rnment 
burcuucrncies, \\hich consider ccr1uin types of informatioo ns their property (Fox, 
1991 ). Azad and Erdem ( l 998) note that in many cultures, information is still equated 
with power, which restricts personnel willingness to share data and information through 
inteb>ratcd databases and systems. Usually databases arc managed on the basis of 
infonnation being secret rather than a valuable source of information that could be 
readily accessible (Soficld, 2000). 
Power and politics has been widely discussed in infonnation systems literature (see 
Standing, 1998). Some examples are: 
I. The politics of organisational change related to information systems (Marks & 
Pfeffer, 1983) 
·,:. 
2. Power in the decision and implementadon of accounting and control systems 
(Marks, 1983) 
3. Post implementation politics related to material requirement planning systems 
(Kling & Iacono, 1984) 
4. The type of power that information systems professionals exercise over users 
(Marks& Bjorn-Andersen, 1987) 
5. Political activities and the use of power in the fonnulation and implementation of 
infonnation systems (Waema & Walsham, 1990) 
6. Use of computerised information sys1,.1ms to serve the interests of those in power 
(Danzingcr, Dutt..-.n, Kling & Kraemer, 1982) and as a tool that changes the power 
balance (Barley, !986) 
7. Colonisation of 'lifcworlds' in organisations through infonnation systems 
(Broadbent et a!., 1991) 
,m 
8. Realisation ofhiddu agendas of managers in organisation through the development 
ofinfommtion systems {Myers & Young, 1997). 
Simi\nr[y, a case study of implementing a computerised rural information systems 
project in India reveals that infmmation systems served to reinforce the cultural context 
maintaining the power of the higher levels over the lower levels of administration 
(Madon, 1992). This case study reveals that infonnation systems by itself cannot force 
the abandoning of Jong established ways of administration (Jayasuriya, 1999). To 
successfully implement a computerised system, the implcmentofl! identified that a key 
factor was the need to reinforce the organisational (administrative) structure whereby 
issues of power and territory had to be taken into account (Foltz, 1993). 
The appropriateness of the technology and the creation of an environment favourable to 
the introduction of t~-chnology were considered critical in Foltz's (1993) study. 
Hofstede (1991) identifies, in most of the devr.loping countries, present greater power 
dependence by subordinates on bosses {a greater power distance) and a higher degree of 
collectivism ns opposed to individualism than in the dev~loped countries. People arc 
mainly unwilling to take risk in these countries and thus uncertainty-avoidance 
behaviour is predominant (Hofstede, 1980). 
Compared to developed countries, communication via information systems and 
language differences can also trigger some information systems development and 
implementation failures in most of the developing countries {De Boer & Wa\beek, 
1999; Klflidog, 1996). The majority of managers in developing countries have 
paternalistic and authoritarian attitudes (Jaeger & Kanungo, 1990). Consequemiy 
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infonnation flows arc mainly from top to bottom in the form of directions and 
commands (Kirlidog, 1996). 
Most developing countries have the difficult task of intcmolising the procedures and 
products of alien cultures. PL7haps the most important realisation is that tcchnolol,,y is 
not culturally neutral, which points to the importance of the social, cultural, economic, 
and political conte:i.t of technologies {Castells, 1996). 
Although the value of information technology infrastructure in business has been well 
recognised (see Brancheau, Janz & Wctherbe, 1996; Broadbent, Weill, O'Brien & Neo, 
1996; Duncfill 1995), many developing countries arc disadvantaged by lack of 
advanced technology such as telecommunication infrastructures (Kirlidog, 1996). 
Additionally, developing countries are characterised by shortages of managerial skills, 
lack of computer knowkdgc, fear to use modem technologies, socio-economic and 
political illstabi!ities, economic depression, low per capita income, lack of development 
policies, and persistence: of market failures (Davison et al., 2000; Palvia, Palvia & 
Zigly, 1992; Hoselitz, 1964). 
4.2 Information Systems Researc!J. and Practice in Developing Countries 
Before examit1ing the information systems research environments of developing 
countries it is important to explain the meaning given to the term "developing 
countries" for the purpose of this research, as it is able to be defined in a variety of 
different ways. The countries referred to here are those in the so-called Third World. 
)i 
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The 1l1ird World rcfors to countries that do not belong to the Western world ccntrc<l on 
the US (Perera, 1989, p. 141 ). Some writers even distinguish a fou1th Vl(lrld composed 
of the poorest or least developed countries of the world (sec Mcso & Duncan, 2000; 
Palvia & Palvia, 1996). 
An examination of information systems development practice of most developing 
countries reveals that they have had little chance to evolve infonnation systems 
practices, which would truly reflect the local needs and circumstances. Jn many 
developing countries, information systems development practice have operated under 
the rubric of scientific and economic reasoning, that forms the foundation of Western 
modernity (Avgerou, 2000; Thanasanldt & Corbitt, 2000; Avgcrou & Cornford, 1995). 
These are characterised by a dominant positivist approach, which itself is based on 
purposive-rational economic rationa!itie~ in social situations (Habermas, 1987a, 1987b, 
1987c). 
The important assumption, made both in the Western and in the developing countries, 
is that the positivist approach used in developed countrio.:s is appropriate for developing 
countries (Wiiliams and Standing, 1994; Madon, 1994). This assumption is associated 
with the belief that the human condition can be improved by reason alone (Touraine, 
1995). This assumption tends to ignore or not recognise tho idiosyncrasies of 
organisations in developing countries with their own socio-culture and economic and 
political environments (Jayasuriya, 1999). 
Avgerou (2000) notes that many of the widoly known problems faced in developing 
countries arc constituted within the tcehno-cconomic and scientific rationality of 
development which stemmed from the Western so~ieties' experience of modernity. 
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This tcchno-cconomic and scientifically rationalistic concepts dornirmte over 
'lifeworlds' in developing countries (Tsoukalas, 1989). For c:,;:amplc, the ad~ptation of 
a computer system by lhc State Bank of India, along with the packaged banking 
software proved not to be suitable because banking practice in India is organised on a 
"social responsibility" ethos, quite different from the Westen\ modernisation concepts. 
The package has remained largely unuti!iscd (Banerjee, 1981). 
In Sri Lanka, this sarnr, principle was evidenced in the demise of database development 
effort in a Department of Management Studies in a University (Williams & Gunatunge, 
2QOOb). More generally, certain indigenous managers in organisations in Sri Lanka 
tend to perceive socio-culture, beliefs systems, and social values as important 
determinants of success in organisations. However, these values arc often suppressed 
by the purposive rationality of organisations (Gunatunge & Jayeratne, 1992; 
Gunatungc, 1991). Often Indigenous managers tacitly accommodate certain socio-
cultural 'lifeworlds', values, beliefs, and myths in solving problems, which has seriuus 
ramifications for infonnation systems development and practice in organisations in Sri 
Lanka (Gunatunge, 1996). 
The positivist approach developed for infonnation systems in the West and its 
adaptation in developing countries is based on priori asswnptions about the research 
enterprise, which do not take into account peoples' behaviour within socio-cultural and 
'lifeworlds' contexts. For example, although several models of national culture are 
suggested in the literature (see Schwartz, 1994, 1992; Hofstede, 1991, 1980; Schwartz 
& Bilsky, 1987; Glenn & Glenn, 1981; Rokcach, 1973; Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, 1961; 
Parsons & Shils, 1951), they are overly structural and suggest only narrowly 
prescriptive constructs to study culture (Thanasanki & Corbitt, 2000), 
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Most of the culture-based studies in management and information systems research 
conducted in developing countries adopt Hofstcdc's (1991, !980) four-dimensions 
framework (Le. power distam:c, uncertainty avoidance, individualism/collectivism, and 
masculinity versus femininity). The popularity of 1-lofstedc model comes from its large 
sample and use of empirical data to demonstrate cultural differences. RcscarchcrS who 
use Hofstede's framework accept the results of tlx, research on face value without a 
critical reflection of their findings. These researchers tend to become 'jailed' within 
Hof~tede's priori framework, which is subject to little or no critical reflection. 
Several researchers recognise Hofstede's model as an insufficient framework to study all 
aspects of cultural differences in developing countries (Wickramasinghe & Hooper, 
2000; Rahmnati, 2000; Thanasankit, 1999a; Shore & Venkatachalam, 1996). Examples 
of infonnation systems research conducted using Hofstcde'G framework can be found in 
Rahamati (2000), Katz and Townsend (2000), Shane (1994), Morris, Davis and Allen 
(1994), Ueno and Sckran (1992), Rodriguez (1991), Kedia and Bhagat (1988), Kogut 
and Singh (1988), Tricker (1988), and Sekaran and Sm;dgrass (1986). 
Within Hofstede's framework, important 'lifcworld' understanding tend to be ignored 
in an institutionalistic fashion (Habennas, 1987b), resulting in information systems 
failure and poor p<"litica! decision-making (Thanasankit, 1999a, Shore & 
Venkatachalam, 1996; Randall, Hughes & Shapiro, 1994; Luff, Jirotka, Heath & 
Great batch, 1993). Alternative ways of perceiving the value of human innovation often 
manifested in the social context of developing countries are poorly understood by the 
researchers. Newly arising situations for the researcher, especially in the stale and 
organisational situations arc often poorly understood in the conic~'.! of existing 
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conditions and value systems in the semantic dimension. This disorientation erodes 
continuity of tradition and coherence of knowledge, which leads to a breakdown of 
management and employee relations in organisations (Habermas, l 987b). 
Researchers who adopt Hofstcde's framework ignore meanings of subjects, not 
captured within their models, and often tend to view such information as irrational and 
unimportant material. Western scientists and experts regard such understanding as 
methodologically questionable or at best of merely localised importance (Brodnig & 
Schonberger, 2000), or implicit and .term incognila (Ngwenyama & l,;,lcin, 1994), or 
irrational (Avgcrou, 2000). The underl,,..mg and deep problems of developing countries 
as a result of Western modernisation through information systems largely fails to 
understand, capture, and explain using Hofstedc's framework. 
In many developing countries, organisational adoption of techno-scientific and 
economic rationalities of technologies has often been stifled by their perceived 
incompatibility with traditional value systems, belief systems, and cultural practice 
(Brodnig & Schonberger, 2000). This incompatibility can lead both m;;;mgemcnt and 
employees to a loss of meaning, anomic, alienation, and a loss of cultural identity 
(Hnbermas, 1987b, 1984). More importantly, socio-cultural '\ifeworlds' arc often 
suppressed especially those appropriate for industrial production using information 
systems in modernity (Peter, 2000). Above all purposive rational economic and 
administrative action have become independent of their moral foundations (Habermas, 
1984). 
This incompatibility, betwec,n Western techno-scientific and economic rationality and 
socio-cultural lifeworlds and their socio-economic and political contexts in developing 
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countries, plague many infonnation systems development and implementation projects 
(Brodnig & Schonberger, 2000; Avgcrou, 2000; De Boer & Walbcck, 1999; Jayasuriya, 
1999; Wacma, 1996; Odcdra-Straub, 1996; Avgcrou & Cornford, 1995). Many of the 
failed information systems projects arc constituted within the tcchno-scicntific and 
economic rationality of development and knowledge, which stemmed from Wc;;tcm 
societies' experience of modernity (De Boer & Walbeek, 1999). 
In the context of developing countries, the techno-economic rationality of Western 
modernity which is instrumental in narrowly defining a series of problems and 
determining their solutions, proves to be unsuccessful in streamlining people's 
behaviour (Avgerou, 2000). Real changes in social systems such as infonnation 
systems development need to spring from social context and historical experiences in 
developing countries (Avgerou, 2000; Jayasuriya, 1999). 
Korpela, Soriyan, Olufokunbi and Mursu (1998) suggest that information systems 
development must be alib>ned with national cultures and local pra1:tice. Another study 
of Palvia and Hunter (1996) suggest that promoting one methodology or a single 
technique for development of information systems, within multinational organisations 
operating in developing countries, is not necessarily a good idea due to culture 
differences between headquarters and branches. Specifically, information-sharing 
systems are not generatisablc or transported across borders (Ein-Dor, Segev & Orgard, 
1993). Socio-economic and political issues in a developing country are important and 
can decidedly influence the development and use of information systems (Waema, 
1996; Walsham, 1992), and effective management and information systems 
development require creativity, largely driven, by the interests of an organisation's 
participant~ (Ciborra, 1991). 
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Korpela cl al. (1998) suggi:st that the 'nuts and bolts' of information sy~tems arc likely 
to be the same in industrialised and developing countries, but the users and 
preconditions differ. 111c information systems development methods and 
methodologies need to be adjusted from country to country to take the socio-economic 
and political differences into account (p. 276), because every problem situation in 
which a participant in systems development engages is situated within a social context. 
Such innovative ideas compelled information systems researchers to explore alternative 
approaches to the dominant positivist approach for infonnation systems development in 
developing countries to suit the needs of these countries (Thanasankit & Corbitt, 2000). 
Information systems must be developed with an understanding of\ocal factors (Barker, 
1993), because culture, value systems, beliefs, myth and so on are unseen, and implicit 
in 'lifeworlds' understandings. They often come most dramatically to the surface when 
change at a technical or social level are suggested or implemented (Laughlin, 1987). 
4.3 Social Context in Sri Lanka 
Sri Lanka is an island in the Indian Ocean. It wJk ruled by Sinhalese Kings for more 
I 
than two thousands years, followed by 500 years of Portuguese, Dutch, and British 
colonialism. Sri Lanka (then Ceylon) won independence from the British in 1948. 
Presently, the country is a democratic socialist republic with an executive presidency 
and Westminster-type Parliament. Since independence, two major political parties 
governed the country: United National Party (UNP) (regarded as the most right-centred 
party) and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLPP) (regarded as the most left-centred 
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party). Additionally, there arc about twenty.five minor political partit:s currently in 
operation in the country. Ruling power of the country ha~· shifted between the two main 
political parties with the introduction of remarkable changes in the sphere of state 
affairs since independence. However, revolutionary social and economic changes were 
brought about due to the 1956 and 1977 elections. 
In 1956, the People's United Front (PUF), a coalition of the SLFP, formed a government 
under the leadership of S.W.R.D. Bandaranayaka. Their election victory unleashed new 
forces hitherto held in check by a colonial-style bureaucracy operating within relatively 
detached political processes (Wilson, 1977). The PUF fought for social reforms to 
restore age-old cultural, religious, cCDnomic, and social values in Sri Lanka 
(Yodhasinghe, 2000). It broke the prevailing laissez-faire state economic doctrine and 
led to Sri Lanka beCDming a mixed eCDnomy with an emphasis on state-controlled 
sectors (Wickramasingher & Hopper, 2000). 
In 1977, UNP, the main right-centred political party won the election on a manifesto 
committed to the liberalisation policies of its leader, J.R. Jayewardena. They introduced 
major changes for monetary and fiscal policies, science and technology, exchange rates, 
trade and balance of payment policies, and the privatisation of the public enterprises 
(Abeysckara, 1984). These reforms remarkably changed the socio-economic life in Sri 
Lanka (lndraratna, 1992). 
Sri Lanka is presently a plural, multi-cultural society with a persistent caste system 
(Samaraweera, 1977). The population is about 18.8 million. There arc three main ethnic 
groups. (Sinhalcse 74%, Tamils 18.1%, Moors 7.1%) Sinhala and Tamil languages are 
used for official purposes whilst English is considered as a link language (Gunasekrrn, 
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J 999). Although S\nlmla nnd Tamil J:mguagcs arc proclaimed as official languages, 
II 
most of the higher rank officials in tl.\c government organisations and the majority of 
.,\'. 
employees in the private sector organ/,ations (not privatised) use English in all forms of 
" 
" 
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communication. 
The majority of Sinhalesc follow Buddhism (69.3%), but other religions such as 
Hinduism (15.5%), Muslim (7.5%), and Christian (7.6%) also receive an equal 
recognition. Per capita income in Sri Lanaka is S823 per annum while inflation 
remains at a rate of 7.3%. The unemployment rate is l 0.4 % of the labour force but the 
literacy rate remains at 91.8%, the second highest in South Asia region. Economic 
growth rate is 4.7% (Cer.tnJ Bank of Sri Lanka, 1998). Abou.t 1.2 million families, 
receive (about US$ 10 per month) subsidiary benefits from the ni~jor welfare program-
''Samurdi"- launchcd by the government (Ratnayake, 1999). ',\ 
The Sinhalese and Tamils claim distinct ethnic identities with respect to their history, 
language, and religion. For over two decades the struggle of 'Tamil Tigers' for a 
separate state drained state resources (i.e. 26% of GDP in 1998) and constrained 
development. The war between official troops of the government and Tamil Tigers 
· killed about 90,000 persons including innocent civilians and the war still continues. The 
efforts of both present and previous governments to arrive at a politically negotiated 
solution with the Tamil Tigers have failed up till now, because the Tamil Tigers 
renounced discussions with the government. Mediation from foreign governments such 
as from Norway, to bring these parties together has been so far failed. Moreover, 
normal life in nbjor cities such as Colombo is at a risk due to unexpected al\acks such 
as suicide bombers from the Tamil Tigers. 
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The economy is largdy agricultural (84%), but current dcvclopmcnt policies continue to 
emphasise markets and industrialisation (Jmlrarathna, 1992). Sri Lanka is located 
physically and culturally in South Asia but, being a trndin!.' colony, it has diverse 
languages, literature, technology, arts and crafts, customs and beliefs (Pcris, 1977). 
Colonialism introduced urbanisation, but Sri Lanka culture is still largely village 
oriented, traditional, ethnocentric, and rooted in the institution of Kingship (Wrigglns, 
1960). The later began in 543 8.C. with the first King Vijaya and ceased when Britain 
annexed the last Kingdom in 1815. The Kingship institution pcnneatcd Sri Lanka 
society (Kupferer, 1988}, containing three elements central to Sri Lanka traditional 
culture These elements were an agricultural economy, a caste system, and a Buddhist-
Sinhalesc ideology (Paranavithana, 1961). 
An effective agricultural economy underpinned the emergence of Sri Lanka's 
institutions (Paranavithana, 196!). Villages emerged alongside rivers and artificial 
reservoirs. Land and water were th·e major forces used in agricultural production. The 
agricultural economy was nommlly self-sufficient (Adagama, 1997). The role of Kings 
was to maintain this self-sufficiency (Nicholas & Parnnavithana, 1961). As the owner 
and controller of land and water, the King was responsible for efficiently providing both 
for agricultural development. The King financed this through taxes on lands and water, 
and was entitled to the free labour of the subjects. The King's powers operated through 
traditions and customs, which entailed considerable ceremony (Silva, 2000; Moore, 
1985). 
Practice and beliefs associated with Kingship, which arc family based and involve 
relations between land, hmdowncrs, and fnnncrs, continue today in agricultural vil!nges. 
112 
In Wcbcrian ( l 947) tcnns they were basically family-based economic structures of 
traditiona! societies. Land is a scarce resource with ownership conccntratc<l amongst 
aristocratic families, Buddhist temples, and some government servants. Owners 
cultiv.i.te their fields for their own profits: tenant formers working on a share-cropping 
basis cultivate others. All use traditional fanning operates with simple instruments and 
cultivation involves all family members. Yields depend upon the quality of soil and 
seeds, rainfall, and the de!,>TCC of protection of crops from animals. Farmers usually 
organise their economic activities around continuing traditional rituals deemed crucial 
to villages' ev!.-ry-day life. Villagers are reluctant to change their every-day life with the 
change of modem technologies (Wickramasinghc & Hopper, 2000). 
Cultural practice and customs such as starting the season at auspicious times, praying 
for better harvests, respecting tools, ceremonially celebrating the harvest, are still 
prevalent. There was little separation between those that worked and those who owned 
capital although some aristocrats paraded their wealth. The harvest was mainly for 
formers' own consumption with any excess being exchanged with neighbours in a 
traditional barter system (Wiekramasinghe & Hopper, 2000). 
The agricultural production process was not subject to particular control or the exercise 
of political power relations with ordinary villagers. Communication was embedded in 
cultural values, customs and heritages. Villagers worked on mutual understanding with 
each other. Cultural collusion and integrity was deemed to have been maintained 
through consensus, which prevailed in every day affairs. Villages paid little attention to 
market concentrations of with other domestic affairs being deemed to be more crucial 
(Wickramasinghe & Hopper, 2000). 
" 
' 
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Women in these sociul units were expected to be involved in child caring, cooking, 
helping on the fann, and above all, respecting and helping their husband with rice 
cultivation. Villagers were tied in to cxtcrulcd family relations. The fathL'f, being the 
head of an extended family, had the responsibility of caring, feeding and bettering the 
family. The father's decisions were hardly challenged by the family. Day to day life 
proceeded on mutual understanding and consensual manner, which still remains part of 
the culture. 
Every one understood the ordinary language used for communication. The whole 
family worked together to raise money if the family wanted additional income to 
maintain their lives. Thus day-to-day life was embedded in work values: agriculture, 
family relationships, and Buddhist cultural ceremonies, as it had been for centuries. 
Industrial activities, in so far that they existed, were married to the traditional culture -
the most prevalent practice was the reciprocal understanding of actions by each other. 
All the interactions in the agricultural society were enacted within the context of a 
commonly experienced 'Jifcworlds.' 
Social relations in the village were centred on feudal cast-based family structures that 
originally classified people according to the service rendered to the King. The King's 
extended family constituted the highest caste (Geiger, 1960; Paranavithana, 1961); 
political and religious counsellors and astrologers formed the second rank; and other 
ranks were based on people's crafts and occupations such as cultivation, smiths, potters, 
barbers, tailors, drummers, and washerwomen. Role differentiation of these people was 
not based on specialised skills. Single households of a man, wife, and children were the 
basic socio-economic units within extended family relations that included grand parents, 
cousins, uncles, nephews, nnu nieces. The eldest male was predomir.antly a decision-
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maker on economic issues. The family unit promoted social unity and individual 
esteem, as one's social stntus was largely derived from one's caste identity rntlwr than 
individual achievements. This system of social structure was maintained through 
marriage, occupation, ceremonies, and social gatherings (Wickramasinghe & Hopper, 
2000). 
Supporting this social structure was a w,.11 ~ndcrstood system of status and mutual 
obligations between families and neighbours governed by trust relationships. For 
example, employees in a paddy field were nonnally family members, though in the seed 
showing and harvesting seasons neighbours help on a basis of aththam. This is where 
neighbours worked for other fanncrs in a reciprocal relationship without any wage 
negotiations. On the workdays in question the fanner provide,; outside employees with 
sufficient food and drink. Women were busy serving, helped by their children, 
grandparents, and relatives. Each working session was a cultural ceremony (Ariyaratne, 
1999). 
Unlike capitalist industrial organisations, social relations were formed not for extracting 
surplus labour for realisi[lg the objectives of owners in a Uetached labour relation and 
political process, but to maintain traditional ways of living {Hindess & Hirst, 1977). The 
village was, and still largely is, a social organisation linked by reciprocal relationships. 
People were conscious of one another's lives. Vi!lagcrs take pains to meet requests to 
participate in activities ranging from fanning to cultural ceremonies. Unlike a capitalist 
society, such human actions (communicative a..:tions in Habermas's terms) are perceived 
as being part of village life rnther than constituting distinct production relationships, 
economic calculation, price payments and wages. Indeed, unlike a capitalist society, 
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work nm! leisure, work an(l family, and economic and social relations were not 
distinctly separated but intcr.vovcn in day-to-day life in a system of reciprocal 
rclati,Jnships (Wickrumasinghe & Hopper, 2000). 
The ancient village culture had been based on deeply rooted value systems (Silva, 
2000). The political problem-solving unit at village level was called a "Village 
Council", the purpose of which was lo resolve day-to-day village problems such as 
boundary disputes of land plots and other forms of disputes of villagers in the village. 
The functions, respon&ibilities and the ways of solving problems by the Village Council 
wCrc not documented but governed by norms embedded in the culture. 
The colle1:tively available situation interpretations were stored by al! participants and 
could be narratively called upon when required. This social grammar was reproduced 
as n whole in every single interaction with other members in the society. By 
implication, the process was understood by every person in the village. The trust and the 
mutual understanding of human actions were vested in the customs and traditions, 
which formed the fundamental ideologies of human behaviour (Ariyaratne, 1999). 
Villagers solved their problems by recourse to core Buddhist principles such as agreed-
upon consensual truth, equality, selflessness, no objectivo truth as sueh which could be 
grasped by reason alone (Amarasckera, 2001). 
In fact these were the core values which fonned the culture of Sri Lanka (Amarasekcra, 
2001; Ariyaratne, !999). The idea of the chief of the village council was neither to 
control fellow villagers nor to gain personal status but to facilitate the solving of day-to· 
day problems for better life. The social structure was stamped by prestige. The Village 
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Council functioned as au autonomous entity at the village level (Adagama, 1997). This 
system of council worked on a fumily model and was committed to its own partially 
independent process of development at the village level linking the whole society. 
Buddhism was, and still is, central to Sinhalese culture. Sri Lanka's culture is the 
expression of civilisation built by the majority ethnic group, the Sinhalesc over 
thousands of years (Amarasckcra, 2001). Sri Lanka Kings had to be Sinhalese-Buddhist 
and their role was to protect the Sinhala-Buddhist nation {Silva, 2000; Scncvirathnae, 
1996). This tradition had been constant historically, was homogeneous throughout 
Sinhala villages (Kepferer, 198~). People in the villages were (and still arc) religious 
and believed those natural disasters such as deaths, floods, or drought could be averted 
through cultural ceremonies. Buddhist festivals such as vesak (full moon day of May in 
each year associated with Buddha's birth, enlightenment, and death) w~re, and still are, 
celebrated intently as an integral part of peoples' lives. 
People in the villages maintained important Buddhist customs, such as not working on 
every full moon day and not hanning animals through rice cultivation on every full 
moon day (Wickramasinghe & Hopper, 2000). Buddhists believe in predestination and 
reincarnation. According to Buddha's teaching, one's future state depends upon one's 
behaviour in the present and previous souls (Karma). Thus there is no way ofrefraining 
or escaping from suffering except by diminishing desires (Sekhera, 1995). 
Such beliefs, and the fatalism so engendered, do not tally easily with moJcrn CL'ccJs of 
self-improvement, change, efficiency, effectiveness, and market models presumably 
being adopted in dcvoloping countries, such ns in Sri Lanka. These market modols 
largely followed a Western positivist approach which is based on the doctrines of 
teehnocrntic-scicntific and economic rationality or purpo~ivc rationality of managcment 
in organisations {Wickramasinghc & Hopper, 2000). 
Although villagcr5 do work for and appropriate economic gains, this neither dominates 
daily activity nor is it necessarily linked directly to individual actions. People often 
perceive their poverty from a karma perspective and consequently do not actively seek 
ways to improve economic activities with the belief that "more desire for accumulation 
of wealth leads to the extension of [undesirable] life" {Sekhera, 1995). Instead people 
use religious ceremonies within the village to 'collect good account' for the forthcoming 
life in the next soul. 
Human action is purposefully geared towards overcoming miseries through the teaching 
of Buddhism and this process is enacted in their day-to-day Jives (Wickramasinghc & 
Hooper, 2000). Such ideas are the major obstacles to transformations of devdoping 
cciuntries such as Sri Lanka through computerised information systems ar.d their 
development or otherwise. Monks and well-established religious culture were, and still 
are, powerful antidotes to non-conformity. The modem day discourse such as 
encouragement, efficiency, and systematisation arc far from the normal life style of 
, , Sinha!ese villagers (Foster, 1961). 
This traditionally deep-seated culture in the traditional villages began to change due to 
Portuguese, Dutch, and British colonialism which began in the early 16Ut century 
(Adagama, 1997). During these colonial periods, the agricultural society changed into a 
commodity-based export and import economy. Political domination became the 
crystallising nucleus of the state. The colonial states mediated the Jives of people acting 
as an arbitrator through administrative organisations. However, the new political orrler 
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of the colonial states was incompatible with the social structures nf the agricultural 
society. The state increasingly mediated the traditionally established customs, social 
value systems. !!lld Jiving patterns of people including their day-to-day lives through 
institutions, administration, education, religion, and !aw. This process constituted a new 
legality and rationality, giving rise to the fonnation of new social structures based on 
Western values and culture. The traditional ways of life increasingly surrendered when 
the state introduced purposive rational actions and the central functions of power and 
control ofhuman lifo in the villages (Adagama, 1997). 
Toe colonial ruling system of control in Sri Lanka (before known as Ceylon) developed 
an elite social c\a~s who imitated and embraced modernisation programs styled on the 
Western countries. This social class enjoyed wealth and power at the expense of the 
ordinary people. Education, often in English, was limited to a privileged group, most 
notably students from the elite class that were trained in Western ways and held posts in 
the administration and catered for the need of the colonial states (Yodhasinghc, 2000). 
Administrative systems were constituted on bureaucractic, scientific and rational 
principles. This system of administration relied upon the creeds of capitalism and 
managers trained in these western principles to buttress the status qua (Gunatunge, 
1994). 
sri Lanka gained independence from the British in 1948, Post-colonial politics spawned 
modem ideologies, often derived from the West, embracing education, industrialisation, 
and changed social attitudes to urbanis1dion. The national ideological pressure to 
mod~mise and industrialise began in the late 1950s following a balance of payment 
crisis. It was part of the country's then industrial development policy of import-
substituting industrialisation (Vidanapathirana, 1999). This included a program for 
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industrialisntion based on public ownership (Lakshmllfl, 1976) leading to the foundation 
ofSOEs under the state ownership. 
The rationale for such SOEs were outlined by the Committee for Public Enterprises as 
follows: "111csc ventures had a long gestation period, a high risk element and required 
tremendous venture capital" (Karunatilakc, 1987). The SEOs were ci::pcctcd to fulfil 
certain social obligations: 
(a) To make goods and services available at low cost to the public 
(b) To assist regional development 
{c) To create employment 
(d) To induce industrial disci,pline among employees. 
These objectives were implemented in the cx:isting political culture of the country. 
Some of these state owned•manufacturing enterprises were established in rural villages. 
The proliferation of SO Es continued from 1960-70. Tiie size of the SO Es as II share of 
GDP increased from 5.7 percent in 1961 to 12.2 per cent in 1974 and to above 15 per 
cent in 1977 (Lakshman, 1979). The control structure of SO Es stemmed from statutory 
documents regulating from the State Industrial Corporation Act No. 49 of 1957 ancl the 
ten-year plan of 1959. This defined a public corporation (public enterprise), as a legal 
entity owned by the government with considerable financial independence within a 
system of accountability to the public through parliament. The assumption was that 
public corporations could be controlled by a "universal model" (Amarasingbe, 1978). 
Fonnal!y the control of public enterprises embodied a philosophy of legal-rational 
principles and bureaucracy (Weber, 1947), that owed much to the statutory corporation 
model underlying the structure of British nationalised industries (Kelegama, 1991). 
120 
Management principles followed the tcnnnL~ of scientific managcfY!cnt principle~. 
Accounti'.ig systems, such as organisational budgets were used us instruments for 
controlling the activities of corporations. The systems were largely manual. Computer 
based infonnation systems did not appear up until this period, in the late 1960s. 
A left-centred government came to power in 1965 uncommitted to expanding public 
sector enterprises: instead they sought to encourage small and medium sized private 
firms (Kanmatilaka, 1987). Managerial issues in public enterprises were low on their 
agenda despite the large amounts of public finance diverted to this sector 
(Balachandran, 1977). When another left-centred government entered power in !970, 
committed to expanding public enterprises, they inherited an "empty Treasury" (Budget 
Speech, 1970) and an incipient financial crisis. 
This situation resulted in introducing a legal framework to control public finances in the 
public Finance Act 38 of 1971, which required public corporations to have budgets and 
associated financial procedures in an attempt to bring economic rationality principles to 
the sector (Kelegama, 1991). 
The use of computers in corporations began in the late 1960s when the first computer 
was installed at the State Engineering Corporation, which was followed by the 
Insurance Corporation, the Petroleum Corporation and the Department of Census and 
Statistics. The rationale for introducing computerised information systems to the SOEs 
was to efficiently monitor and control government funds, while exerting close control 
over the workforce. They were largely installed in Acoounting Departm<!nts to process 
payrolls and prepare accounting documents on a batch-processing basis. Managers used 
budgets to control employees by committing them to production targets. The efficiency 
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criteria used to judge the success of corporntions. However, paradoxical social 
[i movements within corporations emerged. The budgets provided production targets and 
"'\ monitors but they were difficult to implement. 
11 ,, 
' )' Employees' cultural resistance remained and became inflamed by an cconomica!!y 
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rational and unduly purposive-rational actions of bureaucrats (Karunatilnka, 1987). 
Thus the modernisation efforts attempted through the SO Es model of government using 
computerised information systems development, proved unsuccessful due to resistance 
stemming from socio-cultural values, economic and political context in Sri Lanka. 
In 1977 a new government introduced market-based open economic policy (Colombagc, 
1993). The initial reasons for State ownership had e-0me to be seen as unimportant. 
Technological advances required the introduction of computerisation and market forces 
into previously monopolistic business areas such as Cement manufa:;ture, 
telecommunication ond electricity. The election of a right-centred govem.rnent 
committed to market economics was a separntion in Sri Lanka politics and brought 
fundamental changes to the industrial development policy (Karunatil\cke, 1993). 
Policy makers now promoted a more ~ompetitive environment in an attempt to induce 
greater organisational efficiency (Kdegama, 1993). Stimulated by !MF and World Bank 
initiatives towards a policy of privatisation, the government perceived public enterprises 
as a burden upon the economy (World Bank, 1987). 
In general the government hoped to privatise inefficient enterprises. However, the 
policy stipulated that enterprises that were visibly profitable should be given priority in 
order to make privatisation p1ugrammc attrnctive. Two important legislation acts were 
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enacted to support the privatisation, the Conversion of Government-Owned Business 
Undertaking into Public Corporation Act, No. 22 of 1987,2 and the Conversion of 
Public Corporation or Government Owned Business Undertaking into Public 
Companies Act, No. 23 of !987. 111csc enactments were made in order to provide the 
legal framework for the "commercialisation" ofSEOs (Kclegama, 1997). 
The government changed the name of the privatisation into 'pcop!isation' to attrnct the 
imagination of lower middle class voters. The UNP manifesto of 1988 stated that 
peoplisation would be used as a strategy to achieve management recovery and 
rehabilitation of public enterprises. Accordingly, peoplisation signified an attempt to 
introduce commercial norms into public enterprises by converting them to public 
companies and subsequently by transferring their ownership to tbc employees and to the 
public in addition to the corporate investors (Kelegamn, 1997). 
The objectives of privatisation progranune were: 
1. To reduce the fiscal burden and to pennit industries to raise funds from the capital 
market 
2. To increase competition and efficiency which, in tum, would induce technological 
modernisation and lead to better consumer service 
~- To encourage widespread share ownership in the society 
4. To create an enterprise culture (Kelegama, 1997, p. 457). 
The government introduced a separate unit under the Ministry of Industries to expedite 
the privatisation programmes. The World Bank funded the unit. In 1989, the name of 
the unit changed Company from Public Investment Management Board into Public 
Management Investment. In 1990, the unit trnnsfcrccd to the Ministry of Finance due to 
)I 
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slow progress made by the PMIC (Jaycwardena, 1994). Its role was to provide 
institutional lcadcr.;hip to the privatisation process by preparing SOEs for privatisation 
and by mirnaging them till divestiture (Kclcgama, 1997). 
As part of the privatisation processes the following various measures were undertaken: 
I. To strengthen the capital market 
2. To facilitate labour retrenchment and compensation in public enterprises 
4. To reform the taxation structure to create and maintain environment conducive to 
privatisation 
S •• To facilitate necessary regulatory activities (Kclegama, 1993). 
However, the authorities did not provide information to the public (Jayewardena, 1994) 
assuming that the move would be opposed. The government controlled the flow of 
information to the public to reap the benefits of privatisation. Even nowadays the 
government censors information. As a result people do not trust the truthfulness of 
government efforts, particularly the privatisation programme. Morwver, negat!ve 
response by the public towards privatisation was silenced through the use of state poWl r 
such as the suppressio11 of public participation in discussions. 
In the implementation of the privatisation process, priority was given to those investors 
who had the ability to introduce capital and technology into the enterprise and to 
provide access to foreign export markets. The rationality was that the issue of all, or the 
majority of shares, to the public was n ·t a viable option to achieve the priority 
objectives of technological modernisation (Kelcgama, 1997). 
In the offer of sale of shares, 10 per cent was gifted to th~r,employees of the enterprise 
on the basis of the length of their service, 30 percent to the public and the 60 per cent to 
corpornte investor~ 011 the bnsis or open tenders and coP1petitivc bidding. It seems that 
the real motive of offering shares to the employees was to evoid employee resistance for 
the privatisntio11 by giving them token ownership of the privati~cd enterprises 
(Kclcgama, l 997, p. 463). 
By 1994, most of the privatised enterprises were not relatively large in value. For 
,example, 22 entcrp·,isr.s out of a total of 43 valued at less than Rs. I 00 million. Five 
enterprises were valuL'li over Rs. 750 million, one of which was the NCCL Company. 
The total estimated earning was accounted for 12 billion. This amounted to 2 per cent of 
GDP and 10 percent of state revenue. 1l1c investors came from both domestics (Rs. 5.25 
billiion) nod foreign (Rs. 4.07) sources in the case of the sale of the majority share 
holding. This was in addition to what was realised from public share flotation (Rs. 2.5 
billion). Foreign purchasers of shares in privatised enterprises came from a range of 
countries including Japan, South Korea, India, UK, Singapore, Hong Kong, Pakistan, 
Sw1!zerland and Norway (Kelcgama, 1997, p. 466). 
The profits of privatised enterprises have increased with the modernisation and 
technological upgrading including the introduction of new infonnation technologies. It 
" 
·';i~ reported that one of the privatised companies (of the 43 that were sold all went to 
•( 
corporate it1vcstors) appears to have come up with the record of best perfonnance nfter 
privatisation. This infonnation Jed policy makers to emphasise the importance of having 
a singie investor to creat~ strong management perfonnance (Kelegama, 1997, p. 467). 
International donors, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, 
made foreign aid conditional on the pace of implemcntatiot1 of privatisation. Moreover, 
pressures from these donors forced the government to privatise profit making SOEs 
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such ns NCCL and Sri Lanka Telecommunication. The government uml money from 
the sale of such profit-makmg SOEs to reduce annual govcrmm.-nt budget deficits. 
Although the modernisation e1T011s with open market principles led the public and 
employees to oppose the government policy, the process still continues. For example, in 
the par\inment, the opposition parties quest:~ncd the process adopted in privatising such 
SOEs as Air Lanka, Gas, NCCL, and Telecom enterprises. Certain Ministers were 
charged with corruption. The government did not impose any social obligations or any 
other restrictions on private owners in the management of SOEs. This was one of the 
reasons leading to greater profitability offinns after privatisation (Jayewardena, 1994). 
Nonetheless, the rc1a,,ulatory framework prepared to manage the 1,rivatisation does not 
address crucial socio cultural Hfcworlds problems such as the traditional value systems 
in Sri Lanka. Rather, these legal frameworks enactcrl by the government and other 
fiscal and infrastuctural facilities were based sJlcly on Wcstem-tyne narrowly 
purposive-rationalist principles such as base-line ae<:onting. The above processes were 
established to support those who were in power so as to realise their rational objectives 
often at the expense of =rloyees and the gc•.1cral public (Kelegama, 1997, p. 467). 
4.3.1 Socio-Cultural Lifeworlds 
Cultural antl1ropology and history have produced a substantial literature on 
transformation in developing countries that meshes together cultural, political, and 
economic factors (e.g. Nissan, 1997; Dannie], 1997; Schwatz, 1997; Kafcrcr, 1988; 
Williams, 1981, 1958; Althusser, 1970). These researchers, often rejects positivistic 
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science, understand culture as an important, indcpcntlcnt factor in historical and socio-
economic analyst:s of change and knowkdge creation. 
McCarthy (1996) defines kt10wlcdge as "any and every set of ideas and acts accepted by 
one or another social group or society of people~ ideas and acts pertaining to what they 
accept as real for them and for others". Radnitsky (1970, p. i) has provided such a 
broader view: "we conceive of science essentially as a knowledge improving 
enterprise". 
Knowledge in this sense is not limited to what can be learned from empirical data 
collection or mathematical deduction, in positivist sciences, but includes rill human 
insight and wisdom that can be exposed in morale discourse (Klein & Hirschhcim, 
1996). Knowledge is a matter of commmity acceptance. The criteria for acceptance are 
an agreed set of conventions that must be followed if the knowledge is to be accepted by 
the community. The set of conventions is nor arbitrary, as in positivist sciences, but is 
well thought out and historically produced knowledge claims. 
In any society there are a myriad knowledge claims. Habermas contends that theory 
which should be accepted are those which can be supported by the force of better 
argument (Habennas, 1984). The body of thus accepted knowledge claims forms an 
agreed best understanding by a community at a particular point of time (Goles & 
Hirsehheim, 2000). 
In Habcrmas'ss understanding, knowledge is grounded in '\ifowor\ds.' The working 
premise is that social reality is in process and is fonncd out of the prevailing knowledge 
of a society or group of people. In order that knowledge be a convention, it should be 
relnt1-'CI to socictn! nonns, expectation~, values - whkh is used to engage in a search for 
understanding (Golcs & Hirsd1hcim, 2000). The sociology of knowledge is thus the 
sociology of culture, values, beliefs, and mylhs redefined and represented as a ~ynthesis 
between the "social detmnirmnts" (i.e. knowledge is socially determined) and the social 
"ordercrs" (i.e. knowledge coostitutcs a social order). 
The social reality is not n social fact, in its own right, but somethiog produced and 
communicated, its meaning derived in and through these systems of communications 
(McCarthy, 1996). It is the "greater autonomy" over how people in a society are 
represented and how they can construct their own social and cultural models. In 
developing nations, social reality form an inertia which prevents to some extent, a take~ 
over by Western epistemics and historicity (Escobar, 1995). 
Snyder (1978 cited in Gales & Hirschheim, 2000) discusses science as" something that 
people do. It is not a particular set of assertions or theotics, but 11 set of activities that 
may or may not produce organised lileories". 
Science, for all intents and purpose, is a problem-solving vehicle. Science "essentially a 
process of consensus formation" (Anderson, 1983, P. 25 cited in Go\es & Hirschheim, 
2000) .. The consequence of this conception of science is that virtually any scholarly 
attempt at acquiring knowledge could be construed to be "science". It is important to 
note this notion of science places the emphasis of knowledge acquisitioo on the 
"community" (Goles & Hirschheim, 2000). Truth knowledge is therefore a communal 
achievement. It is what the community agrees to bestow the label of "knowledge" or 
"truth" upon (Gok~ & Hirschheim, 2000). 
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In traditional Marxist :;malysis, ideology is an clement of supra-structure and the role of 
culture is de-emphasised. For Marx, culture was just an insignificant factor that 
belonged to the supra-strJcturc while productive materialistic forces formed the 
infrastructure on which that supra-structure rests (Amarasckcra, 2001 ). 
Jn the focc of cult um I analysis, such economic determinism is questionable. If i('.eology 
is the formal nnd conscious beliefs of a class, or other social groups, then culture must 
be the ground for ideologies. Thus culture is more fundamental than ideology and 
culture is a pre-existent and ubiquitous preunderstanding as recognised in Habermas's 
conceptualisation of communicative action (1987a, 1987b, 1987c, 1984) and William's 
nco-Mnrxist conceptualisation (1983, 1980, 1958) which place culture as fundamental 
to social systems. In this respect, culture remains as an important supra-structural 
phenomenon and ideology should be understood as one of various socio-cultural 
reproductions. 
In his analysis of 'lifewcrlds,' Habennas (1987b, 1979) identifies culture as the first 
structural component, defined as "the stock of knowledge from which participants in 
communication supply themselves with interpretations as they come to an 
understanding about scmething in the world". Culture signifies a "shared 
understanding" of actors in communication, a "state or habit of mind" giving rise to a 
"way oflife" and "a general reaction to a general and major change in the conditions of 
our common lifo" (Williams, 1958). Culture encapsulates patterns of meanings of 
distinct peoples or other social groups (Palmer, 1994), including the processes of giving 
meaning to structure, power, identity, and values {Althusser, 1970). Thus culture creates 
a particular "social order" in which cultural practice and cultural rcproductior,s are the 
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main elements through which participants regulate their memberships in social groups 
and thereby secure solidarity (Hubcnnas, 1987h, 1979). 
CUiture is n si!;nifying system through which a social order is communicated, 
reproduced, experienced, and explored (Williams, 1981). Interest in the problem of 
meaning is !inked to a methodological framework that is neither causal nor explanatory 
but semiotic. The semiotic study of culture is directed towards the study of symbolic 
and signifying systems through which a social order is communicated and reproduced. 
These signifying systems and social practice are what make up a culture and it structure 
of meaning (McCarthy, 1996, p. 20). It involves the study of the general context and 
culture of communication and the shared assumptions underlying communication and 
understanding (Beynon-Davies, 1994). 
The study of 'lifoworlds' is crucial for understanding the role of information 
technology and information systems development in social transformations in 
organisations in Sri Lanka. Capitalism and industrialisation llas penetrated Sri Lanka 
unevenly, leaving important segments relatively free of Western domination and 
allowing traditional cultural practice, value systems, bel:cfs, and myths to survive and 
predominate. These socio-cultural 'lifeworlds' may sec as major inhibitors to a wider 
application of emergent Western knowledge through infon,1ation tcclmology. 
Thus socio-cultural practice associated with a non-western societies, such as Sri Lanka, 
provide the starting point for understanding the development of information systems 
through infonnation technology and whether or not they become subsumed into n non-
western or a Western culture. 
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4.4 Modernisation through Science ond Technology b1 Sri Lanka 
A nucleus of modernisation, especially through scientific and technological activities, 
began to appear in an organised foshion in Sri Lanka during the 191h century within the 
Department of Agriculture and the crop research institutions through the Tea Research 
Institute, the Rubber Research Institute, and the Coconut Research Institute (Wijesckara 
& Wijesekara, 1999). First, these scientific and technological activities were directed 
towards servicing the TC(!Uircmcnts of British colonialism. Later, these activities 
expanded into other institutions such as government departments, corporations, and 
universities after Sri Lanka gained independence in 1948. A commitment towards 
modernisation through scientific and technological activities appeared in policy 
fonnulations of all the governments elected after independence (Wijcsekara & 
Wijcsekara, 1999, pp. 400-14). 
4.4.1 Modernisation through Information Technology 
The use of computers in Sri Lanka began in the late 1960s and the early 1970s when 
certain state corporations and departments introduced computers at work for processing 
financial activities such as payroll, inventory, financial, and cost accounts on batch 
processing basis. The rationale for introducing computers to the state enterprises was 
the efficiency principle applied to the monitoring and controlling of government funds. 
Generally, during this period, infonnation systems development and practice was 
largely ad-hoe, with software vendors providing systems for state corporations and 
departments. These systems produced in developed countries mainly the USA and the 
West, are promoted, sold, and served by agents in Sri Lanka. The state organisations 
were mainly concrmcd with the reliability Md accuracy of data maintained on their 
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systems. Many of the .~tute sector organisations began their computerisation projects 
with little in-house capabilities (Samaranayaka, 1989). Concentration was given to 
hardware acquisition rather thnl'l developing necessary information systems 
infrastructure in-house. A number of projects introduced in this way did not have a 
sib'llificant impact on the improvement of performance of government corporations and 
dcpnrtmcnts in Sri Lanka. 
However, the expansion of computer application for commercial and administrative 
purposes in Sri Lanka began with the liberalisation of the economy in 1977, resulting in 
more computers being used fer financial and business applications. For example, in the 
J 980s, service oriented organisations such as Banks and most of the private sector 
institutions introduced information technology for commercial activities 
(Samaranayaka, 1999). 
4.4.1.1 Government Policy on Information Technology 
In the mid 1980s, the need for a national computer policy for Sri Lanka was recognised. 
As n result the government established fue Computer and information technology 
Council of Sri Lanka (C[NTEC) by an Act of Parliament in 1984. The national 
information technology policy objectives as stipulated by the CINTEC, involve the 
following: 
(a) To harness computer technology in all its aspects, for the benefit of the 
people of Sri Lanka, and to further the socio-economic development of the 
nation; 
(b) To promote .and guide the development of computer-related resources and 
their application, to anticipate and meet the future needs of the national 
economy; 
(c) To enhance nnd supplement manpower resources and increase the efficiency 
11nd productivity of management and employees at all possible levels; 
-~~----------------------,---~-=--·~---~~ 
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(d) To improve the quality of life of the people of Sri Lanka, including the job 
satisfaction nnd working conditions of employees; 
(e) To increase the flexibility and dynamism of Sri Lanka society to enable il to 
successfully meet the clmllcngcs of the future, arising from the ever-
increasing pace of world wide scientific and tcchnolo1,,y. (CJNTEC, ! 984) 
Thllse initiatives gave wide scope for information technology being used within both 
state n:nd private sector organisations in the country. The apparent motivation was, and 
still is, the rationalisation of work practice by the use of infommtion tcchnolo&,,y, rnthcr 
thnn cost displacement (cost displacement is realised by substituting technology for 
people, see Davis, 1992, p. 384). For example, in 1986, the Administrative Reform 
Committee of Sri Lanka recommended the extensive use of management information 
systems and information technology to ensure efficiency in the state sector 
organisations for rapid socio-economic development (Samaranayaka, 1999). 
4.4.1.2 Information Technology for Socio-economic Development 
Information technology was, and still is, deployed in the context of enterprises striving 
for efficiency, productivity, and competitiveness in a liberalised ranrket economy in Sri 
Lanka. It is conceived as one of the most sib'Tlificant forces of modernisation that drives 
a "technology push" for socio-economic development in the country (Srunaranayaka, 
1988). 
The development of the information technology sector occupies a very important 
element in the annual budget (Budget Speech, 2001). The implicit assumption is that 
information technology will promote socio-economic development. Fo\lowing this 
assumption, over the Inst two decades, Sri Lanka government has created an 
environment to promote information technology use in organisations through various 
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policy mcnsurcs. For example, the government has removed tariff embargoes un 
imports of computers and computer-related accessories. Certain companies on 
infonnation technology related business, which engage in such areas as development of 
software for foreign markets, have been granted permission to operate in the Free Trade 
Zones (FTZ). 
Significant progress was made in the application of di&ital technologies in Sri Lanka 
during the 1990s. Telecommunication infrastructure developments through 
liberalisation have included an increase in land phone users (36 people pL'l' telephone), 
cellular telephone setviccs organisations (currently 4 companies offering a combination 
of analogue and digital networks), paging services (5 operator e-0mpanies), Internet 
service providers (9 compani<!s), and implementation of modem communication 
technologies such as integrated services digital network (ISDN), Frame Relay, and very 
,.,small aperture terminal (VSAT). There are five web site providers, who operate as 
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tsellers oflieensed operators (Kularatna, 1999). 
Presently, about five organisations are engaged in e-business and about 17214 e-mail 
and Internet subscribers (Central Bank, 1999). The development of telecommunication 
infrastructurr signifies an indication of the "emerging digital economy" in Sri Lanka 
(Ranasinghe, 1999). However, these developments are Hmited to Greater Colombo 
region. Nearly 80% of the population living in rural areas have no access to modem 
information and information and communication technologies. They are neither aware 
of the benefits of infonnation and communication technologies nor are able to obtain 
them because of their poor living conditions. 
The government hus initiated major projects with the collaboration of foreign countries 
(e.g. Australia and Switzerland), to establish an institution to train skilled personnel in 
information technology to meet the manpower rcquiremeat of both the state and the 
private sector organisations. Moreover, the government has an;iounced the year 2001 as 
»the year of information technology" to promote information technology based 
economic development of the country. Recently, the government established a separate 
Ministerial portfolio for information technology development within the country 
(Abeywardena, 2000). The objec\ive of this new establishment was ,.o prepare 
groundwork which will serve as a firm basis for future socio- economic development 
(Peiris, 2001). 
4.4.t.3 Problems in information technology Adoption 
The government expects to introduce information technology-based solutions in 
business and administration, both in the state and the private sector, as enabling and 
promising technology for the 21" Century, despite widely spread problems such as 
dysfunctional bureaucracies, lack of management orientation to the market system, lack 
of co-ordination and outdated work systems, and procedures in many institutions of 
state departments and corporations in Sri Lanka (Budget Speech, 1996; Jayawecra, 
1996). These problems remain major obstacle to the country's economic growth and to 
effective implementation of social programmes in spite of the political will of 
successive governments to reform organisations. For example, some major 
computerisation projects such as the introduction of computers to schools, have proved 
unsuccessful in making a modernisation impact on students using computers to date 
(Samaranayaka, 1999). 
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This is mainly because Sri Lanka lacks organisutional capacities to accommodate and 
manage change to make cffcclivc use uf technology. [t a!aso lacks the ability to move 
towards more modem forms of opcrntions, lack of ~kills to develop and maintain new 
technology, and its inability to sec chan3c in a wider socio-coonomic and political 
context of the country. For example, more than half the schools do not have adequate 
infrastructural facilities such as electricity, roads, water treatment n~1works, and 
telephones, nor adequate teacher trainers. Students arc taught in national languages such 
as Sinhala and Tamil. English, "the language of computers" is hardly understood by 
students, particularly in rural areas, since there is no adequate teachers to teach English 
language. 
More generally, students seem to be reluctant to learn about computers, as they are 
interested only in the formal examination subjects. Neither computer education included 
as an examination subject nor adequate computers were provided for schools. Although 
prevailing infrastructural facilities are inadequate, students in poor families, particularly 
in rural areas, use education as a means to secure jobs to eradicate poverty in their 
families. Achieving highest results in G.C.E 0/L am'l AIL is the only target of many of 
the students. 
In this background environment, it is hardly fair to expect students living in rural areas 
to learn about computers, something they may never have heard about in their life. 
Also, many school principals fear damage to the computers with student use and certain 
principals use computers as symbol of status to maintain the power distance between 
teachers (Snmaranayaka, 1999). The failure of this project proves that existing 
infonnation systems knowledge and professional practice arc insufficient to motivate 
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' stude',.;t~ to use computers in schools am:! thus to derived skills for the effective use of 
infonnntion systems in Sri Lanka. 
At the University level, computer-oriented programmes have been introduced, as part of 
mathematics nod engineering degree courses, with assistance pro'lidcd by the British 
and Japanese governments. The Departments of Computer Science, Statistics, and 
Engineering at the Universities of Colombo, Peradeoiya, and Moratuwa offer courses 
such as computer progrnmmiog, systems design, and systems development through 
undergraduate level degree progranuncs. The University of Colombo introduced a 
Master of Science (M.Sc.) in computer science in 1990. Additionally certain other 
Universities, such as the University of Sri Jayewardcnapura, the University of Kaleniya, 
and the Open University, offer computer courses as subjects within their social sciences 
degree programmes. These courses include management information systems, 
information technology, data processing, computer literacy, and computer application in 
accounting, marketing, and human resources management (Various curricula in degree 
programmes, 1998). 
Similarly, certain MBA and M. Sc. in management programmes have also introduced 
management information systems and information technology subjects as part of their 
degrees. The National Institute of Business Management of the Ministry of Industries 
and Scientific Affairs, offers diploma course in Computer Systems Design in addition to 
the private institutions which provide computer courses in programming, systems 
analysis, design, and systems development and information technology related 
education. 
If [ wer~' to lo~!: back rdlcclivcly, [ would say 
!hat during the greater pan of my career as a 
university lecturer, Che role of a centre of 
learning was understood by the local academic 
community in terms of dissemination of 
Mmodem knowledge" generated nt Western 
centres. This approach is more pronounced in 
information systems areas. Th<:: emphasis was 
decidedly on mere knowledge disscminaiion 
rather than on contributing through knowledge 
creation. 
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The common feature in computer 
education in Sri Lanka, both in the state 
and the private sector, is an orientation 
towards teaching courses as technical 
subjects to generate experts knowledge in 
computers (Williams & Gunatunge, 
2000b, 1999a). 
Teachers adopt expert and an all-knowing posture in teaching computers to students. 
The teacher deposits knowledge into students who are viewed as empty vessels. Those 
students who meekly accept the knowledge arc the better students. Such an education is 
oppressive because it does not teach students to inquire actively and reflect critically 
about the world ofleaming computers relating •.o practical problems. 
Jn most of the universities, curricula are generally oriented towards computer science 
and software engineering rather than towards infonnation systems. An information 
Sfstem has not emerged as a separate discipline in all of the universities (Various 
curricula in degree programs, 1998). There is no information systems Department in 
any of the universities, nor an academic journal dedicat~d to addressing information 
systems issues. In certain universities, management information systems arc a subject 
within business degree courses but the focus is in information technology rather th~n 
information systems. Certain lecturers who teach management information systems 
' 
' 
{', 
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equate it with information technology. Most texts and teaching methods in the field of 
information technology and management information systems (e.g. Laudon & Laudon, 
1998) draw heavily, if nut completely, from nn analytic and instrumentally rational 
notion of education. 111c-sc approaches place considerable emphasis on tccl1niqucs and 
methods as the major form of knowledge required for management in this area 
(Williams, ! 996). Tiicsc courses do not address, for example, how infonnation 
·:cchnology could be developed and used for socio-economic development, rather 
information technology is mealy taught as technical subjects to develop technical 
information systems {Williams & Gunatungc, 2000a, 2000b, 1999a). This can lead to 
staff and management problems in those organisations who employ persor.nel trained by 
the universities (Wijesing.her, 1988). 
It appears that narrow technical education al(?ne is inadequate for generating balanced 
knowledge among students (Williams, l 996). For example, Asian Development Bank 
(ADB) studirs related to Sri Lanka (1989) point out that "facility for technical training 
is grossly inadequate both in tcnns of output ati.d occupations focus" (p. 23). This 
' inadequacy is p.'lrticularly due lo a tendencj' to ignore the existence of non-positivist 
knowledge in Sri Lanka. 
Presently most organisations in Sri 'Lan!<a have introduced computerised infommtion 
systems for word processing, spreadsheets and databases for payroll, sales, inventory, 
accounting, marketing, and human resources managtmcnt. Organisations sui:h as 
banks, insurance, and NCCL have inlroduced management information systems. 
NCCL, for example, ha~ planed to introduce enterprise models to address strategic 
issues as an overall framework for the development of corporate applications and 
databnses (i.e. the Genn!llle "SAP"· Enterprise resource Planning Systems 1. Ahout I OOO 
organisations have their own w..::,' pages in the World Wide Web (WWW). 
These organisations perceive that the introduction of new information systems, largely 
technical systems, acts as enabling technology to derive benefits such as systematisation 
of work, increase efficiency, productivity, flexibility, sharing of infonnation across 
departments, head office and branches, and competitiveness withiu the liberalised 
market model of socio-economic development while employing persons trained in Sri 
Lanka (both in the state and private institutions) and foreign universities 
(Samaranayaka, 1999). 
1'1. 
1\ 
There have been numerous fail~~e~ in developing information systems for organisations 
in Sri Lanka (Williams & Gunatunge, 2000a, 2000b, 1999a; Gunatungc & Williams, 
2000). Part of the reason is that infonnation systems practitioners tend to ignore social 
·context as important determinants of success in systems development. 
Infonnation systems practitioners in Sri Lanka usually evaluate information systems 
success from the standpoint of technical and economic rationality criteria only. A Jack 
of information systems awareness among managers and a narrow technical focus in 
information technology professionals have prevented them from coming together to 
identify and implement meaningful infonnation systems development for organisations. 
This limited framework often results from positivist training within the dominant model 
of knowledge acquisition stemming from Western societies' experience of modernity. 
The dominance of the Western centred model of knowledge in information systems 
dcvelopmcnl often result in a marginalisation and disqualificatio.n of non-Western 
;, 
" 
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knowledge within Sri Lanka society. Prnctitioncrn who ignore the existence of non-
Western values in Sri Lanka may do so partly because their training ignored the 
cllistencc of non-positivist knowledge rntiona!ities, such as communicative rationality, 
which could guide them beyond Western reductionistic thinking (Escobar, 1995). For 
example, development studies conducted in developing countries conclude that 
"systems of knowledge" should include not only the rules and values of Western 
cultures, but a!so ways of knowing within the lifeworlds of indigenous communities 
(Sachs, 1992). 
Indigenous versions of socio-economic development and modernity arc fonnulated 
according to complex processes that include traditional cultural practice, histories of 
colonialism, and contemporary location within the global economy of goods and 
symbols (Dahl & Rabo, 1992). Societies in developing countries may have better 
chances to improve their life conditions if they recognise the limitations of the validity 
of Western techno-economic rationality and pursue alternative rationalities stemming 
from their socio-cultural and value systems (Avgerou, 2000). 
4,4.1.4 Transfer of Information Technologies 
Information tcehnolo&,'lcs together with their information systems development 
approaches are transferred to Sri Lanka from developed countries. The steering media 
are transnational corporations and knowledge transfer agencies, professional 
organisations (e.g. British Computer Associntion and Australian Computer Society), 
foreign consultants, text-books, graduates trained in foreign universities and institutions, 
consulting projects (e.g. UNESCO mission in 1985) and aid projects (e.g. Swedish, nnd 
British aids to equip and train staff in universitie~, with values embedded in the 
modernity of the West. 
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4.4.1.S information systems Research 
Information technology and information systems research occur mostly by 1.1at1icipation 
in various projects funded by Western agencies, with cxpc1tisc from countries in the 
European Community such as, the U.K and Switzerland (Samaranayaka, 1999, News, 
18.03 2001 Island). This is considered to be the most significant vehicle for transferring 
technology from technologically more advanced countries, such as the Western 
communities and North America, and for producing original research results (Avgerou, 
2000). 
This process results in conventional thought and practice being heavily influenced by 
the rationality of modernity in organisations in Sri Lanka. For example, although the 
urgent need is to deal with the management of the technology transfer problems, 
venriors of information technology, mostly from developed countries, through their 
agents, tend to focus on technical issues for solving information problems in developing 
countries (Mohan, Belardo & Bjorn-Anderson, 1990; Samaranayaka, 1988). The results 
of these interventions arc disappointing. Many projects have failed (Samaranayaka, 
1988), and a number of those, which succeed to deliver a technical system, did not have 
a significant positive impact on the performance of many organisation in Sri Lanka 
(Samaranayaka, 1999; Wil!iams & Gunatunge, 2000a, 2000b, l999a). 
Information technology vendors and information systems researchers in the West and 
the North America fail to fully understand the poverty problem in developing countries 
including Sri Lanka. These practitioners, not understanding the prevailing socio-
cultural, economic, and political contexts for information systems development, believe 
their practice and prescriptions are valid for Sri Lanka. These practitioners', including 
'" 
information systems researchers in developed countries, arc relatively wealthy and hus 
little experience of poverty of underprivileged groups in developing countries. Although 
development concerns arc apparent in Western societies, their relative severity is 
different from that of developing countries. For example, privatisation issues in the UK 
are concerned with cost-effectiveness (Hodges & Wright, 1995}. In Sri Lanka, 
privatisation is a matter of ncoco\onialisation, which cmcrged from foreign investment 
mCehanism (Kelegarna, l993; Vidanapatirana, 1993). 
In 'sri Lanka, the planning and implementation of information technology and 
information systems have largely been chara.:terised by some form of elitism whereby 
the users and affected parties are often not involved. These parties have been taken to be 
passive reeipients, resulting in their further marginalisation with regard to their having 
the rcqu!~i:c ~kills and experience to effectively utilise and benefit from the infonnation 
technology and infonnation systems investment. For example, infonnation systems 
researchers in developed countries, in general, and infonnation systems researchers in 
Sri Lanka have not studied the behaviour of peasant employees in multinational 
companies operating in Sri Lanka. Therefore, thfa technology does not contribute 
significantly to the sectors that impact the majority of the citizenry, nflen the poor. The,.' 
result is that the application of information technology in Sri Lanka, actua!ly benefits 
only those who arc in power. Seen in this light, the transfonnation of organisations 
through successful information systems development become illusive. 
Information systems researchers inadvertently neglected, or usually forget to address 
development issues in developing countries where 80 percent of the world population 
lives (Davison et al., 2000). Comparison with deve\opct\ countries show, poor use of the 
information and communication technologies in developing countries. For example, 
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developing countries account for only 2 percent of the total expenditure on informatics 
(Hanna, 1991). They are concerned about the availability of technical skills for 
infonnation systems development (Jayasuriya, 1999), are focused on the reliability and 
accuracy of data maintair.cd by their infonnation systems, and have a low appreciation 
of the benefits and potential of management information systems {Palvia & Palvia, 
1996). Conscqucutly developing countries arc unable to take up infonnation tcchnolot,,y 
opportunities to the "knowledge economy" (World Bank, 1997). 
For example, Internet users in all of Africa and Middle East together account for only 
one per cent of global Internet users in contrast to 90 percent of Internet users in 
industrialised countries, with the US and Canada alone accounting for 57 percent of the 
total (JLO's World Employment Report, 2001). Despite the improvements in labour 
market performance in industrialised countries and the growing potential of information 
technology to create jobs and spur development, the global employment picture remains 
"deeply flawed" for employees in many parts of the developing count1 ics. This results 
in a widening global "digital divide" (ILO's World Employment Report, 2001 ). 
Although information technology and information systems have come to play a vital 
role in organisations and societies in developed countries (Avgerou, 1996; Davision et 
al. 2000), and the infonnation and communication technologies revolution offers 
genuine potential for socio-economic development (ILO's World Employment Report, 
2001), the domain of infonnation systems research has not been adequately explored by 
information systems practice in the context of developing countries (Avgerou, 2000; 
Corea, 2000; Avgerou & Doukidis, 1993). In many developing countries, including Sri 
Lanka, infommtion systems development was not originally a local profession, but was 
imported mainly from imperialist, Western countries and the North America, through 
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various steering media (Abdat & Pcrvan, 2000; Corea, 2000; Broudnig & Schonberger, 
2000; Thanasnnkit & Corbitt, 2000; Jayasuriya, 1999). Although the use of information 
systems development and practice is being called into question in the west and the north 
(see for example, Ngwcnyamn, Truex & Davis, 1997; Lyytinen, 1992, l 986; Orlikowski 
& Baroudi, 1991; livari, ! 991 ), policy makers and practitioners in Sri Lanka have used 
the imported models uncritically. They have assumed that information systems 
development is a neutral profession, independently functions from the socio-cultural, 
economic and political contexts in Sri Lanka. 
Western technocratic and economic rationality in information systems tends to ignore 
the significance of socio-cultural lifeworlds, economic, and political contei.ts in Sri 
Lanka's society, assuming the practice and culture of large multinational organisations 
of the West. The main coocem of ioformation systems development is for narrowly 
defined success in a market environment through information systems solutions with 
modern information te~hno!Ob'Y· However, there is little doubt that information 
technology is penetrating -every sphere of organisational activity in Sri Lanka, even if 
more slowly than in developed countries, given the socio-culture, economic and 
political context of Sri Lanka (Williams & Gunatmige, 2000a, 2000b;Gunatunge & 
Williams, 2000; Samaranayaka, 1999). 
The validity and the socio-economic ~nd political significance of information 
technology diffusion, and new information systems development and practice has, not 
been critically examined in Sri Lanka's social context by either researchers in developed 
countries or in Sri Lanka. There has been no substantial research carried out to 
evaluate the broad socio-economic development feasibility of the use of new 
information systems, supported by information technology in Sri Lanka nor to study 
'" 
what impact new technology-based infonnntion systems have on organisations and 
society. In effect there has been no significant thought on how to understand the ways in 
which information systems could be <lcvclopcd and practised within organisations to 
spur socio-economic development in Sri Lanka. 
Present information systems development and practice in Sri Lanka organisations 
underpin technocratic-scientific and economic rationalism to control human behaviour 
for the benefits of the owners of organisations to rca~ise economically rational 
objectives following the positivist approaches (Williams & Gunatunge, 2000a, 2000b, 
1999a; Gunatunge, 1992). These approaches assume systematised, purposeful, effective, 
unproblematic, and value-free infonnation systems development and practice in 
organisations in Sri Lanaka. However, this is questionable in the context of 
'lifeworlds,' socio-economic, and political contexts of Sri Lanka. 
Following Habermas's framework, I have three main concerns. Firstly, the imposition of 
technocratic and economic rationality into a traditional culture may produce cultural 
dissonance. A discourse that privileges a modem culture of Western valur.s, modes of 
knowledge, and action could lead to discontinuity of cultural values and a fundamental 
incoherence of knowledge necessary for daily practice of managers and employees in 
organisations. Western-based information systems development and practice can lead to 
confusion in Sri Lanka culture with unanticipated consequences leading to personal 
anomie and conflicts in organisations. This process also can create disorder in the 
socialisation process of employees in organisations leading to alienation (Habennas, 
1987a, 1984) .. 
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Secondly, participants involved in systems development process and practice arc not 
value-free. They arc culturally influenced and socially organised. When culturally 
determined aspects such as personal contacts and informal communication, for example, 
become dominant mc,dcs of communication (Yavas, Luqmani & Quraeshi, 1992, p. 76), 
communication via infonnation systems may face strong resistance. This is because in 
these cultures, information is implicit in the physical context or is internalised within the 
people's Hfcworlds understanding. In these cultures, resistance may stem from a 
widespread perception those computers and modem ittformation systems degrade their 
persona! communications (Kirlidog, 1996, p. 58). As a result, information systems 
development and practice in organisations in Sri Lanka may impede rather than 
facilitate the utilisation of information systems. 
Firully, information systems geared to control human behaviour in these cultures resist 
controls, rendering them untenable for managerial purposes and managers faced with 
conflicting experiences.It appears local cultures, predominant values, socio-economic 
environment, power, and politics can contribute to failure (Williams & Gunatungc, 
1999a, 1999b, 2000a, 2000b;Gunatungc & Williams, 2000; Gunatungc, 1992, 1991 ). 
The question, whether or not a Sri Lanka's social context - understood as .::ulture, value 
systems, beliefs, myths, symbols, and behaviour patterns (i.e. 'lifeworlds') - and socio-
economic and political contexts arc favourable to information technology adoption 
through information systems development for socio-economic development need to be 
further investigated. Within unique histories, cultures, socio-economic and political 
contexts, how can the state become effective? Part of the a,;swer is that state should 
match its roles to respomc to the needs and interests of their citizens through consensus 
building in national policy fomrnlation (Stiglitz, 1998). The development programmes 
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needs to enlarge to ie1cluck a range of people's choices and make development 
participatory und more democratic (Human Development Report, l 991 ). 
Within theses interpretations, Habcnnas's ( l987b, 1984) communicative action provides 
a framework for analysing changes induced by cultural, socio-economic, and political 
contexts of Sri Lanka for information systems development and practice. His theory of 
communicative actions provides powerful framework for practitioners to understand the 
focal things and practice that sustain social life and culture in Sri Lanka, to what 
Borgmmm {1984, p. 29) calls for "focal things and practice" that can "centre and 
illuminate our lives". 
The essential point is that the state's interventions of modernity into organisational 
affairs, that impact upon the development of information systems and practice in 
organisations, pays little or no attention to the historically derived socio-cultural value 
systems that sustain social systems (Avgerou, 2000). These socio-cultural value systems 
are the implied knowledge that participants draw meaning during the systems 
development process. 
Meanings arc "the symbolism nssociated with specific objects or activities" (Alasuutari, 
1995, pp. 26-35). Meaning is intersubjective, i.e. based on shared agreement and 
understanding rather than purely subjective. Meanings are shared among different 
groups of people, living different forms of life (Wittgenstein, 1958, pp. 8-12). 
Information systems cic:ist within wider conteic:t of these meaning or sense making 
(Mingers, 1995). Looking for such meanings is crucial as symbolic relations between 
people and information systems shape culture. They are important for developing 
cultural patterns about the information systems being studied. 
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From 'lifewor!ds' perspectives, such meanings underpin cwry-day social practice, 
which have been created and recreated through cultural reproduction, social integration, 
and socialisation of participants in a community (Habcrmas, 1987b, l 984). Therefore, if 
the socio-economic development in a liberalised market through information technology 
application in information systems is the fundamental objective of Sri Lanka, it is 
imperative to understand how information systems practice have been evolved, 
developed, interpreted, questioned, constrained, experienced, and used in various social 
contexts of different modes of socio-economic development. Thus, policy makers and 
mongers in Sri Lanka need to fully apprehend the comple;,:: webs of interactions 
operating in the Jifcworlds, socio-economic, and political contexts within a holistic 
framework for infonnation systems. Without these commonly agreed beliefs about 
s'cicial interaction and role expectation by participants within infonnation systems 
development process cculd not be sustair,cd. 
If infonnaticn technology and infonnation systems arc to be used to enhance socio-
economic development efforts in a meaningful way in Sri Lanka, it is of paramount 
importance to invest in the architecture of patterns of behaviour of people through 
communicative action, i.e. in the 'lifeworlds contexts'. These arc oriented toward the 
cultivation of various technological innovations based on the social context of Sri 
Lanka. The said cultivation requires new patterns of communication [i.e. 
communicative rationality], co· operation [i.e. consensus building among participants], 
and communicative interaction [i.e. shared learning] necessitated by change 
(Kuhathasan, 2000). 
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111is unc!crstanding of infonnation systems development and practice within broader 
dynamic social contexts stimulate Sri Lanka to cope with the resulting organisational 
changes and to adapt information systems to avoid falling further behind and risk 
exclusion from socio-economic development (Splettstocsscr and Kimaro, 2000). 
4.5 Conclusion 
Information technologies together with their development and implementation arc 
considered as much vaunted technology for achieving socio-economic development in 
Sri Lanka. These technologies and their development approaches are often devdopcd in 
the West following the positivist approach of technocratic and economic consciousness. 
These are exported to Sri Lanka through various steering media such as textbooks, 
consulting projects, professional agencies, donor projects, information systems research, 
and training programs. Consequently, infonnation technology professionals use these 
imported approaches in Sri Lanka without critical examination for information systems 
development. 
In Sri Lanka, information systems development was not originated as a local profession. 
As a result, adaptation of these imported positivist approaches has failed due to the 
prevailing nature of the social context - lifeworlds, economic, and political contexts in 
Sri Lanka. This is examined in chapter six developed into an in-depth case study at 
NCCL in Sri Lanka. 
5.1 lntroductlon 
CHAPTER FIVE 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
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In this chapter the research methodology, holistic approach and research processes I've 
employed in my thesis arc described and examined. These include selections of 
research sites, information about participants inter,iiewed, access issues, data collection, 
documentation and validation, and data analysis and reporting of evidence from the 
research findings. 
5.2. Research Methodology 
The research m,:thodology selected for my study had to be congruent with critical social 
theory perspective to study social phenomena. Therefore, my research methodology was 
a contextualised, interpretative one, with the techniques of critical case study methods 
(Myers, 1997; Myers & Young, 1997; Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991; Hirschheim & 
Klein, 1989; Chua, 1986; Lyytinen & Klein, 1985). I studied an in-depth case at a large 
privatised industrial organisation (NCCL) to reveal empirical and interpretive 
understanding of infonnation $ystcms development and practice within historical and 
social contexts in Sri Lanka. I critically examine ten episodes in infonnntion systems 
development and practice over a period between 1958-2000. In this study, I attempt to 
show how critical social theory could be seen in practice by providing evidence from an 
empirical case study conducted over a period of six months. 
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5.2.1 Rc~c1mh Method 
I used critical case study methods (see Myers, 1997). Cnsc studies contrib~te in 
important ways to our knowledge about information systems development whether 
applied to analyse a single case or multiple case studies (Yin, !994; Hirschbeim et al., 
1991). Yin (1994) asserts that a single case study is appropriate where it represents a 
critical or unique case (pp.38-40). My single case study approach helped me to 
investigate information systems development and practice in depth to provide rich 
description and understanding. It helped me to investigate and understand social 
structures which existed beyond the participants' pcre<:ption (see Maseman, 1982). 
Scle<:ting :. single case study for an in-dei:1th analysis for social phenomena has been 
well accepted in information systems literature (see for example, Pom1. & Hirschheim, 
2000; Klein & Myers, 1999; Odedra-Straub; 1996; Walsham, 1995; Hirschheim & 
Klein, 1989; Lee, 1989; Markus, 1983) and for doctoral studies (Remenyi, Wi\liams, 
Money & Swartz, 1998, p. 162). 
Case studies arise out of. a need to under:stnnd and explain corriplcx phenomena 
,,(Remenyi et al., p. 162). Case study methodology is increasingly used as a qualitative 
research method in information systems research to understand and e~.plain the contexts 
within which they are being developed, implemented, aod used (Darke, Shllllks & 
Broadbent, 1998; Ca~ayc, 1996; Walsham and Waema, 1994). !t is the most common 
qualitative method used in information ~:,stems research (Darke et al., 1998; Alavi & 
Carlson, 1992). Yin ( I 994) defines the scope of a case study as "a case study is an 
empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life 
context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context arc not 
clearly evident, and in which multiple sources of evidence are used" (p. 13 ). 
··.,1 
Cnse study research focuses on understanding the interactions between infonnation 
technology-related innovations and the hroad social conlnts (Dru-kc et al., 1998, p. 
273). Case studies provide the best field research in understanding the rroblcms and 
i.\Sues of infonnation management (foyasuriya, l 999; Craig Smith, l 990). The case 
study methodology provides an opportunity to undem md organisational phenomena 
(l:lifubasnt, Goldstein and Mead, !987). It has the potential to yield multiple 
constructions of reality in an organisational setting (Standing, 1998, p. 7). Therefore, 
the significance of employing case study method in infonnation ~ystems has now been 
established. ;,) 
Case study approach is often used l~ infonnation 
" 
' " 
systems research to apply social 
theories in the ,;;ontext of the "whole" (see for example, Avgerou, 2000; Olesen & 
Myers, 1999; Myers & Young, 1997; Montealegr~, 1997; Walsha._'11, 1993; 
0
Hirschh~1m 
et al., 1991; Wal sham & Han,' 199 J ). In these studies, analyses are made observing the 
iteration of theory with empirical evidence. rather than a superficial rejecting or 
accePting of theory based on empirical data. The validity of an extrapolation from one 
,;,;,~or more individual cases depends not on the representativeness of such cases in a 
statistical sense, as in the case when using the positivisr approach, but on the 
plausibility and cogency ~·fthe I.Jen! reasoning. This is further used in describing results 
from the case, and in drawing in[crenees and conclusions from those results. 
Craig Smith 1989, and Orlikowski & Baroudi (1991) make a similar point in the 
specific c;mtcxt of infommtion systems research. They argue that researchers critically 
'analyse social phenomena through theoretical framework which they adopt to conduct 
their work. Being in line with this new trend of epistemology, Habennas's theory of 
communicative action can be used as a social theory for infonnati•)n systems research 
!/ 
,'; 
I! 
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in developing countries and the holi~1ic .:asc study approach can he employed a~ its 
epistemology to ovcrcomu the problems of survey methods such as questionnaire-based 
research to infonnation systems. 
The questionnaire-based research generally assumes an objective reality can be 
discovered through a "falsification~ or "verification" process of hypotheses. This 
approach to infonnntion systems research includes reliance upon the "sampling logic" 
for statistical generalisation by testing hypotheses derived from predett-'ITT!incd theory 
(Orlikwski & Baroudi, l991; Chua, 1986). It is commonly assumed that reality is 
objectively given and can be described by measurable properties, which are 
independent of the observer and his or her instruments. An associated belief is that 
scientific methods enable researchers to explain and predict objective and value-neutral 
records of events of the subjects investigated. 
Generally, most researchers employ questionnaires in surveying phenomena Using )':, 
ell 
predefined variables by the researcher (see Doherty & King, 1998; Hofstedc 1991, 
1980). The survey methods are limited in their ability to investigate the social contexts 
or to obtain infonnation not specifically sought (Jayasuriya, 1999). ?or example, King 
(1996) has noted how research on computer-aided softwan. development has been 
dominated by survey methods arc routinely evaluated by questionnaires that seek to 
elicit managers' and professionals' perceptions of the usefulness of system~· tools. The 
basic assumption is that properly designed questionnaires appear to deliver valid and 
reliable quantified infonnation. As he puts it "surveys do not reveal the context in 
which the tools arc used" (King, 1996, p. 174). 
'" 
In contrast to the questionnaire-based research approach, close cA.pericntial research can 
generate new undcr.;tar.drng more consistent with tbJ actions, meanings, values, 
,, 
perceptions, and beliefs of its participants. It is focused on understanding actual 
practice of informa!ion systems development in its natural setting (see Darke et al., 
1998). 
Knowledge is sought through studying more closely to the participants of research and 
that knowledge is replicated through linking theory with empirical evidence than tt[ogic 
of sampling.tt In this way, the researcher is able to question, interpret, talk, reflect, and 
iterate his data theoretically within a set of situations and issues (Myers, 1997). Such an 
approach is provided by holistic research (Sea pens, 1990). 
5.2.2 Holistic Approach 
The holistic approach to research is based on the belief that social systems develop a 
characteristic wholeness or integrity where any part of this wholeness is largely 
;/, 
determined by the whole social systern'./it's inappropriate to study their individual parts 
' 
taken out of context (Flood, 1999; Standing & Standing, 1998; Keys, 1991; Checkl8:-'ld, 
1981). 
Holistic research methods seek to explain this holistic quality and)/o locate social 
syStems in their particular contexts (Scapen, 1990). Social reality is to be viewed as an 
integrated whole, not detachable behaviour and al\ their underlying myths and 
meanings are to be understood by linking them to the context (Wickramasinghe & 
Hopper, 2000). Although such parts arc interrelated, the whole drtermincs al\ of th~m 
(see Checkland, 1981). 
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Epis','.!mo!ogically, holistic approach researchers understand the whole by, studying 
interrelated parts individually and very closely, looking for analytical themes. They 
find theoretical generalisations, instead of statistical generalisation (Scapens, 1990), by 
applying the analytical themes to other parts of the whole system. In this way, social 
reality lies not in any of the parts but in the whole. The researcher, however, is free to 
attach any particular interpretation about a part until such time as it is contcKtually 
validated (ibid, p. 270). At the same time, tentatively, the researcher has to depend on 
the explanation of the whole system until an alternative pattern is found. 
In this context, theory would act as an explanation for the whole system and through 
the studying of parts, the researcher can determine whether the theory iterates or not 
(Dicsing, 1972). Once researchers understand a social context in this way, they identify 
universal theories emerging from comparative analysis which can determine whether 
the same themes are found within the context (Scapen, 1990). This results in the 
holistic "general theory" (Dicsing, 1972). 
Holistic methodology can be applied to Habcrmas's theory of communicative actions. 
As mentioned earlier, given the holistic nature of society, one has to understand any part 
in the light of its totality in the context of historical evolution and social conteits. 
Focusing on such parts, the researcher can determine whether the part is reflected by the 
,total contexts. In this way, the researcher can understand the nature of information 
systems development and practice embedded in this specific social context. 
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5.3 Research Process 
5.3.1 Research Site 
The research site chosen for my study is 11 privatised industrial organisation (NCCL) in 
Sri Lanka. I used anonymous names to protect the good name of the organisation and 
the people. NCCL was and still is engaged in manufacturing and distribution of Cement 
in Sri Lanka. It started as a government department in 1950s. It converted to a state 
owned enterprise in 1958 under the State lno:!ustria! Corporation Act of 49 of 1957. 
Until 1993, it remained under the ownership of the government. In 1994, 90% of it 
shares were sold to a single partner; Yawakkal (Yawakkal is an anonymous name) in 
India while 10% of shares were transferred to employees. In 1996, a multinational 
Company; Goldembank group of companies (Go!dembank is an anouymous name) 
acquired it from Yawakkal with the intervention of the Sri Lunkan government. NCCL 
was selected for my study on the basis that: 
(!) NCCL was one of the few industrial organisations in Sri L.1Ilka had introduced 
inforr,;ation systems at some late 1960s and continued to be introduced. It 
/
;::: "'~ii~!\s~dy :i~f~nnntion systems development and practice within the 
evolution of social institutions in Sri Lanka. 
f: 
11,, ~~) Change of ownership from the state to n single Owner Company, and finally, 
" 
from the single Owner Company to a multinational Company, brought 
, fundamental changes to information systems development and practice at 
NCCL. 
'" 
(3) Privatisation of NCCL was criticised by NCCL employees and the general 
public. Its issues were brought to the public atlcntion through parliament 
debates (Parliament Hnnsards). 
(4) It was possible to ncccss and study a variety of participants who directly or 
indirectly involved in systems development both in the head office and in the 
factory (see below the number of participants being interviewed). 
5.3.2 Research Participants 
ir, - ' 
In order to obtain a balance view, a-faiige of particip:rnts from Chief ExCcL1tive Officer 
·11 q 
(CEO) to ordinary shopwfloor employees )Vere interviewed. 90 personnel paf.'ticipated in 
,I 
the three phases of interviews (see sectidiJ 5.3.4 below) both in the head office and in 
ii 
the factory. These participants included J.'enior managers (CEO, Vice Presidents (VPs), 
and Chief Factory Otficer), middle managers, operations managers, engineers, 
accountants, infonnation technology personnel, work superintendents, foreman, 
supervisors, clerks, trade union leaders, and shop-floor employees. 3 past employees, 2 
outside information technology consultants working with current information systems 
projects at NCCL, and I high official (Deputy Director) in the Treasury department 
were also interviewed. 
·-' .'., 5.3.3. Access to tht Research Site 
I became interested in doing my research at NCCL whcr. I talked to one ofmy students 
who were working as an information technology consultant to NCCL. Hc·suggestcd me 
some other privatised organisations but l could not secure access to those organisations. 
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Initially, getting access to the rcseorch site (NCCL) was quite difficult. I contacted the 
Chairman ofNCCL through a friend ofmy brother and explained him my need to do a 
research and the reasons (sec above 5.3.3) why I wanted to conduct my study at NCCL. 
I had a lengthily discussion with him. He then passed my request to a decision of the 
CEO. 
The CEO is empowered to take all administrative and management decision on behalf 
of Goldembank Company. After a lengthy discussion (about forty-five minutes) with 
the CEO, he allowed me to conduct rr.y research at NCCL. I have given an undertaking 
that confidentiality of the information collected from the Company will be ensured, and 
such information will be used only for research purposes. He circulated a letter among 
al! the heads of departments informing them to cooperate with me giving relevant 
support and information lo conduct my research. 
5.3.4 Data Collection, Documentation and Validation 
Data were collected using an iu-depth interview method, policy documents, minutes, 
memos, e-mails, financial reports, Parliamentary Hansards, and physical observation. 
These methods arc well accepted and recognised methods for darn collection in case 
study research (Remenyi et al., 1998; Myers, 1997; Yin, 1994). Interviews were 
conducted in three phases. The objective of the first phase was to understand the issues 
·of information systems development and practice and become socialised into . the 
Company. One and half months took to complete the first phase. 
The second phase of interviews wore focused on asking questions regarding the issues 
identified in the first phase of interviews. The emphnsis was given to episodes of 
''" 
information systems development. Information was sought about the history uf 
information systems development and transformation of NCCL focusing on issues that 
influencL'l.i and shaped information ~ystcms development, how and why and in what 
ways information systems development contradicted with the social reality of NCCL. 
The secoml phase of intL'TViews took another three and half months. 
The third phase of the research started after seven months of the second phase of 
interviews. It took me about a month to complete the third phase of interviews. The 
objective of the th!rd phase of interview was to identify some unclear infonnation and to 
secure views from.interviewers on the issues identified in the first and second phases 
and to further validi,."te data. 
Initia\ly, some participants suspected me because the CEO directed me to research 
participants though I explained them the objectives of the research. I assured them 
anonymity and their identity would not be included in my research. Later they agreed to 
participate in the research. Interviews were conducted using a non-directive technique, 
which allowed participants to focus on specific issues but permitted them the freedom to 
expand on areas of personal interests and issues. Participants were encouraged to 
explain the dovelopment process through critical incidents, episodes, examples, 
metaphors etc. that were crucial in their view to shaping infonnation systems 
development and the way they contradicted with the social context ofNCCL. 
Interviews were documented. Interviews with top and senior managers, some middle 
managers, and some Jnfonnation Technology Managers were conducted in English 
whereas others with Sinhala {native language). The majority of participants did not 
agree tape recording but allowed manual notes taking. Therefore, each intctview lasted 
1(,0 
about one and half-hours lo two hours. Although interviewing, taking notes ani.! 
transcribing them was u lengthy process, I understood a; an appropriatc method to 
collect contextual aspects of infonnation about systems development and practice. 
Interviews conducted using Sinhula (native language) were paraphrased in English. 1hc 
documented interviews were discussed with the participants in the following days. The 
objective of this endeavour was to identify whether participants missed out infonnation 
and used it as validation ofinterviews. A further validation was secured by interviewing 
a variety of participants concerning the same infonnation. 
Cross checking was achieved by comparing documents, financial reports, policy reports, 
minutes, memos, Hansards reports, and e-mails. The extended relationship with some 
research participants through e-mails enabled me to more closely understand their inner 
worlds and actions. Physical observation provided me further valuable insights and 
checking. I attended to three green area meetings and listen to interpersonal 
communications (expiaincd in chapter six). Moreover, ! spent several days in the 
research site listening to participants during breakfasts, luncheons, and dinners. In this 
way, a triangulation of data was obtained (sec Darke et al., 1998; Yin, 1994; Walsham, 
1993; Alavi & Carlson, 1992; Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991). 
5.3.5 Data Analysis and Reporting Results 
A detail case description was prepared and thi\SC data served as the basis for critical 
analysis. Data analysis was perfonned by iterating theoretical constructs outlined in 
chapter three and social contexts of Sri Lanka outlined in chapter four with empirical 
data. Data was presented an<l analysed in episodic fonns. Thus, ten information systems 
development episodes were described and analysed in chapter six between 1958-2000. 
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An observation was given by refl~ting on each cpi~odc. llcsults of the analysis were 
used to theorise infonnation systems development. Literature from various disciplines 
were incorpornted in the theorisation of infonnalion systems development. 
5.4 Conclusion on Research Methodology 
The research methodology I used was a critical case study method in congruence with 
the critical socinl theory approach to investigate social phenomena. I explain how 
theoretical constructs could be iterated with empirical evidences within holistic research 
and make observations about social phenomena. Thus in chapter six, I use this approach 
to show how critical social theory can be seen in practice of infonnation systems 
development in the organisation I studied. 
6,0 Introduction 
CHAPTER SIX 
NCCL CEMENT COMPANY 
CASE DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS 
16' 
In this chapter, I describe and analyse an in-depth case study of information systems 
de_yclopment and practice at NCCL in Sri Lanka. This includes scrutiny of historical 
aspects of information systems development and practice as well as current usage using 
Habennas's theory of communicative action and the social contexts of Sri Lanka as 
outlined in chapters three and four respectively. 
The first subsection provides a background of both NCCL and the Cement industry in 
general over the period 1958 to 2000. The NCCL case presented in this c~:,pter was 
examined within two phases of socio-economic development of Sri Lanka. Thus, 
information systems development and practice at NCCL is examined and analysed 
within historical context of: 
(la) The state control phase (Phase Ja); 
(lb) The state control phase With open economic policies (Phase lb); 
(2) Govcn1ment privatisation which resulted in NCCL becoming a single owuer 
Comp[!Jly (Phase 2a); and 
(3) NCCL under the control of a multinational Company (Phase 2b). 
IOJ 
Within these two phases of socio-economic development in Sri Lanka, ten episodes of 
infunnntion system.~ development and practice are described and analysed. Of these ten 
episodes, three occurred in lhe slate control phase Ja ofNCCL: 
• (Episode l) budget as a steering medium in a shift system. 
• (Episode 2) the punch card system 
• (Episode 3) budget with the punch card system. Two occurred in the state control 
phase lb with open economic policies 
• (Episode 4) Wang computerised system for management accountability 
• (Episode 5) preventive maintenance system for management accountability. One 
· occurred in the privatised ~ingle owner Company (phase 2a) 
• (Episode 6) computerised time and attendance system after privatisation ofNCCL. 
Four episodes occurred when a multinational Company (phase 2b) controlled NCCL: 
• (Episode 7) new work shift-plan in computerised time and attendance system 
• (Episode 8) computerised information system for factory maintenance 
• (Episode 9) management information for factory control 
• (J::pisode JO) outsourcing infonnation systems for NCCL. ·,,, 
6.1 NCCL Cement Company and Industry Background 
NCCL was started as a government factory in 1950s. It converted to a Stad' O.Vncd 
11~nterprisc (nationalised) corporation, based on public owncrshii: in 1958 following 
national ideological pressures to modernise and industrialise, rspccially in rural areas. 
The politicians had initiated large industries, unc uf which, Wa8 NCCL, to provide 
employment opportunities mainly for their political supporters !n villages. An employee 
164 
stated. "Mr. [M] initiated this factory. He wanted to provide jobs for his political 
supporters. You sec, "if he was not initiated you would have never seen a factory at 
Singcrb". 
The Cement factory was located at Singerb, a rural village near a suburban town centre 
in the northw<;-~tcrn province of Sri Lanka. II is located about 125 kilometres away from 
the head office in Colombo, the major Commercial City and capital of Sri Lanka. The 
people in the village believed the Cement factory as an opportunity to alleviate their 
poverty and unemployment problems. 
The NCCL had a national monopoly both in manufacturing and distribution. Raw 
materials were locally obtained from quanies near to the factory. Cements were 
distributed through private dealers and government sector orgwtisations such as co-
operative societies. Cement supply was controlled thro!!gh a pennit system during times 
of shortages. Thus, the price of a cement bag was not determined through free market 
demand and supply or through costs and profits calculations. The price of a ccrilent bag 
was partly subject to the influence of politicians in power. 
NCCL was unionised through the activities of unions controlled by p~litician.l in power. 
This division of employees based on party politics led to acts of inter-union rivalry 
within NCCL. A union leader, referring to a major reason for the poor performance of 
NCCL commented that "our division to fulfil the various aspirations of politicians was 
the kodivillaya •• '\Kodivinaya in Sri Lankan word meaning, being hold up). 
Marketing, financial and personnel activities were carried out at the head office in 
Cokmibo. Manufacturing was organistd under a factory manager. , Accounting 
,, 
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personnel, 11 human resource manger, production managers, operations managers, 
maintenance managers and coginccra, electrical cngir.ccrs, and sales manage·.; were 
located at the factory. Cement manufocturing was semi-automated and works in the 
factory were organised on a shin basis. 
Jn l 960s, the government introduced new financial regulations and tight financial 
controlling crune into operation. As a consequence, the focus of NCCL,. shifted to 
efficiency and effectiveness critt:,h NCCL during the corporation regime (between 
1958-1993) was contro!led within state control model of socio-economic development 
making an average profits of about Rs. JOO million annually. 
Theoretically, during the corporation period (i.e. 1958-1993), NCCL followed a formal 
hicrarchl~al power structure in organising and managing work. As will be documented, 
in certain situations, the politicians influenced the fonnal decision making process such 
as the recruitment of employees, their transfers, and the introduction of information 
technology. NCCL oporat,!d in a legalistic and bureaucratic manner, which was typical 
of the public ~ector of Sri Lanka (Kelegama, 1997). As a state owned corporatio•,; 
various successive modernisation reform programmes at NCCL did not manage to 
substnntially change as a better organisation but only superficially affected social 
structures and work processes. The reforms wore stili'>·ened by prevailing socio-culhniil;-
economic and political conditions. 
Since 1958, NCCL has undergone many changes in ownership, administration, 
management, and infonnation technology. The changes have been somewhat more 
,; 
radkal 11fter 1977 when the government was introducing open economic policies 
following a market model for its socio-economic development in Sri Lanka. 
.'(_ 
II,(, 
Consequently. superficial changes to the socio-cultural, economic, and political 
structures ut NCCL were carried out. 
hivatisution of SOEs was introduced as part of these open economic policies of tl:e 
government in 1977. The government had experienced budgct_deficits in lllany years 
an1 thus could no longer fund SOEs from the Trea:;ury. S0Es were identifietl"as,,a 
burden to the Public Treasury due to their inefficieneic;; in the mana.;;emcnt and the poor 
productivity pcrfom1ancc in operations (Kc\cgama, 1997, 1993, 199\). Moreov~r, the 
government experienced pressure from thi\ donor agencies. One seni_or official in the 
Public Treasury Dep:::.,mcnt in the Finance Ministry stated that "you know, what is 
happefling is, the govcmn,t":nt was and still is engaged in selling public asseL~·.to close 
the annual budget deficits following the rccomnibidations of the Worh:! ~ank"., :; 
II .I) , <o 
NCCL in Sri Lanka, up to the end of the I 980s, occupied a monopoly dom:nating the 
market for'thc manufacturing and supply of cement, for the local ,:onstruc\imfindustry. 
\\ The monopoly position of NCCL started. to change in the eadf' !99cis when the 
-- ,! ', 
government created a corri'.)ei'iiive market allowing other competitors_ to enter into the 
' - ' -~ ' 
cement market. " 
,_. ,, 
I) 
S0Es have been openly trumpe·:ed a~ the application of market --;~dice by· the 
' _,J.'- ,, ,) 
governme:i.t as the 1most apprDpriate way to encourage efficiency ai ... !'Cffectivencss of 
' (( soBf As a result, Tolcyi.' -~,emcnt (TC} and Mahava\i Marine cCffiCllt (MMC) started 
\\ ;; -\, . 
·~'-=>IT,anufactllring and i:listribntioii <lf Cement in Sri L?:,1ka. - Ad',iitionally, some 
,, {', 
busin~ssmei1 began to import low priced cefl\cnt at a large scale from lndia, Malaysia, 
Middle East Countries, and Chin&.. 
'! "O 
" 
' 
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Over its history, NCC!. ]1ad gained the reputation nf being the highc,t quality cement 
manufacturer in Sri Lanka. NCCL faced a severe threat from two other competitors and 
from cement importers when the new open economic policy was implemented. With the 
appearance of competitors' products in Sri J.anka's morket, NCCL market share began to 
sbnrp!y decline. At the time of privatisation of NCCL, market share declined from 
100% to an average of 50% of the total Cement market. The decline of market share 
severely disrupted the internal functioning ofNCCL. 
,, 
The introduction of market principles into the cement industry in general, and 
privatisation i~~ue specifically, was strongly opposed by most of the other political 
parties, the employee unions in corporations, and the general public. Opposition leaders 
opposed the move at parliamentary debates (Parliamentary Debates, 1990, 1992, 1994, 
1996). Employees, through their unions. oft.en vented their anger and frustration in the 
fonns of strikes and mass media. They urged the government not acquiesce to the 
recommendation of the external funding agencies such as th~ World Bank and to sell 
public assets to the pri.vate companies. Howeve:, the govcmment carrh.•d through its 
commitments to open economic policies and the privatisation of SOEs. A former 
General Managers ofNCCL commented regarding the privatisation ofNCCL: 
Despite thi:. mass resistance from various intc1csts groups such as 
employees, opposition party \caters and the general public. the 
government had decided to priv:ttisc NCCL. You know. a mission cnme 
to discuss an aid package for Sri Lanka during 1990s and forced the ',\ 
government to priv~tisc NCCL. If the Sri Lanka government diC: not 
listen lo the World Bank's recommendations, it wou!C not have been 
b'Tanted funds for development. 
" Government per~eived privatisation of SO Es us essential if the organisations were to be 
successful in the open economy and newly emerging ,:Ompetitive environments 
"" 
(Kclcgama, 1997). The government privatised many SOEs, including NCCL, in 
aohcn:ncc to its market model. NCCL was seen as burden to government Treasury. In 
l 993, government decldt.."<i to privatised NCCL. It was kept under the administrntion of 
the Treasury of the Ministry of Finance and National Planning, until the government 
fot:nd a suitable partner to sell NCCL. Thus NCCL was intimately tied up with the 
government's reforms. 
[n privatising NCCL, the government did not appear lo consider the 'lifcworlds' of the 
organisation. Privatisation was used as a steering mechanism to steer the lifeworlds of 
NCCL in a direction, which was aligned, to the goals of the Sri Lanka government. The 
government assumed that NCCL could be transformed into an effective and efficient 
business enterprise following market principles. 
In December 1994, NCCL was sr.>!d to Yawakkal, an Indian Company, fcilowing an 
ij ' 
/! 
open tender procedure al a pricil 10fRs. 2.2 billion. Yawakkal, .a single Owner Compn."ly, 
focused on buying and selling of cement. But as an NCCL employee commented, 
"Yawakkal did not have experience in the cement manufacturing industry". 
After taking over NCCL, Yawakknl appointed a Board of directors with Mr. Yawnkkal 
as both the Chainnan, and the Managing Director, of NCCL. Upon the purchase of 
NCCL, Indian managers were appointed ·as the chiefs of the finance and marketing 
departments. Among other changes inb.uUL!eed by new manage,nent included an 
introduction of two payroll systems and il computerised time und attendance system for 
monitoring and control!ing employees at the factory. 
ll,\I 
Alkr major problems due to the Yuwukkal 's changes, NCCL wus sold to Goldcnhank in 
1996. Goldenbank is a leading multinational Company, which comprises more tlmn RO 
cement plants in 27 countries. In addition, Goldenbank hold more than 500 ready-mix 
concrete and concrete ofhui!ding materials as well as variety of services (i.e. providing 
management consulting) relevant to the cement and building products plants along with 
more than 150 quarries. Goldenbank is considered to be one of the most advanced users 
of high technology ar.d information technology in the cement manufacturing industry 
(Goldenbank Polky Guide, 1998). 
The changes in NCCL, outlined above, were intimately connected with infonnation 
technology and its application in NCCL since the late 1960s. Advances in information 
\ technology-notably, hardware ruid software capabilities, and communication 
technology-gave rise to undertake a range ofinfonnation systems development projects 
at NCCL. 
Th.: above description provides a general history ofNCCL. It is important to understand 
information: systems development and practice in NCCL in the historical context of 
social institutions in Sri Lanka. In order to understand the history of information 
systems development, the description and analysis begin with manual infonnation 
systems development. Ten episodes outline below explain what happened in 
information systems development at NCCL between 1958s and 2000. 
6.2 Information Systems Development and Practice under a Stale Control Model: 
Phase la 
Indepcmlcnce iu I 948 led to a commitment to centrally plonned development following 
socialist principles. A balance of payment crises in the mid J 950's caused the import 
,10 
substituting industrialis[l.tion policy to be implemented in Sri Lanka (Vidaimpathirana, 
1999, Lakshman, 1976). 111is included a program for industrialisation based 01' public 
ownership {Lakshmm1, 1976) leading to the establishment of NCCL in 1958 as a 
nationalised SOEs. 
,'/ 
State Industrial Corporation Act No. 49 of 1957 defined a public corporation as a legal 
entity owned by the government with considerable financial independence, within a 
system of accountability to the public through Parliament. Accordingly, accounts of 
NCCL were to be kept according to the Companies Act No. l 7 of 1982. These accounts 
were audited by the Auditor General, and sent to Parliament. Profits ofNCCL need<xl to 
be remitted to the government-consolidated fund. TI1e Ministry of ;ndustries and Public 
Treasury controlled NCCL. Similar to other public corporations, NCCL was focused on 
budgets for political and management accountability. 
Budgeting concentrated on production and costing. The factory was responsihle for 
preparing and executing budgets approved by the head office. Adminisltative matters 
were governed by the general administrative regulation. Thus NCCL's controls formally 
embodied" philosophy of bureaucracy, employing legal conccpL~ that owed much to the 
statutory corporation model underlying the structt•re of British nationa!i~ed industries 
(Kclcgama, ! 991 ). ln particular the legal and administrntivc concepts were influenccr:1, 
heavily by technical, sdcntific and rationi,1 concepts. 1besc concepts did not match 
with the employees' 'lifcworlds' of NCCL. !n the initial phases of this state control 
model, prcparatior. of budgets, payroll, and other personnel matters were carried 01..,t 
using manual information systems. Factory management used infonnntion for control nf 
',\. behaviour of employees. 
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Factory management established a hierarchy of authority relationships between head 
office, the factory. and its production departments that defined tasks and 
responsibilities. ·nicir instrumental rationality gave rise to a distinctive management 
culture within the factory. Employees from the village were controlled on a day-to-day 
basis by supervisors from the village. Factory employees realised that the factory 
management was attempting to dominate their 'lifcworlds.' 
These employees negatively reacted to managers' instrumental actions that embodied 
formal controls of employees' lives. Realising employees' legitimate 'lifeworlds' needs 
and their 1 esistance towards instrumental actions and fonnal controls, factory 
management gradually developed opportunities that permitted employees to fulfil their 
traditional commitments to the village culture, whilst meeting the requirements of 
factory managers for reports to the senior management in lhe head office. Thus factory 
management employed communicative rationality by allowing NCCL 'lifeworlds' to 
~volve in a balanced way. 
6.2.1 Budget as a Steer.;ng Medium in a Shift System: Episode I 
Initially, budget was used as a steering medium to make employees' work harder in the 
factory, rather than as a means of rcw,rting to head office. Thus a production budget 
emerged that operationally linked supplies and production shifts daily and scheduled 
working hcurs through time cards. This steering medium required that supervisors who 
monitored production targets, checked employee productivity, and closely supervised 
employees. As part of budget planing, a shift was defined as a slice of the budget 
portioned into eight-hours of production. The control following budget as a steering 
medium began to achieve the desired production during each shift. 
m 
l'roc!·1,ction managers encouraged employees to be committed to the shift. The shifts 
became the focus of fnctory [ifo and the budget was steering medium to control of work 
by using instrumental actions. 
t 
Production managers at ihe factory legitimised fbeir instrumental actions by employing 
the production budgets. However, thr. employees were uncertain about their 
instrumental actions of this budget ju:;tification. They found it difficult to accept the 
overly controlled work patterns used by managers to dominate them. They realised that 
managers using budgets altempt to threaten their trnditiona!ly established culture, values 
and social pattern of their everyday living in their various lifcworlds. A shop-floor 
employee commented: 
We were surprised about the management, their orders and machines. 
They thought we like machines ourselves. We actually did not like 
production managers to control us. We used to be free within our village. 
We wanted to work and cam but not in that way. 
Employees continually recollected their everyday life in the village. A shop-floor 
employee remembered. "Working in village life is enjoyable. Neighbours and family 
members worked together without any supervision or control but we were collective and 
harmonious". 
Employees found it difficult to adjust to instrumental actions and control of managers 
because work discipline in village life was communicatively controlled. A shop-floor 
employee recalled: 
We were highly controlled. People had to work inside large buildings 
with mysterious machines. Timetables, bells, supervision, checking, 
and above all, working without talking were difficult for people. 
People wanted to work and cam but not in that way. 
Employees in the village continued to define their lives by refening \;ack to traditional 
ways and still wishing to engage in reciprocal village relationships and accompanying 
ccremonin!s. A shop-f\om· r.mployee recalled: 
We have our own lands. lfwc neglect them we do not have a living. 
We used to live u[) them but we want to earn an additional income. 
You know, otherwise it is di11icult to live. Living is expensive. We arc 
poor people seeking extra money for our living. We really only work 
here for money. Otherwise we could stay at home. 
Village life is full of cultural ceremonies and factory life interfered with employees 
participation in these. A shop-floor employee commented: 
We can't just ignore our traditional customs such as the full moon days of 
Vcsak, Poson, Asa/a Pi11kams and Bali Tho1•il. village marriages, 
fimera/s, New Year, and customs are parts and part of our life. All arc in 
our mind. The factory is not the only part of our life. 
Culturally, cmp\~yc~s could m,t relate to a modtm Western, fast-pftced society. Many 
employees had low commitment and motivation to formally define controlling n\ethods. 
The factory manngers realised that they must hdp village employees adapt to factory 
" !ifc, especially the shift system. A fom1er factory manager explained: 
. . 
It was their village. They did not bother about the new life in the factory. 
Shop-floor employees wcn: uneducated and rural. Politicians appointed 
some shop-floor employees. Their traditional beliefs and attitudes were 
difficult to change c:i.sily. Some of our major probkms were maintaining 
punctuality, continuous work by a target, preventing them from material 
frauds, and cnonnous absenteeism. Putting them to a right rack of work 
could not he easily done. 
' A production manager commented. "The problem was we should not intcrfcr~ in their 
lives. The result was a high level of absenteeism. Shop-floor employees di no.l inform 
whether they were coming for the following day work shift. It affected the pr~:duction 
process very much". 
• 
,, 
Ji ), 
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Another production manager Cl{p[ained the effects of frequent traditional ceremonies. 
"Our employees were and still arc active in all traditional C~'Tcmonics. We have to 
manage our production to accommodate these circumstances". Managers also had to 
recognise the anxiety of employees and their lack of commitment. A production 
manager commented that: 
There were unsatisfied employees. They thought they did not ha1·e a 
future. The problem was we couldn't help. What we could do was that we 
didn't force them to do more work. We thought about sensible amounts in 
the budget. 
Production managers and supervisors understood the attitudes of employees and they 
discretely adjusted production targets to meet the 'lifcworlds' needs of employees in the 
factory. 
Generally, the efficiency of employees adversely affects Company budgets, but this did 
not happen in NCCL. A production manager explained. "The production managers 
knew that the employees were not efficient. So they, did not promise the top 
management very much 1hrough the budget". A former factory manager explained that 
"we knew when absenteeism would be high. Then we changed OU!' production schedule. 
The production departments' targets were ~et accordin~ly". The production managers 
managed external difficulties by including '\ifcworld,•' in budgets. Managers at the 
fac1ory used budget lo accommodate employees' conflicts, which arose from the 
different perspective of !heir 'lifcworlds' and the requireinents of management at the 
head office. A production manager stated that "the budget was there but we had to 
consider the demands of employees [lifcwor!ds) in the factory. They were more 
important than the budget. We took into consideration employees' problems when we 
prepared the budget". 
·,.,,\ \ 
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Managers at the head office realised that good industrial relations relied on the 
production manager's budget. A fonner general manager commented: 
!fwc !lad differcnl views about the budgets we cordially resolved them. 
Sometimes, the budget committee asked us to alter targets, as they would 
not be harmonious within the factory. But bas1,.'ally, it was the production 
manager who was competent at deciding budget targets [taking demands 
of employees' \ifeworlds]. 
The factory management treated lifeworlds concerns as everyday management issues. 
Strategies of everyday controls through on-going ad-hoe solutions emerged. For 
instance, when employees were unexpectedly absent, duties were reallocated to other 
employees. Al~hough this resulted in low production and discontinuity of work, the 
factory still made profits as it had a monopolistic market protected by the government. 
The head office was located far from the factory, llnd viewed employees' lifeworlds 
concern as factory matters. This ignorance cre~tcd conflicts between the staff in the 
head office and the staff in the factory. Factory employees believed that staff in the 
head office enjoy lunury life at the expense of employees in the factory. The perception 
of the head office was that it should secure financial resources for the factory through 
effective lobbying in the Ministry and manage tlmiugh political intcrventioos. Senior 
management in the head office realised that the key to resources and decisions lay in the 
hands of politicians and that their powers were weak. 
Control and power in NCCL was fornrnlly vested in Board of Directors. Howc1:cr, the 
' 
Minister had ex.elusive power to appoint and to remove the Board, Chainnan, and the · 
General Manager. The ability to ~:,poir.t and dismiss people gave considerable power to 
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politicians. NCCL managers could not remove any employee without the approval of 
the Ministry. The Minister was sufficiently powerful to appoint political nominees to 
the Board and a~ Chainnan and General Manager. A senior manager commented, "it has 
been the Minister who controlled the corporation, not the Board. The Board acted as the 
agents of the Minister, not the government". 
Each change in govemm.!nl resulted in a new Chairman, General Manager and Board 
" 
membus. Consequently Board members took Ettie interest and pain in the future 
,;:levelopment of NCCL. lnstead of looking to the good of NCCL, Board membct~· 
concentrated on cultivating relationship with politicians. In other words, these people 
acted in the best interest ofpoliticians than NCCL 
National policies directed the factory and the head office through party political 
pressures to employ party support,;:rs and extend party influence through trade unions. 
Most employees were appointed on the recommendation of politicians. A senior 
manager commented "the number employed was much more than actually NCCL 
wanted to run both the factory and the head office". In this way, an average of 2500 
employees was employed in NCCL. Frequently these employees were not competent in 
the jobs they were appointed for. Con~cqucntly, supervisors spent considerable time 
instructing and training them, and maintaining close control. Many supervisors 
remarked upon this. A senior foreman commented that 
When we had new shop-flour employees we always had problems. They 
were unskilled and untrained. Sometimes, tht.'Y came from another 
corporation, which was complctdy different from this. But we had to 
keep them with us because they were useful for politicians. 
'I 
ir 
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Upon joining NCCL these employees became members of the government party trade 
union. Managers experienced difficulties in controlling trade union employees because 
ofthcir political influence. A former factory manager remembered. ttThe employees' 
\ \ 
co-operation was difficult to achieve. On the one hand you have to tackle the trade 
union's demands. On the other hand you have to make these political men 'woi-k 
efficiently. It's very difficult". 
Evaluating the performance of NCCL was difficult as the gove-mment's )lo111icians, ,, 
whose primary concern was to fulfil promises given to voters, diri:ctly influenced 
pricing decisions. As a factory cost accountant observed: 
Prices of cement were very important to the Ministry (by implication, the 
Minister]. They insisted us on fixing prices. Therefore, we did not rely on 
our own pricing decisions. We did not have nny method of doing so. 
~'een in this light, budgeting as infonnation systems failed to establish c1:i'~r operat;~nal 
(, - i.' 
goals for NCCL under these circumstances. A senior manager rer.alled that "the 
management did not have such clear-cut goals or objectives. We were not in a position 
to maintain them. The reason was we had to adhere to the government and Minister's 
orders". Corporate pl~nning and budgeting was not effective as head office officials and 
}) 
Board members acted in the interest of Ministers rather than plans. 
6.2.1.1 Reflection on Episode 1 
The above description and analyses show that the management in the head office(i'nd 
the parliament ··had little interest or expertise in regarding factory problems due to 
conflicts between !ifeworids and budget impkmentations. These conflicts remained as 
factory matters. The Ministers approved budgets without Clmsidering their contents: 
I, 
,,, 
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Board members approvt'<l budgets if they met ministerial concerns; and the head office 
budget committee accepted them if lhl'y offered industrial pcael:. Factury managcmt11l 
through production budgets sutlicicntly inc!udcd '\ifcworlds' problems in production 
,~,'tjclgets to tranquillise conflicts between factory management and employees. Thus, 
budgets took place within interlocking causes and relationship~ within broader socio-
cu!tura\, economic, and po!itical structures at NCCL. 
' ', 
6.3 Information Systems in Regulatory Paradigm 
InJhe l~.tc 1960s, the Sri Lanka government initiated a new control discourse around a 
"public financial control regulations". A control of attendance and discipline of 
employees was one of NCCL's managerial issues resulted from new public financial" 
control regulations instigated by the government. The managers at NCCL considered 
that the need of controlling employees' attendance was essential if the factory was to be 
effective with the new financial ccintrol paradigm. In essence, manually processed 
infonnation systems were replaced by the punch card systems. lnfonnation systems 
began to be utilised automated systems as part of the new regulatory paradigm in NCCL 
since the late 1960s. 
6.3.1 The Punch Card System: Episode 2 
,, 
The punch card system was viewed as an efficient and effective system by which 
I< \\ 
employc~' attendance e1,.)uld be controlled to implement budget targtts for each of the 
, I' , 
. . 
factory shifts. In the t!fte 1960s, a newly appointed Chairman, with' the help of senior 
management, intro<i~.:~d an IBM punch card batch system for recording ~d controlling 
cmphyccs' attcndancr, This ~ystcm was located at the entrance of the fac\C'ry with a 
\', 
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staff of twenty personnel employee.I as time and attendance clerks to process 
information. The office was referred to as "time and attendance" coming under a 
supervisor of the accounting and finance department. 
Factory management used the punch card systere, as a management tool to control 
attendance irregularities of employees. Factory personnel officer commented: ' 
Many employees did not report to work in time. This caused problems 
for arrangh,g shifts in the factory. Lot of employees went for leave 
without taking prior approval. Some employees used to sign attendance 
books without physically coming to work. · " 
Employees viewed the punch card system as another means by which factory 
management controlled their working lives. Being vi!lagers, they were dubious about 
the merits of the proposed punched card system. The general sort of feeling among the 
factory employees was that the -punch card system was '.:icing to further control their day 
to day social life. Employees opposed the proposed systems through their party unions. 
However, being a powerful representative of the Minister, the Chairman overlooked the 
resistance of employees. An older shop-floor employee recollected his past experience 
iegarding the punch card system: 
' 
We realised that the management was planning to control us using a nev;, 
machine. We did not know what it [the punch card system] looked like! 
However, we realised it was going to threaten and dominate our social 
life [lifcworlds] in the factory. Therefore, we opposed to it. 
T!i.is control was anlithtical to employees' traditional working culture in the villages. 
Another shop-floor employee remarked. "We opposed the punch card system but we 
could not change the Chairman's dccisior,". Using Habennas's theory, the punch card 
'"' 
system utilisution could be described as a "colonisation" nf employees' 'lifcwnrlds' hy 
the steering media of the time und attendance techniques :md tcdmology and to 
objcctil)' employees' '!ifcworh!s.' 
6.3.I.t Rencction on Episode 2 
The punch card system was ao example: of NCCL management using purposive rational 
aclion (Wth instrumental and s\rntcgic) to achieve success in regulating employees' 
time and attendance. Tiiis purposive rationality emanated from the new financial control 
regulatory paradigm adopted hy tl1e government. In effect, the punch card system was a 
steering medium of the factory management to steer the 'lifcworlds' of employees in 
directions that were alignL'<J to the goals of the i;ovcmmcnt. Through the punch card 
system, NCCL managem~nt alTected the government's ecormmically rationalistic policy 
in the management of the factory so as to realise push for "vaiue for money" in NCCL 
(value for money concept is adopted from Beynon-Davies, ! 994). 
6.4 Information Syitcms in Financial Control Paradigm 
A new left-centred political party fonned the government in 1970. It was committed to 
expanc!ing public enterprises but they ,nhcrited financial crisis (Bu<lget Speech, 1970). 
Responding to these probh:ms, the new government introduced a legal framework to 
control public finance through the Public Finance Act 38 of !971. The Act required 
public corporations to have budgets and associated firm11cial procedures in an allempt to 
bring economic rationality to the ~ector (Kelcgmna, 1997). The objectives were to 
control gov~mment funds through budgets, to control production targets, and to 
introduce work discipline for the factory employees. 
'"' 
The new framework \(, control puhlic financl.l had direct consequence for NCCL as 
financial controls nml intcnml hudgcls, hccausc audited linJndal sl/l\L'ITTcnL~ in puhlic 
, enterprises hccmnc legal necessities. A fac!ory cost accountant stated that "financial 
controls were the major concern of the Ministry. We had to go to this otlicc every week 
to seek approval or advice. So the Treasury officers were the chiefs in d-:ciding 
allocations fi.1r us". O!licials in the Trc,1>u1;,· implemented the government objective of 
limiting public spending anJ cunscqucn1ly cutting money granted from Treasury tu 
corporations. They had to ensure tlrnl managers at corporations used government's funds 
in the best interest of the public following the legal enactment stipulated in the Finance 
Act. They exercisL-d power over accountants in the negotiation process. 
6.4.1 Budgetary System with the Punch Card System: Episode 3 
The budgeting gained legal status and NCCL had to manage the factory within 
budgetary cont1ol. Committing to the new financial regulation.~. preparations of budgets 
and implanting them at factory beciltne mandatory. Production managers interpreted 
that the new controlling budgetary systems were an improvement on previous systems. 
M~nagers used budgets to control employees by committing them to production targets 
at each shift. 
The punch card system was used as a tool to control employees' shifts. Head office was 
delighted with the new controls, believing that they reflected the new fina."lcial 
regulatory paradigm. NCCL senior management in the head office enjoyed cordial 
relationships with politicians presenting reports to the Ministry which where them 
passed them to the public through Parliament. 
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Paradoxical movements cmcrgctl within the factory. The budgets provided production 
targets and the pund1 card system monitored employee attendance. However, these 
systems were difficult 10 implement. Employees' cuhurnl resistance began to appear 
with economic crisis. During this period there arose political tensions in Sri Lanka, 
which impacted, 011 NC:CL through trade unions. Trndc unions organised against the 
NCCL control systems by means that were not always visible. A shop-floor employee 
commented: 
In the early 1970s, the government prohibited a lot of important 
consumer goods. Salaries were no\ sufficient for the minimum living 
conditions of employees. Managers attempted to control us using modem 
machines [e.g. the punch card systems]. We protested management's 
actiol's via trade unions. Trade unions were very active and national trade 
union leader was a Minister of the government during those days. The 
national union controlled our union. 
A former Factory l\11magc recalled the period: 
Trade union activities were radical at that time and they had considerable 
amount of power within the corporation because they were the official 
repfhentatives of the Minister in NCCL. We had to listen to everything 
frort1 them. I mean even for 'short leave' it was a matter for tmde unions. I 
must admit that they made lot of decisions. However, budgets, and the 
punch card system, were beyond their realistic targets. 
The Factory Manager further said: 
. :fan employee was reprimanded for his late attendance, he came with n 
,'. trade union leader and questioned us. Even though the punch card system 
had recorded actual lime of attendance, we could not take disciplinary 
actions against employees because of the activism of powerful trade 
unions and the relntionships they had with the government Ministers. 
Often Ministers influenced our decisions. 
-------------------------- --------
'" 
Factory trade union leaders, often hcing the leaders of villages sought to protect their 
culturnl integrity and 'lifoworlds', hy demands through trndc union agitation. 
Employees' depression in the factory was linked up with a vast array of economic, 
political, and cultural intricacies. ll was political hccausc trade unions were linked to 
national political parties; it was economic as employees wanted freedom to supplement 
their factory income hy participating in the village economy; and it was cultural as 
employees wanted to protect !heir 'lifcworlds' from the economic crisis and 
management control. 
The situation raised broad issues of social, economic, and political contc;,;:t~ of systems 
development and practice. Both the budgetary and the punch card systems penetrated 
deeply into the social and cultural control of employees, leading to loss of culturally 
embedded value systems of employees. 
Generally, trade union leaders arc not aggressive in Sri Lanka. This is consistent with 
their traditional culture. Politicians use trade unions as instruments to achieve their 
politically motivated objectives. Organisations' unions arc linked up w\th national trade 
unions. Either Ministers or a representative of elite groups bccomi leaders of national 
trade unions. In this manner, the leaders of national unioos, being from educated and 
wealthy families, find it difficult to understand and to empathise with the problems of 
shop-flo;ir employees. Therefore, being from a different social class, they do not 
genuinely represent employees' rights in the working places. Often, union leaders little 
more than merely carry out the wishes of politicians helping to implement some 
government changes in organisations while ignoring the damage these changes could 
make to broad cultural and socio-political structures. 
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Thus, the trade unions, whilst supposcd?y ucting as vehicle for sociul and economic 
justice, in the work place, they nlso provided for access to political and exercise of 
trnditionn! kinb'ship (Wickrnmnsi11£he & Hooper, 2000). 
In periods of economic down town, some employees worked additional hours during the 
weekdays and weekends nt the factory. l11is could always be c1one because as a shop· 
floor employee remembered that "there were ad-hoe arrangements on shift.< 'in the 
factory for production. In fact employees controlled tile production. In certain days, we 
used to work in others' shifts by negotiating with factory supervisors". This attitude of 
employees was widespread indicated by a foreman remarking that: 
We knew shop-floor employees' problems. We were disappointed about 
their economic problems. When we wanted 25 employees for a shift, 
there were about 18 men. On the following day also we have the different 
number but with different people. They had such an informal 
arrangement. We sympathised about this. We could not take disciplinary 
actions against this because trade unions workrd ::gai,1st us. If we took 
disciplinary actions against employees, some times the Minister 
questioned u.~ about these actions. 
Mangers found it difficult to implement budgetary controls because of political, 
economic, and cultural constraints. However, they were aware that politicians were 
more concerned about political survival and responding to political dismrbanccs rather 
than imposing financial rq,,ulations in the public sector. These punch card and the 
budget systems were linked with the development and implementation of government 
objectives in NCCL within the regulatory framework of financial control of government 
enterprises. 
,, 
Politicians increasingly influenced fuctory affuirs thus causing difficulties for factory 
managers to realise production targets using budgets and the punch card system. The 
'"' 
punch card system was subject to political decision making. Politicians thought that 
they could provide more jobs for employees if the punch card system was removed. In 
!979, the Chaimmn, whom was appointed by the then Minister of Industries and 
Scientific Affairn removed 1hc punch card system and reinstalled manual ;;ystcm for 
processing employees' attcodancc. 
Consequently, sixty new employees were recruited and assigned to the time and 
attendance office. The operation supervisor of the time and attendance section wa~ 
redcsib'llated as an accountant and appointed as the head of manual operations to 
administer employees a\lendaoce in the factory. Employees viewed the removal of the 
punch card system provided with a relief. An older shop-lloor employee recollected his 
memories about the reinstallation of the new manual system for processing employees' 
attendance as follows: 
Removing it [the punch card system] was good for us because, we 
thought machines would r,i:vcr monitor our life again, In the villages, we 
are free and we are not monitored. No outsider eontro!!ed us in the 
village. We control ourselves. 
6.4.1.1 Reflection on Episode 3 
Village life evolved over centuries. Work, family and leisure were integrated, as was 
\', ownership and control of tl:c means of production. The control resided in social 
relations at the village level. Villagers were mostly unaware of the modernisation efforts 
of the government. Trust, mutual understanding, and traditional kingship practice 
governed village life. Forma!ly proc<!sscd information to control work. family and 
leisure via machines and techniques such as punch cards and budgetary systems were 
nvt needed. !nfonnation was infonna! and implicit in village culture, which operated 
'"' 
within a system of rcdproca! understanding. The government Minsters an<l their 
representatives in the hcad office had little idea about how the activities of the factory 
disturbed traditional values and connicts spawned in factory socin-culturnl 'lifeworlds.' 
6.5 Reflection on State Control (Phase la) 
After independence in I '148, the new Sri Lanka government introduced modernisation 
and industrialisation following the state-control model of socio-economic development. 
This resulted in the cstahfohmcnt of public owned enterprises in Sri Lanka following 
the Western bureaucralic, scientific and rational planning methods. Politicians, to 
support their political promises about cnl:anccd employment opportunities, initiated 
industrial initiatives and factories. !n the minds of politicians, tl1c establishment of 
factories was understood as traditional kingship rnther than a vehicle for mobilising 
socio-ecooomic development in the country. 
Managers used formal information systems to steer socio-cultural 'lifeworlds' of the 
factory through techniques and machines such as budgetary and punched card systems 
within a bureaucratic model of rational planning to realise political objectives of the 
government. This approach wa~ based on technocratic modes of organisational control 
with rational-legal, economic :-;nd purposive rationalities. 
__ Employees interpreted budgets an1J the punch card system as instruments of domination 
_y----;p 
' of their lifcworlds. lnfonnatim1 systems therefore appeared to endanger the employees' 
!ifcworlds inside the factory. Though politicians promised socin-econnmic 
development through ir,Jcstrfolisation using the state-controlled mode!, their 
development pinning did not adequately address broad issues of socio-cultural, 
economic and po\iticn! context~ of Sri Lanka Thus information systems development 
IS7 
within ihc state control model did not improve NCCL and did not assist the socio-
economic development of Sri Lanka. 
6.6 information systems Development and Practice under Hie State-Control Pha~c with 
Open Economic Policies: Pl111se I h 
lnfonnation systems development and practice at NCCL changed once again following 
the market-hasc<l model intrmluccd under the open cconomie policies by the right-
centred government which swept into power in 1977. The government commitment to 
market economics brought fundamental changes to the industrial policy based on import 
substitution and central planning (Karunatillcke, l 993). Policy makers believed that this 
market economics policies would result in a more competiL<ve environment and thus 
greater organisational efficiency (Kelegama, 1993). 
This was realised in the push for value for money amongst the public sector. One of the 
major components of the government ideology during !977-1993 was the objective of 
improving the efficiency and effectiveness of public corporations. rhc consequence of 
this improving efficiency and effectiveness was the government policy was framed in 
terms ofbolicfs that intemal!y generated savings should finance part of NCCL. This led 
to ideas of improving the politic;;! a,id management accountability of NCCL. both of 
which pointed in the same direction: more and better infonm1tion. Management was put 
under pressure to improve performance and reduce opcratio,, costs at NCCL 
This political and management accountability id,·,,, required NCCL to implement a 
fully dcvc\u'ped managcmem budget approach. lnfommtion was clearly cast as the 
currency to be used in decision-making and to monitor and improve the perfomiance of 
tasks on which a new market system for NCCL was to be developed. lbese new 
'"" 
changes were resulted from successive government's objective of limiting public 
spending nnd consequently cutting money b'l'Ontcd from the consolidated funds to 
corporations. However, the changes did not resonate with broad agenda~ of socio-
economic development. 
The political and management accountability ideas provided a foundation for the 
introduction of computerised infomiation systems both at the head office and at the 
factory with the support of newly arrived information techno!ob'Y- Thus the management 
introduced the computerisation project in a context of financial and pcrfonnancc 
problems at NCCL Computerised inforrnation systems were c.,nsidered by NCCL 
management to be techniques and strategies that would solve their problems and 
decision to develop computerised infonnation systems was taken. However, the 
development of :h'.!Se infonnation systems was constrained by deeply rooted socio-
economic and political structures within NCCL 
6.6,I Computcrbed Jnformntioo Systems for Accurate Jnformntloo for 
Mnoagemcnt Accountability 
In 1983, with a decision made by the Chainnan, batch processing Wang computer 
systems were purchased at a cost of Rs. 1.9 million from DBMS, n local supplier of' 
IBM computer systems. An information technology manager revealed that this amnunt 
was far more than the amount what actually NCCL could be afforded during those days. 
Of these computer systems, an IBM LVI' 2200 computer, compatible with BASIC 
programming, was installed in the head office whereas an IBM VS 25 computer, 
compatible with COBOL programming, was installed in the factory. Accordingly, two 
'"' 
computing unit~ for datn processing were created bolh in the factory and in the head 
office. 
The factory data processing unit was organised under the foctory chief accountant in a 
highly secured "machine room" which dcnic<l unauthorised access. Similarly, the data 
processing unit in the head oftlcc war. kept under the headship of an accountant, 
designated as operational supervisor, within the finance department. Both systems 
remained under the control of the finance manger who controlled overall financial 
matters of NCCL. These batch-processing systems were expected to process 
applications such as payroll, supplies, sales, and accounting to provide accurate 
information for newly emergant financial controls employing market principles. 
Systems analysts and programmers were recruited by using an intelligence quotient (!Q) 
test. However a former computer programmer, who was later promoted to a systems 
analyst, recollected that "only few programmers and systems analysts passed the IQ test 
and others were appointed by the Minister". Politicians were more concerned about their 
party supporters than actual performance in systems development projects at NCCL 
Initially, the supplier of Wang computer systems, DBMS, organised training for 
accountants, systems analysts, and programmes in the data processing units who did not 
have previous work experience in computer applications. 111c training, as commented 
by a systems analyst "was provided about one and half months for programmers and 
just two to three days for systems analysts and accountants". The training was difficult. 
A programmer, who was later promoted to an infonnation technology manager of 
operations, explained. "We could not understand the meanings of what the trainer was 
telling us, his langUage, tenns used, data structures, data files, fields, codes, etc., not 
JOO 
only computers but al! these were nc\V to us". An accountant, while laughing stated that 
"we heard the tcnn 'fields' in our village paddy fields rather than in an of!ice. These new 
tenns were strnngc to many ofus". 
The content and manner in which the training was conducted resulted in staff not being 
able to develop and use infonnation systems properly manner within NCCL. Training 
was conducted with little or no interaction with purticipants, followed an instrumental 
approach, with no open and free discussions which arc usually necessary for the success 
of information systems development and practice. A systems analyst that participated 
in. the training programme commented that "we were told rather than taught in the 
course". The training was unable to properly trained trainees to develop computerised 
infonnation systems. However, management entrusted the task of infonnation systems 
development to these trainees. 
In systems development, all the analysts and programmers adopted technical and 
instrumental approaches assuming the role of "experts". These experts assumed that the 
knowledge possessed by them was not available to users, or other involved parties, in 
the organisation. Users and other involved parties were forced to consent to the 
proposed actions of systems analysts. These experts believed that systems development 
is a neutral action. They ignored social contexts operating at NCCL when developing 
information systems. As a result, many infonnation systems development projects 
eventually failed. Thus, management attempted to steer NCCL in !ine with the 
objectives of the ruling government's market principles, through infonnation systems 
development, in a direction that was not commensurable with the demands of 
employees' 'lifoworlds' at NCCL. 
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6.6.1.1 Wang Computerised lnformntlon System for Management Accountability; 
Episode 4 
111c Wang computerised infonnation systems was used to process applications such as 
payroll, sales invoice analyses, inventory and supplies, and preparing statutory accounts 
to streamline and rationalise NCCL 's business transcciions. Two data processing units, 
with newly trnincd infonnation technology staff, were expected to generate the 
necessary infomiation. Factory marmgcmcnt, using such information, was supposed to 
tnmsfonn NCCL towards becoming a more effective public corporation. 
The government and senior management at NCCL assumed that NCCL was thus being 
transformed through new computerised information systems. However, the dynamics 
operating within socio-economic and political structures at NCCL complicated the 
development process in that new conflicts appeared when the newly introduced 
computerised information systems began to appear and influence employees' work and 
'lifeworlds'. 
NCCL management realised that they needed accurate information. However, the 
information systems development at NCCL, since its inception, whether manual or 
computerised, has tended to he patchy and piecemeal. Each analyst was given a job of 
developing information systems for a specific area such as sales, payroll, accounting, 
and inventory both at the factory and the head office. All the analysts conducted their 
development in a similar manner. Analysts were given information requirements by 
senior management, software vendors provided software, users and other stakeholders 
were not involved nor was their participation considered important, and systems 
development was mainly ad-hoe. 
'" 
With nil of these, what is interesting is tlmt infonnation systems development was 
taking pince in often highly turbulent sm.:io-pl'litica! contexts at NCCL. One 
consequence of this was thnt any computerisation project carried out in NCCL had to 
consider the many forms of relationships that were going to he affected by the 
computerisation project and what activities had to he undertaken to ensure that those 
relationships helped the project. However, there were numerous socio-economic, and 
political relationships placed constrains upon information systems development and 
practice al NCCL. 
Since its inception, management of NCCL lacked experience in developing and 
managing a computerised information systems project. Like ffi!lllY other public sector 
organisations, computer technology was new to NCCl Almost all the employees, 
including senior managers, had never worked h, or been exposed to a computer 
environment. Initially, wi!h the announcement of the nell' ~omputerisation project by 
the sen:or management, many employees expressed opposition through their trade 
unions. A systems analyst recalled that: 
Huge employees' agitation was generated against the computerisation 
project. Some feared about loosing their jobs. Others thought their 
importance would be reduced within organisation if computers were to 
take over their jobs. Still others believed their work was going to be 
taken over by the data processing unit. More employees believed that 
their work would be monitored and controlled using new information 
processed by the computer systems. 
It has been asserted previously that, in Sri Lanka, informal communication appears as 
the dominant mode of communication. Informal communication includes much tacit 
information that is internalised within the 'lifeworlds' of communities. Traditionally, Sri 
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Lankan communities were largely informally controlled through communicative 
actions. A shop-floor employee in the factory stated, "no one controls us in the village". 
Employees continued to work at NCCL in n rather informal manner. Computeri~cd 
information systems were not valued, and indeed were subverted by infomml 
communication of employees. Employees perceived that computerised information 
systems degraded their personal communication. Employees feared that the use of 
computerised information systems would lead to their being dominated by an over-
emphasis on technocratic modes of organisational control, which threatened their 
'lifeworlds.' NCCL management introduced the computerisation project to change the 
organisational culture and to improve the overall performance without considering 
'lifeworlds' of employees at NCCL. 
This use of power by senior management, driven by government objectives, prevented 
open and free communicative discussion with employees about the introduction of 
computers in NCCL. The management legitimised their introduction of computers by 
asserting that their decisions were inevitable, being forced by economic circumstances 
of improving efficiency and effectiveness, and thus were politically neutral. However, 
employees understood that management decision to introduce computers was politically 
motivated to change their conditions. Employees expressed their opposition and they 
forred that computer systems would threaten their cultural values. Employees organised 
against the computerisation project through their unions. Unions were thus used by 
employees as a medium through which their socio-cultural value systems could be 
protected from the domination ofmanagcmont. 
'" 
TI1e cmployer,s were dubious abu.;t the merits of the new computers. They realised that 
their work-~\'.ifts would he closely mnnitnr~'l.! thornt1gh cornputt:riscd information 
s~c.1ms and thu~ the factory management would control them. Employees perceived 
new computerised informal ion systems as a threat to their job security. Some employees 
believed that computcrisntion of their work would lower the standards of their living 
patterns. Many who did overtime for additional earnings were particularly fearful and 
actively opposed the computerisation project. 
After the introduction of computers, many employees used derogatory terms such as 
'complicated machines' and 'comJ}actor'. A shop-floor employee stated that, "they 
[computers] were brought here not to help us but to threaten our lives". An infom1ation 
technology manager recol!ected reasons for introducing computers at work: 
Apparently, there was no identified reason for moving from manual to 
computerisation of work as such. However, the idea of iotroducing 
computerisation project was to introduce remarkable control over 
finance, production targets, factory shifts, and everything with a 
minimum number of employees rather than actually transforming NCCL 
towards a better organisation. 
Sri Lanka's culture reflects a collective society where members of the society construct 
social structures which express concerns with each other in a well-understood system of 
statutes and mutual obligations between families. Traditionally, families and 
neighbours were governed by trust relationships. They supported each other within 
villages without any wage negotiation. When employees realised tlmt their jobs were 
going to be tltrcatcn by new computerisation projects, they organised against the 
projects, as they were concerned about their own and fellow colleagues' job security. 
'" 
St.'11ior management cnntrullcd employees' resistance using coven slrntcgic actions, thus 
indirectly fulfilling the promises of politicians and by implication the government 
objectives. They offcrcJ salary raises for those who were joining the data procc,sing 
· . 'i _units, thereby supprt'Ssiag employees' agitation against the computerisation project. An 
information technology manager recalled, "in order to overcome resistance from 
employees, the management increased salaries for those employees who were willing to 
join data processing units". As a consequence, many employees who suffered from 
economic problems and were unable to maintain their families with low income joined 
the data processing units as data entry clerks. Many of those who joined the data 
processing units did not have sufficient knowledge about the tasks of the data 
processing units. 
Employees had never seen computers before. Another information technology manager 
commented that "all employees who joined with the data processing unit as data entry 
clerks were concerned only the salary increase for their own interest, but not because 
they liked the computerisation project or they were aware of how to work with 
computers". On the other hand information technology professionals had promised 
employees that the proposed infonnalion technology solutions would transfonn NCCL 
into a better organisation. An infonnation technology manager stated that "unions were 
opposed, but management persuaded many employees that the computerisation of 
works would benefit them". In this way, NCCL management used covert strategic 
actions to realise its purposive rational objectives in the computerisation project. 
While NCCL's systems analysts and programmers were legitimised by management as 
developers of infonnation systems, an outside specialist from DBMS was brought in by 
the management and introduced software for processing payroll, inventory, sales 
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invoicing, and general accoun:ing, despite a mass protest hy the trade unions. !,ithough, 
the software vendor did not have prior e~perience of introducing such n large project, he 
expected NCCL to modify its infonnation needs according to the processing facilities 
and capabilities available in the soft.ware package. 
An understanding of a nation's culture as part of requirement elicitation is considered as 
an important dclenninant in the infonnation systems development suCccss (sec 
Thanasnnkit & Corbitt, 1999a). There arc many researchers who suggest that during 
elicitation, systems analyst should "acknowledge the social!y organised character of 
work and its environment" {Randall, Hughes & Shapiro, 1994). Luff, Jirotka, Heath and 
Greatbatch (i 903), suggest that inadequate attention is paid to the social context within 
which computer systems function, resulting in many systems eventually failing. 
However, recognition of social contexts in systems Jevc!opment did not happen at 
NCCL. 
Neither outside experts, nor internal systems analysts, had conducted proper 
requirement identification for any of the modules of the software package introduced at 
NCCL. Rather the senior management dictated the requirements. Senior managcm.cn~ 
was not properly educated regarding information requirements because they were 
subject to whims and fancies of politicians' self interests which were not related to the 
actual performance of corporations. A system analyst recollected his experience. 
"Senior management expected from us to develop such n system that could meet their 
infonnation requirements for controlling production scheduling and factory work-shifts, 
however, they were also little aware about their needs". Recalling traditional Sri 
Lanknn culture, he said, "! didn't want to create conflicts with my superiors, because 
'" 
our culture is to respect thcmtt. However, the information system introduced hy the 
software provider was im:ompatihlc with the information requirement of management. 
A former data-controlling officer explained the process adopted by the external expert 
during the introduction of a payroll system at NCCL as follows. 
What happened was, before introducing the system, one day, an expert 
from DBMS came to our organisation. He just asked what information 
we want from the system? We gave our requirements. We thought, he 
would bring u5 a system that we need, but the system, he introduced was 
completely different from the one we wanted. 
The software provided by DBMS was incommensurable with tht needs of NCCL's 
payroll processing requirements. NCCL payroll system was complicated by massive 
links operating with production shifts, targets, overtime payments, leaves bonus, 
performance bonus, incentives, loan, and advance paymeots. Users found very difficult 
in producing required management reports using this software system. A systems 
analyst remarked. "We also could not do much to improve the system because we were 
not aware what he [the external consultant} was doing!" He acknowledged that he 
lacked knowledge about both software and payroll structure of NCCL. "I also did not 
have much idea about NCCL's payroll system. I had to listen to what he [the external 
consultant] was telling me". However, the systems analysts had realised that users could 
not generate reports. "Users also could not generate employees' pay sheets and other 
reports for the use of management". A former data-controlling officer explained: 
the package introduced at our organisation was originally developed in 
the USA and consequently used in some other organisation before. It was 
not the system we wanted. Our system is totally different. He initially 
agreed us to provide our own system. Now he wanted us to adjust our 
requirements according to the facilities available in the software. Can we 
do that? It's going to be another nightmare. 
1% 
The consultant from the software providi:ir (DBMS) together with NCCL's systems 
analyst introduced modifications to the system. "Aller introducing sr'J.warc, we had lo 
introduce lot ofmodilicatfons", TlTirnrkcd /tnothcr sy.~tcm.~ analyst who was manning for 
inventories and supplies systems. A systems analyst stated that ·'we didn't involve users 
in designing of systems. They came to know only when we were trying to put systems 
into work". He further explained his instrumental and technocratic approach, used in 
systems development, stating that: 
Users did not have ideas about systems development. Until users saw 
the system and began to work with it, they didn't know what the 
system looked like. When they began to work, then only they realised 
what they wanted from the system. 
Users were considered as unintelligent and passive objects to be manipulated and 
controlled by instrumental actiohs of systems analysts. When users were experiencing 
problems in use of systems, they were ''users who Jacked expertise" but not the systems 
analyst. "Onca the system has been developed, users believe that's the end. They expect 
everything to be done by computers". He further said, "they don't make any attempt to 
generate anything creatively. Most users didn't have background of computing, because 
those who joined data processing units were transferred from other sections where they 
worked as manual clerks". 
In Habermas's terms, rather than employing communicative action to cultivate 
employees' capabilities to use information technology, these experts acted 
inappropriately in an instrumental manner, serving their own best technical interests and 
the perceived technical interests of senior managers at NCCL. In this way, they 
objectified the systems development by dominating the lifcwor!ds of employees at 
NCCL. 
199 
In general, employees who joined the data processing units as data operating clerks 
found it hard to use infonnation systems developed by both c,et~-mal and internal' 
experts. The existing manual procedures dependent on a whole series of human 
decisions and judgements for which rules were tacit and located within the lifew~·rlds of 
employees. Jn such an environment, these staff members could resist any attempt to 
translate their intensions and actions computerised infonnation systems. They opposed 
systems development in various ways. They perceived that the te;:hnical and instrument 
approach of experts in introducing comprised systems appeared to threaten their values 
systems and 'lifoworlds.' 
Even though they opposed the computerisation project, they believed that they were · 
ignored during the system deign and modification of the payroll system. Forced by 
their economic problems to accept the higher salaried positions in the data processing 
units, these employees ellperieneed cultural clashes with modern technology introduced 
by NCCL's management. 
Users repeatedly refused systems development projects that were dominated by syst~~ 
analysts, A systems analyst explained how: 
I developed a credit control module as part of a sales and accounting 
information system. The finance department gave the information 
requirements to me. Sales clerks refused to use the system when it was 
implemented. They continued to work with manual system for recording 
credit information about sales. 
Users and other affected parties, such as employees in other divisions, were reluctant to 
change their everyday life to fit ''I with the change of computer technology, which faced 
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employees' scepticism. G.:ncru\ly, employees at NCCL proved that the <lcvdopmcnt of 
technical infonnation systems were unsuccessful without their participation. 
Users perceived that their participation in systems modification was essential ifit was to 
be successful. However, user participation was restricted by the poW<..'l' of systems 
analysts and outside consuhants. It was found that, employees perceived that a system 
of knowledge lies in collective decision making where members of the community 
express concerns with each other. They perceived that trust and mutual understanding of 
human actions are vested in customs and traditions. In general, the everyday life of most 
of.employees was built into cultural values of working as a family with equity, trust and 
reciprocal understanding. This everyday life was fused with Buddhist teaching. Most of 
the interactions in employees working lives were enacted within understandings, which 
arose from contexts of commonly experienced '!ifcworlds.' 
However, systems analysts and external consultllflts ignored this social grammar that 
influenced as a whole in every single interaction between employees at NCCL. The 
former data-controlling officer who worked for the payroll section recalled. "Although 
we don't like to see the computerisation of our work, there is always a way forward". 
Recalling how they make decisions in villages, he explained. "We were not given 
opportunities to involve in the design and modifications of system nor we were 
consulted for our views about the system design. It was only by experts doing 
everything". If we arc involved, he explained, "we know lot about NCCL's payroll 
structure. Wo know how to get it done". 
Referring to the socio-cultural values of Sri Lanka, he continued to explain how 
,, 
information systems could be developed. "It is we who should work togctP~·r to develop 
,OJ 
info!Tll11tion systems". H-c understood the foct that information systems development 
should be carried out as II knowledgc,sharing uclivity among different parties in a free 
and an open environment 
A great deal of criticism arose from the staff in general over the Jong development times 
" 
and manpower resource implications for the computerisation project. Several factors 
contributed to this charge as infonnation technology manager explained. 
When there were technical problems in computers in the factory we had 
to bring the matter t•J the notice of the head office. Our matters were not 
priority concerns within their agendas. The head office had little 
undc~tanding about factory affairs. It took many days to come and sort 
out factory problems. They also not took much interest because the 
factory was located in a remote area. We could not work with computers 
until they come and solve those problems. 
Generally, ever since the inception of NCCL, employees in the head office viewed 
employees in the factory as of an inferior status. The perception of factory employees 
was that the employees in the head office enjoyed luxury life at the expense of factory 
employees. They believed that the factory stam, but not the staff in the head office, 
were undergoing hardship in cement production with the minimum facilities. This 
division was reflected in the organising of data processing units in the factory and head 
office. 
While information technology people in the factory were struggling in developing 
information systems, information technology people in the head office exercised a 
considerable amount of power over the information technology staff in the factory. A 
factory systems analyst recollected. "As far as status arc concerned there is no 
difference between peop-\c who worked both in the head office and in the factory, but 
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they thought that they are superior to factory information technology staff, because they 
had access to many information technology resources". 
The control of power exercised by information tcchnolot,,Y staff in the head office, over 
the information technology staff in the factory, created conflicts between these two 
groups. These conflicts plagued information systems development in the factory, which 
were further exaggerated by hardware and software failures. An information technolo1,,y 
manager of operation explained. "We had to depend on our suppliers for maintenance". 
Additionally, the factory computers repeatedly made hard disk errors due to electricity 
fh.ictuations. 
Moreover, information technology personnel were not skilled enough to properly 
develop information systems. All these added to the slow progress made by the 
computerisation project in the factory. An infonnation technology manager explained 
that "infonnation technology people were and still are not competent enough to 
implement change through infonnation S}Stems development. This is why many pcop\c 
in other sections didn't trust ori the works carried out by the employees in the 
infonnntion technology units", 
The inability to develop s•Jccessful infonnation systems is mainly related to the lack of 
understanding about the social context ofNCCL by infonnation technology personnel. 
Since the late 1960s, computer education in Sri Lanka has been developed as a technical 
profession. 
Software vendors, who mainly provided standnrd Western technical solutions, used their 
own experts who had been trained as tccimical staff. These jnfonnation technology/ 
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personnel lacked understanding about major social issues and complex intricacies 
operating within NCCL. They could not appreciate the idiosyncrasies of operations 
operating in Sri Lanka. A systems analyst commented that "it was very difficult for 
them [ outside infonnation technology consultants] to implement their solutions because 
they lacked social knowledge in systems development. That's why computerisation 
projects took unusually long time to implement and some projects were abandoned". 
Employees perceived that the main reason for the introduction of computerised 
information systems to change in the political and economic climate in which NCCL 
operated. Despite the proposed benefits of the computerised information systems, the 
employees feared disruptive changes in work and social life. These employees' fears 
regarding the computerisation of work became reality when management announced a 
compensation plan to remove the excess staff A shop-floor employee explained: 
This was what hoppened after the introduction of computcrisotion 
project. The payroll section, previously 60 employees, was reduced to 
two. Similarly, the number of employees in other divisions was rcduct".:l 
significantly. The management removed excess staff, offering 
compensation of Rs. 20000 per employee, following the government's 
recommendations of removing excess staff in public corporations. 
NCCL had ignored the social cost such as unemployment problem and the resultant 
economic problems of employees of infonnation systems development. These retired 
employees added to increase the unemployment problem in Sri Lanka woPiening their 
living conditions. 
i) 
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6.6,1,l.l Reflection on Episode 4 
One of the main claims made for the development of computerised infonnation systems 
was that it provided valuable information for decision-making tasks. This idea was 
inspired by the early writings of Herbert Simon (!977) who wrote that information 
systems reduce the complexity of decision-making rationality by relaxing the bounds 
that prohibit informed optimisation of the decision problem. M<magement actions at 
NCCL were framed by Herbert Simon's conceptualisation of economics of information 
processing. Their ideas were heavily influenced by the open economic policies 
introduced in 1977 by the Sri Lanka government. Following these ideals, computerised 
information systems were designed to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of 
NCCL. 
The introduction of Wang computerised information systems clearly adhered to these 
ideals. However, management did not take into account many important aspects such as 
the nature of the organisation, its social, economic and political structures, experience in 
management and organisation of computerisation projects. Neither did it identify the 
skills necessary for information technology professionals, and infrastructure facilities 
required for the computerisation of works. It was partly unable to meet the interests of 
various employee groups and assumed that computerisation of work could be 
undertaken with no disruption underlying socio-cultural 'lifeworlds.' 
Consequently, management ignored the importance of practical problems of employees 
whose voices were suppressed by dominating managerial actions. As a manager 
explained, "computers were just introduced without considering social aspect of life of 
employees". In this light, it can be argued that information systems were adopted to 
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strengthen the narrow instrumental and strategic concerns of management of NCCL 
rnthcr than actually to transfonn NCCL towards a belier organisation. 
6.7 Computerised Preventive Maintenance Information Systems for Management 
Accountability: Episode 5 
In 1987, senior management recognised that maintenance of factory operation was 
central to its modernisation program at NCCL. Consequently, introduction of 
computerised preventive maintenance information systems for maintenance activities in 
the factory plants was regarded as essential in addition to computerising the payroll, 
sales invoicing, inventories, and general accounting system. The responsibility for" .. ,e 
development of the eomputerised preventive maintenance information ~ystcms 
remained under the factory data processing unit but took place in a highly turbulent 
socio-cultural and political contexts. Factory engineers saw this new system, although 
developed for their u.se, as II t:lfeat to their professional status and their conditions of 
employment. While engineers were fighting to preserve their professional status, 
systems analysts gained states as experts in the development of the plant maintenance 
system. 
Engineers saw the newly appeared information technology profession in general, and 
?' 
i{6oople who worked in data processing units, as a threat to their already established 
engineering culture. This gave bir'.h to conflicts in both an organised and passionate 
manner, by engineers with information technology people in the data processing unit. 
Conflicts appeared as factory engineers sought to preserve their professional status 
within the factory. Engineers were considered as experts in production, maintenance, 
electrical, and "iher engineering works. A shop-floor employee commented. 
When there was II problem in the plant, we always had to see an 
engineer through our supervisors. Though we knew how to get the 
machines to run quickly, we were not allowed, we had to wait till au 
engineer came and said OK. 
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Engineers thus used technical, scientific and bureaucratic techniques and methods to 
control work in the factory. 
A significant number of engineers opposed the proposed plant maintenance system that 
was to be developed to put the senior management initiatives into practice. A systems 
analyst commented that engincc~· support in the development of computerised 
preventive maintenance information systems as essential part of the project: "it was 
essential for engineers and technical staffs to support the development of plant 
maintenance information system. Their participation was also essential because the 
proposed information system was meant for their use in plant maintenance". 
Briefly the computerised preventive maintenance information systems was expected to 
monitor breakdowns of plants and take preventive actions to effectively control 
production and employee-shifts. Management believed that the introduction of the 
computerised preventive maintenance information systems could provide a means to 
direct attention to the maintenance of factory plans, and thereby management could 
organise employee-shifts accordingly. By using computerised preventive maintenance 
information systems, management believed it would get reliable and objective 
information about plant maintenance activities and thereby reward employees for grater 
efficiency. This information, in tum, could be used for the financial control at NCCL. 
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Engineers, as users of computerised preventive maintenance infonnation systems, were 
annoyed that they had not bc~n consulted earlier by the senior management. However, 
engineers were refused the right to participate in \he requirement identification process 
initiated by the systems analyst. The genera! feeling among the engineering staff was 
that computer, and by implication, people in the data processing wiit, was being used, 
yet against, to further control professional people and engineering culture. Engineers 
believed that systems analysts did not have sufficient understanding about plant 
maintenance and that they should develop the proposed system. A systems analyst, 
working with the coniputerised preventive maintenance information systems stated: 
Engineers did not co-operate by giving information. They viewed that 
they could develop it [computerised preventive maintenance information 
systems] iftrainiag was given to them. They believed that engineers, not 
computer people, should develop the proposed system. Moreover, 
engineers felt that systems analysts do not have an idea about plant 
maintenance to develop a better system for their use. 
Engineers feared that systems analysts and the data processing unit, by way of 
computerised preventive maintenance information systems development would gain 
control and power of their work within the factory. They realised that their rccognitiori.. 
as experts would be reduced if data processing unit controlled the plant maintenance 
system and, by implication their engineering expertise within NCCL. Engineers 
questioned the legitimacy of systems analysts' developing system for engineers' work. 
A factory engineer commented: 
They [systems analysts] pretended lo know everything. Who arc they to 
come and ask questions, I mean from engineers, what information do we 
need from the computerised system? What they know about factory 
maintL·rmnc.:? What they know about us [engineers]? They knew nothing 
about plant maintenance. They might have been fwni!iar with a bit of 
computing but nothing about plant maintenance. ?!ant maintenance is a 
completely different busi~~ss. 
'°" 
TI1c development <,f computerised preventive maintenance infomialion systems in 
general and the in'lolvcmcnl of systems unalys\ in the development of computerised 
prc~.;ntivc maintenance infonnation systems in specific were annoyed by engineers. 
This agitation was further increased when the management increased salaries of 
information technology people in the data processing unit hy 40%. This salary increase 
of information technology personnel went up above the salary level of cngint:.~rs and 
some other executives such as accountants and technicians. An engineer stated that 
"computer staff had neither gained qualification on a par with us, nor were they 
competent in their profession. How could they be considered as ~upcriors to us?" 
However, the fact that engineers and technician~ opposed the raise resulted in a 
decreased raise of pay, which led to bad feelings and poor morale among computt-r 
professionals. The computing staff perceived the decrease as a low appreciation of the 
information technology function within NCCL, mainly due to structural design of the 
orgunisation. An information technology manager stated: 
Computing in general, and staff who worked in the sections have not 
received due recognition right fiJm the beginning to now because it 
[computing section] was and still is an instrument of finance department. 
Managers who used information processed by the computing units were 
esteemed but the p1coplc who made available such information to them 
[i.e. people who produced such information while working behind the 
screen], were devalued. 
The information technolocy manager further said, "however, a systems analyst who had 
a deduction from his salary subsequently left the Company for a higher salaried position 
in an another Company". 
Ii 
Like other computerisation projects, the devolopmcnt of the computerised preventive 
maintenance information systems was significantly affected by party politics. Factory 
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employees opposed the proposed system through their trnde unions. This organised 
resistance resulted in a personal clash between the senior systems analyst, in the factory 
data processing unit, and the trade union leader. As a r~oult of this clash, the senior 
systems analyst, who belonged to the opposition party, was transferred to the head 
office on the request of the trade union leader who had ties with the Minister of the then 
ruling government. A systems ana!y$1 commented that "we came to know later that 
engineers also supported Mr. [X's] transfer". 
The development of computerised preventive maintenance information systems 
ostensibly taken a political nature. Engineers' agitation towards computerised 
preventive maintenance information systems was defeated through organised politics 
within NCCL. They realised that systems analysts acting as experts attempt to 
implement hidden agendas of senior management through the development of 
computerised preventive maintenance infommtion systems. However, systems analyst 
could not develop a type of computerised preventive maintenance infonnati~!l systems 
required by the senior management, as explained by a programmer who was'\vorking iii 
' 
the tlata processing unit in the factory. She explained that: 
Senior management began to inquire about the plant-maintenance system 
[computerised preventive maintenance infonnation systems], but we 
didn't have one ... , because we didn't receive support from engineers to 
develop such a system required by senior management. However, we 
developed one according to our knowledge, though it was not the same 
infonnation system that the senior management wanted, so we also had 
to work with a bit of frustration. 
When the development of computerised preventive maintenance infonnaticn systems 
was failed, the. systems analyst interpreted engineers' resistance as incapable 
management b'l'OUP within factory who didn't perform in their task efficiently and 
''° 
effectively. 111c systems analyst in the factory explained that, "th..'j' didn't like others 
[senior management) seeing !heir weakness''. However, engineers interpreted proposed 
computerisL-d preventive maintenance information systems as a management-controlling 
tool to closely monitor their works in the factory. Because there was no proper ways of 
evaluating their jobs at that time and some engineers would have thought their weakness 
could easily caught by the management and 11ccordingly they would be disadvuntaged 
A maintenance manager (engineer) explained, "once infor,nation become formal, it is 
easy for them [senior management] to control us within our factory life. It 
[computerised preventive maintenance information systems] was totally a new 
controlling device e::nanated from the government's reforms". 
In 1991, with a newly promoted progranuner as a systems analyst recommenced the 
computerised preventive maintenance information systems. Senior management later 
realised that proposed computerised preventive maintenance information systems could 
not be developed without the support from engineers. The former Factory Manager: 
Engineers deeply felt that they were ignored from the decision making 
process, I mean, the development of the computerised plant maintenance 
system. I realised, without their support, implementing the project would 
be impossible, so I fi.1ally decided to send a team, including an engineer 
fortrainingn. 
Realising that management decision-making proe<:ss was hampering due to lack of 
infonnation about the plant maintenance, it was subsequently used such information for 
financial controlling. The management had decided to send a team consi~ting of senior 
engineer (maintenance), systems analyst, and programmer for a training at the 
Engineering Corporation in Sri Lanka hoping that training would develop an 
understanding among thc~e employees. The training was aimed at demonstrating a 
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sample computerised preventive maintenance information systems that could be used in 
the cement industry. Systems analyst rcco!lcctcd their training. "It was really 
interesting, only for the first time !n my factory lifo, we understood each other. We 
developed good relationships with the maintenance engineer". The team together 
realised Urnt the demonstrated computerised preventive maintenance information 
systems would not meet the requirements of the corporation, all agreed to develop a 
suitable computerised preventive maintenance information systems in-house. 
Since the team members comprised from various stakeholder groups (systems analyst, 
programmer, and senior maintenance engineer), the team members developed more 
loyalty to each other as time went on. The same process occurred when design and 
development of the system was started. Engineers continued to invest their time and 
effort in the development of the computerised preventive maintenance information 
systems, they spent more time in it. Seen in this light we can conclude that the team 
members had employed communicative actions in understanding the problems of 
demonstrated computerised preventive maintenance information systems. 
Engineers began to support the development of computerise.cl preventive maintenance 
information systems when their involvement and participation were recognised by the 
senior management, systems analyst, and programmer. A former programmer 
commented that "the second stage of the project [development of computerised 
preventive maintenance information systems] was successful hence the senior engineer 
involved in the design and development of the system". With his support, "we shared 
our knowledge about the development of system [computerised preventive maintenance 
information systems]", and later the system analyst designed a four-mod•J\c 
" 
computerised preventive maintenance information systems, which comprised of 
,,, 
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mnchinc-maintuining module, preventive module, job catalogue module and condition 
monitoring module. Engineers, systems analyst, and programmer~ 'lgfCCd on the design 
proposed by systems analyst and management approved it. 
In 1992; the tcnm decided to develop the first of the four-module design, i. c. machine-
maintaining module. Once the team approved the design of machine-maintaining 
module, a problem appeared ~· .,, where and by whom it should be developed as 
maintenance engineers opposed to develop proposed system by the data processing staff 
in the data processing unit. The systems analyst explained. "Engineers wanted to 
de_vclop it in their section by their people, but not in the data processing unit by 
information technology staff'. 
Realising the importance of the machine-maintaining module, and the agitation of 
engineers to develop the system in the data processing unit, senior management decided 
to develop it in the maintenance section. However, management faced with a problem 
of developing it on the Wang computer as it was installed in the data processing unit. 
During this period, small PC's wern available in the market. In 1992, Wang systems of 
the head office were converted to a PC environment but the conversion of factory 
systems was excluded. Head office was delighted with new PCs and enjoyed in the head 
office believing that the factory was running smoothly following newly introduced 
market principles of the open economic policies of the government. 
When the factory management sought approval from the head office to buy a PC to 
develop a factory maintenance system, it was delayed. A factory systems analyst stated, 
"they didn't worry about the tllin[!a happening in the factory. We wrote acvcral letters to 
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the head office asking a J'C". Staff in the head office exercised a considerable amount 
of power in use of money Bhoul the factory activities. The conversion of head oflicc 
system form Wllng to PCs was rationalised along the line of high maintt'llancc cost of 
Wang computer systems but the exclusion of conversion of factory Wang computer 
systems into to PCs could not be rationally justified. 
However with the support from the General man~gcr, the factory management was able 
to secure a PC and it was installed in the maintenance section. The maintenance system 
was developed using Clipper programming in a DBASE. The systems analyst 
recollected her experience in the development of computerised preventive maintenance.: 
information systems: 
We [design and development engineer, foreman and systems analyst] 
jointly developed the system [computerised preventive maintenance 
infonnation systems] and it was successful, because of the participation 
of engineers. Both design and development engineer and foreman had 
good understanding about the computerisation of maintenance work. We 
worked as a team and shart:d our views when we were working 
[developing] in the system. It was good, because they knew what is really 
happening in maintenance. Other engineers such as maintenance manager 
[an engineer] also supported us though he did not have knowledge about 
computerisation of work. 
Seen in this light, the engineers were not opposed to the introduction of new system per 
se rather, they were more concerned about preserving their engineering culture within 
NCCL. They were more concerned about how the computerised preventive maintenance 
information systems and their involvement with it would be perceived by senior 
management. Systems analyst stated that "with the inputs and support of engineers 
and technical staff, it [computerised preventive maintenance infonnation systems] was 
later successfully implemented". This is not to say that all the engineers and engineers 
'" 
in the factory supported for the development of computi.-riscd preventive maintenance 
information systems, but the development was legitimised by the support and 
participation of engineers who did so. 
The development of computerised preventive maintenance information systems by 
engineers within maintenance division served to reinforce their already estr.blishcd 
engineering culture whilst maintaining the power of enginrers over the production 
employees revealed that information systems by itself can not force abandoning of long 
established social structures within NCCL. A shop-floor employee in the factory 
commented, "they [ en.ginccrs] realised that they were loosing their status. Now they can 
more easily control our life within factory using computerised infonnation systems. We 
become victims of the system". These ideas arc consistent with many critical accounts 
of computing in organisations (sec Rule et al., 1980; Mowshowitz, 1976; Briefs, 
Ciborra & Schneider, 19'83). These authors view information systems as a new device to 
reinforce control and surveillance of the workforce leading to an organisational "iron 
cage" (Weber, 1947) with increased alienation. 
The computcriJed previ:.:ntive maintenance infonnation system was legitimised by the 
senior management with the ideas of engineers' scientific and bureaucratic ideals 
(culture). Information technology fused with engineers' scientific and bureaucratic 
culture to control employees facilitating the modernisation efforts ofNCCL. Thus it can 
be argued the information systems devclop1rtcnt served the interest of government rather 
than the general interest of employees and other affected parties in the NCCL. ' ' 
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6.7.1 Reflection on Episode S 
The management purist of efficiency and effectiveness through technocratic and 
economic rationality dominated over 'lifcworlds', transformed social action to context 
of action bound by the requirements of the tcchnolob'Y itself, and ultimately imposed its 
own authoritarian system. The adoption of technocratic and economic rationality in 
information systems development in the context of modernity is a political system of 
domination, which aimed to serve the interest of government's modernisation 
programme. 
The computerised preventive maintenance information systems project went on within 
deeper political and cultural contexts within which it is embedded. Thus information 
technology adoption within political and management accountability paradigm model of 
modernisation for socio-economic development proved unrealistic with th..: prevailirg 
social, cultural values systems, economic and politics in Sri Lanka. 
6.8 ReRection on State Control with Open Economic Policies (Phase lb) 
Generally, the inability to develop infonnation systems as communicative rationality 
nnd become as an institutionalised practice was symptomatic to Ute existence of 
scientific and bureaucratic rationality which fundamentally at odds to the 
communicative rationality. This scientific and bureaucratic rationality was rooted in the 
historical context of management of S0Es in Sri Lanka. As many other SOEs in Sri 
Lanka, NCCL followed the ideal model of fonnal scientific and bureaucratic rationality 
of the Western countries to plan and manage organisational affairs. While the state was 
acting as a provider of an infrastructure of services necessary for technological 
'" 
modernisation, the covert hut highly institutionalised and politically manipulated 
apparatus for employment followed an uneven industrialisation. The politicians were 
cffc~!1ve in the manipulation than the declared objectives of government's socio-
economic development. Modernisation of NCCL frustrated with the interventions of 
politicians, institutionalised scientific and rational bureaucracy. These were coexisted 
and hampered information systems development projects. 
Generally, Sri Lanka's public service has not been structured in such a manner in 
consonance with the socio-economic development needs of the country. From this 
perspective, it is quite natural that employees at NCCL have been unwilling and 
incapable to employ communicative actions and to sustain modernising reform 
interventions of the government through information technology. 
Seemingly, modernisation efforts of the government through the introduction of 
computerised information systems following open economic policies did not make any 
impact on transforming NCCL towards effective organisation but significantly 
influenced on change of social, economic, and political structures. Employees' 
lifeworlds were insufficiently linked up with the open economic policies of the 
government leading to loss of cultural traditions, customs, and values. 
Additionally, availability of competitor products and inefficient management of 
competition reduced market share by 50% leading to financial crisis. NCCL's machines 
were obsolete. Moreover, the government had no funds to replace machinery due to 
financial crisi!i of the government. The government faced with fiscal difficulties and 
with the recommendation of the World Bank, the govcmmcm persuaded to privatise 
NCCL. 
"' 
6.9 Preparation for Privatisation 
From 1993-1994, NCCL became a public Company under the Treasury supervision with 
making legal and institutional arrangements for privatising NCCL and making it attractive to 
potential investors. It was the first step o;' privatisation of SEOs. The secretary to the 
Treasury appointed a Board of directors. During these period employees' agitation towards 
privatisation was developed. It affected for poor pcrfonnance of NCCL. Market share of 
NCCL reduced to an average of 50%. 
Initially, the Treasury instructed NCCL management to prepare a Company profile to 
attract investor~ to sell NCCL. It was considered as a document, which contained 
critical infonnation about corporation to help buying decisions of investors, NCCL 
management gained little experience in preparing such a document. The former Factory 
Manager explained why: 
Since all of us were working in a government corporation, we did not /.' 
have knowledge about how to prepare a Company profile, wha( 
information is to be included? How to generate information from dat:i, 
and so on. Until, the earlyl990s, information requirement was not felt. 
We operated in a protected market by the government. 
The prevalence of an inflexible adherence to rigid bureaucracy, imprnctical top-down 
approaches in decision-making and communication, use of overly authoritarian power 
structures, and unrealistic intervention by politicians in corporation affairs constrained 
employees to engage in critical examination and self-reflection of their work. This 
rational scientific, technical decision making and control was a defining feature of 
NCCL and was d<.:eply employed in the course of management practice since its 
inception. As a whole, many NCCL employees were not aware of their objectification 
by rational scientific and technical decision mHkiug processes, NCCL managers became 
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myopic masters of use of bureaucracy leading to a sclr-imposcd ideolo!,,Y tlial 
bureaucracy is the ideal fonn of management and control of organisations. In other 
Words, managers imposed distorted fonns ofrationality upon themselves by continually 
reproducing the nonnuhvc, objectifying structures that distort communication and 
constrain practical npplicat1 .111 of their knowledge. 
6.9.1 Reflection on Preparation for privatisation 
The use of power in the process of scientific and technical decision making and 
authoritarian control within bureaucratic organisation of work prevented free 
discussions necessary for creativity of employees in NCCL. On the other hand the 
management worked in a relatively stable environment buttressing the status quo. 
Bureaucratic culture employed within NCCL restricted information sharing across 
departments. 
This management and administrative culture of NCCL strengthened managers' power 
within their departments. Information was interpreted as an instrument to be used to 
control employees and to exercise political power over t::iployees rather than 
facilitating to change NCCL towards a better organisation. Both manual and 
computerised information systems initiated were used as devices to reinforce control 
and surveillance of the workforce and to buttress the status quo than actually 
transforming NCCL for an effective organisation. This culture has annihilated 
employees' momentum for change through information systems development. From 
this perspective it is quite natural to believe why innovative ideas did not cultivate in 
managers' minds and why information systems did not develop using communicative 
actions. 
"' 
6.9.2 Privatisation of NCCL 
NCCL was privatised under the conversion of Public Corporations and Government 
Business undertakings into Public Limited Companies Act. No. 23 of 1987. NCCL was 
valued at Rs. 1475 million. TI1c value based on tl,.! trading potential and adjusted for 
non-perfonning assets and liabilities was Rs. 1017.2 million, however the Chief 
Govcmmcm Valuer has recommended a floor price of Rs. 1250 million for the transfer 
of the ownership of the Company. In 1993, calls were made for sale of 90% of the 
shares ofNCCL. The balance 10% of the shares, valued each at Rs. 10, was owned by 
the Treasury on behalf of the interest of employees. Employees viewed that, "free offer 
of 10% to employees was II political trick of the govtmmcnt. It used as a strategy to 
hide information about privatisation and to suppress employees' resistance towards 
privatisation", 
In selling ofNCCL, six: major investors who had vested interest on NCCL forwarded 
bids. Yawnkkal Group of Companies offered the highest bid. Their bid was Rs. 2.2 
billion (US$ 41.1 million). Other bids offered included, John Keels Holdings Limited 
Rs. 1080 million 21.9 (US$ million), Go\denbank Rs. 1056.1 million (US $ 21.4 
million), Gujarat Ambuja Limited Rs. '.191.9 million (US$ 20.1 million), Specialist 
Centre (Private) Limited Rs. 968 million (US$ 19.6 million), and Free Lanka Trading 
Company Limited Rs. 5-20 million (US$ 10.5- million). 
Finally, 90% ofNCCL shares were sold to Yawakkal Group of Companies in 1994 and·. 
the enjoyed selling. A letter to the President on February 1 Slh 1966, the Director General 
ofS~curities Exchanged Commission had stated that, "the government obtained the best 
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price for the country. Twice the bid offered by the second bidder". (Cited in 
Parliamentary Report 19 March 1996, p. 763) 
Due to an unknown deal, Yawakka! had paid Rs. 1128.3 million (US$ 22.5 million) in 
foreign currency and the rest Rs. 900 million (US$18.6 mmion) being paid in Sri Lanka 
Rupees by obtaining a loan, which is known as leverage buy out. A senior manager 
stated that, "even this payment had not been made up front". Purchase of shares by 
using Company funds is a violation of Section 55 of the Companies Act (Parliamentary 
ReporL 19 March 1996). 
Section 55. "It should not be lawful for a Company to give, whether 
directly of indirectly, and whether by means of a loan, guarantee a 
provision of security or otherwise any financial assistance for the purpose 
of or in connection of, or for any shares in the Company". 
The offer to Yawakkal had violated the procedures stipulated in the report dated 18 
August 1993 of the Technical Evaluation Committee of privatisation of Cement 
Corporation (Parliamentary Rt--port, 19 March 196). The report says: 
Section 5 (ii) ... "the entire purchase consideration should be paid up 
front, on the award being made". 
Section 7.2 ... "If the successful bidder is a foreign organisation, the 
price offered should he paid to the Treasury in freely conve1 '.ible foreign 
currency". 
However, the government rationalised its selling of NCCL along in the line of 
improvement of production capacities using modem technology such as the introduction 
of new Cement plants and infonnation technology. The Former General Manager stated 
that, "the objective of government of privatising NCCL was to increase production 
using modem technologies". This purposive rationality of government was challenged 
when it was unable to legitimise its actio!ls of the privatisation ofNCCL and the courses 
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of actions thereafter followed by the privatised organisations. The covertly motivated 
strategic actions, often hidden, of Yawakkal inhibited taking an effective transformation 
of NCCL towards a better organisation thus proved lhc government's objective of 
privatising of SEOs was problematic through infotTI1ation technology in a free market 
economy. 
6.10 Information Systems Development and Practice after Privatisation: Ph::ise 2a 
Information systems development and practice at NCCL changed once again with the 
change of ownership from the government to a private businessman. This change of 
ownership resulted due to the r.rivrn1ment policy for 9rivatising S0Es introduced in 
1977 in line with the open economic policies. Upon the acquisition, Indian 
management's focus shifted to tightly control financial management and call for 
analytical reports. 
Information was clearly seen as instrument to Le used to aid decision-making and to 
monitor the financial performance through controlling production and employee shifts. 
Their concern was short-term profits rather than achieving a long-term transformation 
ofNCCL. For instance, Yawakkal sold 50% ofNCCL shares to investor in Hong Kong. 
Former General Manager remarked, "being a businessman, Yawakkal did not want to 
transform NCCL rather his hidden idea was to se\l NCCL at a higher price later". 
Yawakkal's purchase ofNCCL was motivated by covert strategic actions for realising 
bis hidden objectives. The -,hortsi~~hted policies of Yawakkal in respect of NCCL 
created many problems in the social context ofNCCL. 
Indian management implemented various strategies to realise their hidden objectives. 
For example, the selling price of a bag of Cement, which wns Rs. 182.50 prior 10 
privntisntion, increased to R~. 215 nftcr privatisation. 
In addition, the buyers of Cement in bu!k had to pay a deposit of half the value of 
purchase, which wns refunded at the time of purchase. This money was then invested in 
the bank to reduce interest payment on Company's debt (Kelcgama, 1997). 
Consequently, utilising employees for higher productivity turned to their close scrutiny. 
Production control using shift systems expressed through budgets was re-established. 
Production manager commented that: 
the Indian managers were so surprised about the ways in which the 
employees used to work in the factory. Their low commitment, leave, 
day-to day affairs and absenteeism were strange to them. But they 
ignored them. For them, changing behaviour of employees and control of 
production using shifts matter. 
Yawakkal's instrumental (i.e. tunnel visioned) ar,prnach to management of NCCL 
assumed employees as objects to be manipulated to realise his hidden objectives. He 
considered lack of commitment and irregular panems of attendance of employees and 
their relationship as causes of !ow production i11 the factory. 
Additionally, factory Human Resource Manager explained, "lndi1111 managers realised 
that there were some frauds in recording employees' attendance. Some employees 
through their colleagues and with the support of some beads of sections signed on 
attendance registers without physically attending to work". For Cl{ample, a production 
manager stnted, "one <lay, a factory employee [shop-floor emp!Gyee] was marked on the 
attendance registry of hie<; wedding <lay while his immediate supervise was on loave to 
m 
attend the snid employee's wedding on the same day". Some sectional heads and 
supervisors supported such informal arrangements to work during corporation period lo 
accommodntc employees' Jifeworlds within work. They nccommodatcd communicative 
actions tacitly within formlllly defined production budgets tn tranquillise employees' 
problems in working on formally defined production shifts in the foctory. 
Yawaklrnl believed a price of cement baf determines c,:ment competition in a free 
market, as low-priced cement bags were available in Sri Lanka cement market atlcr 
1990. Consequently, high labour cost due to excess hours of overtime was considered 
'\ critical in determining price of a Cement bag. However, factory employees worked 
overtime to supplement their low salaries and to overcome economic crises due to low 
salaries and increasing cost of living. Amon~ ethers, overtime cost of labour was 
considered as a major isime for lowering the cost of Cement. Factory Human Resource 
Manager commented: 
Indian managers worried abJut high overtime cost. It was around 
100000 hours per month. In fact those days [during corporation period], 
employees controlled pror'.uction shifts in the factory than managers. 
Some employees did ove:1irne as a habit without actually being needed. 
If mnnu;,;emcnt appear ,o control their overtime work, lhat would be a 
disaster, 1;e.:ause you see, you don't get adequate number of employees 
to run the factory mifis in the following day. To certain extent, they used 
their power to control work. 
During corporation time, some sectional heads organised such informal work 
arrangements to accommodate employees' socio-cultural lifeworlds to help employees' 
economic problems. Traditionally, they were free in organising their work as a family. 
Villagers help eaph other's work as a family within a system of reciprocal relationships 
without any wage 1!eg:r;\iation. Social structure was linked with well-understood system 
of statues and mutual oblignthms between families and neighbours governed by trust 
-------------
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relationships. They employed communication actions in their everyday work and the 
life .. \ndino management did not understand this social structure operating within 
NCCL. 
Indian management had realised that budgetary controls were difficult in the face of 
employees' cultural resistance and feared that local managers might fonn coalitions with 
the employees. These simmions led Indian managers to introduce two payroll systems, 
one for executives nod another for non-executives, to seek trust from indigenous 
managers for pursuing their objectives which resulted executives salaries being 
increased and left their salaries confidential. Consequently, processing of accounting 
functions previously done by data processing units transferred directly und.er the control 
of accounting department. An accountant stated that "taking over of processing 
activities from the data processing units was to maintain confidentiality of financial 
matters from the rest ofthc employees". 
6.10.1 Reflection on Yawakkal Management atNCCL 
The push for value for money for investment and strategic rationality of Yawakkal in 
the form of manipulation of employees severely affected their lifeworlds in NCCL. 
Indian management concentrated on achieving proper control of production and thereby 
efficiency by imposing control on production shifts rather than addressing the 
apparently peculiar problems of employees' lifeworlds. Indian managers did not take 
into account the internal causes of a "systematic" overloading of control capacities or of 
a "structural" insolubility of control problems of employees. For instance, control of 
work by employees through informal arrangements was rooted in their traditional value 
systems. They did not understimd employees' problems as structurally inherent socio-
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cultural imperatives that .are incompatible with formal control linked with modem 
infommtion systems. They did not understand employees' problems were linked up with 
broad relationships operating within economic and political structures of Sri Lanka. For 
example, nn attempt to introduce computerised information system for controlling time 
and attendance of employees in the factory was challenged by ~ocio-cultural, economic 
and politi,•:al conditions which were as odd as with the covertly motivated strategic 
rationaiicy oflndian management. 
6.10.2 Computerised Time and Attendance Information System after 
Privatisation: Episode 6 
In the mid 1995, the management of NCCL purchased hardware and software from 
Barcodc Automation Lanka Limited (BALL) to introduce computerised time and 
attendance information system for controlling time and attendance of the factory 
employees and thereby to reduce labour cost. Group Human Resources Manager 
explained, "main purpose for installing a computerised time and attendance information 
systems was to reduce cost and increase efficiency by controlling employees frauds". 
This purposive rationality of management in the form of control of behaviour of 
employees emanated from the free-market model of modernisation programme of the 
government and it was included in the computerised hule and attendance information 
systems as its objectives: processing of accurate information for control of production 
work. This computerised time and attendance information system once again appeared 
to threaten employees' socio-cultural 'lifoworlds.' 
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During the corporation period, factory employees used to work eight hours per shifl 
including an hour for lunch/dinner leading to 48 hours per week. This law was enacted 
by the Factories Ordinance of NO. 45 of l 942. Since this law was enacted, working 
eight hours per shift became a norm in the factory. On the other hand, with ad-hoe 
organisation of facto1y shifts to accommodate employees' culture, there mainly 19, 
eight-hour shifts were operating before the privatisation ofNCCL. 
Realising low commitment of employees towards production and shifts and resulting 
high cost of production, the Indian management proposed new shifts-plan, each shift 
consisting of eight hours per shift with fifteen minuets break for lunch/dinner. The new 
shifts-plan included only five shifts instead of twelve shifts operating before. 
I. 6.00 a.m. to 2.00 p.m. 2.00 p.m. to 10. 00 p.m. and 10.00 p. m. to 6.00 a. m. 
for shop-floor employees. 
2. 8.00 a.m. to 4.00 p.m. for other employees (e.g. clerical and aligned) , and 
3. 8.00 a.m. to 3.30 p.m. for executives. 
Employees were dubious about the merits of the proposed shifts-plan of Indian 
management and it created much dissension among employees. They realised that 
Indian management was attempting to dominate their lifeworlds emphasising too much 
control on their work using computerised time and attendance system to realise their 
hidden objectives. 
Employees feared once again, that their personnel communication would be interfered 
with by the formally processed information via computerised information systems. As 
we've already discussed employees' traditional culture was oriented towards mutual 
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understanding through infonnal interaction. They were not subject to control in their 
tmditiona! villages. A shop-floor employee rceolkcted: 
Employees realised that Indian managers allcrnptcd to control their day 
to day life using new machines in a new way [using a computerised time 
and attendance system]. They also rcali~cd that Indian managers were 
attempting to deprive their factory income through stiff control of 
production by way of monitoring their time and attendance. They knew 
that they would be tlisadvantagcd when the proposed controlling system 
begins to appear and monitor and control their auendance. 
Employees interpreted computerised time and attendance information systems as a 
system of domination of their 3ocio-cultural values and lifcworlds. Scnior·managers 
promised employees additional benefits from the proposed computerised time and 
attendance information systems and pushed the computerisation project ahead through 
systems analyst. For example, systems analyst stated that, "we convinced employees 
that the proposed computerised time and attendance information systems would give 
more chances to work more shifts for employees". However, employees did not trust 
management explanation because they appeared as mere agents of implementing Indian 
managers' covert strategic actions. Rather employees continued to work in the factory 
following their traditional work practice. 
Employees cultural relativism and ethnocentric attitudes appeared against the 
technological domination of their every day lives. They organised against the 
introduction of time and attendance system focusing on their poor salaries and high 
expenditure of Indian managers. A factory supervisor explained: 
Shop-floor employees did not change their working culture after lndian 
managers taking over NCCL, rather they were much more angered with 
them. You sec, poor employees were not given a salary increase, but 
salaries of executives and foreign managers were increased and made 
unavailable to the public. How do we s1mfrc with our poor salaries? 
How could we trust our managers? 
Employees did not seek support from politicians, as they knew that the ownership of 
NCCL rcmoincd ii:. the hands of Indian management. They did not want to close the 
factory e?thcr. What tliey wanted was to opposed the unduly authoritarian actions of 
Indian management. Human Rcsourci: Manager explained. "Fundamentally, employees 
opposed controlling their attendance, but using it [controlJing attendance] as a reason, 
they did not want to sec the closer of the factory as they knew they would be loosing 
their factory income". However, Indian managers' economic rationality became 
inflamed Gy political crises that linked to broad economic issues of NCCL and 
employees themselves. Employees pressured Indian management through national trade 
unions by focusing on their high salaries, fringe benefits, and selling of properties 
belonging to NCCL. A union leader commented: 
Upon purchase of NCCL, three was no proper management of finance 
and their expenses, salaries, fringe benefits, foreign visits and so on were 
very high. In the same time, they removed mil!ions of worth spare parts, 
ion bars and metals and other valuable properties such as machines 
owned by NCCL. He [Yawakkal] really made no commitment to 
improve the factory rather he wanted to sell the properties owned by 
NCCL and earn as much as he could do within a short period. 
While employees' strong opposition towat\1~ time and attendance system was spiral!ing, 
an internal systems analyst and an outside expert from BALL with the support of senior 
management carried out the development of computerised time and attendance 
information systems. A trade union leader stated that, "management supported them 
because Indian management increased their [executives] salaries". The management 
legitimised its action introducing neutrality into political action context of employees. 
229 
The manner in which computerised time and attendance infonnation systems was 
developed and implcnwnted CUll~cd little to change employees' attitudes towards the use 
for infonnation technology in their working culture and broader conditions for work. 
For cxnmplc, a systems analyst with an outsirie consultant was assigned for developing 
the system, Indian management gave information requirements for the computerised 
time and attendance information systems. Software vendors provided software. 
Employees were not involved nor they were considered as intelligent actors who could 
provide sufficient knowledge for design and modification of the computerised time and 
attendance information systems. 
Information systems development at NCCL followed positivist approach which 
assumes a seemingly objective, instrumental relatio11ship to the object of study. It 
refrained from being included value judgements of employees as design ideals of 
information systems development. 
Tor. development of computerised time and attendPnce information systems commenced 
in lhe fuctory data processing unit. Systems analyst was taken an expert role. Systems 
analyst explained the process adopted in developing the computerised time and 
attendance information systems as follows. 
While the development was going ahead, we did not allow others to 
come inside the computer room, and allowed only to the people those 
were authorised. We thought employees would disturb and destroy 
attendance-recording machines as they were opposed to it. 
Employees were considered as passive objects to be manipulated by systems analyst's 
superiority of technical knowledge. The exercise of power by systems analysts in the 
designed and development of computerised time and attendance information systems 
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prevented necessary discussion with employees to be included in the d1$igncd ~y!.'tem. 
Information systems development did not focus on the <lLmnnds of employees' 
'lifeworlds.' 
The proposed system was expected to link complex administrative, maintenance, 
production, and payroll systems. Neither software was compatible with the needs of 
NCCL nor outside expert was able to integrate these major activities together. The 
systems analyst explained: 
Software provider did not have a better understanding about our needs. 
He did not know how to modify software to our needs. It was first time, 
he introduced this software to an organisation in Sri Lanka. He used our 
organisation to experiment his package hoping that it could be so!d to 
other organisations later. It took long time to put into work. 
The technical experts, as products of technically driven education and training, could 
not understand broad phenomena operating in Sri Lanka society. The technical training 
of infonnation systems development included by the bc!i-.fthosc tcclmical\y superficial 
information systems outperform in organisations. These experts focused on technical 
and instrumental solutions rather than constituency politics, a concern for expertise 
\i rather than employees, a conccm with available training rather than with a network of 
social relationships, which might be brought into play. This technical and instrumental 
knowledge is insufficient to design and develop information systems for the use of 
organisation understanding the lifcworlds demands. Therefore information systems 
development is understood largely as ''work" rather than "interaction" in Habermas's 
sense (1987a). 
"' 
Hoping that computerisL'il time and attendance information systems could be 
implemented, management purchased six machines for recording time and attendance 
from BALL (three machines for shop-floor employees, two machines for supervisors 
and clerks and one for executive managers). Machines for shop-floor employees, clerks 
and supervisors were installed at an office near to the main entrance while executive 
machine was employed inside the factory. Managers refused tu go to the time and 
attendance office with other employees because Group Human Resources Manager 
explained that, " managers have the mentality that they arc superior to others and should 
be treated separately". 
The superiority and imperiority which was fused with bureaucratic ideals and 
hierarchical powerto C-Ontrol labour, aimf'.d at extracting maximum output to realise 
objectives of organisations while maintaining high power distance between managers 
and subordinate was a defining feature of management and control of work in NCCL 
during the corporation period. This division of work according to management strata 
separated an integration of managerial actions with tl:c requirement of 'lifoworlds' of 
employees in NCCL Narrow focused of instrumental actions to management and 
control of work by management had forgotten the existence of collective symbolic 
structures of the lifoworlds. Rather these instrumental systems imperatives contributed 
to systematically distort communication with employees. 
Machines to record employees' time and attendance were linked up with two PCs 
installed in the personnel office in the factory. Two data processing clerks were 
employed and was expected to generate analytical report~ for controlling production and 
shifts of employees in the factory. Systems analyst explained the procedure for 
recording attP.ndance. "It included swiping a card using a machine readabl1: barcodc card 
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issued to each employee. Once card is swept, the machine automatically verifies 
employee's pay code number and issues a beefing sound with a blinking light". 
Management planed to implement both manual system and computerised system 
concurrently as n strategy. Group Human Resource Manager explained. "We planed to 
run both systems parallel about six months to reduce the resistance of employees' 
towards the new computerised system". However, this computerised time and 
attendance infonnation systems could not implement as was predicted by the Indian 
management at NCCL. 
Seen in this light, information systems were employed in the context of management 
control to realise aims of Yawakkal management. Systems analyst and extemal 
consultant acted technically on "scientific" basis as legitimated enablers of 
transfonnation of NCCL through the development of effec.tive computerised time and 
attendance information systems to aid decision making by monitoring employees' 
attendance and to execute production in a shift system. 
This technical expertise and use of computer-based technology lead to instrumental 
rationality placing too much emphasis on technocratic modes of organisational control. 
The use of power by experts in this process prevented the discussion necessary for the 
success of good industrial relationship through effective infonnation systems 
development and practice for the bettennent of NCCL. The use of positivist 
infonnation systems development in the manipulation of individuals within organisation 
to realise technical interest of designers revels itself to be ideological in tcnns of the 
aims of the designers. 
m 
The purposive rationality of Indian management was as odd as with the reality 'out 
there' in NCCL. Information systems d~·velopment once again disturbed by socio-
cultural, economic, and political contexts of NCCL within which it was situated. 
Accommod::ting technical inuovations in the fonn of computerised infonnation systems 
for work and broader work conditions of employees !cft little thought towards 
modernisation effort of the government operating in a fr(:.e-market economy of Sri 
Lanka. Yawaklml's purposive rationality, taken for granted social reality of NCCL and 
value neutrality of employees actions were not in line with the established social reality 
ofNCCL. 
Yawakkal's perfonnance at NCCL had been criticised by the employees and the general 
public through parliament. Fonner Factory Manager stated that: 
After Yawakkal took over NCCL, they just conducted business. There 
was no much benchmark. They haven't done anything to improve the 
performance of NCCL. No any capital expenditure projects have been 
undertaken at NCCL's works which would substantially increase the 
value of the plants in the factory and NCCL. 
In contrary to what it was at the time of the initial privatisation, the balance sheet of 
NCCL was debt-loaded and hence, the net value of the Company substantially reduced 
creating a huge financial crisis (Kelegarna, 1997). 
In the meantime a dispute had arisen between Yawakkal and foreign investors whom he 
brought in. Yawakkal was charged at Colombo district court with the breach of 
agreement. Opposition party members brought Yawakkal's matter to the parliament. 
Minister was charged on corruption and insincerity of dealing ofNCCL. However, latter 
the Minister denied the char:'"S at a parliamentary debate (Parliamentary reports on 19, 
-------------------
20, 21, March 1996). The government interfered affairs ofNCCL for a fresh evaluation 
to be carried out hoping to offer NCCL to a new buyer. After the failure of Yawakkal 
management at NCCL, Fonner General Manager remarked: 
The government sbould not scled a partner like Yawakkal to sell its 
public properties like NCCL. Yawakkal group arc only importers, who 
have no knowledge what so ever of the Cement industry. His operations 
at NCCL aimed at short-term profits only while selling the properties 
owned by NCCL, and not at a sustainable development of NCCL, with 
all the related plant rehabilitation, modernisation and training plants. 
6.10.2.1 Reflection on Episcdc 6 
The attempt to introduce computerised time and attendance information systems proved 
that information systems development could not be separated from economic, political 
and socio-cultural contexts. Information systems development took economic nature 
because it attempted to deprive of income of employees. It took economic crisis of the 
state as the selling of NCCL was linked up with the financial difficulties of the 
government. It was pelitica\ because employees protestL'<i against the computerised time 
and attendance with their counterparts in national unions; the whole matter was brought 
to the public attention through the parliament. It was socio-cultural, because employees 
faced with erosion of their inherent cultural values in the course of modernity, which 
was ascending from free-market model. 
The communication infrastructure of 'lifeworlds' of employees which is constituted by 
understanding oriented action, is displaced by an objectification attitudes of Indian 
management leading to much dissension and further erosion of employees' 'lifeworlds.' 
'" 
6.1 I Information SysteJI15 Development and Practice after Privatisation: Phase 2b 
Information systems development and practice at NCCL changed once again with the 
change of ownership from a single owner Company to a larger multinational Company; 
G,1\dcnbank. While investigations into the practice, applied in the privatisaticn process 
ofNCCL, and the course of actions which followed by Vawakka, l were carried out by 
the officials in the government. Goldenbank influenced the Minister and the President to 
assert its interest in buying NCCL (Letters dated, 30.3.1995 cited in Parliamentary 
Report 19.3. 1996). After the purchase of NCCL by Goldenbank, former Factory 
Manager stated that: 
Goldenbank had an interest in buying NCCL quite long ago. You know, 
from 1990 to 1993, Goidenbank's Management and Consulting Ltd. 
conducted a modernisation study strategy for NCCL. It has acquired an 
fn-dcpth knowledge of the entire Sri Lanka Cement industry. Goldenbank 
would have convioced of Sri Lanka market and fruits ofbuying NCCL. 
With this purposive rationality in mind, Goldenbank transferred a series of management 
techniques and methods, information technology and systems, and ciperts to NCCL as 
steering media to management and control operations to achieve its mtional objectives. 
Goldenbank's bid for NCCL was geared towards: 
1. The integration of NCCL into Goldenbank's global network of 
Cement producers. 
2. A sustainable development and expansion plan for NCCL, which 
was in line with government policies [of privatising S0Es] and the 
development of Sri Lanka. 
3. Investments for technical improve,L1cnts and know-how transfer to 
the local staff in line with the findings of the modernisation strategy 
study [conduct-cd during 1990-1993], and 
4. Development and training of human resources to iinprove opernting 
performance and efficiency of NCCL (Goldcnbank bid document, 
1993) 
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This modernisation plan of NCCL was cmanntc<l from the strategic management and 
corporate culrurc of Goldcnbank. Clearly, as will be documented later, these 
modernisation programs severely affected the working cu!lurc of employees in NCCL. 
These initiatives created much dissension in the general interest of employees of 
NCCL. Moreover, these modernisation plans conflicted with the locally established 
socio-culture, economic, and political structures of NCCL and deeply penetrated into 
values systems of employees and consequently symptomatic to further erosion of their 
'lifeworlds.' 
Goldenbank believed that NCCL could be transformed to an effective and ''efficient 
organi~ation following technological modernisation and thereby to realise its rational 
. objectives. This belief is attritiuted to the undcrstW1ding of scientific and technical 
improvement of management in positivi~t irleology. Habermas (1973, p. 281) cited: 
Science as a productive for1,e can work in fl salut:iry way when it is 
suffused by scicnc~ as an emancipat01y force. to the same cx:ent as it 
becomes disastrous as soon as it seeks to subject the domain of praxis, 
which is outsi~e the sphtrc of technical disposition. to its exclusive 
contn,1. 11ie dcmythification which docs not break the mythic spell but 
merely seeks to evade it will only bring forth new witch doctors. 
This positivist ideology is aligned with the government's objective of modernisation 
pro,gram of upgrading SOEs through technological improvements. Some senior 
managers who were frustlatcd both with Yawakkal management aml poor performance 
of NCCL mostly welcomed the purchase of NCCL by Go!denbank. Forme~ Factory 
Manager: 
This factory was some forty yeas old, its machines, spare-parts 
everything obsolete. During corporation time they were not replaced due 
to finical crisis r,fthe government. Yawnkk11l did not improve plants due 
to his short-siµi1tc<l 11ision, his hidden agenda of selling NCCL. 
The VP of Finance stated that, "Goldcnbank is one of the best high-tcch and 
infommtion technology solution users in the Cement industr; in the world. We are 
fortunate to have a partner like Goldembnnk". They presumed that NCCL could be 
transformed through effective design of information systems towards a better 
organisation adopting management practice embodi~d in the corporate culture of 
Goldenbank whose purpose is geared by narrow technical or tcchnocrati,. images and 
ideals ofmnnagemcnt of work-process relationships at NCCL. 
11 
" 
6.11.1 Cement Competition in Sri Lanka in the late 1990s 
In the late 1990s, Cement competition in Sri Lanka was switched into a price 
competition. Selling price of a Cement bag of all the three loc;,I manufactures (NCCL, 
MMC and TC) remained at Rs. 290. When a competitor increases its price of Cements, 
other two competi1ors also followed the incre:ise and vice versa. This price competition 
was intensified due to availability of low-prked imported Cement. For example, a bag 
of imported Cement was sold at Rs. 265-270. Marketing information systems Manager 
obsCIVcd the situation. 
Cement buyers simply now compare prices of Cement bags when making 
their buying decisions. Now we can not keep high profit~ margin, simply 
because we arc the leaders. It is true that our locally manufactured 
Cement has n rcput:ition among our customers, but that along is not 
sufficient. Price of a Cl-:ncnt bag is now very important. 
All the three competitor Cement manufactures have introduced imported Cements to the 
market using different brand names in addition to their locally manufactured and 
marketed products. For example, a brand named 'Sevana' Cement was introdvccd by 
NCCL, however it acted against the Company because, marketing infoITTiation systems 
manager stated thnt "people have lost their fear of using imported cement because this 
Company also marketed imported cements using a different brand name under the name 
ofNCCL". 
By the end of 2000, NCCL maintained its market leadership holding 40% of the total 
Cement market, TC held ! 8%, and MMC held 17% and the balance 25% remained with 
the direct importers. NCCL expects to increiu:e the production capacity of the factory 
from 480000 tonnes to 600000 tonnes per year. 
Cement competition in the nmket i~ 
concerned to gain an objective view of the 
competitive environment ln which NCCL 
operates. This knowledge mainly dcri1·es from 
informntion of tl1c demogrnphic. attitudinal 
and behavioural characccrisiics of the Cement 
buyers. l! seeks to generate predictive and 
explanatory behaviour of Cement bnyers and 
how they can persuade to buy more Cement. 
This objective knowledge of marketing has 
become the basis for Goldcnbank operations 
at NCCL This approach is firmly based on 
positivistic view ofth~ world 
A positivist view of marketing has been 
implemented through developing 
infoITTiation systems to realise rational 
objectives of the Company such as 
profits and market share. Marketing 
Manager stated that "our marketing 
objective is to better off the market 
h!adership. We are in a competitive 
situation now and to edge out this 
situation, we need good infoITTiation". 
The Company aims to edge out this Cement competition through adopting integrated 
infoITTiation technology solutions and tm.'1.~ferring management practice of 
Goldenbank to NCCL in Sri Lanka 
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Goldcnbank has invested nearly Rs. 2 billion to upgrade Cement plant at Singcrh in 
2000 after it purchuscd from Yawakkal in 1996. lt is planning to invest another Rs. I 
billion for further improvement. Doring the first four years after taking over NCCL, 
Go!denbank has earned high profits however the Company was expected to declare Rs. 
750- 800 million at the end of 2000. 
6.11,2 Rcstri1cturing ofNCCL 
6.11.2.1 Organis;ition of Work 
Go!denbank adopted a global, but hierarchical!y top-down power structure at NCCL. 
Th1: CEO, four VPs, and the Chief Factory Manager make up the senior management. 
The CEO has with al! the executive powers to nm the business oflhe Company. Foreign 
managers employed in key positions. For example, CEO from Australia, VP, 
Manufacturing from Austria, VP, Marketing from South Africa, and the Chief Factory 
Manag:~r from the United Kingdom. Tho VPs of Human Resources, Finance and the 
Chairman were locally appointed. This change was stimulated by the belief that transfer 
of Gol<lenbank management practice together with newly advent technologies will 
transform NCCL for an efficient and effective organisation. 
6.11.2.2 Vision and Objedlves 
The policy ofGoldenbank is designed to adopt Simi!M management practice throughout 
l' 
its group of companies all over the world (Goldenbank Policy Guide, 1998). '!'he VP of 
manufacturing of NCCL, consistent with the group policy, stated that "manufacturing 
process of Cement is as s.ume as everyWhere in Goldcnbank group of companies and Sri 
Lanka has no option". Following this policy, operations at NCCL were organised 
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around n broad "business plan" which comprised of annual plans to be implemented 
each year. According to NCCL's annual plan (2000), the Company vision, overall 
objectives and cash-llow objectives arc as follows. 
NCCL's Group Vision: to be the leading supplier of Cement and related 
materials in Sri Lanka by effectively meeting the needs of our partners. 
NCCL's Group Objectives: cost leadership and market leadership. 
Cash flow Objectives: Rs. 700 million 
M11rket Share: 39% 
ROE; 18% 
The above ideals fur vision were directly transferred from Goldcnbank to NCCL 
without negotiating with employees and employees in NCCL. Training Manager 
observed, "certainly these ideals were transferred from Goldenbank than internally 
generated". Managers and other employees were not allowed opportunities to 
participate in jointly designing the ends of NCCL. In contrast, ends were to be realised 
by using computerised information systems as means. 
The unilateral transfer of Goldenbank's vision and objectives had ignored nonnative 
structures embedded in communication, understanding and shared meaning of 
employees actions at NCCL. lt prevented necessary discussions with employees to take 
place and to incorporate in the business plan. Rather, order, efficiency and effectiveness 
as values aid the reproduction of advantages already vested in Go\dernbank. 
For example, some of the terms used in business and annual plans were strnni,ers and 
hard to understand to many of the employees including some middle level managers. 
Factory Personnel officer commented: 
Some of these [new] concepts, I mean, vision, mission, business plan, 
annual plan, key performance indicators, etc. etc. were not heard before 
JI 
,;{ 
many ofus. We don't know the real meilning of these concepts. Even if 
a trans\ntion of these concepts using our language [Sinhala], would give 
nothing. [ mean, it is hard to understand lhe actual meaning of these 
concepts [vision, mission, business plnn, annual plan etc.]. You know, 
why? We were not working in a business culture before. 
"' 
However, the business plan of Goldcnbank was to be realised by improving efficiency 
and effectiveness of NCCL in a competitive market operating within open economic 
policies in Sri Lanka. The VP of Finance, "foreign investors are coming here mainly for 
making profits than for social services". This push for value for money objectives of 
Goldenbnnk pointed in the direction of seeking more and better infurmation. 
Information was seen as corporate resource to be used to edge out the Cement 
competition and information technology as enabling technology to be employed to 
process this information (Goldenbank information technology Policy Guide, 2000). 
6.11.2.3 Budget and Cost Centres 
As a consequence under new vision of Golden bank call for fully developed centralised 
management budgetary approach within NCCL. It was being used as a tool to control 
overall operations of NCCL linking to the factory production targets. Financial 
Controller explained: 
Under new financial management, budget uses as a tooJ for controlling 
all the financial IJCrforrnancc of NCCL. Initially, we start with sales 
forecast given to us from the marketing department. These figures then 
incorporate to production schedule and accordingly factory budget will 
prCIJllfe. We use factory budget as a basis for financial calculation. In 
budget meetings, we take a grouIJ decision on the best available 
information to rationalise figures. 
Overall costs of operations in NCCL was highly monitored and controlled through cost-
ccntres. Cost centres in the factory were linked to the budget through sales and 
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production tnrgcts bnscd on shifts. Various rcrorts were prepared on each cost centre on 
monthly basis to monitor and control the ovemll financial performance of the Company. 
Financial Controller explained: 
We have 70 cost centres, 50 at factory and 20 at head office. The 
objective of cost centres is to have a better control over \he Company. 
For each cost centre, there is a responsible person [head of each section] 
who will, at the end of each month, receive a report showing the budget, 
actual and the variance. We identify everything in tenns of costs: people, 
material, and capital expenditure, spare parts and so on. The purpose of 
budget is mainly to monitor and control overall cost of operations of 
NCCL. 
Goldenbank used budget as an instrument to provide information for economic decision 
making for managers to steer economic activities of NCCL to realise its rational 
objectives. Budget and cost centres emerged as a new organisational language, which 
was displaced by previously employed dominant culture in relation to the use of budgets 
at NCCL. 
Today budget gains commercial status rather than a legal document prepared during the 
corporation period. It appears that strict control offinandal matters through budgets and 
cost centres in the name of improving efficiency and effectiveness is becoming 
influenced on carrying out works of employees despite their resistance. For example, 
an accountant stated: 
Now foreign managers arc tightly controlled the factory matters using 
budgets than before. During the corporation time, budget was used as 
merely as a statutory document to rC)lort to the public through 
parliament. To certain extent, those days, production managers had 
freedom to alter budgets to accommodate shop-floor conflicts of 
employees, but t<Jday employees' freedom is replaced by Company 
culture [Goldcnbank's management practice]. 
'" 
6.11.2.3.1 RcOectlon on Dndgd and Cost Centres as Steering M'Cdia 
Budgets and cost centres as steering media are becoming influenced on employees' 
lifeworlds by new accounting initiatives introduced by Gldembank to NCCL operations 
in Sri Lanka. As consequences, current practice of Goldcnbank's management restricted 
communicative actions to take place at NCCL environment. Employees' spiritual 
freedom, shared understanding, informal communication, and reciprocal relationships 
are being restricted by -dominant management and corporate culture of Goldenbank 
leading to colonisation of employees' '!ifeworlds' at NCCL. 
6.11.2.4 Retre;:icbment PoUcy 
Following its rational objectives, the Company continued to reduce its staff of NCCL. 
The high man-hour per Cement metric ton was considered as a major determinant of the 
cost of production. The Company policy was to maintain a ratio par with that of 
Goldenbank companies in other countries. Push for value for money was ubiquitous in 
every management action. The Human Resource Manager at the factory explained the 
Company policy as follows. 
During the corporation period, man-hours per metric ton was 7-7.5, 
which was far ahead with the standard of Goldenbank group of 
companies. The labour cost of Cement production during that period 
accounted for 15-20%[of the total cost of production]. Afte-,. laying-off 
employees, we reduced it [man-hours per metric ton] to a ratio of less 
than three, but still our rate is very high. For example, in certain countries 
it [the ratio] is about 0.3. We expect to improve the efficiency with a 
minimum number of employees to further bring down our ratio. 
'" 
By the end of December 2000, the number of employees employed at NCCL reduced to 
1200 personnel. This number was after a major retrenchment program introduced by 
Goldcnbank to reduce employees at NCCL since it was acquired in 1996. 111c Company 
strategy for reducing employees purely based on reduction of labour cost in production 
following the principles of economic rationality. The number of staff currently 
employed is about two times less than the number employed during the previous 
corporation period. The Group Human Resources manager stated: 
We need to further reduce our work force. We offer a compensation 
package worth of Rs. I million per person for voluntarily retired people 
depending on their service. Under this scheme, in 1999 along, about 425 
people including 188 executives left the Company. Our idea is to keep 
the minimum number of employees required to make this company a 
profitable organisation. 
6.11.2.4.1 Reflection on Retrenchment Policy 
The modernisation program of Goldenbank at NCCL left out its significant effects on 
employees• lives. The past-track reduction of employees of Go!denbank policy affected 
to increase high pressure on remaining employees and increasingly affected their 
lifcworlds. 111c objective of running NCCL operations with a minimum number of 
employees interpreted to stabilise and legitimise Goldenbank's control and domination 
of work. 
6.11.2.5 Management Techniques and Methods 
6.11.2.5.1 Dialogue /! 
Management techniques such as Dialogue and Green Area Meelings have been 
implemented in 1998 with the business plan of NCCL to support the policy of thC 
Goldenbank. The Dialogur ~ystem is a method to initiate discussions between sup.:riors 
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and subordinates to set targets to be achieved by the subordinates, the focus of which is 
human resource development (Guidelines for the Dialogue, 1997). The outcome of the 
implementation of these techniques and methods arc related to employees' pcrfonnancc 
npprnisnl system. Salary increases and promotions to employees are given on the 
su.::~cssful achievement of targets of each employee. The Training Manager explained 
the objectives of the Dialogue system: 
Dialogue is a top-down, truget-aimed, approach on employees. The 
pressure goes from the top to the bottom levels. We have an annual plan 
for each year in which we establish targets for each and every employee 
of the Company. From an evaluation, we identify whether an employee 
has achieved his targets against the standard decided by the management, 
which in turn uses as controlling tools to monitor the actual targets 
achieved by employees. Accordingly, salary increases and promotions 
nre gramcil. A dialogue between superiors and subordinates decides 
targets to be achieved by employees on given Company objectives and 
these objectives are derived from Go!dcnbank's vision. 
However, the way the Dialogue system executed ciid not provide opportunities for 
necessary discussions with subordinates. Rather, management used it as a steering 
meehmism to extract the maximum output from the employees to achieve the Company 
rational objectives. Factory electrical engineer commented that: 
Rather than using 'Dialogue' as a method of facilitating employee-
manager relationship to improve the perfonnanee of the Company, it is 
being used to control employees by the management to achieve its 
targets. There is no discussion in setting targets. Goldenbank provides 
targets for employees and employees have to work for them. 
The Dialogue system was forcefully executed method to implement the parent 
Compa;iy policy. Neither the method nor the policy was negotiated or open to 
< 
discussion. The policy states that "each Goldenbank Company must implement a 
working Dialogue to explain the Company's objectives, to translate them into individual 
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goals, and to help each individual to reach those goals which are essential for success" 
(Guidelines for the Dialogue, 1997, pp. 2-3). Furthermore, as can be detected on the 
quote below, the CEO forced the employees to use the system. In a message to all the 
employees, the CEO stated: 
I can't underst11te the value and importance of the Dialogue process. For 
us, both as individuals and as NCCL group, to achieve our goals, we 
must clearly identify our objectives and mouitor our progress towards 
them. Dialogue [system] provides the process for the measurement and 
management of progress. It provides for regular feedback, allowing for 
ongoing coaching and encouragement in the behaviours needed for 
success. This document is yours. Use it! 
Dialogue as a steering medium acts as social domination of employees' 'lifeworlds.' 
The ideology of Goldenbank's management was defined to mean ideas that serve to 
legi.timi~(thC underlying social structure ofNCCL, which was still to use the benefits of 
Goldembank. 
This irrationality of Goldenbank was geared to partial interests rather than to collective 
needs of employees. For example, middle and supervisory level managers were under 
stressed to achieve the targets of top management. They were also under stress because 
they needed to threat subordinates to achieve these goals. The senior managers did not 
consult middle level managers and shop-floor employees for their views when setting 
overall Company targets. Rather the Company unilaterally decided targets. An 
electrical engineer disclosed the following about the Dialogue system. 
What is happening is, senior managers are forced us [for middle level 
managers and supervisors] to implement targets of the Company. We have 
to force our subordinates to complete their targets. If not they take 
disciplinary actions against us due to non-compliance of senior managers' 
orders. Ifwc take disciplinary action against employees, they threaten us at 
night over the phones. 
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According to Habcnnns, the 'lifeworlds' understanding based on collective self-
representations of employees of NCCL were dried up by covert strategic actions of 
Goldembank management. These actions were reduced to mechanically conceived idea 
of economic criteria of profits. In this way suppression of employees by management 
have produced a negative result~ such as social instability caused by steady erosion of 
standards and values (anomie), withdrawal of legitimation and motivation by employees 
to work leading to alienation and psychopathologie~. Steering media such as Dialogue 
steered a social intercourse that has been largely disconnected from norms and values of 
employees. Above all the purposive rational economic and administrative action have 
become independent of their morale-political foundation (Habermas, 1987b, p.154). 
Jn Habennas's tenns, the forced social change, the manipulation of employees' 
worldviews, desiccation of traditions and the forced acceptance of partially defined 
targets through Dialogue combine to distort "the communicative structures'' and "ego-
securing structures" upon which mass motivation of employees depend. It seems that 
the management actions Ocfined through Dialogue were no longer effective in 
sustaining the legitimacy of the social structures ofNCCL. Rather management actions 
affected to cc1lonise employees' 'lifeworlds.' 
6.11.2,6 Manager-Employee Relationships 
The senior managers consider their subordinate as inanimate constraints, which can be 
manipulated in ways that will serve the advantages of both managers and the Company. 
The work pince relationships were defined by focusing on closer monitoring and 
controlling of employees' behaviour at the factory. For example, when I was 
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interviewing the planning engineer at his office, suddenly the Chief Factory Manager 
stepped into his office and the following dialogue oc1-'Urrcd. 
Chief Factory Manager: Kumarnn [the planning engineer], do you 
know plant is closed now? 
Phmnlng Engineer: No 
Chief Factory Manager: You should know about it ... sec, I went to 
the factory, but it was stopped. You don't know what is happening there. 
You must inform me immediately about the shutdowns. 
Planning Engineer: How ahould I know unless somebody informs me? 
The plnnning engineer spoke to several officers, using his national language (Sinhala), { 
to discover rcason(s) for the closure of the factory. The Chief Factory Manager did not 
allow the planning engineer to explain reasons for the closure of the factory and thereby 
to take place communicative actions in the discussion between the Chief Factory 
Manager and the planing engineer himself. The result of these instrumental actions of 
:iqiior managers appears to be high levels of stress in middle level managers. For 
~ . 
example, some of the managers have encountered severe <liseases such as eye problems, 
accidents and sickness. Moreover, two engineers died recently. It was widely thought 
that high stress led to their death. An engineer in the planing division who frustrated by 
the coercive instrumental actions of senior management stated: 
I am working here because I can't find a similar job. My doctors 
advised me not to work under sever prcssun,, which was badly 
affected for my eyes weakened. But, how can I do that? The factory 
manager issued mo several warning letters. Similarly other managers 
also have received warning letters form the factory manager. We are 
treated in the factory as slavers [passive objects]. Last year two 
engineers were died inside the clinkering mills of the factory. The 
immediate reason for their unexpected demise was the high pressure ', 
of the senior managers to achieve Company targets, profits. 
The rationalisation of work processes through technical and instrumental actions of 
management has created pathological side effects, which endangered the symbolic 
reproduction of organis~tion, This intense pressure for achievement of Company i,;oals 
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and for the utilisation of values which destryocd the employees traditiona\ly established 
culture nnd values systems. 
Humnn understanding based on shared knowledge in a reciprocally arranged social 
structure was being replaced by instrumental and covert stratc1,,ic actions of 
Goldembank management. Norm-confonnative attitudes and identity-forming social 
memberships were not considered necessary by Goldembank management; instead they 
considered peripheral. 
" 
In.Sri Lanka, legal enactments that deal with privatisation, little mention is made of 
employees affected by the privatisation programs which has created a social cost 
(Kelegama, 1997, p. 477). After the privatisation, the new Company reduces employees 
employing information technology. This act of new companies led to reduce the 
employment opportunities for the poor. Those who do not have proper education are in 
trouble in this path. For example, a shop-floor employee commented: 
Some employees who went for retirement due to the retrenchment policy 
of Goldembank have faced grate economic diffkultics due to lack of 
income to maintain their families and to survive tli.eir lives. They could 
not find new jobs because some of them were old and not acquired 
adequate educational qualification to find new jobs. 
Many employees bad lost their interest and withdrew motivation to work due to 
communication barriers, unrealistic expectations of senior management, and unduly 
authoritarian style of management culture at NCCL. The use of instrumental and covert 
strategic action by senior management in the course of employee control appears to be 
symptomatic to the steadily erosion of 'lifoworlds' of employees. Factory operations 
manager stated: 
" 
Many t..'lllployccs !'lave lost their interest anrl withdrawn talking to 
management. You know, vr of manufacturing is so tough. He never 
wants to listen to others ideas. For him, if something is black, then it is 
black. !fit is white, then it is white. To him, no blacic arid white. 
,so 
Various practice such as Dialogue systcr,, act as steering media for the Company to 
renlisc its objectives. Training programs arc ideally used to educate employees so as to 
improve their efficiency and c!Tectivcncss. However, training programmes, run by the' 
Company, were seen to be merely instrumental to inform treating employees as passive 
··~ objects. It did not provide opportunities to take place communicative actions. 
factory personnel officer mentioned that: 
,, 
,, 
People have lost their interest of learning these practices [Dialogue ,.r 
system and daily Grum Arca Meetings] because all these pra~tice are 
top-down rather than shared. At the training, executives too :ouldn\ 
understand these concepts. For instance, a foreign consultant gave 
trainir.g on Dialogue system, but hardly any could understand what it is 
and whet it is supposed to do in an organisatiun. Most of them [the 
executives] could not understand due to their language problems ... in 
communication, there i~ no balance. People worL:: according to orders . 
and freedom to speak, a basic human right of c:,,:pressing ideas, was taken 
away by the Company management. As far ns [ understand, speaking 
[human actions] and thinking is interrelated. 
The 
Anothe1· practice, Xnown as daily Green Area Meetings, was a participatory approach 
introduced by the Company to share the views of employees with the management. The 
objectives of daily Green Arca Meetings, held every momi~g are: 
(I) to inform senior man.a gem cm <lccisio:is to employees 
(2) to review the performance of previou~ day work 
(3) lo plan targets for the day Using the reports generated by management infonnatic,n 
' 
systems division in the factory 
(4) to direct employees' problems to the ntlcntion of senior managL'111Cnl. 
These meetings arc implemented through the middle level managers. I attended to these 
meetings to undcr:'itnnd the manner these meetings arc conducted by the middle level 
managers. At meetings, the middle level managers talked about the first three objectives 
of the daily green area meetings whilst employees listen to their L1lks. 
From my observation, I understood that the Company employs daily Green Arca 
Meetings as another steering mechanism to control the behaviour of 1,.'lllploycc to 
achieve its objectives. Both 'Dialob,ue' and Green Area Meetings" were too narrowly 
foo;:uscd on economic rationality and organisational control objectives of Goldembank 
management than to focus on cmployci.'S' practical problems. 
6.11.3 Reflection on New Forms of Management Techniques 
.,.,_ 
Generally, new work practice and new forms of scientific management of\'l_GCL have 
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fllomised the workforce in a way that invisibly secure control from above. The power is 
effectively embodied in the design of management techniques, control, production 
targets, and application of information technology r;~Jating to economic calculations 
while ignoring the needs of 'lifeworlds', whit-:1 are independcmiy rooted from their 
traditicaal values ~ystcms and culture in Sri Lanka. The purposive rationality of 
Go\dembank management were shaped and included in the design and development of 
information systems at NCCL. The organisation of information technology and the 
development of information systems were focused on transferring Golde~bank's vision 
to NCCL to control employees' socio-cultural 'lifcworlds.' 
c I 
' ' 
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.. 6.11.4 Organising of Information Technology Function 
,::· ',\ 
The so,cio-cu'1'tura!, political and economic context has clearly influenced the c11rrcnt 
shape of NCCL 's information systems development and practice. Ever since the 1983, 
the head office and the foct()ry maintained two computing centres. The primary focus of 
these computing centres was to process data processing requirements such as sales, 
accounting, payro!l, and inventories of other departments. These data processing units 
mediating as servicing units had been in operation until Goldcnbank started its 
operations at NCCL. In 1997, the data processing unit in the factory was dissolved. 
St~ffwho worked in the far.tory data processing unit was transferred to the head office. 
The nnme of the data processing unit of the head office changed to management 
information systems and it was kept under the control of the VP of Finance. 
Management information systems manager, two information technology managers, four 
systems analysts, and a data processing manager were employed in the management 
information systems section. The management information systems and d11i~ processing 
manages were externally recruited but two former systems analysts were promoted as 
information technology managers. The VP, Finance is professionally qualified in 
accounting and finance. With this new changes, some of the employees who served for 
the data processing units as systems analysts, programmers, and data controlling 
officers left the Company and some transferred to work in other sccf.ons of NCCL. A 
retired data-controlling officer stated tiiat: 
Those who worked for the data processing units felt the new management 
neglected them because Company polky was changed to introduce 
software packages for every application. Management would have 
thought it was cheap and cost cITectiw. One day former VP of Finance 
summoned me to his office and said 'your service is no longer required 
by this Company', meaning of which was that he directly insisted us to 
get away the Company. 
('.{ 
'" 
The change of name of data processing to management information systems caused 
little to chllnge the attitude of employees towards the use of information systems at 
work rather the change diminished the morale of employees who worked in the data 
processing units. 
The new change is linked up with the economic orientation of Goldcmbank 
management and it continues to erode the technological leadership of organisational 
infonnntion technology, for better or worse. After changing the name of data processing 
units to management information systems, Goldenbnnk introduced several infonnation 
systems development projects independently in the late 1996. They included an 
implementation of computerised time and attendance information systems with a 
revised shift-plan, development computerised work-order information system for the 
factory maintenance, and the development of management information systems for 
monitoring and controlling of factory operations. 
6.11,5 Implementation of Computerised Time and Attendance Information 
Systems 
Mana~ement's attempts to control employees' attendance in the factory using manual 
systems, punch cards systems, and computerised information systems were radically 
opposed by employees long before Goldenbank gained ownership at NCCL in J 996. 
Computerised time and attendance information systems initiated by Yawakkal 
management was delayed due to employees' agitations and the questions raised about 
NCCL' selling at the Sri Lankan parliament. After the take over of NCCL, Goldenbank 
introduced the delayed computerised time and attendance information systems in the 
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latel996. The objective of the introduction of computcrisc<l time 11nd attendance 
information systems was to monitor and control employees' attendance to implement 
production schedules through a rigidly controlled shift-plan. The newly introduced 
shift-plan was scheduled to implement with a minimum number of employees running 
each shift. Factory Human Resource Manager commented: 
Goldenbank management was not happy with the way employees used to 
work. Employees never changed their way of life in the factory. Most of 
our employees were not nomially punctual to work. Foreign management 
realised that empl-oyee absenteeism and unplanned leaves could be 
disturbed for organising factory shifts because the management planned 
to run the facto!)' shifts using a minimum number of employees. 
Therefore, changing employees' attitudes towards the new shift-plan was 
a seriously contested matter by Goldenbank management. 
Goldenbank management did not understand employees' behaviour in the context of 
existing conditions in the semantic: dimension; NCCL was steered using purposive 
rational actions instead. This disorientation of management prevented initiating 
communicative actions between management and employees at NCCL. Management 
actions were driven by purposive rational actions to control emp\ayees through 
manipulation of their behaviour. Goldenbank adopted taken for granted attitudes in the 
' public domain of NCCL and intervened NCCL's affairs by introducing neutrality into " 
political action context. 
Titis ideology was framed in management actions and included 11s part of the 
implementation of computerised time and attendance infonnation systems. The 
implementation of computerised time and attendance infonnation systems was 
motivated by technical interests of Goldenbank management to predict and control of 
NCCL affairs including employees' 'lifeworlds.' 
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6.11.5.1 New Work Shift-Plan in Compntcri11ed Time and Attcnd1mcc Information 
System: Episode 7 
After the successful take over of NCCL, Gol<lenbank's management proposed a new 
shift-plan, each shift consisting of 12 hours per day for four days work for II week 
continuously and the rest of days in the week as holidays instead of previously 
employed 8 hours work in a shift. This newly proposed plan was to be implemented 
through computerised time and attendance iofonnation systems. The new shift-plan was 
entirely based on increasing production targets by controlling employees' behaviour in 
the factory. Manageme11t legitimised the introduction of computerised time and 
attendance information systems and the new shift-plan in line with increasing 
production targets in the factory. Factory Human Resource M.magcr stated: 
Employees were entitled to claim 42 days leave annually together with 
every full-moon · 1y off from work. Company had some problems of 
organising shifts under this leave scheme of employees. Some employees 
went on leave without taking prior approval. This had been badly 
affected for organising factory shifts. Some of the employees who had to 
work long hours to cover absent employees' work also affected to lower 
the Cement production. 
Management's desire for increasing production through employee control could not 
easily be legitimised and rationalised because the new shift-plan was strongly opposed 
by employees. The new shift-plan significantly affected to further erode employees' 
lifcworlds. Assistant Factory Human Resource Manager stated: 
Employees opposed the new shift-plan arguing tlmt working eight hours 
a day is a human right and working long hours cause physical and mental 
disturbances. Some employees opposed due to their transport prohlcms, 
because they ~sed to report to work from remote villages. 
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Employees opposed to new shift-plan because working eight hours a day was an 
accepted norm both by employees and management since the inception of NCCL. 
Goldernbank used the new ~hift-plan to translate employees' behaviour in line with the 
demands for improved efficiency and effectiveness. The new shift-plan introduced new 
rules and procedures, which were contradictory to the existing work arrangements of 
employees. 
Employees were sufficiently incorporated their socio-culture within the existing work 
arrangement. They controlled the shop-floor work arrangements with the ~e!p of some 
production management in the past. They employed their lived experience in arranging 
work. In other words, they employed their tacit knowledge in decision making in regard 
to the arrangement of work in production shifts. They realised that the new shift-plan 
takes away of their control of work. They realised that they would be unable to fulfil 
their social life within factory with the proposed shift-plan and the control of senior 
management. Therefore, it can be argued that Goldenbank management employed 
power in management actions to executive 12 hours of work instead of previously used 
eight hours work per day. 
However, Goldenbank implemented the new shift-plan despite the employees' 
resistance by objectifying their lifeworld~. Instead of changing shift-plan, the seninr 
management pushed local managers to use the new shift-plan in arranging employee 
shifts in the factory. Senior managers promised additional benefits such as more off-
days for employees by munipulating them. Factory Human Resource manager stated: 
We explained employees that they benefit if the proposed shift-;,lan' will 
be implemented and asked them to work at least three months w!th1. the 
new shift-plan to sec how it was going. The Company organised 
:I 
.J 
transport facilities for employees who were reporting to work from 
remote vi!!agcs. W c promised them a more secure economy with the new 
ownership. 
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Goldenbank managcmc,lt realised that changing attitudes of employees towards new 
::,: management culture was uneasy. They stratcgica11y planned to remove unproductive 
" 
and old employees to realise its objectives. Factory Operations Manager stated: 
Changing attitude is a major problem. Reluctant to change their attitudes 
hampers our production targets drastically. What we arc doing is to offer 
them a voluntary rctirement scheme so that those who couldn't adapt to 
the Company environment can leave the Company. Our strategy is to 
reduce little by little unproductive employees. 
Goldembank's policies do not adequately address the issues of protecting the older 
employees in particular with respect to learning opportunities and guarding against age 
discrimination in the workplaLe. The older employees were seen as an unproductive 
workforce and incapable employees who couldn't change their attitudes towards the 
Company. The Company did not understand employees' ethnocentric attitudes towards 
modernisation programs. As a result, many employees have lost their motivation to 
work. A trade union leader commented that: 
In the name of modernisation of NCCL through infonnation technology, 
Goldembank has been engaged in reducing workforce drastically without 
ignoring their soda\ life. Most of the employees have lost their 
motivation to work as a result of the past pace policy of reduction of 
employees. We opposed several times but foreign managers unheard to 
our voices and the Company still continues its policy of removing 
employees. 
The VP of Manufacturing stated: 
Machines arc planned to run 24 hours with a minimum number of 
employees but it is not happening due to various shutdowns recording 
low profits for the Company. Changing attitude of people is a major 
problem for them to be punctual. The family concept is very strong here 
[in Sri Lanka]. For example, to attend funerals, wedding, taking children 
back and forth to schools, and other social occasions, people ask i•:avr:, 
which is the biggest problem for running factory shifts. 
"' 
In the implementation of new shift-plan in computerised time and attendance 
information systems, cmpl<'yees had to sign in an office registry in addition to sweeping 
their cards on machines. Two data processing clerks together with a human resources 
office were employed to produce reports. These personnel in the human resources 
department in the factory forwarded those reports for the verification to respective heads 
to physically check whether an employee is actually reported for duties. Late arrivals 
were penalised according_ to Company rules. 
The computerised time and attendance information system was Jinked to Company 
performance appraisal system. Group Human Resource Manager commented, "both late 
reporters lo work and early leavers have bad marks as their attendance arc linked to the 
Company pcrfonnance appraisal system. Incentives and promotions for employees are 
granted on the basis of final appraisal of their performance". This systematic use of 
instrumental and strategic actions in the form of objectification of employees' 
lifcworlds through information systems development to achieve rational objectives of 
management were directed towards the colonisation of 'lifcworlds' of employees at 
NCCL. Such a goal of Goldcnbank tends to negate and inhibit a balanced social 
development. The imbalance social development denies the possibility that management 
receive "symbolic guidance" from lifoworlds via steering media, which arc grounded in, 
and controlled at, the level of employees' 'lifeworlds' at NCCL. 
Employees opposed Goldenbank managers' unrealistic actions. They realised their 
traditionally established working culture is being challenged and replaced by newly 
introduced changes. A shop-floor employee recollected: 
We oppos\:d both. new shift-plan and time and attendance system. 
Foreign managers were attempting to control our factory life more than 
ever before reducing our freedom and taking off our factory income. 
Wh~l they planed was to reduce our overtime work. On the other hand 
we had to work more hours like machines. Company also attempted to 
mo~itor our life using computerised system. We never ever in our village 
life controlled by others like this. If a person dies during a working day 
we can't attend to his funeral because factory is scheduled to run with a 
minimum number -of employees. We have to he free to enjoy our social 
and cultural life while working in the factory. Because tha'.'s our culture 
[emphasis added]. 
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The presupposition uses of "we" and "our" by employees presume the recognition of 
their shared acts. As employees speak together, they act together. This ordinary action 
context can not understand just only we listen to their words, but listening to people. We 
must attend not only to what is said, but also why employees opposed to the changes 
introduced by the management. Within villages, employees were not subject to any 
control mechanism. Villagers worked as a family in a system of reciprocal 
understanding that was governed by trust relationships. Goldenbank management did 
not understand this social context of Sri Lanka that produced and reproduced in every 
action and interaction of employees' remained unchallenged over many centuries. 
The opposition of employees has multiple meanings emanating from their socio-
cultural, economic, and political contexts. For example, the unrealistic management 
actions began to clash with the fulfilment of employees culturally embedded value 
systems. They affected to breakdown of collectivity of decision making, loss of their 
traditional value systems and the erosion of their traditional culture. Employees 
understood that they would ke;;:p away from the management interaction when 
·/Jomputers beginning to monitor and to control their behaviour within the factory. They 
perceived computerised information systems degrade their personal communication. 
260 
The use of informal r;ommunication is consistent with traditional village culture of Sri 
Lnnka. 
Employees opposed management actions because it affected to further deteriorate their 
main income from the factory leading some employees to earn low income. Some 
employees lost their jobs after the introduction of information systems. For example, the 
number of employees who worked in the previous time and attendance office reduced 
from twenty to two. Ostensibly, employees through unions opposed the proposed shift. 
plan and monitoring and controlling of their works through computerised time and 
attendance information systems. From these perspectives, it can be natural to believe 
that the development and imp!ementation of computerised time and attendance 
infonnatioo systems went on within socio-cultural, economic, and political contexts at 
NCCL. 
6.ll.5.1.1 Rcffection on Episode 7 
What is interesting is, with all these changers were taking place in the social action 
context of NCCL, management regarded such actions as irrational and unimportant 
disturbances to realise their rational objectives. They ignored the collective symbolic 
structures of employees' 'lifeworlds'. They did not understand employees' resistance as 
a result ofunre~ilvcd steering problems. 
Crisis situations in the secio-cu\tura!, economic and political contexts occurred much 
owed their objectivity to the fact that they issue from unresolved steering problems 
introduced by Go\dembank at NCCL. These steering problems affected and endangered 
social integration of NCCL. Rather than understanding 'lifeworlds' demands, 
'" 
management rntionaliscd its actions through interpreting tinanci:i] and production 
figures to realise its objectives, meanings of employees' actions was interpreted at best 
of localised importance or irrational behaviour rather than understanding the behaviour 
is resulted from the unsolved steering problems of Goldcmbruik. The adoption of 
science-based innovations and tcchno!oglCs by Goldenhank management at NCCL has 
often b:en stifled by the employees' percclvcd socio-culhm1l 1ifowor]ds. 
6.11.6 Maintenance for Cement Systems (MAC) for Factory Maintenance 
As part of the modernisation program of Go\denbank at NCCL, a project named, 
'ffiaintcnance fur Cement ( MAC) was introduced at the factory in the late 1996. MAC is 
a manual system which has been implemented in other Goldcnbank group of 
companies. Simply, MAC project was focused on the maintenance of factory machines 
to improve the efficiency of the operations of factory perfonnance. Former Factory 
Manager explained the objective of MAC project. "The focus of MAC was to reduce 
maintenance cost with the improvement of overall maintenance activities, to reduce net 
operating assets, and to improve overall equipment efficii::ncy". 
Go!denbank management assumed that MAC 'Could be implemented at NCCL as it had 
been in other Goldenbank comp'l.nies. However, employees were strongly opposed the 
introduction of MAC proJect through unions. Employees who previously divided into 
various political parties united through their national union leaders to protest against the 
introduction of MAC project. A union leader recollected: 
Employees organised to protest the implementation of MAC project 
despite their pretty differences in politics. After the take over of NCCL, 
Goldcnbank Company highly controlled us through various systems. We 
have no freedom within factory. Employees in the factory use as slavers 
to realise (he Company targets. They reduced u number of employees 
employed in cuch shift. We have to carry 01.!I their works too and we arc 
now over pressured. 
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Howeve,, the management ignored employee resistance but expected a massive 
attitudinal change from employees. Fonner F.:ictory Manager stated: 
;; 
' 
To introduce MAC, Goldenbank expected an entire attitudinal change 
from people, but employees viewed MAC project negatively. It took 
nearly three months including a month to select a task force to study the 
project. Another two months to give awareness. Company introduced 
past-track reduction of employees. Employees were monitored and 
controlled through computerised time and attendance information system 
[as previously explained]. People thought all these changes were 
emanating from MAC project and they opposed to it. 
Management perceived employees' resistarrce as disturbances in the social system to 
realise rational objectives of Golden bank rather than understanding cultural problems of 
employees' lifeworld~. MAC as a steering medium did not match with the established 
working culture, socio-economic and political context~ of NCCL. However, 
management organised training program for some employees hoping to change their 
attitudes towards MAC implementation and to improve !heir condition for use of MAC. 
Golden bank perceived social life of employees as a technical issue, and its improvement 
was entrusted to technical experts, capable of rational decision making and 
management. 
Management organised training for a task force selected among employees to 
ii 
implement MAC project. The group comprised of 12 employees including a systems 
analyst. Foreign consultants conducted training on MAC implementation. However, the 
way training was conducted could not cultivate new ideas about the use of MAC at 
NCCL. It did not provide opportunities to learn MAC concepts by employees. The 
'" 
training followed an instrumental approach. A planing officer in the factory planing 
division stated: 
Though training was aimed at changing our attitudes towards MAC 
implementation, it did not happen because it was just conducted. Yi£ 
could not understand many ofthe concepts he [foreign trainer] taught us. 
We have never heard of those concepts before. We had problems of his 
language [English) [ emphasis added]. 
The presumptive use of"our" and "we" in planning officer's use of language presumes 
the recognition of learning as a set of collectively shared knowledge generation process. 
These "our" and "we" words appear as quite ordinary expression, or presumptions 
altogether unchallenged the solidarity of employees in the face of practical 
communication. What we see here is the practical relevance of use of communicative 
actions in training of employees. This use of social grammar of ordinary communication 
··<::- ;s still remained unchanged in Sri Lanka's culture. 
"English as a mcdiwn of instruction also inhibited learning by employees of con~epts 
associated with MAC project. Many of the employees who employed ~: NCCL had 
completed their pre studies in schools and universities using national languages such as 
Sinhala and Tamil as medium of instructions. This resulted due to the recognition of 
swabasha (swabasha refers to a nation's own language) medium education policy 
adopted in teaching in 1944 (Rubero, 2001). This adoption of swabasha policy in 
teaching students was inspired and convinced by the universally accl'pted principle "the 
mother tongue of a child is the medium most appropriate for a child to learn effectively" 
(Rubero, 2001). It considered that the mother tongue as the natural medium of education 
and the genius of a nation finds fu\l expression only through its own language and 
literature. Once a person is socialised in his mother tongue and has been instructed as 
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such, he docs not pr0cccd subject to transcendental rules, but at the: ievl.'1 of 
transccnJcnta\ structures thcmseivcs because he is concerned with the a priori or 
intuitive basis of knowledge as im!cp~11dcnt of experience (Habcrmas, I 987c). 
6.II.6.1 Reflection on MAC 
The transfer of the purposive rntion~lity of Go\dcnbank carried witl1 it the transfer of 
values and institutions embedded in corporate and management culture of the Western 
societies. The application of in:;tnuucntal approach in the course of employees' training 
towards the use of MAC !nhibiteci to take place employees' discussions necessary for 
the inclusion of the requirements of lifeworlds. Raiher, this instrumental approach 
further eroded employees' ability to define and take care of thejr own lives further than 
the erosion of past periods of corp~ration and Yaw~al management at NCCL. 1J 
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6.11.7 Development of Computerised Work-Order li.forriution System for 
Factory Maintenance: Eplsode 8 
. , 
·· In the MAC proje<:t, one 0ftl1e areas, namely, work-order information systems, required 
.. 
computerised information systems .:levckpment to imp\c~ent in the maintenance of 
factory plants. Simply, the objective of computerised work-order information systems 
(computerised work-~,r..lcr information systems) was to design preventive information 
systetT,1S for monitoring maintenance activities in the fac, ,.y plants on a scheduled basis. 
·, It was sehif .Cd for I) week monitoring plan of plums. Thus, infonnation technology 
\\ ' .· 
and managemC11t infonnation systems m~n~iers went to Thailand 10 study those 
, sy:;tcms use by the si~tcr companies of Goldenbank expecting that the similar systems 
could be used al NCCL. The mar>agcrs realised that the eomputcrise.t work-01Jer 
.information systems used by Thai .~ompanics did not meet NCCL requirements, becnuse 
Thai manufacturing of Cement process was highly automated and equipped with 
modem machines and technologies. Hence, the management infonnation systems and 
information technology managers requested NCCL management to develop 
computerised work-order inll1:mation systems in-house that met Company 
requirements. 1l1c management infonnation systems manager explained insufficiency of 
1liai systems to meet NCCL requirements; 
We observed the way that Thai manufacturing process and the wny plants 
were monitored and controlled. Thai machines were absolutely new. We 
realised the same system [computerised work-order infomiation systCTns] 
and the approaches used in Thailand would not be effective with our 
,;ome forty years old and obsolete machines [emphasis added]. 
Consider the above three presumptive uses of "we" and "our" in management 
information systems manager's expressions, 'we observed', 'we realised', and 'our 
some .. , ' recognise the collectively shared knowledge in managerial actions. Realising 
the importance of computerised work-order infonnation systems and believing the 
.(i 
fL~ommendations of infonnation technology and management infomiation systems 
.rnan::igers were correct, the senior mamgement decided to develop computerised work-
order infonnation systems in-house. This situation could be ronsidcrcd as a culmination 
of communicative actions in decision making between employees ::ind Goidenbank 
management. H<Jwevcr, a consu!lant from :he parent Company headquarters was 
brought in rather lhan trustin!'. loC.J.lly ::iv::iil::ible experts to develoJ,l the rm.'~osed system 
in-house. 
With the MAC project, a flew planning division wns created with four planning offi~~~' , 
·I' ' ,, 
together wi!h an cngi~'~cr ~:the head of the division to look al\er the irnplcmcntation of 
the computerised work-order infonnation systems. A systems analyst was appointed as 
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the coordinator of the projcc1. ·n1c system development process was largely ad-hoe. The 
consultant did not ec,nduct a systematic study to identify inform::..''on requirements of 
NCCL rather the head of MAC project provided requirements for the developmen1 of 
the system. Foreign eXpL'fl presented himself, as en expert who is in a possession of 
knowledge \hat is not available to users and other alTected parties at !>':::CL from the 
computerised work-order infonnation systems. Users were not consulted nor tl1ey were 
involved in the design and 1hc development computerised work-order infonnation 
systems. The consultant dcvdoped the computerised work-order information systems 
within three weeks using Microsoft ACCESS database software package and he left the-· 
country leaving the responsibility of implementation with the staff in the planning 
division of the factory. 
The foreign expert fo!!owed purely scientifically rational, technical and instrument&.[ 
approach to desig'I comroterised work-order infonnation systems while introducing 
neutrality into political !letion contexts in which NCCL operates. The foreign consultant 
would have assumed that infonnation systems development could be carried out 
painlessly to underlying social and cultural structures of NCCL in which infonnation 
systems development takes place. However, it is impossible \:0 argue that public domain 
is objective and value neutral. For example, the VP-manufacturing whom needed using 
the comruterised work-order infonnation systems for maintenance activities in the 
factory urged the planaing division to make use of the computerised work-order 
infonnation systems deve!opei.1 by foreign consultant and to produce required 
management report to monitor and control maintenance activities in the plants. 
However, the users could not produce the required report using the computerised work-
order information systems, Systems stated: 
" (I 
We had hell of problems using it [ computerised work-ord!."r infonnation 
systems] including, creating documents for management. We identified a 
list of problems, we had, when we were using the system and handed 
over it [the list] to the hend of the MAC project. lie then faxed the list to 
Edinbara [name of the consultant]. E<linbara came back to work out the 
probkms. However, he just gave me a trnining about ten minutes before 
he was leaving the country. We experienced another set of problems even 
after correcting the earlier list of problems. We brought those problems 
again attention to the management. 
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The group col!cctive!y employing communicative actions identified difficulties 
regartling the use of co1nputeriscd work-order infonnation systems developed by the 
:'/ 
foreign consultant. However, senior management, particularly, the VP of manufacturing 
ignored such understanding of the users of the computerised work-order infonnation 
systems, because he was inculcated with the belief that foreign expertise was superior to 
locally available knowledge of information systems development. Instead, he suspected 
that the employees who worked in the planning division assuming that these employees 
were sabotaging ;Jctory work by not committing to work with the computerised work-
order information systems developed by foreign consultants. A planning officer 
explained: 
Chief factory manager suspected us. He thought that we [users] 
sabotaged the computerised wm"k-ordcr infonnation systems since a 
foreign consultant developed it. For example, one day, the operation 
manager asked us to create wports whilst he was sitting wirh us, but we 
could not produce any single report he required. All planning officers 
were also fed-up and frustrnted with the computcrisl'<l work-order 
information $)'Sterns. Tncn only they [management] realised that the 
computerised work-order information systems could not generate 
necessary reports for their [management] use. Later, it was given up. 
Luter the system was abandoned leaving u huge cost (Rs.30 million) to the Company. 
Commenting on the failure of the computerised work-order information systems, the· 
' I'> pl:mning engineer in the planing division stated: 
The computerised work-order information systems was designed for 
previ.-,1tivc maintcrrnncc of plants. It was sd1cdukd for 13-wcck 
monitoring of plants. Bul our machines were nearly forty years old. 
There arc frequent shutdowns and stoppages that require ll,1mcdiatc 
attention and repairs. We can not maintain them on scheduled basis 
because failures !ah place before the scheduled days. Goldcnbank has 
not considered these aspects of machines before considering the 
development c,fthc computerised work-order information systems. 
"" 
The purely instrumental approach -:Jfthc consultant denied the possibility to engage in 
critical exmninalion, self-reflection, and awareness of the development process of 
computerised work-order infonnation systems relating to employees of NCCL. 1be 
instrumental approach ndopted by foreign consultant restrained the development of 
information systems according to the understanding of local employees about the 
factory maintenance activities. For example, plaani;,g engineer recollected, "when 
factory systems analyst sought to take part in the design of computerised wor!t-ord~r 
information systems, he was told by the head of MAC that his service was ;10 longer 
required by the project." The process adopted by consultant in dcvclcping computerised 
work-order information systems inhibited a critical awareness of the conditions of 
factory machines to be included in the development. Furthermore, making comments 
about the failure of the computerised work-order information systems, Former Factory,. 
Manager stated: 
Goldenbank expected a massive bel,aviournl and attitudinal change from 
. the part of employees to implement the computerised work-order 
information systems. However, the approach was top-down and the 
1
/· Company neglected listening to the voices of bottom-levels. The poor f knowledge ubout computer usc of planners was further added to the 
\.\. failure of the computerised work-order information systems, 
' ' 
,i i', i.'.:'° 
Both ·Goldcnbank munaJcrncnt nnd consultant assumed that instrumental and technical 
' 
approaGh used in the development of computerised work-order infonnation systems 
would help to implement MAC projce! to trnnsform NCCL towarps a modem 
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organisation. However, the developer ncithl'r had an idea about the Company 
requirements nor he involved in the implementation of computerised work•ordcr 
information systems with the planning officers. The developer followed an instrumental 
.. approach which is embodied in the philosophy of positivist science. He concealed the 
problems of world constitution of user employees at NCCL. 
The positivist designer, taking an c~pert position, iia,'llored the social grammar of 
employees that produced a system of knowledge as a shared learning pwcess, which 
allowed interaction with other emp)oyees at NCCL. A superficial /1doption of 
_instnunental approach and lhc use of power in the process of development of 
computerised work-order information systems prevented contesting the nonnative 
context of information systems development and its possible consequences for 
lifeworlds of employees at NCCL. Both Go!denbank management and foreign 
consultant did not understand the fact that modem scientific knowledge and the 
knowledge pnssessed by local employees arc grotesquely unequal in leverage. 
6.11.7.1 Reflection on Episode 8 
The domination of Western positivist science ignored knowledge and wisdom in 
employees' lifcworlds in Sri Lanka. They did not believe that they could have anything 
to learn from local people or to recognise that there is a parallel system of knowledge to 
their own which is complementary, that is usually valid and in some aspe~t superior 
than scientific knowledge adopted in positivist science. From these pcrspccti.ves, it is 
important to understand that knowledge producers, knowledge users and knowledge 
recipients such as affected parties must communicate, because knowledge products 
possess latent socmpolitica! characleristies that surface and activate when changes arc 
---------------------------~--~---
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implemented in practice. The inner motive that all the parties share is needed to b·:lh'r 
understand and effectively employ in information aystems development if it is to be 
productive in organisations. However, this shared knowledge in information systems 
development was missed out both by '.he managrment ofGoldcnbank and the consultant 
who developed the computerised wurk-ordcr information systems. Seen from these 
perspectives, transfer of instruw.~nta! science am! technolo!,'Y, management techniques 
and methods, and expe!!~' knowledge from the Western countries to Sri Lanka as 
steering media prove problematic and unsuccessful in the prevailing socially 
constructed Jifeworlds of people in Sri Lanka. 
6.~.1.8 Mal'.lagcmcnt Information Systems for Factory Control: Episode 9 
After the closure of data processing unit in the factory and the introduction of MAC 
project, the planning division was regulated, as the management infonnation systems 
unit in the factory, to pro-duce various management infonnatinn sy~tems reports. These 
wee to enable factory management to closely monitor and control factory production to 
achieve Company target~. 
The objective of management infonnation systems development was clearly linked up 
with the Company's rational objectives. A system analyst in the head office had 
developed a database system using fox prOb'l'amming language. Additionally, using 
Microsoft EXCEL software package various reports arc produced. Planning officers 
independently operate database and EXCEL systems. Neither database system nor 
EXCEL system is integrnted on-line with information systems in other departments, 
' 
units or head ntlice. The planning engineer stated that, "our system is not yet 
intcb'l'ated but we interface information manually to database and EXCEL systems !Tom 
"' 
other departments and sections to generate various management information systems 
rL-ports required by the factory manugerncnt. Each manager decides what information he 
wants". 
Both databas.: and EXCEL systems were developed to control the workforce in the 
foetory. Similarly, neither users nor other afTectcd parties were involved in the design 
and development of management infonnation systems. Systems analyst stated: 
Things are different here; !here were no many interactions with the users 
and other parties who affected management information systems. We 
can't take their priorities into considerations, because managemei,t 
requirements are different. Therefore, we develop management 
information systems to meet management requirements. 
Th~ systems analyst employed an instrumental approach of which was aimed at the 
;,,f 
production of technically exploitable knowledge in management infonnatiurr systems 
development. This instrumental approach discloses reality from the viewpoint of 
possible instrumental control over objectified processes of nature. This approach has 
regressed behind the level of rel\eetion represented by the worldviews of users and 
other affected parties from management infomiation systems development. The systems 
analyst ignored the sociol .:ontcxt uf NCCL within which management infonnation 
systems dev~lopment occurs. Rather, objectives of Go!dcnbank were included within 
the objectivaes of management infonnntion systems, for possible control of behaviour of 
employees in the factory. The objective of each management infonnation systems report 
produced by the planning division is as follows. 
I. Daily plant maintenance and review reports. Objective is to review the past 
perfonnnnce of the maintenance department against the plan, iilentify sources of a 
deviation to adapt to daily plant production needs. ·· 
m 
2. Weekly maintenance report. Objective is to review the attainment of last week plan 
and to develop the plan for the coming week. 
J. Shill hand-over report. Objective is to ensure a smooth trnnsition between shifts, 
discussing problems that ncc<l specific focu~ as well as potential problems. 
4. Weekly marmgcmcnt review reports. Objective is to review the results of the past 
week of all sections, reporting lo the Chief Fadory Manager, identify variance, 
analyse them and lake appropriate action. 
S. Daily deviation report. Objective is to review day-deviations. 
Factory managers in tum use these reports as purposive-rational means to control the 
operations at the factory to achieve Company objectives. For example, the Chief 
Factory Manager stated that: 
I nm looking aftt:r operations both in the factmy and the quarry. I receive 
daily, weekly, monthly and annual reports about the operations from the 
planning office. I use these rt-ports [as management contro!!ing devices] 
to see whether the factory is running smoothly. I closely look at every 
movement of the factory . and tightly control the operations using 
management information systems reports. For example, we closely 
monitor employees' anival and departure time to work. Thi, is very 
essential for us as the fact0111 is scheduled to run with a minimum 
number ot employees. l forced supervisors to take <li~dplinary uctions for 
late aniva!s, which is their responsibility to make the employees 
disciplined. I pressured all the superintendents and other sectional heads 
to issue warning letters for them [for the late arrivals]. ]fa person reports 
r,.ipeatedly late, 'sack' him. then employees will realise that this 
Comprnly is tough. We have to have disciplinary workforce to nchieve 
our targets. The Comp~!'IY hast" make m;:mcy to keep going. 
Mrnlagemcnt information systems development at the factory planning division 
reflected the prevailing managerial ideo\.1gy of Go\denbank, which strengthened the 
instrumental rationalisation of work process of NCCL. Employees arc considered :is 
objects to be manipulated by mrnlagemcnt actions. lnfonnation system was used as an 
instrument to monitor and the control tif performance of both employees and other 
departments. By using management information systems, Goldcnbank management 
believes to obtain reliable and objective measures abovt the pcrfonnance of both 
employees and other rlepartments. lnfomiation is used as a new management-
m 
controlling device by management to reinforce control and surveillance of the 
workforce leading to increased alicr,ution. 
Goldcnbank assumed that management information systems development could be 
carried out painkssly to the underlying socio-cultural contex.ts at NCCL. The use of 
instrumental actions by factory management through management information systems 
to control and surveillance of employees in the factory threatened the communicative 
actions that had reconciled their traditional way of life. The traditional way of life was 
surrounded by the pu:-posivc rational actions of management. A shop-floor employee 
commented that: 
Earlit:r [during corporation period] we did not see the factory differently. 
Factory bd become a part of our every day life. Many things occurred 
in a manner we were used to. Trade unions were always with us in our 
ewryday life. Our managers used to know our sltuation [traditional way 
of life). We fully supported them and they fully supported us. Mutually 
we understood each other. 
Employees believed that Goldenbank management would not interfere to continue their 
customary shop-floor customs and practice. Unlike privatisation of other SOEs (e.g. 
Ko.Janey Tyre Corporation) in Sri Lanka, the employees at NCCL did not resist through 
prolonged strikes realising that they would be disadvantaged from the instrurnenrnl and 
strategic actions of management. However, employees heavily suffcr-:d from the new 
disciplinary controls introduced by Goldcnbank management through management 
infonnation systems. 
In their traditional village culture, naturally villagers employed communicative action in 
their evcryd11y affairs. Their everyday affairs and experiences were not SJbject to the 
transcendental conditions of action itself. Reality is constituted in a framework that is 
"' 
the form of life of communicating groups and is organised through ordinary language. 
What is real is that which cun be experienced according to the interpretation of a 
prevailing symbolic system. Villagers produced their lives both through learning 
processes of socially organised labour and processes of mutual understanding in 
interactions mediated by ordinary language. In this use of lan!,'ll~ge ~<!dal interactions 
and understanding was predominant. Everyone understood the language used in 
ordinary ,ommuoication. 
However, new control initiatives of Goldenbank through management information 
systems suppressed the employees' lifeworlds leading to alienation and to an 
organisationul iron cage as referred by Weber (1947). The intro:lucdon of targets made 
employees more aware of the prr-ssures for increased controlled leading to loss of 
socially organised knowledge. Employees never used to work in the villages under a 
sever control by external parties. In the villages, controlled was communicatively 
formed. A work-superintendent explained changes occurred in the factory after the \\ 
initiatives ofGoldcnbank management. 
During corporntion period, employees were somewhat free with usual 
habit of work. Now the factory is very busy. Attendance, timing, and 
targets arc very important priorities of the factory. People normally clon't 
'1ike that type of control. They prefer to work freely without such rib>id 
control. 
During corporation pcrir_d, employees lmd amicable relationship with production 
managers because they understood the circumstances of employees. Goldcnbank 
managers ignored this cordial relationship between production managers and employees 
and the effects of their relationship to the production in ~h,: factory. Rather than 
understanding the employees' behaviour and the importance of keeping good industrial 
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rclmionship with employees, Goldcnhauk management ignored the demands of every-
day life of employees. When employees' everyday life clashed with management 
priorities, it considered as irrational behaviour of employees ad became a matter of 
investigation and disciplinc. A work-superintendent explained: 
When employees are absent the ChiefFactory Manager asked us to take 
disciplinary actions against employees. Good example is that about a 
month ago one employee in the clinkering division told me Umt he was 
absent because he had a tbmily ceremony. TI1c Chief Fa,·tory Manager's 
reaction was not like local managers. He is ir.orc scrim.'.S about factory 
discipline and wanted us to take disciplinary actions ab,ainst absentees. 
Employees now should be serious about their work. They have to select 
either factory or family, not the both, because the Company policy is 
very tough now. 
Another shop-floor employee stated that "now everybody is busy working but ~.e do not 
like it. It's very difficult for us to have leave. Now we don't have freedom to talk much. 
We do not like it". lbe work intensification through management infonnation systems 
had pressured and increased employees distressed in the factory. An operation manager 
said, '"the freedom to talk with people had withdrawn here. People do not talk. They 
carried out orders with fear psychosis. And negatively respond". It seemed that with the 
stiff management control, employees' attitudes have become hardened. As a result., 
employ~rs opposed senior management actions by focusing on thr.ir high salaries and 
;', 
expensc·s. An accountant COl!Hnen!cd: 
Executing the plar,~ of the expatriates proved expen~ivc for NCCL, 
which veered betw,;:cn low profi!s. The foreign mangers (according to 
local managers) were paid hight salaries a scale higher than local 
managers. Their salaries are far ahead with the salaries paid f JT other 
employees. lhey were provided luxurious benefits ~·uch as vehicles and 
accommodations at the Company cost. The Coinp~ny had to satisfy them 
with al! facilities. For example one of VP's te\cp\mne bill for one month 
oxceedcd Rs. 200,000, whie!1 means thr Company can pay twenty shop-
floor employees of this bill alone. You know, our output is to local 
market and we me severely attacked by other rnmpetitors. We could not 
increase prices as the cost increases. I am concerned whether these 
additional costs 11rovided substantial returns to the NCCL. My 
understanding is they didn't. 
6.11.8.1 Reflection on Episode 9 
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Within this social milieu, therdore, management infonnation systems development was 
incapable of being Jegittmiscd at NCCL. Employees opposer! management actim,s 11s 
·\\ means of expressing their discontent. Employees' 'lifoworlds' demands were not dealt 
with democratic and rational means. Rather they have been suppressed or dictated by 
managerial endorsements. Goldenbank pen.:.:::ition abcut management information 
systems development was tcclmica\ and instrumental to obtain better and accurate 
information to monitor and control work-place relationships. 
In developing management infonnation systems, systems analysts adopted an 
instrumental approach for realising technical interests and suppo.tcd in realising the 
purposive rathmality of Goldenbank management. Management infonnation systems 
were aimed to get reliable and objective measures to predict and control ofpcrfonnancc 
of individuals and departments and NCCL itself without integrating employees' 
!ifeworlds demands in infonnation systems development. It can therefore be concluded 
that infonnation systems development at NCCL represented the positivist approach 
emanated from the Western cultural and value systems. 
6.11.9 Outsourcing information systems: Episode JO 
» ' 
The CEO.iii NCCL believed that infonnntion and infonnation technology was critical to 
\I 'I 
sustain.,'.hd in pursuing Company vision. Therefore, in tiie late 1999, Goldenbank 
considered employing infonnation teclmology for gaining strategic n<l\':!.'l.!ege in the 
m 
cement market. The implication of this thinking is that NCCL required a sophisticated 
computer communications infrastructure for the daily activities. lbis view of 
information and infonnation technology is reflected in the infonnation technology 
policy and strategy forr.mlated in the 2000. 
According to information technology policy, Goldenbank endeavours to develop fully 
integreted, enterprise-wide infor.nation system. Goldenbank assumed that the 
development of effective information systems could be used successfully to enhance the 
coinpetitiveness in the Cement market of Sri Lanka_ and .thereby to achieve sustainable 
development for NCCL. 
According to information technology policy and strategy, Goldenbank was to 
'increasingly use of computer based solutions to improve the efficiency and 
effectiveness of NCCL. NCCL endeavours to reduce the reliance on manual systems 
and to implement fully in1egraled, enterprise-wide infonnation systems with 
Go\denbank standards. Jn theory, NCCL relics on e-mail. Calendar and other Group-
ware applications for improved communication and coordination while looking upon 
and managing datfr. as a confidential corporate resource (NCCL infonnation technology 
.Rolicy Guide, 2000). The infonnation technology strategy was cast to give much 
·- .,. __ concerned on tho e-commerce and fully integrated and automatOO infonnation systems 
in all the aspects of operations to talce advantages 
management assumed that integrated infonnation 
over co, 1petition. Go\denbank 
' 
' infrastructure would provide 
management with accurate and reliable infonnation. The VP of Finance stated that: 
We wero looking at full} integrated infonnation system on line with 
factory, head office and ot!ler locations. Our strategy was to outsource 
standard-licensed snftwar: in a!! the applications including 
ii 
administration aml to introduce lu!ly intcwat~,l and automated systems 
such ns SAP 10 edge out the competition. The Company, f<.Jllowing i1~ 
infonnulion tcchr.olngy strntcgy, had introducctl new outsource ,oflwarc 
(infommtion systems) for accounting, p;tyroll an1! inventory app!kations 
and a Lotus Nntcs ncl W()rk l!,r hoth intcrrwl and c:,;tcmal 
communication. Murcowr. lht: Company u~·c~ Goldcnhmik .,p,qcc web-
site for slmring and comparing infonnation with other Cioldcnbank 
compm1ies. 
"" 
lnforrnntion t~'l:hnology poliL'y am! strntq,'Y was highly linked 1rl Company vision and 
objectives of cost and market leadership. The underlying belief of Goldcnbank is that it 
Suff~rs from unclear, ambiguous and complc:,;: co-ordination probh.'tl1s, which require a 
lot of communication and documentation. Gu\denbank parccived that employees in 
every location should share infonnation accurately and in a timely manner. Implicit in 
this policy and strategy is that information must be systematically gathered on people 
and their activities. Thus, infonnation systems development were tied up with and 
focused on realising the interests of Goldenbank of monitoring and controlling 
performance of employees and their activities at NCCL. 
In the selection and the deployment of information technology resources, the Company 
relied upon the principles of econi:,mic calculations for obtaining value for money. 
Go]dcnbank believed that information systems have a direct impact on the economics of 
>.<, 
information processing. Prevalent belief in the direct social and economic value of 
computerisation (Kling. !996) presumably infonns such counsel. Information and 
communication technologies were understood to improve the ~uality and productivity of 
information processing and reduce labour cost. For example, VP, FinrJlCC stated: 
We have external communication systems. We are now able to 
communicate with remot~ areas such ·Js with Goldenbunk and with the 
factory people. We internally communicate using Lotus Notes. As far as 
cost i~ concerned these 1c :hnologics arc chcup and they serve lot of 
moucy lo the Company. The selection and deployment of inf~miation 
technology solution is based on value for money to obtain u grater 
economy. 
279 
Although Goldcnbank has been grappling with the problem of information since I 996, 
albeit with a conspicuous lack of success, cheup and ca~ily accessible infonnation 
tcchnolog}'- L'.i\ly appeared on 1hc NCCL scene ntlcr the Goldcnbank has started its , 
~- .. 
operationSat NCCL. On the other hand, the dcvelupmcnt of piecemeal information oO 
the integratL'tl information systems to support iofonnation requirements of user 
&ipartments substantially changed socio-cultural, political and economic climates in 
which NCCL operates. Outsoucing of information systems from different vendors and 
assigning the task ·or information systems development to external specialists following 
\he information technology policy and strategy continued to erode the technical 
l~~~..._hip of organisation of information systems within NCCL. In many cases, the 
partnership between vendors and NCCL experienced sever problems leading to 
information systems failures in user departments at costs. 
Following the Company information technology policy and strate!:,,Y, different versions 
of application software from different vendor firms were set up in user departments: 
"ACCPAC" in the head office's Finance and Accounting department; "ACQUIRE 7" in 
the factory's supplies and inventories dcpi!I1ment; and "Shenide" in the head office's 
payroll section. These application softwares were products of developed countries. 
Though Goldenbank perceived integrated infonnation systems as powerful and 
significant forces of modernisation program of NCCL, the developed nature of the 
inte!,'l"llted information systems has been uneven and piecemeal. Neither specialists from 
vendor finns nor information technology personnel of NCCL conducted formal 
)·information requirements elicitation study identifying needs of the Company. 111e 
'"" 
spcdalists from vendor finns excluded users, internal information technology staff am! 
other employees and carried nut information systems development independently 
adopting technical knowledge with narrow ins1rumcntal approaches for the best 
interests ofthc Company managcmn1t and the specialists themselves. 
User departments purchased their own software and hardware and frequently developed 
their own ir.fonnatiun systems. Each department was starting to implement small, 
standalone applications on PCs. Many of such systems directly vied with those available 
from the market and have no formally linked with other departments. Because of their 
very nature, integrated infonnation systems needed to run on large, centralised multi-
user systems. However, this did not happen up till the end of 2000. 
The practice of piecemeal informMion systems development fostered n boom on the 
piecemeal development ot user departments. These piecemeal infonnntion systems in 
users' department acted as major barriers on the del'elopmcnt of inteb'filted information 
systems. While software installed at different user depanmcn\s was incompatible to link 
to function as a unified information systems, these information systems reinforced the 
traditionally estaiilished b:.Jreaucratic culture of managers in user depa!1mcnts. The 
deve!opmeul of information systems sel"\•ed the needs of some managers at the expense 
of employees. The ends of information 5ystems development in user departments were 
in question to many employees. Information systems development has not been guided 
by the demands of employees' 'lifcworlds.' Clearly, socio-cultural, economic and 
political asr,tcts ofNCCL influenced information systems development at NCCL. 
Frequently, settings up of small data processing units have been created to satisfy the 
neixls of user departments who gcn.!rally felt dissatisfied with former data processing 
units. Shifting infonnation technology responsibility from information technology 
section to the user departments sc1.mcd like n good .~olulion for all. According to 
Habcnnns this situntion can empower users and cmuncipatc them from the power of 
information technology staff. These departments welcomed infonnation system~ 
development within their departments as answers to the applications backlog. 
This is mainly because, over nearly three decades, two computing units in the head 
office and the factory served for those who were in power. Throughout the history of 
NCCL, staff and the data processing units were subject to instrumental use of senior 
m:inagcment and politicians. In many instances, infonnation technology staffs followed 
narrow instrumental and technical approaches to design and development ofinfonnation 
systems. They were considered as legitimate experts in infonnation systems 
development. Their main concerned was to develop technical information systems 
necessitated by management decision making to monitor and control lifeworlds of 
employees at NCCL. 
This narrow focus of information systems development within NCCL not only alienated 
employees at work but also annihilated wide assimilation of infonnation ·;.)'stems used 
in other departments. Its access was denied to overall employees as a w·:1ole. Therefore, 
information systems devc!opment did not hnvc any impact of trnnsforming NCCL 
towards an efficient and effective orgnnisntion it initially emulated for. Rnther the 
development of infonnation systems frustrated NCCL trnnsfonnation. 
Though competition for Cement has been changed since 19905, until the end of 2000. 
NCCL and its information systems followed rclntively fonnal and stable structures, 
Therefore, they can be view!!d as machine-like structures with fixed relationships that 
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produce purposeful results (sec Porra & Hirschheim, 2000). lnfonnation systems 
function received little recognition in comparc<l to other business functions such as 
accou11ting and finance within NCCL. 
In the [ale 1999, Goldcnbank transferred the responsibility of information sy.~tcms 
development from the management information systems section to external specialists. 
The management information systems manager commented that "the 
infonnation technology division was broken by introducing software 
monopoly o/ 
.~ .. 
packai~"tor'> 
·' various applications in user departments". This can be seen as evidence of the 
infonnation technology personnel being considered as an inferior organisational class 
by Golden bank management (Parra & Hirschheim, 2000) . 
. ·;·. II \1 Howevef, outsource policy has created poor morale of infonnation technology (/"' ' 
persoru'iel in the management information systems section leading to alienation and 
i'< I', 
apathy. \/or example, an analyst who was !,'Teatly suffered from the Company's decision 
,. ,: 
to outsource infonnation systems function mentioned that \i'we arc now ignored and 
' cornered by Goldenbank management". The poor morale of inteTnal information 
technology specialists was symptomatic to a lack of information technology vision for 
NCCL management. 
' . . .J' 
The vast array of information systems that developed at NCCL has been developed 
largi:!y through the initiatives of particular individuals in user departments. The 
expectations of handing over information systems development responsibilities over to 
the user departments were too optimistic, because it created much conflict between user 
departments and the management infonnation systems section. ln many cases, the 
management information systems section was c~eluded from the selection process of 
/I 
F 
2S3 
software and hardware for user departments. Deputy General Manager in the accounting 
and finance department stated that "things are quite different here now. We feel 
information systems need l(l come up from us". In many instanccs, these ideas led 
personnel in the user departments to depend on personnel who initiated and introduced 
such information systems, The project manager stated that "in every section, there is an 
infomrntion technology person. Others have to depend on them nnd have to accept what 
they say correct". An information technology manager in the management information 
systems section stated that: 
If mister [X1, an accountant in the accounting and finance department, 
leaves the Company, then that it would be the end of 'ACCPAC' 
[accounting software package] because he initiated, he trained himself 
and he is being used it now by him. Information systems became 
properties of individuals rather than the property of the Company. 
This practice of infonnatmn systems development by individuals in user departments 
fostered to maintain power and to dominate over the staff within and outside the 
departments. In certain instances, user departments recruited internal or external 
information technology specialists. For e,\ample, a systems analyst that worked in the 
management information systems section was transferred to the accounting and finance 
department by the VP of fianccc to strength the information system in the accounting 
and finance department {Gunatunge & Williams, 2000). 
... ,. 
In many occasions, i'Monnntion system~ initiatives in user departments did not occur 
following a dialogue bet'Wecn stakeholders, i. e., user departments, and specialists in the 
management infonnation systems section and other employees. According to Habermas, 
communication brings people and their knowledge together and it provides a forum for 
exchanging their intersubjeclive knowledge in a mutually understand manner. However, 
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certain user deportments excluded communication with personnel in the manugcmcnt 
infonnution systems section and other stakeholders. Management infonnation systems 
mnnngcr commented that: 
Managers in user department~ are now rcsponsibli:i for buying 
infonnation technology products and services from suppliers; they arc 
absolutely critical in giving us control of information technology. 
Management inforn1ation systems section was just informed about 
such decisions by user departments even though it didn't make much 
difference. 
Similarly, management information systems section had little coordination about the 
information system~ initiatives in users' dcpart,ncnts. User departments handled such 
infonnation systems developments with external software vendors. Very often, external 
specialists from vt:ndor firms appear in NCCL's premises. Accordingly, user 
departments' received little direction by management information systems section in 
helping users and ensuring user salisfaction in use of information systems developed by 
external specialists. 
The lack of relationship between user departments, information technoiugy personnel in 
the management information systems section and employees in other departments 
affected creation of mutual confidence, understanding, trust, hannony, and successful 
commtini,;ation. Moreover, Goldcnbank management deemphasiscd the work carried 
,, 
,, 
out by inl'ernal information technology personnd. As a result, when technical problems 
ar:~::. in User departments, a systems anali;st stated that "information technology people 
do not actively involve in correction of tho\le problems because they were not involved 
', 11 
)") -- \\ ,J /(-,,,A in developing such systems". ;,- _,_ 
:f 
The Management infonnatiun ~yslems manager wmmentcd on being informed about 
such prohicms by user (kpartmcnt.~. "infom1ation technology people in the management 
information systems section used to contact cxtcnml vendors who supplied software and 
hardware for user departments to correct every minor problem in users'. In some 
situations, users requests wcn: negle<"tcd". For example, management information 
systems manager continued: 
Recently, secretary to the CEO had informed the management 
information systems section that she had problems in reading her e-mail 
account, but about n week, information technology staff had not attended 
to correct her problem. What happened was that she had brought the 
matter to the attention of the CEO? After few days, CEO sr,,1ghttcd at me 
telling that I'm not serious about information technology functioning at 
NCCL. 
This practice of many information technology personnel in the management information 
systems department impaired the speciality of the information technology people within 
NCCL as being experts. TI1c project manager slated that "most of the information 
technoloi,,y personnel were not acquired adequate infonnation technology skills and 
business skills. As a result, information systems development was not gcucrated 
innovative solutions". What is interesting is that the new organising of management 
information systems function, information technology, and information technology 
application in information syskms has ignored the existence of such socio-politics 
between management information systems section, user departments, and other 
involved parties in systems development. Personnel within NCCL were not considered 
as valuable and cnp'lble human assets in solving business problems and opportunities 
through informatim1 systems development. 
Following Company information technology strntcgy and policy, software selection for 
various departments at NCCL wns made purely relying on rational criteria such as 
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obtaining information for rational decision making and controlling. This belief of 
mnnngcmcnt was aligned with the idea that informa(ion systems produce fu~l lo the 
organisational dcci.~iun making {Lyytincn, 1992). Scvcrnl factors conlrihutc tu this 
belief: reduce cost to access and mnnipululc information, a foster decision cycle, which 
pennits more alternative to be explored, and higher infonnatiun quality such as 
accuracy and timeliness, which allowed for more informed decisions. The Deputy 
General Manager of accounting and finance stated: 
Now we can make good decisions [rational) and have a better control all 
over the operations at NCCL. After introducing ACCP AC, the culture of 
the Company has changed, for example, now only a single person is 
doing works of five persons. 
In this role of infonnntion systems have substantially shaped the prevailing managerial 
ideo]~'ID' by strengthening the instrumental rationalisation of work processes at NCCL 
' leading to increased a\icr~Mion of employees. According to Ha berm as, the application of 
infonnation technology has not addressed social needs that arc recognised as justified 
by an informed democratic consensus. It ignored the effects of application of 
information technology on workforce. For instance, an accountant who works with the 
ACCPAC system at the head office stated: 
Now we don't have social-life within the Company. All arc busy with 
targets, because poor perfonnanees affect our promotions and pay 
increases. We don't have a lunchroom to share our feelings and 
sentiments with others but we used to have one before [ during the 
corporation time]. 
Information systems were employed to monitor the perfonnnnce of individuals and 
other organisational units without considering their everyday life. This belief about 
infonnation systems s,.;rves several objectives of management: information systems 
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provide a means to direct attention to important aspects of organisational pcrfonnancc; 
and infonnntion systems r,rovide nn explicit contract or implicit rules to evaluate the 
perfonnanee of employees and compensate accordingly (Lyytinen, 1992). By using 
infomiation systems, Goldcnhank management believed that it would get reliable and 
objective measures to rcwiml employees and shapes their perceptions and behaviour 
townrds the implementation of modernisation programs ofNCCL. 
Increasingly, these new idras ofinfonnation systems were fused with instrumental and 
strategic rntionality of management actions and reinforced the existing traditional power 
bases of senior managers to control and surveillance of the workforce leading to 
increased alienation and apathy rather than developing motivated workforce within 
NCCL. The Project manager stated that: 
People use information as power to control others. Some managers 
have created their own power bases within the Company. You sec, 
more people you call, you love them. [ don't get information. Giving 
information is considered as something that you favour others. You 
know why, still truditional bureaucracy remains unchanged here. 
Some senior managers who have been worked for the corporation time 
still remained in the Company and they became more powerful than 
before because of setting up small computing units within their 
departments. 
At present, throughout the Company remains the traditional state corporation culture 
where the focus was to target functional objectives using information systems set up 
within each department. Many of them have not been exposed to working in a changing 
business environment. Factory Human Resource Manager stated. "We have to go 
outside and sec what is happening there". Introduction of new information systems in 
user departments supported to growth of bureaucratic infighting and the Joss of 
flexibility through the entrenchment of the status quo (Alvesson & Willmott, 1992a). 
'"" 
6.11.9,1 ReOeetion on Episode 10 
lnfonnntion systems development and practice did not match with the needs of various 
stakeholders and it ignored the inclusion of their value choices as design objectives of 
infonnation systems following their socio-cultural 'lifeworlds.' Information systems 
were not developed considering the social context of Sri Lanka. Changing information 
systems development from management infonnation systems to user departments 
therefore did not chanr,c the direction of information technology development for the 
betterment of employees and the NCCL itself. 
Overall, the present information systems development supported the purposive 
rationality of Go!dcnbank. This techno-scicntific and economically rational approach, 
while considering others as objects, appeared to be ignored information systems 
development as a socially valuable function, normally acting in the genera! interests of a 
larger stakeholder group. The results of information systems development have caused 
little to change NCCL towards the use of information systems and the transformation of 
NCCL towards a modem organisation through effective information systems 
development. 
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CHAM'ER SEVEN 
SUMMARY, THEoR1sATION AND CONCLUSION 
7.0 lnlroduction 
In this chapter I present a summary of each episodic analysis of infonnation systems 
development and practice at NCCL, then I summarise major findings of the research. I 
present an account of theorising information systems development from communicative 
actions whilst adressing problems of application of Habermas's communicative actions 
in organisatiens in Sri Lanka. Finally, I conclude the chapter with some 
recommendations for successful information systems development and practice in 
organisations in Sri Lanka, conclusion for each research question, overall conclusion for 
the study with some recommendation for future research. 
7.1 Summary 
7.1.1 Episode I: Budget as a Steering Medium 
In this episode, the Ministry of Industries and Public Treasury controlled both the head 
office and the factory affairs at NCCL. Preparation of budgets at NCCL emerged from 
the consideration regarding political and management accountability of funds towards 
the public through parliament. Budgets were produced for production and costings 
concentrating on improving efficiency of operational perfonnance ofNCCL affairs. 
'"" 
lnitially, factory rnuoagcmcnt used budgets as a steering medium to control shop-flour 
work than as a nmms tu wport tu head office. Senior munagcmcnt used budgets to 
achieve the purposive rationality of the government. As part of the implementation of 
budgets, employees' shins became ttie focus of factory life. Senior management 
legitimised the use of budgets by employing production targets in line with improving 
factory efliciency. Thus management assumed that budgets would improve the 
efficiency of operations and thereby fulfil NCCL's political and managemcnl 
accountability to the public through parliament. 
However, employees found it hard to accept the managers' justifications ofbudgets and 
their instrumental actions. Budgets appeared to clash with employees' socio-cultural 
'\ifcworlds.' Employees interpreted budgets and shifts as threat, tn their identity within 
NCCL. Employees opposed the formal control of their '\ifeworlds' through budgets. 
They opposed management use of budgets as a controlling device: in the factory. They 
questioned the legitimacy of formally defined budget targets and shifts operation by the 
management. In Habermas's terms they questioned the contextual validity claims 
(comprehensibility, truth, truthfulness, and rightness) of management actions through 
the representation of their unions. They wanted, instead, managers to use their everyday 
life in the village ns a way to communicate about budgets and shift planning within the 
factory. They were culturally and ethonocentrically free from the control of modern 
management techniques and methods such ns budgets and shifts. In villages, employees 
didn't need formal controlling systems because human interaction within village 
occurred through well-understood and reciprocally established communicative 
structures. 
"' 
Rcco!,'llising employees· resistance towards budgets an<l rcllising their legitimate 
lifcworlds needs the factory management gradually developed opportunities that 
allowed employees to ful fi1 their traditional commitments to ~odo-culture nnd economic 
conditions. 
Factory managers understood employees' resistance as something that required worthy 
consideration to achieve industrial hannony and to improve relations with employees 
nnd thereby to achieve frictory efficiency. They understood efficiency had to be viewed 
not only as scientifically and teclmically defined rules and procedures, (as the case in 
positivist approach), but also on a whole series of human decisions and value 
judgements for which the rules of meanings were tacit nnd located in the employees 
socio-cultural '\ifcworlds.' By npplying Habermas's work, it is argued that factory 
managers used efficiency in a balanced way by applying tacit rules and meanings of 
employees' lifewor]ds to meet the requirements of both groups - management in tho 
head office and the employees in the factory. In other words, factory management 
accommodated value choices in budget guided through the exercise of human reasons 
when they found difficulties in implementing budgets in the factory. 
Factory mnnagcmen\ considered employees' '\ifcworlds' within the factory's everyday 
concerns. They tacitly .accommodated the underlying rules of meanings of employees' 
actions emanating from their lifcworlds in implementing budgets in the factory. Factory 
management considered the practical relevance of ~c of budget and incorporated value 
choices of employees within budget controlled operations. In Hnbcrmas's term, it is 
argued that the factory management integrated demands Jf lifcworlds within steering 
media The budget was legitimised by the inclusion of tacit knowledge of employees' 
lifeworlds. In other words, r,roduction managers in the factory cmploy.-.-1 
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communicnti·Jc actions tacitly to in1cgratc employees' 'lifcworlds' in hutlgcl. In this 
way, by cmploying.';ommunicativc acti.i;,s in budgets, it can he argued that the budget 
us a steering mctliub did not colonise 1•mployccs' '!ifcworltls' in the initinl phase of its 
u~e in \li'i:'..'control at th.: factory. 
By allowing employees' 'lifcworltls to be tacitly includl't! in budget, production 
managers and employees maintained cordial relationships while supporting each other 
and reporting to the head office. However, both rational bureaucracy and the influence 
of politicians annihilated further communication action in managerial planning and 
stymied communicativt: rationality as an institutionalised practice within NCCL. In 
other words, these dual characterislics, bureaucracy and influence of politicians on 
NCCL affairs, hindered NCCL becoming an effective organisation using 
communicative rationality as an institutionalised practice. 
NCCL formal\y- foliuwed the statutory corporation model of the British nationalised 
industries, which formally embodied a philosophy of bureaucracy, scientific and 
rati(i~al legal concepts. The government adopted these natural, scientific and rational 
planning and decision making concepts to transform NCCL into :m efficient 
organisation. If this transformation were to be successful, then NCCL would be 
characterised by more efficient organisation practice. 
Management actkms at NCCL were guided by these bureaucratic ideals and were 
institutionalised as norms and normative structures within NCCL. 'Lifcworlds of 
employee~ were not allowed to evolve n.1tural!y. Above all employees' 'lifcworlds:,-, ,; 
" 
were suppressed by the purposive rational actions of the government's plans of 
modernisation of NCCL and objectified through management actions. Senior 
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mamigcmcnt hml 1i1tlc illlcrcst regarding the lifcworlds' problems in the factory. Senior 
management could not sec foctury lifcworlds' problems us their concerns because they 
blinded by narro,vly focused scientifically rntional managt'tllcnt approaches uod 
bureaucratic rationality principles and acted in the interest of politicians. The senior 
managct1,.::"lt, on the other hand, as being bureaucrats did not want to sec their 
diminishing pm11Cr c.,;:ercL~cs against the employees. 
The underlying problem of the management ofNCCL was that the government Minister 
held the exclusive power of the control and access to resources. The Minister often 
arbitrarily inlluenced and changed NCCL activities, including budget decisions for his 
interest rather than the interests of NCCL. The senior management and the Board of 
Directors had minimal 'power or their power was weak in the eyes of political power of 
the Ministers of ruling governments. They were unable to properly advice and guide the 
Jl/,foister, but vice versa. 
Both bureaucracy and political domination coexisted and frustrated NCCL becoming as 
a better organisation through effective planning by employing communicative actions. 
Thus budgets could not establish clear objectives agreed upon by all the parties through 
communicative actions. Budget served the partial interest of the govenunent Ministers 
rather than serving it to wider interests oftbc community. Though production managers 
in the factory and employees wanted communicative rationality to be institutionalised 
within NCCL, they were prevented against the power of politicians. 
Generally, nrnnagemcnt and employees had minimal p(lWCr to cl1angc the decisions of 
politicians and they were unub!e to properly manage NCCL becoming cffcc\!w 
organisation. 
'·.!:2 Episode 2: The Punch Card System 
In the episode 2, NCCL affairs were eontrol!ed by the new financial control fC~ulations 
' 
introduced by the government in the late 1960s to improve the efficiency of SO Es. The 
punch card system at NCCL was introduced following these new financial control 
regulations of the government to control employees' attendance and discipline at the 
factory. With the introduction of the punch card systems, infonnation processed via 
manual systems was rq,laccd by the semi-automated systems. 
Senior management at NCCL legitimised the introduction of punch card system in line 
with the government objective of improving efficiency in SOEs. The managemr,nt 
considered the punch card system as an efficient and effective steering medium to 
cont,'01 omployees' attendance to implemenl budget and work shifts to achieve the 
efficiency ofNCCL. It is argued that the NCCL management introduced the punch card 
system to change the employees' working culture within NCCL and to reduce the 
operational cost and thereby to improver the overall efficiency of performance of 
NCCL. Senior management assumed that the introduction of the punch card system 
would change employees working culture and thereby transformed NCCL becoming an 
efficient organisation. 
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The decision to inlrnducc 1hc punch eanJ system was taken by the Chainnan of NCCL. 
Factory management used the punch card ~ysWrn> to monitor and control employee 
attendance tu maintain u discipline(! workforce. In other words, NCCL managers 
assumed that the employee tlisciplinc could be achieved through the introduction of the 
punch card system, bcc,iusc infonnation aboul employees become transparent when 
these semi-automated systems rccordctl their time and attendance. 
The punch card systems influenced the way employees interpreted management control. 
Employees interpreted the punch card systems as another steering medium (controlling 
tool) emanating from the new financial control ret,'11\ations of the government. They 
interpreted that management attempted to further control their socio-cultural lifcworlds 
within NCCL. They interpreted the punch card system as a threat to their existence 
within organisation. They questioned the legitimacy and the validity claims of 
managements' actions. 
Employees opposed the external control by the management using technically designed 
information systems through their unions. Culturally and ethonoccntrically employees 
could not adjust to the past pace technology introduced by NCCL management. 
Employee control using the punch card systems was antithetical to their traditionally 
established culture. Employees wanted managers to stop the control of their lifeworlds 
using technical information systems and revert back to the manual information systems. 
They wanted managers to employ their everyday life within the punch card system 
while considering their 'lifoworlds' concerns. 
29/o 
Thuu!lh employees opposed the decision to implement the punch card system, the 
Chaimrnn who introduced the system did nol change his decision and forced factory 
management tu u.,c the system in controlling employees' attendance in the factory. 
Using Hahcnnas's words, it is argued that the punch card system as a steering medium 
colonised the lilcworlds of employees in the factory. The punch card system constituted 
constitutional character of colonisation of employees' 'lifcworlds' as explained by 
Habcnnas. 
Through the punch curd system, rnanag=cnt introduced new set of rules for attendance 
col1.trol of employees' shifts {recording, time of shift starts and off, shift allocation and 
so forth). Senior management viewed the punch card system as a universal contro!ling 
tool to discipline the employees' behaviour within the factory. They used the punch card 
information to predict and discipline e,.nployee behaviour to realise the objectives of 
both the senior management and the govirrnment. However, the punch card system, as a 
steering medium, did not support social integration in NCCL. The new rules stemming 
from the new working patterns and the efficiency were not matched with the rules of 
meaning emanating from the tacit knowledge of employees' 'lifeworlds.' 
Senior management did not integrate employees' rules of meaning emanated from their 
social context within punch card system. Jn other words, steering medium (the punch 
card system) did not meet the demands of employees' lifeworlds. Rather it objectified 
employees' 'lifeworlds' leading to distorted communication. 
The major effect on control and new work disciplines of management arose from 
discretion being taken away from employees and scheduled into the punch card system. 
Previuusly, employees were sufficiently incorporated their socio-culture withiu 
management techniques such as budgets using communicative actions. rroduelion 
manngcrs by including employees' 'lifL'World~' in budgets maintained good industrial 
relationship. Aller the introduction of !ho punch e..i.rd system, such relationship were 
blurred because formally processed infonnation via the punch card systflm were 
available to organise formal work shins to achieve production targets in the hudget. 
Senior management did not use communicative action lo define efficiency through 
information system in a balanced way for the benefit of themselves and the employees. 
As a result the introduction of punch card system exacerbated refationship between 
mllnagement and employees. Inability of management to integrate 'lifeworlds' demands 
with steering medium of the punch card system alienated employees leading to loss of 
their cultural traditions, customs, and value systems. Rather than integrating cmployee3' 
'lifeworlds in information systems, the senior management objectified their processes to 
achieve the objective of the Minister of the government. The design purpose of the 
punch card system supported the objective of government at the expense of the demands 
of employees' lifoworlds. Thus the punch card system benefited the partial interest of 
the government and the senior management than it would be benefited for the 
divergence interests of a large group of participants. 
In the design and development of the punch card system, management did not allow 
employees to reflectively understand and critically examine the punch card system. 
Management did not understnnd the meaning of employees' resistance in the semantic 
dimension. Managers, instead of stopping it responded to employees' resistance by 
pushing ahead with the punch card system without employees being participated. 
"" 
Resistance of employee!- was connected with a va~t array of socio-cultural, economic 
nnd political conditions op1:rnling in Sri Lanka. The management outflanked what they 
perceived as resistance by employing thcir power, resources, and authority in decision 
making in regard to thc punch card system. The punch card system rcinforccd the 
worsening industrial harmony and alienated employees within the factory. D1ispite 
senior managers having power in terms of decision making, they failed to achieve their 
desired objectives. Senior manager could not successfully lransfonn NCCL becoming 
an effective organisation following the efficiency as defined by them. Rather efficiency 
required defining in a balanced way by integrating the requirements of 'lifoworlds.' 
The discussion about the punch card system call for the development of information" 
systems need to consider value choices of a wider participants stemming from their; 
,, 
' social context 
7.1.3 Episode 3: Budget with the Punch Card System 
1;!{; episode 3 begins when the new government swept into power in 1970. It introduced 
/I 
' \gal framework to control public finance through a parliamentary Act No. 3S of 1971. 
Budget and the punch card system introduced in a context of financial crisis of the 
government. The Act required having budgets and financial procedures to introduce 
economic rationality to improve the efficiency of public corporations. In this way, the 
government introduced commercial nonns into NCCL affairs. 1l1c senior management 
introduced new financial regulations to change organisational culture and values and to 
improve efficiency of overall operations at NCCL. 
,, 
,, 
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Consequently, budget implementation with the punch card system urose as II legal 
necessity within NCCL. 
Senior management legitimised the use of new budget control and the punch card 
system as new management techniques and strategies to improve the operational 
efficiency and the overall performance ofNCCL. In this new approach to control SOEs 
by the government, the public Treasury had empowered exclusive power of limiting 
public spending and consequently cutting money approved from the Treasury to NCCL. 
By implication, the Sri Lunkan government wanted to transform NCCL into an internal 
mal"ket. If this view of government were to be successful, then more efficient SOEs in 
Sri Lanka would foreshadow NCCL. 
Following these new regulations, within the factory, budget set targets for production 
on employees' shifts. The punch card system monitored employees' attendance. Senior 
managers simultaneously employed both the budget and the punch card systems as 
steering media to closely monitor and control production targets by arranging employee 
shifts in the factory to achieve efficiency. 
Production management and employees in the factory interpreted new budgetary 
controls were an improvement of previous budget systems (as explained in the episode 
1 and 2). Production managers found it difficult to implement both the budget and the 
punch card system as defined by the senior management following new rules stipulated 
by the government through the new financial control regulations. These systems 
appeared to clash once again with employees' everyday life within the factory. 
These new controlling systems influenced the way employees interpreted management 
actions and information systems. Employees' opposed managers' instrumental actions 
"" 
and information systems through their unions. Employees interpreted new controlling as 
threats to their survival and socio-cultural integrity within NCCL. They interpreted new 
controlling as a way of suppressing their 'lifcworlds.' They interpreted that the new 
controlling systems would threat to worsen their living patterns and maintaining their 
traditional village culture. Tiley thought that their personal communication was 
d..::grading by the improved budget and the punch card systems. 
The resistance of employees was coiled with economic crisis of Sri Lanka during this 
peiiod, which resulted high political tensions. They opposed newly proposed controlling 
systems, because these technical and economically rational systems continued to erode 
employees' traditional cultural values and customs and living conditions. These new 
controlling systems substantially affected lower the factory income of employees. 
Employees questioned the legitimacy and contextual validly of management controlling 
systems, which were aimed at, improved surveillance of work. They opposed the uso of 
modem management techniques such as budgets to formally control their factory 
'lifoworlds.' 
Employees sought ways to protect their socio-cultural integrity and 'lifeworlds within 
NCCL. What they wantc,d was to consider their socio-economic problems in budget and 
shift arrangement in the punch card information system. They wanted to legitimise 
infonnation systems through their participation. 
By using Habemias's approach, it is ar1,'Ued that the government steered NCCL by using 
steering media of budget and the punch card system in a direction which was not 
amenable to employees' 'lifeworlds.' Thus these steering media had constitutive 
character of colonisation of 'lifeworlds.' These two management-controlling systems 
reinforced the management power to control employees' discipline in the factory. 
'"' 
Senior management, instead of stopping employees' resistance rcspomlcd by pushing 
ahead with new controlling systems without employees' purticipation. They ignored 
employees' everyday life:. Managers believed that the new controlling systems would 
better explain and prcdit·t employees' bchuviour within the factory. Politicians and 
senior management dccmphasiscd and ignored understanding the meaning stemmed 
from employees' resistance. Employees' resistance towards the new controlling systems 
was associated with meaning stemming from vast webs of socio-economic, political and 
cultural contexts. 
The most problems within NCCL were related to uncoupling of steering media with the 
requirements of employees' 'lifcworlds. The government, often the Minister of 
Industries remained exclusive right in decision making and influenced on information ,.,:/ 
systems development at ll. e expense of employees' 'lifeworlds.' 
Politicians introduced government objfctives, through the senior management, 
following Western techniques with thci\" embedded value systems such as improving the 
efficiency, without recognising the i<lio3)''Tlc-rasies in Sri Lanka's social context. The 
way efficiency was interpreted by the senior management was associated with 
scientifically and technically defined set of rules and procedures with economic 
rationality in the positivist approach. Employees interpreted efficiency differently 
following their socio-culture, particularly their village cultures. 
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Village life evolved over centuries. At village level, the control remained in social 
relations. Villagers were averted to modem past pace technology and their momentum 
for change was subverted by these modem technologies. Village life and work was 
governed by trust and mutual undcrstunding within a system of reciprocal understanding 
ofhuman interactions. This culture was fused with Buddhist thinking. 
Fonnally processed information using budget and the punch card system was not 
needed to control their lifcworlds. Information and control was inscribed in lifoworlds 
understanding. These social rules of meaning were produced and reproduced in every 
social interaction and relatively remained unchanged free from the domination of 
Western values systems. However, these social value systems were contradicted with 
the modern intCTprctation of efficiency. 
The modernisation program for Sri Lanka was introduced following independence in 
1948. As part of this modernisation programme. SOEs were established following 
Western values systems, bureaucracy, management techniques and methods for 
modernising S0Es in Sri Lanka. NCCL was instrumental to use of these ideas of 
modernisation and change. Politicians used these SOEs to provided employment 
opportunities for their political supporters than the declared objectives of the 
government's socio-economic development in the political manifestos. In the minds of 
politicians, establishment of SOEs could be understood as traditional kingship rather 
than vehicle for mobilising Sri Lanka for socio-economic development. Politicians were 
more interested in political survival than actually transforming NCCL towards a better 
organisation using information systems. Their ability to access resources and implement 
and change infonnation systems through senior management provided social 
domination of employees' 'lifoworlds.' 
',·, 
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ManJgcrs used fonnally processed information via modem Western based management 
controlling techniques such as budgets and the punch card system to control cmploycc!l' 
'\ifewor!ds' of which were based on tacit rules of meaning emanated from their socio-
cultural contexts. Trade unions while acting as medium to protect employees' 
'lifoworlds' and helping for mobilisation of socio-economic development were provided 
access to exercise of the kingship for politicians. 
Within these considerations, it is ari,,ued that, the rational planning model of the 
government imported from the Western countries were failed within state control model 
o(socio-economic development of Sri Lanka because they were not integrated with the 
needs of broad socio-economic and political circumstances of local communities. 
Consequently, information systems development within the state control model of 
socio-economic development, which followed these concepts, did not include the social 
contexts of Sri Lanka. As a consequence, information systems development and practice 
did not assist to transform NCCL towards a better organisation. 
7.1.4 Episode 4: Wang Computerised Systems for Management Accountability 
In the episode 4, information systems development and practice at NCCL followed a 
m~;ket-based appror.ch under the open economic policies introduced by the right 
centred political party that formed the government in J 977. The government assumed 
that the introduction of market principles would create competitive services and 
operations for NCCL. The belief of this ideology was that NCCL should be financed 
partly by the internally generated funds to imprcve the political and management 
accountability o fNCCL. 
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In this new approach, senior management developed and implemented management 
budget in which information was considered as the currency to be aided in decision 
making to improve the dficicncy and effectiveness on which a new market system for 
NCCL was to be developed. Senior management considered that information 
technology and computerised information systems as means (techniques and strntcgics) 
to be used to solve their problems. 
In Haberrnas terms, senior management employed information technology and 
information systems as steering media at NCCL to achieve the purposive rational 
objectives of the government. It is argued that the senior management introduced 
market principles through information technology and information systems 
fundamentally to change the NCCL's socio-culture and to improve efficiency and 
effectiveness. 
The information systems were introduced in a context of financial crisis of the 
government and thus limited public spending and reduce;! money from the public 
Treasury to NCCL. The Chainnan took a decision to develop computerised infonnation 
systems to provide better and accurate information for decision making. The 
computerisation project was introduced in line with the objectives of the government 
and it reinforced and strengthened instrumental and strategic approaches to management 
of NCCL. Senior management legitimised the introduction of infonnation systems in 
line with improving efficiency and effectiveness ofNCCL and assumed that they could 
fulfil the political and management accountability to the public through the 
representatives of parliament. 
JOS 
The Chainnan taken a strnng force with numerous resources for decision making which 
should have sufficient to change NCCL through computerised infonnation systems and 
thereby to transfonn NCCL towards an efficient and effective organisation. If the 
computerised information systems development were successful, then NCCL 
management would believe that by using computcrise<l infonnation systems they were 
doing well in their jobs and government's open economic policies were represented in 
information systems to aim at efficiency and effectiveness. However, computerised 
information systems was not succeeded and constrained by various socio-cultural, 
economic and political factors. 
NCCL followed an ad-hoe approach to develop computerised information systems. 
Developers {both internal and external) did not include value choices of infonnation 
systems users and other affected parties as design ideals. Rather the information systems 
development reflected only the interest of senior management to fulfil the demands of 
the government's Ministers. 
Developers followed purely technical and instrumental approaches in design and 
development considering users and other beneficiaries as empty vessels to be 
manipulated by systems developers. Thus by employing instrumental approaches to 
design and develop infonnation systems, they objectified 'lifeworlds' of employees at 
NCCL. They did not allow users and other affected parties to critically reflect and 
rationally include their value choices as design ideals in infonnation systems. This 
approach is antithetical to the historically established socio-cultural and value systems 
of employees at NCCL. 
'°' 
The new infommtion sy!>tcms introduced new langl"'';c, rules, procedures, schedules, 
work and shifts arrangements, recording and reporting trnnscctions and so on for work. 
Employees opposed the introduction of information system drawing meaning from their 
social context. The senior management used efficiency following scientific and 
technical rules for predicting and controlling the employees' behaviour and NCCL 
operations. They were contradicted with the ways employees interpreted efficiency 
drawing meaning from their social context. As interpreted by employees, efficiency iS), 
" 
dependent on whole serks of human decisions and judgements for which .rules were 
tacit and located in the Jived experience and historical contexts of employees. Jn such an 
environment human b;/ernc!ions arc socially interpreted because social reality is 
historically constructed. In such an environment, these staff members were opposed to 
translate their hwnan intentions and actions to improve e"'fficieney in a way it was 
" 
interpreted and used by the senior management. 
,, 
Ii, 
Employees opposed the computerised information systems through unions because 
these systems threatened and clashed with their historically cst:iblished socio-cultural 
values. Employees saw the introduction of infonnation systems to change their political 
and economic climate in which NCCL operates. The adoption of a infonnation systems 
approach significantly affected and shaped employees' work and life within NCCL. 
Culturally and cthnocentrically they were sceptical to the modem Western 
technology and ~ubverted to the fonnal control via computerised infonnation 
systems. They interpreted that the modem infonnation technology degraded their 
,, 
personal communication. They interpreted that the new computerised infonnation 
systems would control their working culture and worsen their already living and 
,'i 
' 
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economic conditions. They qL,.cstioncd the validity claims of the systems 
dcvclopmcnl and imph!mcnlation. ·nicy instead, wanted mmiagcmcnt to consider 
their lifcworlds in systems development and legitimised the system development by 
their participation. They wanted management to integrate their 'lifcworlds' concerns 
with the design and development of computerised infonnation systems. In other 
words users, employees wanted systems developers to use communicative actions to 
integrate their tacit knowledge in information systems development. 
Most problems in infonnation systems development appeared at NCCL were related to 
laCk of fit between the expectations of senior management and the rest of the 
employees. From these perspective it can be argued that NCCL management used 
computerised information systems for the benefit of them rather than benefiting it to a 
larger stakeholder group. The information systems development constitutccl force of 
power by senior management and information technolo!,>y staffs. Jt did not incorporate 
value choices of other people, which is the rationale for the infonnation system and 
provide the legitimation for its implemeotation as it provides opportunitie:1 for 
reflectively understanding the objectives ofinformation systems development. 
Information systems developers and senior managers did not understand resistance of 
employees to computerised information systems. The resistance was linked up with 
their socio-cultural and economic contexts. It is argued that computerised information 
systems as steering media did not integrate tacit knowledge stemmed from the systems 
beneficiaries such .. ~s employees' '!ifeworlds in such a way to make mutual 
,,, ~ 
understanding, negotia.tion and relationship possible. 
' ,, 
JOR 
Hnbermns insists that the ignorance of trndilit>ns, the manipulation of worldvicws and 
the forced social change all combine to dislorl "the communicative structures" and 
"ego-securing" structures upon which mass loyalty and generalised motivation of the 
people depend. Within this interpretation, it is argued that information systems 
development at NCCL did not represent knowledge from wider participants and were 
not guided by the interest~ of their views other than the interests of some politicians and 
senior management. Using Habennas terms, it can be argued those information systems 
as steering media did not socially integrate the needs of 'lifeworlds.' 
The management used infon.nation systems as means without resolving the objectives 
(ends) ofinfomiation systemt' development whose were problematic to many employees 
at NCCL. Senior management and systems developers considered that ends of 
"infonnation systems development were neutral and therefore value free. 
Practical problems such .as employee resistance were interpreted as unimportant and not 
the concerns of the senior management. The management responded resistance using 
covert strategic actions such as offering high salaries and promising additional benefits 
for employees rather than understanding the actual meaning of resistance .from 
,'ii 
the 
seinantic dimensions. 
According to Habennas, management employed irrational and repr,essivc forces in 
infonnation systems development. Using Habcnnas's tenns, this irrational and 
repressive impact of "rationalisation" and "development" can be explained as a new 
fonn of ideology- "technocratic con~ciousness". Therefore, it can be concluded that 
the computerised infonnation systems contained constitutional character of steering 
media. According to Habennas, information systems de;•dopment distorted ethically 
loaded images of the good life <>ud dominated employees' everyday communication and 
'!ifeworlds.' The effect of this domination is the high level of anomic and alienation al 
NCCL employees. 
The NCCL history revealed that the focus of iofonnation systems development and 
practice (in this episode, computerised information systems for accurate infonnation of 
political and management accountability) based on the reasoning of human actions 
arising from the Western positivist ways of thinking. The application of positivist ways 
of thinking in information systems development seemed problematic in other countries, 
particularly in a developing country such as Sri Lanka, where the reasoning of human 
aciions arising from particular social context and reality oflhat country. 
It can be summarised that the market•bascd model within open economic policies of Sri 
Lanka used the imported positivist approach in information systems development and 
practice at NCCL to gain objective power over the self-understanding of socio-cultural 
Jifeworlds. According to Habermas, this positivist thinking in information systems 
development rendered inert the frame of reference nfinlernction in ordinary language. 
NCCL management ignored the social context in which information systems 
development was functioned. Senior management by assuming that infonnation systems 
development could be objectively carried out, cmp!oy~es' 'lifeworlds were viewed as 
cybernetic control systems within NCCL, relying upon the information systems as the 
control mechanisms. 
In other words, alternative ways of perceiving the value of technical innovation, often 
manifested in the deployment of infonnation technologies in the social context of Sri 
Lanka, were largely ignored and tended to be ignored as unimportant. Thus the process 
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of information systems development separated the process of generating knowledge 
from the prnctin1\ application of that knowledge. 
In other words, NCCL management ignored the use of communicative rationality in 
information sysl~ms devt!lopmcnt as a system of reasoning arising from particular 
historical experience and related to socio-cultural lifoworlds of Sri Lanka. As described 
in chapter six, there were·numerous ,;; . .,mples where the use of positivist approach h, 
information systems development was challenged by the social context ofNCCL. 
In spite of the many calls for a new organisation and new forms of work through 
efficiency and effectiveness, the possibility of transforming NCCL remained severely 
constrained by socio-cultural, economic and political constraints in Sri Lanka. In its 
hi~tory ofNCCL, attempts to change NCCL towards a better organisation have focused 
on reengineering, downsizing, employing hieratical control, and operating efficiency 
rather than reinventing new form of organisation through the development of 
information systems using communicative actions. The pervasive use of information 
systems was further aggravated by poor infrastructure facilities available within Sri 
Lanka. 
Politicians on thu other hand used information systems to preserve their political whims 
and fancies. They were interested more on political survivals than the aet"Ja! 
transformation of NCCL. Trade unions acting as a medium between employees and 
management struggled to protect employees' 'lifoworlds' were also provided to access 
to exercise of kingship for politicians. Senior management used rigid bureaucratic 
approaches to control work. The traditional bureaucratic ways of organising work and 
m 
control were repacked by infonnation technology. lnfonnation technology and 
infommtion systems used as instruments (steering media) to control and dominate over 
their \ifoworlds rather than using ii in an innovative way to organise and control work. 
The use of rigid bureaucrncy, power and domination of both politicians and senior 
management together with their instrumental and strategic approaches, poor 
infrastructure, and lack of experience hampered to effectively take place systems 
development activities at NCCL. For the NCCL to be transformed into a better 
organisation using infonnation systems required a range of remedies. These included 
breaking of rigid bureaucratic ideology, changing of instrumental and covert strategic 
approaches, elimination of political domination, provision of a better infrastructure 
with adequate training, and use of communicative action to critically reflect and 
rationally include value choices of a wider membership at NCCL. However, this did 
not happen at NCCL. 
More importantly, as previously been asserted, information systems development at 
NCCL was not opened to a wider community to critically reflect and rationally 
include their ide...Js as deign objectives in information systems development. NCCL 
adopted non-reflective positivist approach in information systems development and 
practice. As pointed our by Flood (1991, p. 305) this "non-reflective positivist 
position is epistemologically untenable". As a result many information systems 
development projects were abandoned and some were marginally benefited for 
NCCL to become an effective organisation. Thus the marker-based model with open 
economic policies did not help the government to transfer NCCL becoming an 
m 
efficient and effective orgnnisation through the development of computerised 
information systems. 
7.1.5 Episode 5: Compulerised Preventive Maintenance Information System for 
Management Accountability 
In episode 5, information s.ystems development and practice at NCCL resulted from the 
open economic policies of the government, as was the case in episode 4. The objective 
of limiting government funding forced NCCL to partly generate necessary funds 
internally. The improvement of 'factory maintenance was central to this political 
objective. NCCL management initiated development of a computerised preventive 
maintenance information system for the factory maintenance in an attempt to realise the 
government objective of limiting funds. NCCL management, by devdoping such an 
information system, assumed that it would fulfil the political and management 
accountability towards the public through parliament. Therefore, it can be argued that 
the senior management introduced market principles through computerised preventive 
maintenance information systems (both technology and information systems) to change 
NCCL organisational culture by improving efficiency and effectiveness. 
The computerised preventive maintenance information systems was aimed at 
monitoring breakdowns of plants and machineries and taking corrective actions to 
effectively control production targets and employee-shifts. The senior management 
introduced information systems in a context of financial crisis of the government as 
means to obtain accurate and objective information for decision making about the 
plant maintenance to predict and control the behaviour of employees at the factory. 
Senior management legitimised the introduction of computerised preventive 
m 
maintcnAncc infonnation systems in line with improving the efficiency aml 
effectiveness of NCCL. In liabennas terms, the proposed computerised preventive 
maintenance infonnation systems was effectively a steering medium to control the 
foctory plants and machineries and the behaviour of employees. 
Senior management employed information technology personnel in the factory to 
develop the computerised preventive maintenance infonnation systems. If it were 
successful, the senior management would have believed that the information systems 
reflected government's objectives and market principles and NCCL was 
characterised as an efficient and effective organi~ation in the public sector. However, 
this did not happen and the development of computerised preventive maintenance 
information systems was thwarted by socio-cultural, economic and political 
atmosphere ofNCCL. 
Initially, maintenance engineers, being users, were opposed the proposed 
computerised preventive maintenance information systems development. Engineers 
viewed the computerised preventive maintenance information systems as a threat to 
their already established engineering culture within NCCL. They feared that their 
jobs would be taken by information technology personnel and by implication their 
professional recognition. They interpreted that the senior management used 
information technology and information systems to control professional people and 
their perceived engineering culture. They interpreted that the computerised 
preventive maintenance information systems ns a new controlling too! emanated 
l'rom the reforms ofth~ government. Engineers opposed the control of their work vin ,, 
computerised information systems because they thought their jobs would become 
more transparent when form~'.ly processed information were avnilnb\c in the hnnds of 
'" 
senior management and thus easy for them to control engineers' work in the factory. 
Engineers assumed that they would be more disadvantaged as there was no formal 
method of evaluating their performance. 
The senior management pushed the computerisation works by using covert strategic 
actions such as increasing salaries of information technology people to get computerised 
preventive maintenance information systems into their hands. System analysts 
employed instrumental approach in systems development assuming user employees as 
passive objects to be manipulated by using the power of expert knowledge. The system 
an~lyst would have believed that the infonnntion systems development was neutral and 
therefore value free. He assumed that the users would not question bis role of 
involvement as a developer of computerised preventive maintenance information 
systems because he believed that his analytical knowledge was superior to the 
knowledge of user employees regarding the maintenance work. The system analyst 
sought to obtain co-operation of engineers using the authoritative power of senior 
managers and his expert knowledge. 
Following Habermas's theories, it can be argued that both the senior management and 
the information technology personnel employed th.::ir power and irrationality in the 
development of computerised preventive maintenance information systems. 
B::ith engineers and other employees questioned the truth, legitimacy, and sincerity of 
computerised preventive maintenance information systems. They questioned the hidden 
agendas of information systems development by senior management through systems 
analysts. Employees opposed the maintenance system through their party unions while 
engineers supported employees to defeat the management initiatives following the 
government objectives to control their work. The computerised preventive 
maintenance information systems development was failed because engineers and other 
employees were strongly opposed to it. 
Maintenance engineers opposed the development of computerised preventive 
maintenance information systems because the senior management did not consult them, 
instead information technolob'Y personnel. They thought they ignored and degraded by 
the senior management. As a result, they refused to their right to participate in giving 
information for the systems analyst to develop the computerised preventive maintenance 
in~ormation systems initiated by the senior management. 
Maintenance enginee•,s questioned not only the legitimacy of information system but 
doing systems analyst of engin~ers' wcrk (professionalism of information technology 
personnel). Engineers believed that the systems analyst lacked knowledge about the 
factory maintenance activities. Instead, engineers wanted to legitimise the computerised 
preventive maintenance information systems development by their participation. They 
wanted to remain the control of computerised preventive maintenance information 
systems in their hands. 
After the failure of the computerised preventive maintenance information systems, the 
senior management responded to engineers' resistance by way of giving training for 
both the senior maintenance engineer and the information technology personnel at an 
outside organisation. The training was aimed at demonstrating a software package for 
maintenance work to be used at NCCL's factory. During the training, these personnel 
understood that the demonstrated sy~tem did not help NCCL's requirements and agreed 
to develop a system in-t.ouse. These members developed more loyalty to each other as 
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time went on. The same process occurred during the design and development stage. In 
Habcnnus's terms, these team members were employed their intcr;ubjective knowledge 
ir information systems development. 
Engineers supported systems analyst to design and develop maintenance system when 
their involvement and participation were recognised by the senior mnnagcmcnt. Both 
information technology personnel and engineers employed shared knowledge to 
develop information systems. The development of computerised preventive 
maintenance information systems was legitimised by engineers who supported to 
de.velop it. Seen in this light, it can be argued that cornputeriscd preventive maintenance 
information systems, as steering media did not colonise the 'lifeworlds' of engineers 
who supported to develop the system by way of including their needs in the system. 
Using Habennas's interpretation, it can be concluded that the steering media fol!owcd 
the demands of maintenance engineers who participated in the design and development 
of computerised preventive maintenance information systems. According to Habermas, 
the development of computerised preventive maintenance infonnation systems followed 
communicative action. 
However, a question remained "did the developed information ~ystem by information 
technology personnel and maintenance engineers benefit of the rcsi of the employees, 
including engineers who did not participate the design and development of 
computerised preventive maintenance infonnation systems?" In. other words, how do 
we know whether the computerised preventive maintenance information system was 
used as a service for all the employees at NCCL? l11is question raises moral issues of 
information systems development {Klein & Hirschheim, J 996): whether the infonnation 
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systems development was included the real and genuine social needs and value choices 
of employees emanated from the society'! Or whether the development of computerised 
preventive maintenance infonnation systems was fused with technocratic, scientific, 
rational and bureaucratic ideals of both the systems analyst and engineers who 
participated am! developed the system? 
This situation can be understood by r{'bring to the resistance of employees. The 
,\;, ,'' 
development of computerised preventive rriii;;;';C:1ancc information systems was not 
widely opened to include value choices of other inakcholdcrs such as employees and 
other enb>ineers who did not support the development of computerised preventive 
maintenance information systems. The development of information systems by allowing 
only of few people to participate doesn't mean that the information systems serve the 
wider interests of all the employees. It doesn't me:in that the dev~lopment of 
information systems is neutral and value free and it does not disturb the symbolically 
established social structures in organisations. 
The effect of computerised preventive maintenrnce information systems was that it 
shaped and influenced the employees' 'lifeworlds' leading to withdrawal of their 
motivation tO work aod increased expression of alienation. In this understandiog of 
employees' resistance, it can be argued that the development of computerised 
preventive maintenance information systems reinforced the power of maintenance 
engineers within NCCL. 
It was fused by engineers' culture which was framed by the highly institutionalised 
scientific and bureaucratic ideals of which engineers were understood as their own 
culture and rational. They were blinded and objectified by Western scientifically 
rational and bureaucratic ideals from the inception of NCCL. They under~1ood these 
ideals as rational approaches to management and control of work. They understood 
these unreflcctivc rational upprouches as their own nonnativc Htructurcs. They 
employed the same ideals in the design and development of computerised preventive 
maintenance infonnation systems as the design ideals of their own and as legitimised 
nnd rational. In this light, following Habennas, it can be ar!,'lled that the infonnation 
systems development represented irrational and repressive forces of management to 
control employees' life within !'!CCL. 
A~cording to Habermas, the infonnation systems development protected the engineers' 
scientific and bureaucratie culture and rationalised work procedures while maintaining 
power of engineers over the production employees and activities within the factory, 
Initially, maintenance engineers were opposed to the project because they were not 
included in the design and development phases, not because they didn't like the 
computerised preventive maintenance infonnation systems. What they didn't like was 
the development of the computerised preventive maintenance infonnation systems by 
infonnation technology personnel for their use alone. They wanted to protect their 
perceived scientific and bureaucratic culture, often perceived as rational and legitimised, 
to control work and employees. 
Employees opposed the engineers' fonnal, scientifically rational control approaches 
long before the introduction of computerised information systems and they interpreted 
that the new computerised preventive maintenance infonnation systems would threaten 
ITlore on their lifeworlds within the factory. Hence, it can be argued Iha: the system 
analyst and engineers developed computerised preventive maintenance infonnation 
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systems to scive the interest of themselves and the govcmmenl, rather than the common 
interests of all the employees at NCCL. The maintenance system dominated and 
objectified the 'lifcworlds' of these employees because they were nul allowed to 
critically self-understand the effects of the control of their work using information 
systems. 
The new information systems did not enhance the social integration bccau.se, 
information systems as steering media did not design following the nc«ls of employees' 
socio-cultural 'lifcwor!ds.' In Habermas terms, NCCL management did no use 
co~unicative actions in the devclopmcn; of computerised preventive maintenance 
information systems. Rather computerised preventive maintenance mformation systems 
as a new controlling device reinforced control and surveillance of workforce leading to 
an organisational ''iron cage"(Webcr, 1947) with increased alienation and anomie. 
Moreover, information systems development at NCCL was !irked to highly 
institutionalised and politically manipulated domination of politicians. The politicians 
were effective in manipulation for achieving thdr politically motivated interests than 
the development ofNCCL using infonnation systems. They :1Sed trade unions as a baso 
to achieve political power and advancement. They wanted trade ~mion multiplicity to 
serve their leadership interests (Jayasekara, 1.05.2001 Daily news). The domination of 
politicians, institutionalised scientific and rational bureaucracy, instn:mcntal and 
technical approach of systems analyst all together disturbed the modernisation program 
of NCCL using computerised infornation systems. NCCL nrk,!)ied non-reflective 
positivist approach in infonnation systems development. 
\ \ 
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The infonnulion systems development did 1101 adequately address and inlcgra1c the 
ls~ues arose from employees' socio-cultural value systems and economic conditions. 
The npp!icatinn of technology did not address social nec<ls that were recognised as 
legitimised by employees. 
,, 
As a result, as II whOlc, infommtion systems development was failed at NCCL. 
Therefore, ·
1
NCCL was not benefited from the computerised information systems and 
could not change towards an efficient and effective organisation using information 
technology and information systems development under the open economic policies of 
th7 government. Rather, NCCL experienced financial crisis internally unable to support 
its activities. 
7,1.6 Episode 6:Computerlsed Time and Attendance Information System after 
Privatisation ofNCCL 
Episode 6 begins with the change of ownership ofNCCL following the privatisation of 
SOEs introduced in 1977 within the open economic policies of the government. In 
1993, 90% ofNCCL's shares were sold to Yawakkal, ,m Indian businessman, with a 
strong resistance of employees and the general public. The government legitimised and 
h rationalised the privatisation of NCCL in line with improving the production capacities 
through modem machines and infonnation technology. 
Consequently, Yawakkal management introduced various changes after L'1e tokeovcr of 
NCCL. One of these changes wos computerised time and attendance information 
systems aimed at increasing production through controlling employees' attendance and 
shifts in 1hc factory. It can be argued that Yawakkal management introduced the 
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computcrisL'ti time and nltcndunce infonnation systems t:1 change the socio-culture of 
NCCL 
Ynwakka! management legitimised the computerised time and attendance information 
systems under the heading of efficiency. Information technolob'Y and information 
systems were seen as means (techniques and strategies) to control and discipline the 
employees in the factory. [nfonnatilln was seen as un instrument to aid decision~making. ):1 
Information technology and information systems were introduced· to gai(; objective 
power about the performance of employee behaviour and NCCL performance. Jn 
Habennas terms, computerised time and attendance information systems was a steering 
media to be used to steer NCCL for realising Yawakkal's objectives of making short 
tenn profits. However, the computerised time and attendance infonnation systems 
created much dissension in part of employees in the factory. 
Yawakkal believed that the high overtime cost paid to employ'!~s. irregularity of their 
attendance, informal arrangements in production shifts, low commitment of employees, 
their everyday social and cultural events caused l~w production and increased cost of 
production resulting low profits. /' 
'·:,, I} 
'0.--,· /j 
As a result, utilising ef,;plict>,(pr6J~~tively turned to his close attention. Ya.:;,.akkal 
re-established production control using shifts expressed through budg'!ts. He wanted to 
change employees' behaviour and discipline within factory through the computerised 
information systems. Yawakkal strategically used the local managers to push ahead with 
the computerised time and attendance infonnation systems by increasing their salaries 
and leaving confidential. Rather than understanding and addressing the apparently 
322 
peculiar practical problems of employees, and their socio-cultural values and 
'lifcworlds' through infornmtion systems <lcvclopmcnt, Yawakkal concentrated on 
achiuving proper control of production through control of employees' attendance and 
production shil\s. 
The Barcode Automation Lanka Limited (BALL) was selected to purchase software and 
hardware for the computerised time and allcndance information systems. NCCL senior 
managers believed that the la.:k of experience of the consultant from BALL caused to 
the failure of the time and attendance system. However, the employees opposed the 
computerised time and attendance information systems because it appeared to threaten 
their socio-cultural values and lifcworlds. They questioned Indian management's 
instrumental and covert strategic actions. In Habermas's explanation, employees 
questioned the legitimacy and of the introduction of computerised time and attendance 
information systems to control their social life within NCCL. 
Employees opposed the system becau;,e the new management introduced formally 
defined shifts instead of previously used informally arranged ad-hoe shifts. They 
realised that they cou!d not earn more income through informally ammgrd work shifts. 
They realised tlmt they could not fulfil their social and cultural obligations and use their 
everyday life within the factory. They interpreted that the computerised time and 
attendance infonnation systems as a new controlling system introduced by Yawakkal 
management to control their day-to-day life within the factory following the open 
economic policies introduced by the government. 
Employees interpreted the computerised time and attendance information systems as a 
system of domination aimed at social control of their values and '\ifeworlds.' 
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Employees' culturnl relativism and ethnocentric attitudes appeared against the 
technological domination of their everyday lives. They interpreted the ~"Omputcriscd 
time and nllcndancc information systems as an improved controlling system (i.e. 
steering medium) of the previously introduced punch card system. Instead of supporting 
the computerisation project, they opposed the project through their unions. They did not 
seek the support from the politicians, as they knew that the ownership of NCCL 
remained with the Yawakk.al management. They did not want to close the factory using 
computerised time and attendance infonnation systems development as a major reason. 
The employees realised that the closure of the fuctory affected their factory income, thus 
rendering then incapable of maintaining their family's living. What they wanted, was to 
stop Yawakkal management ar.tions and to use manual system for recording their 
attendance and use such infonnation for arranging their shifts in the factory. 
Before privatising NCCL, employees were relatively free in organising their work as a 
family. In fact, employees contro\led their shifts. They understood each other and their 
problems. They helped each othcr working in the shifts with infonnal arrangements. 
Some production managers tacitly employed employees' socio-culture and 'lifeworlds 
within budgets to achieve industrial peace because employees were opposed to any 
formally controlled information systems. This can be understood by referring back to 
the previously analysed episodes. The resistance towards formal control of works 
through computerised infonnation systems was stemmed from their traditional culture. 
Within village employees were infonnal\y contrnlled. Employees were inherited from a 
culture where authority und control were largely inseparable. Control was stamped and 
inscribed in thdr culture within well-understood social structures. They worked 11s a 
family. They used participatory approaches in solving their problems. In Habennas's 
tenns these societies experience crisis when external control overloads their social and 
symbolic structures and undennincd their identities. In Habermas's teITTJs, 
communication was taken place reciprocally within this well-established traditional 
societies or simply socio-cultural systems. 
The infonnation systems development under the Yawakkal managerm:nt failed because 
the consultant from the BALL adopted instrumental approach in developing the system. 
He did not understand resistance in their meaning or semantic dimensions. He worked 
wi~ the internal systems analyst to translate the objective of Ynwakkal through 
technically developed information systems, often borrowed from the Western countries, 
which was incompatible with the demands of the employees' socio-cultural lifeworlds. 
Employees were considered as passive objects to be manipulated by both Yawakkal and 
experts knowledge. Employees' knowledge was categorically excluded from the 
development of computerised time and attendance information systems. in Habennas's 
terms steering media did not follow the needs of employees' lifcworlds. 
Yawakka\ management promised additional benefits for employees from the 
computerised time and attendance information systems through systems analyst and 
pushed ahead with the project from the support from the senior managers. However, 
employees ignored the promises of the senior management and continued to work 
according !o the way they were used to work on shifts. The instrumental and technical 
approach used by both external consultnnt and internal systems analyst in information 
systems development did not support the social integration because these experts 
overlooked an inclusion of socio-cultural lifcworlds of employees. They did not 
understand the constitutive polit'.··~ involve in information systems development. These 
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experts could not legitimise llnd rationalise information systems as a strategy to 
maintain compliance and social cohesion in social systems because information systems 
were not legitimised using reasons of employees. Developers did not follow the tacit 
rules of meaning cnrnnatcd from employees' resistance in developing computerised time 
and attendance infonnation systems. Therefore, according to Habcnnas, computerised 
time and attendance infonnation systems included constitutive characters of 
colonisation of lifcworlds. 
Employees followed tacitly accepted set of rules stemming from their socio-culture to 
organise shifts with the negotiation of some production managers in the factory. Th~\\e 
. w 
tacit rules were operated within employees' socio-cultural lifeworlds. This approach t6'-
work was different from the forrna!ly introduced shifts and the shift arrangement 
through the employment of computerised information systems. The introduction of 
computerised time and attendance information systems appeared to degrade the 
informally operated social structures (often symbolic) of employees and communication 
with managers. 
Experts did not understand this social grammar which was produced and reproduc~"<l in 
every employee interaction. They did not learn ltssons from the previously failed 
information systems to develop the computerised time nnd attendance inforrnation 
systems. Rather, information systems continue to be developed within an environment 
bound by the social contexts. Thus information systems development was devoid of the 
social reality ofNCCL and followed the non-reflective positivist approach. 
The computerised time and attendance information systems dcvelo'p,:nent was not 
represented by collective value choices of all the employees as collective id~ntity within 
' 
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NCCL. As n result, experts were unable to change the altitude of employees to use the 
computerised time and attendance infonnation systems. l{ather the experts' power 
suppressed employees and their 'lifoworltls' with increased expression of alienation. 
Computerised time and attendance infonnation systems were developed to fulfil the 
interest of Yawakkal. In this way, infonnation systems development at NCCL reflected 
the market principles and modernisation reforms of the government. 
Yawakkal management was inflamed by political crises that linked to broad economic 
issues of NCCL and employees themselves. Employees opposed Yawakkal 
management focusing on their high expenditure and mismanagement of NCCL affairs. 
NCCL was heavily debt burden after the privcrisation. As a result of a dispute between 
Yawakkal and foreign investors whom he brought in, he was charged with the breach of 
agreement. Yawakkal management's affairs were criticised by the public through 
members in the parliament. The government had intervened for reselling ofNCCL to a 
new buyer after the problems that the NCCL bad experienced after the takeover of 
Yawakkal. 
The above discussion suggests that the information systems development is not free 
from the interaction of broad issues of sub-systems of socio•culture, economic and 
political contexts operating within a country as explained by Habennas. Inability to 
fulfil the responsibility of one sub.system creates problems in other systems according 
to Habennas. In other words political and administrative systems need to steer socio-
cultural sub-system in a way commensurate with the needs of 'lifcworlds' in those 
socio-cultural sub-systems. 
m 
Jn this episode, Habcnnas's arguments were clearly evidenced. The government 
privatised NCCL as part of the open economic policy introduced in 1977 which was 
aimed at socio-economic development of Sri Lanka. NCCL was privatised in a contcx.t 
of financial crisis of the government. The government used the money earned from 
NCCL's selling to bridge th1.: annual budget deficits on the advice of the World Bank. In 
privatising NCCL, the government considered only the economic aspects and ignored 
the political and social considerations of the employees (Kclegama, 1997). In other 
words, the government directly allowed Yawakkal to operate as an entrepreneur in an .. 
open market following the market principles and economic rationality in which NCCL;,1 
w:i.s to be transfonned towards an efficient and effective organisation. 
The new ownership, Yawakkal being an individual partner, ~ought short-term profits at 
the ei.pcnse of employees, customers and NCCL itself. He manipulated some 
government ministers to buy NCCL. After the purchase, he strategica!!y used NCCL 
resources to pay the government money, which was considered as illegal by the 
procedures stipulated for privatising of SOEs. He increased the prices of Cement 
hardening customers. He sold some shares to foreign investors at higher prices. He 
employed information technology and information systems together with other covert 
strategies as means to realise his self-interest by controlling employees' behaviour at 
NCCL. 
The NCCL experienced financial crisis and unable partly to fulfil its obligation such as 
meeting the demands of employees and customers. Employees were experienced severe 
hardships under the Yawa.kkal management. Steering media were insufficiently linked 
with the cultural values and lifeworlds of employees at NCCL. The instrumental and 
strategic actions of Yawakkal management created Cl'tiflicts and dissatisfaction amon~ 
J2H 
NCCL employees including senior management and customers. Information systems 
continued to erode and objectified employees' culturu! values in the efforts of 
modernisation prob>ram intro1faccd by the government through information tcchnolob'Y· 
Employees' unrest protested against Yawakkal management through unions, whicl1 
resulted calling for the government rcintcrvention of NCCL affairs. The result of the 
reintervention of the government was that NCCL transforrcd to a multinational 
Company. The whole effort of the government modernisation program through 
information technology at NCCL was failed due to uncoupling of value choices of 
wi~er stakeholders in information systems dP.velopmcnt. This points out the need of 
articulation of tacit knowledge of wider stakeholders and inclusion of this knowledge in 
the development of infonnation systems to reflect the social reality ofNCCL. 
7.1.7 Episode 7: Implementation of Computerised Time 1md Attendance 
Information System 
The episode 7 begins after Goldenbank, a Multinational Company, purchased NCCL in 
1996. The Company is considered as being one of both high-tech and information 
technology solutions users in the cement industry all over the world. After th<! 
acquisition, Goldenbank transferred a series of management techniques, methods, and 
experts' knowledge 'a,._~ information technology and information systems to NCCL as 
' 
steering media. 
These steering media were emanaleri 'from the strategic management and corporate 
culture of Go\denbank. The integration of NCCL to Go!denbank's global network of 
Cement through information technology was central to its strategy and success. 
Fo\lowing Habcnnas, it em. be argued that Go!dcnbank introduced infommtion 
i.i 
,'i ,, 
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technology and information systems to change the socio,culture and to improver the 
operuting performance of services and cfticicncy by way of reducing operational costs 
ofNCCL in line with the privatisation of SO Es introduced by Sri Lankan government. 
NCCL was sold to Goldcnbank when there was competition for Ct.:ment in Sri Lanka. It 
was sold during a period of unsolved steering problems of previous management, i.e. 
employees were objectified using unrealistic bureaucrntic, scientific and technical 
approaches of management. Indeed, the selling was related to financial crisis of the 
government. Goldenbank considered information as corporate resource to be used to 
ga!n competitive advanta_ge over other cement company's competition. 
Information technology and information systems were employed as means of 
techniques and strategics to process that information. The management assumed to gain 
objective view about employees and overall performance of NCCL hy employing 
resources and authority to make decisions through information systems. According to 
Habennas, this thinking is largely attributed to the understanding of scientific and 
technical improvement of management in the positivist ideology. These scientific and 
technical improvements were reflected in independently carried out information systems 
development projects at NCCL. 
In the late 1996, Golde[lbank reintroduced the previously delayed (during Yawakkal 
period) computerised time and attendance information systems with a new shift-plan. 
Like Yawakkal, Goldenbank assumed employees' way of life; their irregular 
attendance, absenteeism, unplanned leave, social and cultural ceremonies, and informal 
shifts arrangement disturbed the organisation of factory shifts and thus realising its 
rational objectives of profit~. 
JJO 
The new shift-plan included work of 12 hours per shift for four <luys continuously 
instead of previously employed eight hours per shift. The new shifts systems were 
scheduled to implement with a minimum number of employees running each shift. It 
can be argued that GoldcnbMk introduced infonnatiou systems for both rationalisation 
of work and cost displacement (sec Davis, 1992). 
Management legitimised the introduction of new shift-plan through the redesigned of 
computerised time and attendance information systems in line with improving 
production targets to improve the efficiency and effectiveness at NCCL. Goldenbank 
management thought that the intrnduction of computerised time and attendance 
information systems would help to discipline employees in shifts and thereby increase 
production targets to achieve their r<1.tional objectives. 
Employees perceived that Goldenbank management had introduced a new social order 
to control their work within factory. They understood computerised time and 
attendance infonnation systems as nn improved management technique to control their 
work and life within factory. The computerised time and attendance infonm1ti,m 
systems influenced the way employees interpreted management style. The autocratic 
style of Golden bank management and their t(X:hnological modernisation were opposed 
by NCCL trade unions. 
" Employees opposed both the new shift-plan and tb·~ implementation of it through the 
computerised time and allendance information systems. The new shift-plan included the 
hidden agendas of Goldcnbank management of running production shifts with a 
minimum number of em~loyees and removing excess employees. In Habermas's words, 
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Go\denbank munagcmcnt employed covert strategic actions in computerised time and 
attendance infonnation systems to realise its rational objectives. 
Employees opposed the new shift-plan nnd the computerised time and attendance 
infonnation systems due to nn objectification of their lifeworlds. Employees perceived 
that the computerised time and attendance infonnation systems significantly affected to 
further erode their lifeworlds and Jiving conditions of their families. They realised that 
their traditionally established working culture was being chullengc<l and replaced by the 
domination of computerised time and attendance infonnation systems. They wanted, 
in~tead, participation in the process of decision making regarding the new shift-plan and 
its implementation through the oomputerised time and attendance infonnation systems. 
Employees employed their shared acts in everyday communication within NCCL. 
According to Habcnnas, the sanity, well-being, and the very identity of each individual 
ultimately depends on shared, or at !cast, reciprocally communicable, self-
understanding, upon "ego-defining structures", that join up individuals inner worlds in 
such a way as to make mutual understanding, negotiation and relationship possible. 
Goldenbank management did not understand this mutually operated everyday acts and 
interactions of NCCL employees. They did not understand the meaning of employees' 
resistance fo·, the proposed changes through the computerised time and allendance 
infonnation systems. 
'i') 
As previously been asserted, traditionally, within villages, employees were free from 
rational and objective controls of modem organisations. They opposed fonnal control 
via infonnation systems. They believed that the new computerised time and attendance 
infonnation systems disturb their everyday life within the factory. These lived 
m 
C)[pericnccs of employees encouraged their spiritual freedom because they were 
reciprocally understood in villages within a system governed by trust relationships. This 
communicative structure remained unchanged over centuries within villages. 
Goldcnbank management did not understand this social contex.t which remained 
unchanged in Sri Lanka's society. 
Employees opposed the computerised time and attendance information systems because, 
senior management introduced new norms and procedures for work through 
computerised time and attendance information systems. These new norms and 
procedures were clashed with their socio-cultural value systems. They found it difficult 
to fulfil their social and cultural obligations. They found they could not socialise their 
life with the rest of the people. 
The computerised time and atteodance information systems affected to breakdown of 
collective decision making. They believed that the computerised time and attendance 
information systems keep away from the interaction with the management. They 
believed that their personal communication was degraded by the iotroduction of 
computerised time and attendance information systems. Employees' opposition was 
li~d up with their poor standard of living in the villages. They opposed the 
computerised time and attendance information systems, because it affected to further 
worsen their family income and some leading to unemployment. 
Goldenbank maoagcment pushed local managers without employee participation to use 
the new shift.plan together with the computerised time and attendance information 
systems system for controlling work rather than understanding and chant,,jng the new 
shift·plan and the computerised time and attendance information systems. They 
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interpreted employee resistance as irrational and lack of collaboration. Rather senior 
management promised additional benefits such as more off-days for employees and 
employees by employing covert 3tratcgic actions. Rather than understanding employees' 
socio-culture and economic conditions and their peculiar practical problems within 
factory, they strategically removed unproductive employees offering compensation. 
,, 
Goldenbank did not address the issues of protecting thl• older employees within 
information systems dcvc!opment. The older employees were s,~en as unproductive and 
incapable work force. Goldenbank management overlooked understanding the social 
p~blems such as the poverty problems of Sri Lanka. Rather than improving the quality 
of employees' living standards using information systems, it added a social cost to the 
society resulting unemPloyment. 
Following Habermas's thinking, it can be argued that Goldenbank management 
employed power iliegitimately in the development of computerised time and attendance 
information systems. These irrational and repressive forces of rationalisation and 
development of co1:iputerised time and attendance information systems embodied the 
technocratic consciousness ·;n the positivist approach. The computerised time and 
attendance information systems reinforced and strengthen management power to control 
and surveillance of employees in the factory. According to Habennas, information 
systems served the interest of Golden bank rather than the common interests. As a resuit, 
the computerised time and attendance information systems worsened industrial 
relationship tctween management and the employees leading to social instability caused 
by steady erosion of standards and values (anomie) and ilpathy. 
The consequence of the introduction of computerised time and attendnnce information 
systems wns that it insutllciently linked with the needs nf employees· 'lifcworlds.' The 
objcetive of computerised time and attendance information systems was linked lo the 
economic criteria of profits. The design ideals were disintegratrd by the value choices 
of employees. 
· Using Habennas·s terms it can be ar1,iued, Golderbank used computerised time anc\ 
attendance infonnntion systems to steer NCCL's employees in a direction which was 
not commens!.lrable to the needs of their socio-cultural sub-system, i.e. lifeworlds. 
ln~ormation systems developmt:'nt comprised of constitutive characteristics of 
colonisation by steering media. Goldenbank management did not change the idea of the 
imple;nentation of the computerised time and attendance information systems, which ' 
implies that th~ information systems objectified the employees' 'lifeworlds' and 
distorterl communication. The des;gndJ ideals entailed the use of narrow. technical or 
teehr.ceratic images an/j ideals of management uf work-process relationships at NCCL 
to realise interests of Goldenb:mk. It can be e<)nc\udcd that power was embodied in the 
design of computerised time and attendance information system~ relating to economic 
rationality at the expense of employees' 'lifeworlds' The senior management at NCCL 
system11tically ancmpted to gain objective power of socio-cultural 'lifeworlds' self-
undcrstandiug using infonnation systems. 
The design of computerised time and nttcndnncc information systems did not reflect the 
valu{: choices of employees at NCCL. The developers adopted instrumental approach in 
developing computerised time and attendance information systems assuming employees 
as objects to be m~:1ipulated. They used positivist approach to develop computerised 
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time and attendance information systems. This non-rdlcctivc positivist way of thinking 
did not considered employees' interactions in the ordinary lang;uagc. 
Employees were not allowed to critically reHcct an<l self-understand management 
controls introduced through computerised time and attendance information systems 
using their tacit knowledge in socio-cultural 'lifcwor!ds.' These developers suppressed 
employees' knowledge grounded in their socio-cultural 'lifcwor!ds'. In other words, 
they did not employ communicative actions in developing computerised time and 
attendance information systems considering the socio-culture of Sri Lanka. 
The systematic use of narrow instrumental and strategic actions of Goldenbank 
management ignored an inclusion of value choices of other stakeholders \llithin 
computerised time and attendance infonnation systems. Acconling to Habermas, 
ignorance of value choices of other stakeholders denies the possibility that the 
Goldenbank management receive "symbolic guidance" from 'lifeworlds' via steering 
media which were grounded in, and controlled at, the level of employees' socio-cultural 
lifcworlds. 
As explained in chapter six, it can be concluded that one of the reasons why information 
sys\ems·were not successful at NCCL was the lack of integration between management 
expectations and that of employees' 'lifeworlds.' Information systems development did 
not buttress social integrntion. Rather, its development endangered the social 
integration. 
Seen in this light, it carr be argued that the Goldenhank used computerised information 
systems to consciously control the employees' lifoworlds without being linked their 
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needs to information systems development to 1calise its objectives. One significant 
feature was that information technology used to control work than it was being used as 
an enabling technology to trnnsfonn NCCL towards an efficient organisation. 
Information technology was not used as an enabling technology in which interests of 
employees were met. It can be concluded that Goldenbank management experienced in 
difficulties in transferring NCCL using computerised information systems because of 
the lack of integration of socio-cultural '\ifeworlds' within information systems 
development. 
Integrating e.nployees' knowledge is not a secondary issue or a side issue - mobilising 
employees' views and having their socio-cultural 'lifeworlds' in development of 
information systems. According to Habermas, this lack of integntion of employees' 
lifeworlds within information systems development can be firmly tied to the counter-
factual ideals of a reconstructed practical rationality in which reason becomes active in 
politics. Information systems development is validated by human reasons. It can be 
argued that information systems development were successful if employees were given 
opportunities to have their voices amplified and to include their value choices in 
systems development. 
7.1.8 Episode 8: Computerlscd Work-Order Information Systems for Factory 
Maintenance 
ii 
In the late 1996, Goldenbnnk introduced its globally usJ~ MAC technique iO; NCCL as 
" 
steering medium to improve the efficiency and the effe(:'i:jveness of the operations of 
factory performance. As part of the MAC implementation, one of lhe riiodu!es, namely 
work-order system required to ~~veltp computerised work-order information systems to 
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monitor maintenance activities of plants on a scheduled basis. As e:i1plnincd in chapter 
six, the integration of infonnation technology and information systems were central to 
Goldenbank's success al NCCL In 1997, management announced that lhc CWOS had 
failed. Both MAC and computerised work-order information systems were abandoned 
and manual systems were reintroduced. Following Habcnnas, it can be argued that the 
management of G.oldcnbruik introduced both MAC and computerised work-order 
infonnation system.~ to change the socio-culture and to improve the perfonnance of the 
factory by way 0frcdudng operational costs at NCCL. 
The introduction of MAC and computerised work-order information systems were 
ostensibly related to the control of employees' social life. Information technology and 
information systems were employed as means of techniques and strategies to gain an 
objective power of the behaviour of employees as well as performance of NCCL. 
Information and objective knowledge came to play as important roles in the production 
process, the organisation of work, and the everyday life of employees within the factory. 
According to Habermas, this way of thinking of 'llanagement is largely related to the 
understanding of human behaviour in terms of science and technology in the positivist 
ideology. 
Goldcnbank management spent nearly Rs. 30 million with some strong resources and 
power in decision making which should be sufficient to design and implement 
successful information systems. If it were successful, Goldenbank management would 
have interpreted that the information systems reflected its economically rational 
objectives; profits. The government would have believed that NCCL was doing well 
using the modem information technology introduced by Goldenbank. However, when 
developing computerised work-order information systems, Goldenbnnk overlooked the 
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social context in which both NCCL and information systems development was 
functioned. 
As explained in chapter six, MAC nnd computerised work-order information systems 
were introduced in a context of poor performance at NCCL. By the time that MAC and 
computerised work-order information systems were introduced, NCCL's plants and 
i' ;, 
machines were some forty years oltl and had some frequent shutdowns due to 
unexpected breakdowns. Jn this context, senior management legitimised the 
introduction of MAC and computerised work-order information systems under the 
heading of improving efficiency and effectiveness ofpcrfonnance of the factory. 
Employees' unions opposed Goldeobank's decision to implement MAC through 
,;omputerised work-order information systems. They were frustrated with various 
instrumental .:.!'Id strategic actions introduced by Goldenbank after the privatisation of 
NCCL. Rather than understanding the behaviour of employees, Goldenbank 
management expected a massive behavioural change of these employees to implement 
MAC and computerised work-order information systems. Goldcnbank pushed the 
development of computerised work-order information systems with an expert it brought 
from the parent Company in Sweden, without relying on the knowledge of NCCL 
employees to develop it. 
Goldenbank assumed those experts in the Western countries and their lcn,owledge i•.1 
information systems development was superior to locally available knowledge. 
Consequently, they assumed that technically sound information systems would 
transform NCCL towards an efficient and effective organisation. Using Habennas's 
tcrrt1s, it can be argued that Goldenbank perceived that social life of people as a 
technical issue, its knowledge could be objectively understood and its improvement was 
entrusted to technical eKpcrts, capable of rational decision making. Goldenbank used 
instrumentnl and ~tratcgic actions, both in the MAC and computerised work-order 
information systems, unbalanced by communicative actions. Employees opposed these 
steering media because they realised that their way of life: social life, freedom and 
socio-cultural 'lifeworlds" were highly monitored and controlled by Goldenbank 
management after the privierisation ofNCCL. 
Rather than understanding employees' socir,-cultural 'lifewor!ds in which meaning for 
nctions for communication was supplied, Goldenbank interpreted employees' resistance 
as irrational. The resistance of employees were considered as localised importance and 
assumed that their knowledge was not important in systems development. Both senior 
management and the eKpert ignored the participation of user employees during the 
systems development process. It can be arb'lled that Goldenbank used power irrationally 
with associated technocratic consciousness in the design and development of 
computerised work-order infurmation systems. 
Information techno!o&,Y and information systems were used as means assuming that 
ends of systems development were agreed upon by employees at NCCL. As explained 
in chapter six, major problems that employees eKperieneed were related to the ends of 
information systems development. These ends were represented the purposive 
rationality of Goldcnbank, often transferred from the headquarters, than the collective 
interests of employees at NCCL. According to Habermas, this positivist ideology 
render~ inert frame of reference of interaction in ordinary language to gain objective 
power over the self-understanding of socio-cu!tura! !ifcworlds lending to Iron Cage of 
Weber ( 1947). 
340 
User employees were opposed to computerised work-order information systems due to 
their inability to work and generate necessary management reports. Other employees 
were opposed the hidden objectives (covert strategic actions) of management: control of 
work and their everyday life within factory through computerised work-order 
infonnation systems. According to Habcnnas, steering media did not buttn:ss the social 
integration because it did not integrate the needs of 'lifeworlds' of employees. 
Goldenbank management and experts took for granted that the NCCL project was just 
another infonnation systems development prjcct. They assumed that the development 
an~ implementation of computerised work-order information systems was value free 
and neutral. They sought to gain objective truth and knowledge from the development 
of computerised work-order information systems. In this view, power dissolves truth 
and the employees became the object rather than the subject of politics. Habermas, says 
that social integrations is not at the disposition of the imperatives of power 
augmentation. Goldenbank, perceived, information systems as cybernetic systems to 
control the production process. According to Habermas, they did not understand the fact 
that the truth and knowledge arc interwoven with political contexts and can emerge only 
from freedom to dialogue and exchange. They did not understand the fact that the true 
knowledge could be found by allowing employees' to work together and to critically 
self-understand information systems using their knowledge in the socio-cultural 
lifcworlds. Hence, it can be argued that the use of positivist approach in infommtion 
systems development separated the generation of knowledge from the creation of 
knowledge in the lifoworlds of employees. 
Through MAC and -computerised work-order information systems, Goldenbunk 
introduced new rules and procedures for work and management. These new rules and 
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procedures were emanated from the similar management practice adopted by 
Goldenbank group of companies throughout its worldwide operations. Goldcnhaok had 
transfCO"ed these steering media to NCCL without employees' being participated. The 
result of this unilateral transfer was that many employees could not understand the 
meaning of these steering media. 
These changes were introduced new work and practice within NCCL. Introduction of 
MAC and computerised work-order information systems were carried out new 
procedures for identifying, recording, controlling, ar.:I responding maintenance work. 
~ey were also introduced new working culture in terms of organising production 
process such as rearrangement of employees in each production shift. Every hum:m 
action was monitored and controlled using formally processed information. All these 
changers were different from the previously existed social order ofNCCL. Naturally, 
the new information systems were disturbed the employees' social and work life within 
NCCL with increased alienation and apathy. 
Employees drew meaning for communication from their socio-cultural lifcwor!ds. They 
used their tacit knowledge for organising work and shifts. They employed ordinary 
language in communication. They translated their tacit knowledge through 
communication drawing meaning from their socio-cu!ure. Employees' tacit knowledge 
was informally operated within a system of well-understood communication structures. 
The everyday communication wa;; embedded in every action and interaction. Simple 
words in everyday use can have broad-ranging and deep meaning and interpretations. 
These meaning arc very important for human life and affairs. Similarly, these meanings 
have implications for infonm:tion systems development because they carry tacit 
knowledge about the socio-culture of Sri Lanka. 
m 
The cfticicncy as understood by employees was dependent on a whole series of human 
actions und communication for which rules were tacit and located in the lived 
experience of their socio-cultural lifcworlds. Their communication, work arrangcmcnt, 
social and tultural life were related one another and economic circumstances. 'Ibey 
understood how local managers included their implicit background knowledge within 
budget implementation and shifts arrangements when NCCL was operating as a 
corporation. They understood how industrial harmony was achieved between local 
managers and themselves using communicative actions in the past. 
In. this example, user employees expericnl.ed problems of using computerised work-
order information systems because they were not participated in any of the activity in 
design and development of information systems. The new rules of meaning introduced 
for employees through MAC and computerised work-order information systems were 
carried different meaning from their daily practice of life. It is now clear that the 
resistance of the employees including users carried meaning emanated from their socio-
cultural contexts. 
What thi:~e employees wanted was to consider their value choices within information 
systems to protect their socio-cultural values and traditions as well as to overcome 
economic problems. They wanted to participate in decision making process associated 
with the design and development of computerised work-order information systems. The 
failure of information system revealed that Golden bank was unable to fulfil the needs of 
socio-cultural lifcworlds of employees at NCCL. 
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7.1.9 Episode 9: Managcmcnl Information for Factory Control 
In this episode, information systems were developed to produce daily, weekly, monthly, 
and yearly management information for management decision making. Preparation of 
management infonnation systems reports emerged from the consideration regarding 
effective control of production process through increased employee discipline in the 
factory. Factory management used management information systems reports to control 
shop-floor works to achieve economically rational objectives of the Company. 
Go\denbank employed information technology and management information systems as 
means of strategies and techniques (and Jegitimise<l the implementation of management 
infonnation systems in line with improving the efficiency and effectiveness of factory 
performance. It can be argued that Goldenbank introduced information technology and 
management information systems to change the socio-culture and to improve efficiency 
and effectiveness following market principles under the open economic policies 
introduced by Sri Lankan government. 
[n management information systems development, the systems analyst used 
instrumental and technical approach without considering the views of other 
stakeholders. The rntion!ll objectives of Go!denbank management were included as 
objectives of management information systems development. Employees who worked 
in the planning and computing divisions were also subject to the authoritarian control of 
senior management. Their power was minima! to change the decisions of Goldenbank 
management. Thus senior management initiated objectives of management information 
systems and informed the personnel in the planning and computing divisions. 
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Consequently, these personnel developed management information sy.~tcms to support 
the information ne.!ds of factory management und the NCCL. 
Factory management in tum used management information systems reports to closely 
monitor and control of employees' behaviour in production process. According to 
Habennas, science and technology fused together into a new production force as an 
independent variable with.out considering the socio-cultural lifeworlds of employees at 
NCCL. Thus, Goldcnbank steered NCCL employees using management information 
systems that has been largely disconnected from norms and values. The systems analyst 
us~ power illegitimately in developing management information systems assuming that 
other stakeholders as passive objects to be manipulated. The instrumental and technical 
approach has regressed behind the level of self-reflection represented by the worldviews 
of employees. Above all purposive rational economic and technical actions have 
become independent of their morale-political foundations. 
According to Habennas, this irrational and repressive impact of rationalisation and 
development comprised of technocratic consciousness of Goldenbnnk managemer.:. 
Employees' socio-cultural Iifcwor!ds were consolidated and objectified into norm-free 
structures, processes of exchange and power. "Norm-confirmative attitudes" and 
"identity-forming" social memberships were considered as unnecessary and impossible 
in management information cystems development; they were considered peripheral 
instead. Thus it can be concluded that management information systems served the 
interests of Go!dcnbank management to realise the rational objectives rather than 
common interests ofNCCL employees. 
Employees' opposed management infonnation systems through their unions. Employees 
realised that their social life was s:ipprcssed by increased use of purposive rational 
actions of Goldenbank management. For the factory managtment, employees' way of 
life was unimportant. The only thing that mattered was an increase of production 
matters. Though employees realised that their everyday life was being controlled, they 
did not resist through continued strikes because they were aware that they would be 
economically more disadvantaged if the Company removes them from work. They were 
aware of how the Company reduced employees both in the head office and in the 
factory. 
' Employees' opposition towards management infonnation systems was connected with 
vast array of socio-cultural and economic problems. They believed that the Golden bank 
management would not interfere to continue their customary shop-floor practice. They 
,' 
wanted managem~n.! to consider their socio-cultural 'lifeworlds' within management 
information systems and use as institutionalised practice. They wanted to use 
1 1 communicative actions in management information systems development. 
I,' ); 
As explained in chapter six, they used communicative actions in their day to day 
interactions through the use of ordinary language. This ordinary language carried deep 
meaning and intcrprctadon of their social life. These meanings were carried widespread 
socio-culture of Sri Lanka in which employees drew meaning for communication. 
According to Habennas, all the interactions that arc structurally possible in such a 
society are enacted within the context of commonly experienced social world. 
Rather than understanding this commonly experienced social world of employees and 
including their needs within management information systems, factory management 
'" 
responded initiating disciplinary actions to control employees' everyday life. Employees 
were punished through disciplinary 'lctions. The intensification of work through 
management information systems increased employees' dislres.~, alienation, 
psychopathologics, apathy and anomic resulting in withdrawal of motivation to work. 
According to Habcrmas, Gol<lenbank dcni1:d lhc possibility of getting "symbolic 
guidance" from lifeworlds to effectively change NCCL towards a better organisation 
because management information systems were not integrated the needs of socio-
culturn.l '!ifcworlds' of employees at NCCL. 
It _is therefore clear that Go\denbank management could not legitimise management 
information systemri development because, management information systems 
development was not incorpornted needs of lifeworlds of NCCL employees in a 
democratic and rational way. Put this in different way: management information 
systems did not include value choices of employees at NCCL considering their social 
context Management information sy3tcms represented non-reflective positivist ideology 
of Goldenbank management. Thus NCCL could not transfer towards a better 
organisation through effective infonnation systems development. 
7.1.10 Episode 10: Outsourcing Information Systems 
Episode 10 emerged as a result of an information technology policy and strategy 
introduced by Go\denbank late in the 1999. The Company aimed to develop integrated 
on line information systems to coordinate overall performance of NCCL. As part of 
information technology policy and strategy, information systc~11s development activity 
for NCCL transferred to external organisations. A decision to outsource information 
systems function was taken by the CEO of NCCL considering unsatisfactory 
"' 
performance of internal management infonnation systems function including its slaff 
and high operational costs of NCCL activities. It was thought by Goldcnbank 
management that the introduction of outsource information .'>)'.~terns in various user 
departments might produce a more accurate and timely information. Using Habcnnas's 
terms, it can be argued that Goldcnhank intrcducc outsource information systems to 
change the socio-culture and to improve the performance of NCCL in a free market 
operating within Sri Lanka. 
Goldenbank legitimise.i its decision to outsource information systems alone the line of 
ecoriomic calculations of costs and profits. The Company sought value for money for 
their investment and perceived that outsource information systems in user departments 
would help to better understand the performance and coordinate NCCL operations. If 
the systems had worked, Goldenbank management would have been praised for saving 
Company money and claimed that they were doing well at NCCL with the support of 
outsource information systems. Accordingly, the government would rationalise its 
decision to privatise NCCL. However, Go\dcnbank could not develop integrated 
inforr.mtion systems. Various socio-cultural, economic and political contexts 
constrained its development. 
In developing technology or information systems application and/or its functions should 
be intcJligible to the stakeholders as a whole (fJein & Hirschheim, 1996). This means, a 
~hared vision about infonnation systems needs to develop between information systems 
users, creators, and beneficiaries such as management and employees. Jn the case of 
NCCL, acquisition of many information systems has been based on poor or non-existent 
requirements of user employees, other employees, and customers. 
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Regarding the integrated information systems major problems occurred in the social 
context of NCCL For example, certain user departments wc~c unwilling and poorly 
motivated to share infonnation across departments. These problems are occurred 
1( 
through structurally induced systems imperatives. Information systt.'ris development at 
NCCL failed because of institutional forces whkb inhibited dramatic changes in work 
','1 
habits. These problems were emanated from the h;iitorical contexts oftechno-scicntific, 
~f 
·,-, economic and bureaucratic style of mwu1gemcnt culture employed during the 
corporati0n regime. Since the inception ofNCCL, man~gers imposed distorted forms of 
rationality upon themselves by continually reproducing the normative, objCctifying 
sti:uci'tes that distort communication. 
:1 
\i .;' 
According to Habermas, these s~lf-imposcd objectifying organisational processes were t 
perceived as legitimate and even se\l··willcd ·~ecausc ideology ofmanagemenr;1,as itself:,' 
', I ', 
built upon distorted corrununication. This distorted fonn of ideology, often perceived as 
NCCL 's culture, apptared as major obstacle to develop sham:! vision of information 
1
,systems for NCCL and other privatised organisations in Sri Lanka. What is pcrcl!ived as 
organisational culture by NCCL management is still stimulated by the beliefs of 
positivist ideology? This culture separated knowlcdsc creation from the knowledge 
gr.neration consideri,,g the socio-cultural lifcworlds of people in Sri Lanka. 
,, 
The current practice ignored or refused to deal with the issues of value choices of 
participants in information systems development. Rather, the information systems were 
stamped by narrow instrumental and strategic objectives of monil<>ring and controlling 
' 
performance of departments and individuals. Organisational members such as 
employees' everyday lives were controlled using technical information systems in 
11nprecedented ways. For example, the heightened surveillance attitude of accounting 
34' 
and finance department created much depression and alienation in employees in other 
departments. 
The transfer of the responsibility of information systems development to external 
specialists of software vendors further eroded info1111ation systems development 
function at NCCL. Many of lhc specialists from vendor companies did not have 
knowledge about the social contc:d of NCCL. They,wcre just products of technically 
oriented educational institutions of both in the public and the private sector 
organisations. 
Majority of systems developed by external specialists did not meet the information 
requirements of user departments. Users were unhappy and found it difficult to use 
technical information systems developed by external specialists. Users were neither 
consulted nor they were participated in the development of information systems. As a 
result, some information systems development projects initiated in user departments J'-' 
were abandoned and previous manual procedures were reinstated. 
Since the introduction of information systems in the late 19.60s at NCCL, information 
!,i 
systems development served the expectations of tho_se who had pov,:er to control 
information technolOb'Y function. Both inside and outside of information technology, 
there apparently existed a set of belief about infonnation technology that had little 
relationship to what was actually happening in NCCL. Though NCCL's ownership was 
changed from the state control to free market control model, information tecllnology 
function excluded categorically as important factor in changing NCCL towards nn 
effective organi~ation. 
I\ 
During corporation period, politicians and senior managers' hold the power on 
infonnation technology function. lnfonnation technology remained under the control of 
.,-. 
accounting und tin:incC\?epartmcnt. lnfonnation technology people who worked in the 
' data processing units have had minimal power to influence or change the decisions of 
politicians and senior management of NCCL. During Ya•vakkal period, the accounting 
and finance department controlled infonnation tcchnolob')' in the same way as it., 
controlled during the corporation time: Indian management and senior management 
ho!d the power on information technology function. Today, infonnation technology 
appears to exist in the same way: information technology remained under the control.of 
VI:' offinanee of Goldcnbank man.igcment. 
Over the last three decades, information technology was not assigned a major role 
within NCCL. During corporation period, infonnation technology development 
represeriied only the interests of some government politicinns and senior managers. 
During Yawakkal and GoldC11bank periods, information technology supported the 
interests ofYawakal and Goldenbank management. Therefore. information technology 
supported partial interests; i.e. those who were in power. Over the history of NCCL, 
information teehr.ology was assigned lower organisational position and the position 
today remained unchanged. The fact that there was a separate organisational unit 
responsible for information technology activities has led to the emergence of cultural 
gap between information technology section and the rest of the organisation (see 
Peppard & Ward, 1999). 
Since the late 1960s, NCCL has introduced several information systems,projccts .. iJn the 
late! 960s, the first project consisted oft he introductio~ of the punched card Systems. In .. 
the 1980s, the second project comprised of inlroductk,n of computers in application 
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areas such ns sales, inventory, payroll, and accounting and factory maintenance. In the 
1990s. the third project constitutctl of setting up of PCs in certain user department~ . 
. Finally, in the late l 990s, the fourth project consisted ofthc introduction ofm:tworks for 
both internal and external communication. However, the some senior managers and the 
majority of middle level managers, and other employees still negatively perceived 
information technology. There was no declared commitment to address this negative 
relationship (i.e. cultural gap) between infonnation technology section and the rest of 
the organisation and the employees. The history ofNCCL failed to exploit and leyeragc 
information technology for the betterment ofNCCL. 
This is mainly because information systems development was aimed at controlling 
employees' lifeworlds. Therefore, the growth of information technology function was 
stagnant or negative within NCCL since the late 1960s. Since the introduction of 
computerised information systems at NCCL, information technology innovation by 
information technology personnd was suppressed by political domination, domination 
of senior management and the highly institutionalised bureaucratic, scientific and 
rational culture ofNCCL. 
The negative perception regarding information technology development caused outside 
parties in other departments to perceive information tcchno\ogy ~'3 systematic failure 
stands in stark contrast with the view inside ofinfommtion technology seeing itself as a 
significant contributor to modernise NCCL. 111c history of NCCL revealed that NCCL 
missed out some important opportunities in transforming NCCL towards a better 
organisation using communicative actions in information systems development 
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It was succulently clear that the overall lnfonnation systems initiated in user 
departments were focused on narrow deployment oftcclmo-scicntific and economically 
rational approaches to obtain an objective power of information for prediction and 
control of individual's behaviour and the performance of departments at NCCL at the 
expense of communicative rationality. Ti-wugh information sy5tcms were developed in 
different locations, they were operationally linked to monitor and control the socio-
cultural lifeworlds of employees at NCCL. 
Generally, both internal and external information technology personnel applying their 
expert knowledge dominated over employees' everyday life. The infonnation 
technology specialists adopted an "all-knowing" position in information systems 
development while considering user employees, other employees and customers as 
inmate objects who don't have their own ends. These personnel were categorically 
excluded from the design and development ofinfonnation systems. 
This understanding about infonnation systems development is related to the positivist 
ideology. The positivist experts considered that understanding of employees' socio-
cultural values as irrelevant and unimportant-they relied only on technical solutions and 
rational decision making regarding information systems development. According to 
Habennas, in this way, these positivist designers transformed socio-cultural lifeworlds 
into instrumental ones and instrumental reasoning became a normative force that 
displaced the purposeful discourse between subjective selves. NCCL's employees' 
\ifcworlds were increasingly governed by objectifying instrumental rationality at the 
expense ofintersubjectivity, communicative action. 
I 
353 
Employees' lifcworlds were more methodically arnmgcd and monitored ever than 
before. lnfommtion systems were often correlated with their management \c:chniqucs 
and methods as means, but means were not rclated to their socio-cultural and economic 
problems, cods. Entls were taken for granted and means were assumed to be 
unproblematic. Thus, it can be argued that infonnation systems development was 
focused on rationalisation of work processes at the expense of other interested parties. 
Following Habcrmas, it can be argued that Go!dcobank's rational and carefully 
designed approaches to information systems development continued to be 
systematically eroded socio-cultural lifcworlds of employees at NCCL. 
7.2 Reflection on Current Practice of Information Systems Development at NCCL 
It seems that NCCL today acts like any other private entrepreneur after the privatisation. 
its every aim is to succeed in the ~arket and its services and practice are tailored with 
Goldenbank's corporate and management culture. Ironically, these practices were 
implemented through information systems while ignoring the social context ofNCCL in 
Sri Lanka. Present information systems development and practice reflects market-
oriented policies of economic rationality and priorities to encourage efficiency and 
effectiveness of NCCL. As a result, commercial values received prominence over the 
traditionally established socio-cultural values systems at NCCL. This represent~ an 
"effort to extend the commercialisation of information into every existing space of the 
social sphere" (Schiller, 1987, p. 25). 
Employees were treated as commodities in a market to be sold out. This means, that 
according to Habennas, the CJrrent information systems development approaches have 
" 
.been brought into boing with an unmatched capacity to shape the symbolically 
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established socio-cultural value systl'ffiS which NCCL's employees inhabit from their 
traditional socio-cultural value systems; lifcworlds. 
Such an approach is oppressive because it :locs not allow participants to inquire actively 
and self-understand about the world constitute of infonnation systems development. 
The underlying belief w~s that Go\denbank management practice need NCCL 's 
individuals to accept and adapt their behaviour accordingly. From this perspective, 
using Habermas's terms, we can argue that employees are blind to the interests of those 
who are in power and inadequately sec themselves as acting freely on behalf of the 
disadvantaged employees at NCCL. The high oppression left out of hopes of m~y 
employees leading to loss ofmotivation and disestablished socialisation process within 
NCCL. Infonnation systems as steering media did not support social inteb,ration. They 
were not aimed at solving employees' socio-economic problems by the end of 2000. As 
a result, many employees decided to leave the Company. A trade union leader stated: 
Many :6nployecs have decided to leave the Company taking 
compensation package because they have lost their interest in rcmaint at 
NCCL due to high oppression of Go\dcnbank management. We arc 
highly monitored and controlled ever than before. They control 
behaviour of employees using computerised information systems. We 
lost everything: our freedom, socio-cultural value systems, joys and 
pleasure within NCCL. I myself decided to leave this Company. 
Many employees at NCCL had shared the expression made by trade union leader 
regarding the high oppression of Gn!denbank management. Management information 
systems manager who frustrated with the domination of senior management announced 
his resignation in the late 2000. Meanwhile Go\denbank declared Rs.750-800 million 
operating losses at the end of 2000. Economically employees had not benefited from the 
privatisation of NCCL in tcnns of real income (Kclegama, 1993) and the infonnation 
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technology introduced by Go\dcnbank management. Rather Goldenbank management 
through computerised information systems increasingly controlled the socio-cultural 
lifeworlds. lt scL-n1s that Goldcnbank lacks a broad vision of issues related to poverty, 
unemplo;;ment and lifcworlds problt::rrd of employees at NCCL. Information systems 
were not developed considering the soci::! context ofNCCL. 
To build a strategy there must be first an awareness of objectives ofinfonnation systems·-
by the parties who involved in information systems: information systems developers, 
users, and beneficiaries such as management, employees, and customers. Information 
systems as a strategy must be benefited to plurality of interests of a wider community so 
that both organisation and society benefits from the application of information 
technology (sec Klein & Hirschheim, 1996, 1991; Hirschheim et al., 1996; Hirschhcim 
& Klein, 1989; Lyytinen & Hirschhcim, 1988; Lyytincn & Klein, 1985). For example, 
systems analysts working in the marketing department stated that "it seems to me that 
this Company has not yet identified the type of information systems for the benefits of 
all of us". Clearly, many of the objectives of the various stakeholders were in conflict 
with the current practice of information systems development at NCCL. The current 
practice of information systems development reflected non-reflective positivist 
approach inscribed by the vision ofGoldenbank management. 
It seems that dependent form of values of modern Western societies transferred to 
NCCL through various steering media represented in information systems. They were 
not created by the socio-cultural value systems of Sri Lanka. The information systems 
development as means did not match with the ends of wider membership. Thus, it can 
be concluded that infonnation sy~tems development and practice at NCCL requires 
approaches that take into account wider social contexts to g~ar towards promoting 
cooperation for improving living standards of people and the socio-econOr,,ic 
development of the co,mtry. 
7.3 Mnjor Findings from NCCL Ca$C Analysis 
The case analysis uncovered that information systems development at NCCL functioned 
within broadly related but interlocking socio-cultural !ifcworlds, economic, and political 
and administrative systems. These social structures formed the contexts for NCCL i.nd 
information systems development. The ten episodic analyses revealed how information 
systems development was shaped by and shaped NCCL reality through socio-cultural, 
ec~nomic, and political contexts in Sri Lanka. This holistic nature of information 
systems development can be summarised as follows. 
Firstly, information systems development at NCCL was socio-cultural because 
employees wanted to protect their socio-cultural integrity anO. · 'iworlds from economic 
problems, formal and external management controls, and domination. Employees drew 
meaning for their everyday actions from lifeworlds contexts. These lifcworlds were 
carried tacit knowledge of employees. This knowledge was suppressed by the adoption 
of Western scientific, technocratic, economic, and bureaucratic rationality in 
information systems development and practice. Information systems development did 
not meet the needs of employees' lifcworlds. They opposed formal and external control 
of management resulting failures of information systems development. Thus, it can be 
concluded that infonnation systems development wns shaped by socio-cultuml 
lifoworlds of Sri Lanka. 
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Secondly, infomwtion systems development was connected up with socio-economic 
development or Sri Lanku before and after privatisation of NCCL. It wus economic, 
bccuuse infonnation systems development was aimed at modernising NCCL and 
improving economic criteria of efficiency and c!Tcclivencss of performance. It was ulso 
economic because infonnation systems development wus connected with employees' 
work and life, living conditions, unemployment, and poverty. !n sort, modernisation of 
NCCL through effective infonnation systems development was failed leaving 
unresolved conflicts between government, management, and employees. Thus, 
information systems development did not assist to change NCCL towards a better 
organisation and therefore unable to resonate broad agenda of socio-economic 
development while meeting the economic expectations of the government, employees 
and NCCL itself 
Thirdly, infonnation system~ development was political because the government was 
involved in ch11I1ging NCCL thrcagh information technology and infomiation systems 
in both phases of socio-economic development. Information systems development was 
political because employees were opposed systems development through trade unions 
and trade unions were linked to national political parties. !t was also political because 
politically manipulated apparatus, institutionalised rational bureaucracy, and scientific 
an~ rational decision-making hampered infonnation systems development. As a result, 
NCCL could not trnnsfonn towards a better organisation through effective infonnation 
systems development. 
Finally, ):jnfonnation systcr.~,s development and practice led to unanticipated 
consequences of personal ·,mG~ie and conflicts at NCCL. It also created disorder in 
3'8 
socialisation of employees leading to alienation, apathy, repression, psychopathological 
deceases, distress, and depression. Therefore, management was unable to rationalise and 
legitimise information systems development as steering media (means) at NCCL. As a 
consequence, management experienced conflicting dilemmas in transforming NCCL 
towards a successfo[ organisation through effective information systems development. 
Seen in this light it can, therefore, be concluded that information systems development 
at NCCL was operated within a vast array of economic, political and socio-cultural 
intricacies ofSti Lanka. 
7.4 Theorising lnform11tion Systems Development from Communicative Actic~s 
In this section, I explain and critique how Habermas's theory of communicative actions 
can be used as a rational approach for information systems development in 
organi.;ations in Sri Lanka. Firstly, major problems of the positivist approach are 
discussed. Secondly, communicative actions and tacit knowledge arc e:i1amined. 
Thirdly, relationship between tacit knowledge and lifcwor!ds is e:i1amined. Fourthly, the 
relationship between communicative actions, tacit knowledge and social conte:i1t of Sri 
Lanka is discussed. Fifthly, the relationship between lifcworlds, systems and 
information systems development is c:i1plained. Shthly, the relationship between human 
development, communic!ltive actions, and information systems development is 
examined. Finally, the relationship between communicative actions and innovation in 
information systems is cx·fllaincd. Critiques of the Habcnnasian interpretation of events 
have been woven throughout this chapter to provide a counterbalance and critical 
appraisal of this perspective. 
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7.4.1 F11ll11cy of Scientific Neutrality or PosltivM Approach 
It appears that positivist ways of thinking influenced information systems development 
nnd practice at NCCL over a period of 1958-2000. The position at present in NCCL is 
that information systems development and practice still functions as an imperial and 
force manner c1;forcing its views and exerting its power, confident in assumptions of its 
own superiority. The increasingly rigid positivist ideology that has dominated and still 
dominates current information systems development and practice at NCCL is 
destructive of !ifoworlds in deeper manner within the organisr.tion. 
,, 
This positivist approach used for information systems development at NCCL continues 
to be non-reflective. It can not be considered as a rational approach for knowledge 
creation in information systems because, it ignores alternative ways of knowledge 
creation perceiving knowledge as a system of reasoning arising from social contexts of 
Sri Lanka. The analysis of ten episodes presented in chapter six revealed how social 
context:. in Sri Lanka influenced and shaped information systems development projects 
at NCCL over about five decades. 
As Western idea spreads across the world r.nd positivist thinking, technology, and 
politics are imposed upon, or taken on by NCCL, information systems development 
1! ": 
fo!lnWed suit. The fact that positivist approach itself bas not been ,.:;hown to be 
applicable cross culturally or to be free of social context gets obscured its over 
attachment to Western cultural values. The prestige of positivist approach rubbing off 
knowledge in other socio-cultures in developing countries including Sri Lanka (Schiller, 
1995; Chambers, 1980). 
'"' 
In the positivist approach, information systems development being presented and 
accepted as a part of science is assumed to he ;;cicntific activity with objective methods 
-_ 'rotknOw!edge acquisition that is free from socio-cultural contexts. As such this 
scientific and objective view of ir.formation systems development in the positivist 
approach was seen as being universally applicable to all people in all countries, 
irrespective of their socinl contexts, although this was clearly not so. 
Control of the natural and social world to improve the human i:onditions has become 
cornerstone of Western management ideology (Williams & Standing, 1994; Sandberg, 
1985; Kraft, !977; Braverman, 1974). This control nature is dominant in infomrntion 
systems (Alvarez & Klein, 1989; Gurstcin, 1989; Briefs, 1987; King & Iacono, 1984). 
As such information systems were perceived as superior lo non-western equivalents. It 
content was not questioned; it was taken on trust without critically reflecting upon the 
adoptability in other social contexts such as in Sri Lanka. However, this controlling 
nature of information systems and technology may not be appropriate to non-western 
equivalents (Williams & Standing, 1994). NCCL case revealed that NCCL 
management used information systems to control work and dehumanise the workplace 
relationships. 
In the pace of We.,tcrn knowledge, knowledge in other socio-cultural contexts in Sri 
Lanka was,,considcrcd as localised importance. However, NCCL case analysis revealed 
,, 
that infonnation systems development is much more than scicmific and technical 
control and involved considerations of social activities in workplace. Therefore, the 
significance of research in un:'~rstan<ling organisation~[ issues in different socio-
,'i 
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cultural contexts, otlcn in non-western countries, can not be underestimated (sec 
Wcns\ey, 200!; Avgcrou, 2000, !996; Odcdra-Stmub, 1996; Kiangi & Tjipangandjara, 
1996; Lind, J 996; Korpela, l 996; Williams & Standing, 1994). 
Information and communication technologies arc pushed on to developing countries as 
steering media by economic and political forces allied to Western powers (Avgcrou, 
Jf ooo; Lind, I 996; Williams & Standing, 1994). The promotion .. of info1mation 
.. ,ij 
techr1ology, techniques, mctl,.!<is, skills, expert knowledge, information systems and so 
on originated in developed countries go hand in hand with the positivist knowledge of 
tht West (Avgcrou, 1996). The dominance and control of global organisations is greatly 
facilitated by advances in information technology and international communication 
(Walsham, 1991). This situation has created imbalance of world information flows, the 
doi;,.ination of third world culture, and the dominance of advanced countries in the 
developrrient and transfer of information technology (Stover, 1984). 
The types of knowledge that is promoted via positivist approach, with its cmphasi~ on 
science and information technology that have developed within Western cultui-es and 
with models suited with Western political systems deemphasised, if not ignored, the 
importance of social context in organisations in developing countries such as Sri Lanka 
for infommtion systems development. 
Although positivist approach as a superior approach is too much part of its Western 
culture to be plucked out and traru,ferred into other non-western cultures as it stands it 
\I has within it modules of theory and practice they may be usefully offered to people of 
a'1i nations and cultures. The positivist approach has after all amassed over the past years 
ii ,, 
\\ 
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enormous of knowledge. It has developed unprecedented ways of managing !:uman life. 
' It devdopcd ways of managing organisations through effective information systems 
dtvclopmcnt. It has dc,.,clopcd methodologies, methods, technology, techniques, 
systems, and expertise knowledge, and so on for information systems to improve 
performance in organisations. It has rapidly become the infrastructure upon which 
.. business is conducted and has penetrated all economics ano we\! being (Oded~a-Strau.b, 
1996). It can use as im11rovcd infonnation syst,;ms for the planning and implcmcritation 
of rural devc\opmcm projcc!s in developing countries (sec Bhatangar, 2000; Mesa & 
' Duncan, 2000). There is a mountain of knowledge without which it would not possible 
to devdop infonnation .~ystems for organisations in all over the world. 
,\-, 
NCCL case uncovered that poG!tivist app~ach has failed 
0
in\nformation However, Ji 
. I' 
sYstems development in organisations .. in Sri Lanka. Thereff::, what, is neces~~r}' is to// 
uiiderstllnd the socio-cultural context of Si Lnnka to articulate ~cit knOwJedge and ma.kc 
use .of that knowledge in infonnatiori systems development to innuvate new information 
systems relevant to organisations. The development of approprfatc infonnation systems 
is more important than adoption of positivist knowledge in systems development as the 
.. ,, ,;, 
NCCL case revealed. Focus sl1ou!d be give:, to ;:nowledge creation based on social 
::·-;/ 
context of Sri Lanka tha.'l assimilation ofWt1sterri positivist knowledge (Gunai'!a.rdena, 
2001; ,V'ijesekcra & Wijeseker!!, ·'.999). 
i) 
{' .,-- ,,,,,) ,·;,; 
R~.~arches on deve;..,J)ment literature relating to deve]opjng counnies suggest cha! 
.: ii< ' ;1 ' /;::= -' , 
de.velopmcnt programs must be aligned with !he needs· Of the peoPlc of those countries 
' . ..,-\ '· 
(sec \:;~~bar, 1995; Todaro, 1994; Sadi~, 1992; Dahl & Rabo, 1992). For example, 
Escnhm1 (!995) examined theoretical ide~:. and practical interventions that have 
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constituted development in developing countries. He argues that lhe adoption of free 
market rationality principles and its institutions, and the cognitive instruments of 
(') 
sciCnee and technology in developing countries were socially constructed than naturally 
chosen. The point made facobar here is that the development programs must be 
developed fo\l~11:ing historically derived value systems that sustain social systems in 
developing couDtrics. Habcrrnas's theoretical framework provides a rational approach to 
articulate such historical values in social context in organisations in Sri Lanka and make 
use of them in systems development. 
Similarly, studies relevant to transfer of informatior. technologies from developed 
countries to developing countries suggest that transferred technologies tend to be 
adapted to the social context, rather than being used in the same form as in the context 
where they were first developed (Wenslcy, 2001; Avgerou, !09!16). lnfomrntion systems 
development r~'.!ires creativity and is largely driven by, ofkn, informally, by the 
intere-sts of an organisation's participants (Ciborrn, !991). History of infonnation 
systems development at NCCL revealed that the prevailing positivist approach was too 
!imitul in scope, unable to cope with social conte:d of the systems development process, 
and therefore jeopardising efforts ,1\ improving organisational pr.rformancc bY 
introducing information technology. lnfonnalion systems development involves much 
more than the narrow h!chnical designs; it is an organisational technology in Westney's 
terms(l991). 
,, 
)! 
'I / / 
,! 
Succes~ful information system3 'development is more a matter of judgement of wh~t 
l' 
,' 
organisational challges arc frasibie and desirable and how they can be realised, than the 
adoption of some techniques, mctl:mls, skills, a'ld expert knowledge and information 
technology. It involves much more than automating jobs, controlling employees. and 
3M 
work place relations (Zuboff, 1988). It involves social empowerment of people (Zemakc 
-· & Schanf 1989; Lawler, Ledfo~'!. & Mohrman, 1989; Zubof, 1988; Lawler, 1986). It can 
' act and transfom1 conditions to lead to abettcr quality oflifc (Nath & Scholar, 2000). 
Orlikowski (1996) and Rohitratana (1998) assert that computer technologieS' are 
technical insofar as they are instrumental for particular ends, but this use is 
simultaneously social insofar as the ends are interpreted. This relegation of computer 
technologies needs to consider the approprillt'eness tct organisations technology 
(Avgerou & Land, 1992). While acknowledging Orlikowski's & Rohitratana's 
inierpretation of computer technologies, it can be ar!!lJ_E<!. that interpretation of ends 
alone does not make computer technologies social because it lacks the critical 
component of systems development. 
' // 
This use of technology is necessa_:1
1
to critically analy~e and reflect upon. This i~_done 
' 
from the standpoint of emancipation, i.e., an interest in "an equal distribution of power 
and chancesJr, satisfy personal needs and in liberating people from domination by other 
people (see Hirschheim & Klein, 1994, 1989; Flood 1990b; Flood & Ulrich, 1990; 
,, 
Hahennas, 1987b; Klein & Ljytincn, 1985). This is necessary because the inevitability 
of values choices in the application of information systems. Historical evidcnCe shows 
that technology is not neutral (Burns, 1'981; Briefs, 1980; Cooley, 1980; Braverman, 
:( 1974). 
For example, Mowshowitz (1984) arb>Ucs that" ... a technology which requires the 
mastery of a certain know-how and therefore favours the intcrc>ls of certain group~ in 
society at the expense of others . , .", He continues to say that the mere fact that 
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computers can be used to improve the quality of !iii: or to increase citizen participation 
in government docs not mean that they will be so o5ed" (Mowshowitz, 1984, p. 85). He 
asserts that "the neutrality thesis is every bit as naive as the stork fable of human birth". 
Therefore, following Habennas, it can be argued that infonnation systems become 
social if and if only if the ends of systems development arc rationally decided by force: 
of better aq,'llments. Following Habennas, il can be statecl that in this manner can 
appropriate and innovative infonnation systems be developed for people working in 
organisations,.in Sri Lanka. Foll wing Founcault (1982), it may be argued that u~ing such 
a Habcrm~iian method will probably result in new forms c,f power and control that 
", 
would mitig~\c against human development. 
' 
7.4.2 Communicativc\'Actlons and Tacit Knowledge 
The central question is "how can the power of technical control be brought within 
the range of the consensus of acting and transacting citizens?" (Haberrnas, 1987a). Put 
it differently, how can the power of Western knowledge take over and make it part in 
our socio-cultural tradition to serve the needs of people in Sri Lanka? Or what 
institutional arrangements stimulate managers and employees to innovate successful 
information systc,ms that support the people doing the work'! For example, Japnncse 
firms select an appropriate technology t!wt ho!ps them achieve perfonnancc goal in a 
wax that supports the people doing the work. They use tacit knowledge that employees 
already possess (sec Bensaou & Earl, l 9!J8; Nonaka, 199! ). 1l1us, tacit knowleclgc plays 
an intogrn! part in infonnation systems development (sec Wcnslcy, 2001 ). Habcnnas·s 
t~.cory of communicative nctions provides theoretical insights to explore such tacit 
knowledge in Sri Lanka '8 socio-culture and to innovate successful information systems. 
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NCCL case analysis revealed that socio-cultural knowledge was represented in 
employees' everyday actions. 
7.4.3 Tacit Knowlc~gc and Lifoworlds 
Polnnyi {1983) in his famous book titled, "The Tacit Dimension" a:;scrts that "we know 
more thnn we enn tell"(p. 4). The true knowledge residing in the recognition of what 
one does not know rather than what one knows (sec Wensley, 2001, p. 2). Episod7 4 of 
NCCL: "We know more ... ", provides relevant empirical supporting for Polanyi's 
assertiOn. This means "knowledge involves an embedded skill and can not cosily be 
articulated" (Hedcsstrom & Whitley, 2000, p. 48). Tacit knov·\ng is the fundamental. 
power of the mind which crates explicit knowing, lends meaning to it and controls its 
uses (Polanyi, 1983, p. 18). Polanyi argues that sharp division between tacit and explid~ 
knowledge docs not exist (ibid, p. 16). Even if knowledge ·has been ar1iculated into 
words or mathematical formulas, this explicit knowledge must rely on being tacitly 
understood and applied (Hcdesst~om & Whitley, 2000, p. 48). "Tacit thought.funns m1. 
indispensable part of all knowledge" {Polanyi, 1958, p. 20). Hence, all knowledge _is 
either tacit or rooted in lacit knowledge (Polanyi, 1983, p. 7). He emphasises the 
' 
knower's active participation in any act ofknowing (ibid, p. 4~. 
This tacit knowledge is embedded in lifeworlds of mdividua\s. They are part of a. socio-
ct:lture ofn society. To understand tacit knowled~c, one must need to fully understand 
the 1ifew1?rlds /'.r a society. This lifcwor!ds is not anything else but socio-cultures which 
' 
provide substrnt~'m for generation of meaning in human actions. These meanings carry 
\I mount.of knowledge about socio-culture of a society. Therefore, to fully undcrst'and 
/ 
/:' 
' 
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how such tncit knowledge operates within lifcworlds, one need to fully understand the 
socio-eolturc of a society nod how socio-cultures intlucnced in shaping meaning of 
lifeworlds in societies. llse of such tacit knowledge provides an indispensable 
opportunity for continuous lnnovation in infonnation systems (Wensley, 200!; Dietz & 
Lyytinen, 1998; Bensaou & Earl, 1998; Negwenyam.:i & Klein, 1994; Nonaka, 1991). 
Such use of tacit knowledge would accord with Foucault's (1982) perspectives, 
although Foucault might assert that such knowledge might be used to new forms of 
control. 
7.4.4 Com?1unlcative Aelions, Tacit Knowledge and Social Context in Sri Lanka 
For Sri Lank.ans, use of communicative actions in information systems development is 
not an insurmountable dilemma mainly for three reasons. 
" I The fact that communicative rationality is based on human reasons, in getting at the 
;'( 
true and rational ... knowledge, appear to be consistent \'lilh traditional culture and 
value systems of Sri Lank.a. Traditionally, communities in Sri Lanka used 
communicative actions in political decision making. People used these cultural 
values in everyday communication. They provided meaning for their daily actions 11 
and social interactions. 
)' (r"'"/.· 
The present day efficiency and effectiveness of management were built into the · 
cultural lives of people in the traditional societies in Sri Lanka without nny formal or 
external control (Ariyaratne, 1999). Socio-cultural values such as working 
collectively and sh3ring with one another, participation, trust, respect, infonnal 
"" 
communication um! mutual umlcrstunding were parts and part of social actions and 
·,:interactions. They arc still remained relatively unchanged in Sri Lanka. NCG., 
employees used these socio-cultural values in everyday communication and 
interactions with managers. Some manager~ tacitly employed such socio-cultural 
values when they were confronted with p~·;blems in their everyday life. These sor:io-
culturu] values carried mountain ofknow.1.Cdge about our society. By looking at these 
socio-cultural values, one can undcr~tand how thinking process is functioning in the 
minds of people in Sri Lanka. 
7.4.4.1 Tacit Knowing 
Jn ordc~ to fully' understand the tacit knowing of people, we need to understand the 
minds of people which create explicit knowing, lends meaning to it and control its 
uses (Polanyi, 1983, p. 18). In order to understand minds of people in Sri Lanka, one 
needs to understand the Buddhist teaching, because it had a tremendous influence on 
shaping our thinking process and the way we s<'t about doing things (Ariyaratnc, 
1999). 
In Buddhist way of thinking, mind is supreme; it is the forerum1'!r of everything. It is 
nOt a physical organ of the brain. It is the consciousness itself. This consciousness 
was formed by the core concepts of Buddhist thinking over thousands of years. 
These concepts have been influenced in fon:iil:;; meaning for lifoworlds, The 
thinking process of pcnplc is guided by these !ifoworlds. Understanding !ifcv-.'Orlds 
means, we understand the thinking process of people. Understanding thinking 
process of people mcnns, we understand the socio-culture of Sri Lanka. 
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Buddhists believe the oim of living is not lw1•ing hut being. Fromm (1979) describes 
these having and being modes referring to two poems that describes a flower: 
Tennyson's reiatiOnship to a flower is in the mode of possession or of having; 
Basho's relationship to flower is in the mode of being. He says, "by being I refer to 
the mode of existence in which one neither bas anything nor craves to have 
something, but is joyous, employs one's faculties productively, is one with the 
world" (pp. 26-8). In contrast to the Western culture, Buddhist cultures is a culture 
of being and not culture of having (Amamsckern, 2001 ). 
Humanism and selflessness arc supreme virtues which should be practiced in our 
sojourn in Samsara (Samsara refers to the eternal cycle of birth, suffering, death, and 
rebirth)";)bid, 2001). For Buddhists, craving is the major cause of, existence of 
human life. The supreme state of being Nin·mw (Nirvana refers to the incff~;1~-~-
ultimate in which one has attained disinterested wisdom and compassion) is the 
ultimate goal of human life (Sekhern, 1995). According to the Buddha, the 
emancipatien (i.e. awaken) involves the elimination of illusion that craving for things 
l~ads to happiness (Fromm, 1979, p. 48). Craving and happiness are related to 
objective reality of the world. Therefore, egoism and individualism are illusions 
created by human being (Amarnsckera. 2001). These are essential aspects of the life 
oftlie Western world. 
Buddhists believe in an agreed-upon consensual truth. For Buddhists, unconsciously 
understood lifcworld~ include the myths of objcctiVe reality of the world. The 
'I 
enlightened truth involve; an elimination of objective reality of the \~mid. It involves 
(r 
,,; ,·. 
,, 
,, 
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core Buddhist thinking that guide's consciousness. Knowing this knowledge involves 
elimination of illusions that control the \Juth to be emerged explicitly. Attaining self-
enlightenment implies not only a systematic thinking upon a given subject, but also a 
systematic development of the higher qualities that tend to produce supramundanc 
wisdom which in its tum makes enlightenment possible (Sckhcra, 1995, p. 6). It is 
the tacit knowledge intuitively operates in individual's mind. It involves conscious 
awareness of the truth nbout the true Jifcworlds of human beings. 
Understanding of lifcworlds gives the idea of more dynamir.: forces penneating 
-through every cell of individuals conscious and unconsc.ious being guiding their 
thoughts and actions (seep. , . "thinking and speaking" is interrelated). These 
thoughts arc shupcd by individual socio-culture and expressed through human 
actions. They arc not absolute truths, something one could feel secure (as the ease in 
positivist approach), b•Jt the self-affinning process of human reason (Fromm, 1978, 
p. 48). The case analysis revealed that the world of employees could not be separated 
from themselves. [t was also revealed thnt there wa£ no wall separating one from the 
rest of the world as in the posit:vi,t approach. Individuals were part of the world as 
the world was part of them. In sort, they lived in their world of consciousness. 
Therefore, "the world is nothing more or less (han a projection of one's self. To 
understand the world, we must understand onc'\7clf' (Flood, 1999, p. 82). 
Enlightenment by a person means to know thi' truth in its nakedness. This means 
knowing penetrates the surface and to strive critically and actively in order to 
approach truth ever more clo,scly (Fromm, 1978, pp. 47-8). Knowing in this way 
becon',cs part of the process of productive thinking (ibid, p. fP). Knowing means 
m 
knowing about the truth of the reality. "!t is an intuitive looking inlo in which we 
discover one's mind. Knowing the essence of things is to know one's sclr' (Flood, 
1999). Incorporation of knowledge in lifcworlds in information systems development 
means, we allow the truth - the tacit knowledge that sustains in socio-cultural 
lifewodds in Sri Lanka to be emerged. 
2. Another factor that uses of communicative actions in systems development makes 
possible is ancient knowledge and technology. Traditionally, societies in Sri Lankii.-
achievcd impressive achievements using ancient knowledge and technology. Among 
these, the complex networks of massive-scale artificial lakes, intricately laid out 
irrigation canncls, excellences in nautical construction, and complex town and 
country planning were few examples (Gunawardena,,·2001; Silva, 1981; Wijesekera 
& Wijesekera, l 998). 
This knowledge is the best remains in our ancient civilisation (Wijesekera & 
Wijesekera. 1998). This ancient knowledge was used before the enlightenment that 
took place i11 the l 7'h century and the positivist knowledge in the Western countries. 
The ancient societies used readily available socio-cultural knowledge, skills and 
re~ources to achieve excellences. TI1cse were inscribed and embodied in cultural 
values. Therefore, what is necessary by NCCL management to take deliberate efforts 
to explore this socially valuable knowledge in our society and make use of that tncit 
knowledge in developi[lg successful infonnation sy$t1.-ms? 
NCCL case analysi~ showed that employees rducte:11 to use modem fast pace 
information lcchnology and formal and external control based on modem 
m 
computerised information systems. This doesn't mean that Sri Lankans are totally 
·dvcrtcd to use of infonnation technology. Buddha was not against any social custom 
" 
" iind tradition if they arc harmless and useful to society (Sckahera, 1995) (I use 
Buddha's teaching here, because as ! explained previously, thinking process of the 
majority of Sri Lankans was shaped by Buddhist teaching). This n:001'.niscs the 
"essential intc,Telatedncss, and interdependence of all phenomena • physical, 
psychological, social, and cultural" which transcends current disciplinary and 
conceptual boundaries (Capra, 1982, p. 285). Jn this context, employees would 
support information systems dcve!opmcnt if the proposed designs rum; their 
_economic, psychological, and socio-cultural Iifcworlds' needs. NCCL case analysis 
revealed that employees wanted management to consider their practical problems 
and develop information systems to meet the needs of their lifcworld~. 
The need of use of indigenous knowledge, skills and resources has been emphasised 
in information systems literature (see for example, Fox, 1998, 1991; Broding & 
Schonberger, 2000; Suchman, 1987; Hirschheim, 1986). Suchman (1987), argues 
that designing computers that can interact with humans, the system of 
commnnication "must incorporate both sensitivity to local circumstances and 
resources for the remedy of troubles in understanding that inevitably arisc"(p.28). 
This means "instead of looking for a structure that is invariant across situations, we .. 
look for the processes whereby particular, uniquely constituted circumstances arc 
systematically interpreted so a~ !o render meaning shnrLx! and action accountably 
rational" (ibid, p. 67). Thus Habcrmas's communicative actions provides vi~icle for 
exploring this indigenous knowledge in lifcworlds of people in Sri LJnka for the 
design of innovative information systems. 
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J, The analysis of ten episodes revealed that for Sri Lankans used infonnation 
technology and information systems us strategics and techniques to transform NCCL 
towards a better organisation in line with the objectives of the govcmmc)t's 
modernisation programs introduced in two phases of socio-economic ilevch;ipmcnt. 
However, ill1bnnation technolob')' and infomrntion systems did not assist NCCL to 
achieve this social task due to narrow deployment of positivist approach. The 
problem that Sri Lanka grappling with over a half century (after thc'.indepcndcnce in 
,' 
19480 was how to develop its economy to alleviate poverty and improve the quality 
of life of peoples (lndraratna, 1998; Co\ombage, \998; Ratnayaka, 19,98). Even 
though the application of information technology has been failed in NCCL and some 
other organisations (see chapter one and four), today central focus is placed on tile 
II, 
'-"·--
improvement of information technology sector and infonnation systems development 
to achieve this social task (Budget Speech, 2001). The prevalence bcljef is that 
infonnation technology is related to direct socio:economic development. 
In order to address this social task of socio-economic development, it is essential to 
innovate s..?ccessful infonnation systems relevant for organisations in Sri Lanka. To 
develop innJative infonnation systems, what is necessary is to articulate the socio-
cultural knowledge, lifcwoilds, and include that tacit knowledge in infonnati.on 
-~ystems development. Th.is knowledge consists of tacit understanding of socio· 
cultural lifcworlds. I nfonnation systems a:; '"!leans must be guided by needs of socio· 
cultural lifcwolds. In NCCL case, employees were opposed infonnatio.'/ systems 
,;..-,, 
devC!oµ'ment because they were not economically and socio-culturnlly benefited 
' 
from the modem knowledge transfc.i:td from Western countries via information 
I\_ 
m 
tcd,no]ogy and information systems. 1bcsc employees opposed modem information 
technology based information sysh:ms because they were clashed with their thinking 
process. Such an assertion would align with Foucault's (1982) project of 
und.i.m~ding power and control as a panoptican created by modem technology. car;! 
using Habermas's communicative action create empowerment of and by itself! 
Founcault would pi:rsumable have grave doubts. 
1fS Lifeworlds, systems and Information Syst~ms Denlopment 
AC.cording to Habennas, if political and administrative sub-systems steer social 
'"1·, 
intercourse in a manner commensurable to the needs of Hfeworlds in socio-cultural sub-
systems, then reasons bccome active in political dccision-fDaking {Wilson. 1_?97). 
Panicipants become ncth·cly involved in designing their future. Information systems 
become easy to impkment within organisations because they' arc committed, w dew lop 
their own future. 
Once this poiitical decision··making becomes norms and institutionalised, it lays 
foulldations in shaping organismional culture in a similar way that the pcsithist 
approach established its roots for shaping organisational culture. Consequently. policy 
makers ruid senior man.igcment would receive symbolic guidance from the lifeworlds · 
for the management of org.inisations (Pusey, 1987). Organisations become joint 
optimisation of meeting plurality of hum(lll interests {Emery, 1959)., Jn this way, 
\\ " 
th~ries become ,.'l'actica! if thcv serve human interests and thereby become "a cause 
. ' 
determining the )t·il!" (Kant, 1964, p. 128). 
-,c:·' 
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Episode J one of NCCL case revealed that how production managers in the factory 
fu\fil!t.'tl the needs of employees' lifcworhls by informally adjusting opcrational 
budgets. [n this way, production managers achieved a good industrial harmony by 
meeting the needs cf both senior management in the head office and the lifeworlds of 
employees in the faclory. However, this prnctice had not considered within formal 
decision making and actions. This prnctice was not institutionalised due to the 
domination of politicians, over attachment to the rational bureaucracy, and narrow 
deployment of scientific and economically rational decision making. Narrow 
deployment of positivist approach hindered transferring NCCL towards a successful 
organisation. 
7.4.6 Human Development, Communicative Actions, 11nd Information Systems 
Dcvclop.ment 
Central to Habcrmas's theory of communicative action is its htiman focus and 
development of societies (see Habcrmas, 1987a, 1987b). One of the objeetiv1os of 
communicative action is to facilitate human participation in decision making process in 
systems development and increase their level of understanding and knowledge. These 
are necessary ingredients in development in any society (Wuema, 1996). 
The, basic objective uf human development is to enlurge the range of p~Jp!c's choices 
•/ . ·11 
and make development more participatory and dcmocl''atic (Human Deve.1.opment 
Report, 1991). l/NDP defines development as follows: development of the people, for 
the people and b)' the people (cited in Waema, 1996, p. 8). Similarly, if we focus on 
transferring c:ganisation through inform.ition systems development, it must be of the 
,,,, ' ,, 
31(, 
PL'Ople, for the people llnd hy the people. Jt i~, the co-operation of 11/1. l'urtkipation or 
pL-ople and their involvement is an essential aspect nf this kind of infnrmatitm systems 
development. lt allows sharing of knowledge. Bo1 this alone is not sof!icicnt. lfwe 
need to achieve human development, '.hen we r,;ust pul people at lhc centre of 
devclopmc11! process in free and open comn1unirntivc inlerm:tinns. By allowing people 
to freely and unintcm.iptedly comm11r.ic;1tc then only hoth human development and 
' dGvelopment of societies c:in he achiel'cd. lliis means that sharing of knowledge is an 
interactive process of making the right information uvailahlc to people at the right time 
in a comprehensible manner to enable them to act judiciously- enriching the knowlc,Jge 
.. base in the entire mechanism (Nath & Scholar, 2000). TI1creforc, free and open 
1icommunication plays a significap.t ·role in information systems development and 
.development of societies (Habc~:s, 1995, 1987a, 1987b, 1979). 
Human communication is recognised as central problem of "how understanding 
possible in general" (MaCanhy, 1982, p.60). It is related to thinking process and human 
actions. These actions are carried monument of knowledge that human possesses. 
Understanding true knowledge in human actions req,iircs free am! open communication 
'0 
(Dietz·& Lyytinen, 1998; Williams, 1996; Klein & Hirschheim, 1996, 1991,1987: 
Mingers, 1995; Lyytincn, 1992; Steff & Grimes, 1992; Power & Laughlin, !992; 
1, M,organ, 1992; Alvesson & Willmott, 1992a, 1992b; ForcstC'i;Jt9.7"\ Murray & Ozannc, 
- ' 
1991; Keys, 1991; Young, 1989; Lyytinen & Hirschheim, 19~sv/ughlin, 1987; Steffy 
~ Grimes, 1986). 
.•() 
These authors promoted Habcrmas's theory of communicative action as basis 
invcstigatiflg,communicativc infraslruC,lu~c in organisations and societies because it is 
~ ,. ~-
" 
CJ 
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based on "consensual n.{)nns", which define mutual cx.pcctntions about how participants 
in u given situation should behave in terms of communication (Lyytincn & l [irschhcim, 
~,988). It is based on participatory and dcmnnatic way of developing i11fbrmalinn 
systems {llirschhcirn & Klein, 1994, 1989), putling people al the centre of the 
i.lcvclopmenl process, which provides legitimacy and rn1ionalily for instito\iona! 
" 
arrangcmc:1\s and pruclicc because actions nrc guided by human reasons (Habcmrns, 
i,'._, 
1979, 1987;, 1987b). 
lnfonnation systems d-evclopmcnt involves decision about moral value judgements 
because design choices of information systems are made to serve some human interests 
\\ 
'·<'.~\. the expense of others (see Klein & Hirschhcim, I 996; Hirschhcim & Klein, 1994, 
' ',\ 
1989). Habennas's theory of communicative actions provides a rational way to 
appropriate how such value judgements arc made. His theory assures that only 
legitimised infonnation systems can be developed by giving all the participants equal 
'I 
chances to communicate their interests about information systems (Klein & Hirschheim, / 
1996). ,_ I 
'\,} .. , 
Habermas's communicative rationality, therefore, is concerned with the ultimate 
fundamentals of "good communication" {Klein & Hirschheim, 1991). It provides 
"symbolic interaction" through the cxch~nge of meanings in !an1,'llage and other media 
such as sing-systems (Mingcrs, 1995; Burrell & Morgan, 1979; Silverman, 1970). The 
use of language tend to take an important fenture the need to expose as closely as 
possible the true meaning and social reality behind words of communication {Keys. 
I/ 1991). Through the use of language. mutual understanding about the worldviews of 
systems development is achieved (Lyytincn & Hirschheim, 1988). It tries to reflect and 
critically l.'llarninc the conditions anti scope of our practical, tacit koowlcdgo of how to 
engage in organisational coff~crsations and constitute our social world (Dietz & 
Lyytincn, 1998). 
NCCL cnse analysis revealed that infonnation systems development were conflict to 
.,,~--· 
many employees, because they werC'oot given opportunities to participate in systems 
development. Several authors have recogr,iscd the importance of participation in 
systems development success (sec for example, Mumford, 1997; Mumford & 
Breekman, 1994; Hirschheim & Klein, 1994, J 989; Land & Hirschheim, 1983). 
The case analysis also revealed that information systems were developed to support the 
interests of those who were in ;~~'er, Jnfonnation systems were mainly to fulfil 
technical interests of systems developers, senior manages and some politicians. 
Infurmation systems development was aimed at controlling employees. However, 
employees wanted management to consider their practical problems in systems 
!1 
development. ':They v..anted to free from the domination. Within this context, 
,, 
Haberm8.S's ideal speech situation enables various stakeholders to resolve these 
conflicts and mutually designed ends of systems development. 
In an i~·speech situation, every assertion and utterance of the comrn.unicative 
I, 
participant is carefully checked against the four validly claims of comprehensibility, 
truth, legitimacy, and sincerity refcning to the three worlds ofobjective, intersubjcctivc 
and subjective worlds. It is an in-depth study about human communication and 
communicative patt~ms of societies. It is n methodology that aimed at no in-depth 
investigation of true and rational knowledge latent in socicties,'.Thc nor.roach provides a 
(.' -. \\ 
i) 
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relentless dedication to appropriately balance the positivist knowledge with socio-
cultural lifoworlds (subjective knowledge) in societies. It provides an intersubjectivc 
account of humm1 knowledge (Mingcrs, l 995), and rcconstrm::tivc form of knowledge 
(Dietz & Lyytincn, 1998). 
What lessons can organisations like NCCL in developing countries learn from 
H·;bcrmns's theory of communicative actions, particularly from his ideal speech 
situation in information systems development? It allows participants to work in a free 
and distortion free environment because infonnatioo systems can be made rationally by 
the force of better Ufb'llments than by the forces of power and politics or some other 
blind appeal to social convention (Klein & Hirschhcim, l 996). 
The NCCL ease revealed that use of power in systems development predominated. 
Organisational processors were objectified by narrow deployment of purposive rational 
actions. Therefore, Habcrmas's approach enables organisati,)nal stakehold,;rs to inspire 
criticism, to facilitate learning, and to raise the overall le\'el of competence in systems 
development (Lyytinen & Hirschhcim, I 988). It can be argued that if senior managers' 
thinking is focused on rational discourse under conditions of relative power symmetry 
and iiltional action, then organisational members become free from domination of 
purposive rational actions. Such an assertion could be challanged from n Foucaultinn 
(1982) standpoint, but this docs not mean that attempts to nmeleriate the sitution would 
not be of some benefit. 
Using debates in the ideal speech situation, a design ideal can be justified by human 
reasons (Lyytincn & Hirschhcim, 1988; Klein & Hirschheim, 1996). For example, 
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management at NCCL understood its culture as objective, scientific, technical, nn<l 
bureaucratic. This culture required decision-making be based on rationality, i.e., the 
knowledge about existing structures was oficn objectified. The case analysis revealed 
that this rationality wns fundamen:.au; as odds as with true and legitimate rationality of 
NCCL The power structure of NCCL made such rationality more difficult am] 
forbidden. 
Habennas asserts that rationality means being able to provide and alternatively, to 
expect adequate reasons for statements, decisions, and actions. Thus rationality relics 
directly on communication characterised by discussion and argumentation. The validity 
or inadequacy of reason is contextually defined. However, NCCL case revealed that 
decision-making and actions related to infonnation systems devclcpment were not 
guided by human reasons based on discussions and arb,uments. Therefore, Habermas's 
ideal speech situation provides opportunities for :;:!l foe participants in systems 
development to get into discussions and arguments nnd critically self-understand the 
design ideals for information systems development. His ideal speech situation provides 
a vehicle for reflective learning which is an essential aspect of human development in a 
society (Williams, 1996). It enables participants to talk about the social structures of 
work and consequently to increase the level of self-confidence ub6ut the systems being 
developed. 
Debating interrelated issues, aims to induce learning between people that nurtures a 
fuller appreciation of e11ch other's mental model (Flood, 1999, p. 88). It helps to free 
participants from inner compulsions, wmecessary linguistic or conceptual bias,.-
" 
unwarranted prejudice, and false beliefs about information systems development 
(Lyytincn & Hirschhcim, 1988). The rational discourse in the ideal speech situation 
·~ .. 
stimulates critical thinking and encourages sharing of ideas and collective problem 
; 
solving (Klein & Hirschhc::im, 1996). 
7.4.7 Communicative Actions and Innovation of Information Systems 
,c;.,,~~°""-> 
Social scientist h'nve been emphasised the importance of the fonnation of the structure 
of an organism for innovations in systems of nutional development (Porter, 1990; 
Lazonick, 1993; Amsden & Hiknio, !993, Perez & Soetc, 1988). These authors have 
emphasised the importance of innovation in developing countries to reduce 
technological disparities in those countries (Amsden & Hikino, 1993). This can be 
achieved through alquiring the capacity for participating in the generation and 
improvement of tcch:1ologies, rather than in simple use of them (Perez & Soete, 1988). 
Because it provides opportunities for participants to rcflcclive\y !cam and innovate 
creative infonnation systems to suit their social milieu. 
;, 
;/ 
Since the inception, information syst_~~.clCvelopment neglected the social taik it could 
play in mobilising NCCL towards a better organisation. As the case analysis revealed, 
/r in both phases of socio-economic development, the social context of infonnation 
\( systems development wns not critically analysed and reOected >Jpon. It was taken for 
granted. From this perspective, the soci,al reality was found, observed or modelled rather 
than interpreted or re-created. This culture annihilated momentum of change hy 
employees through innovative infonnation systems. Therefore, infonnntion systems. 
development was unable to legitimise and rationalises as means of transforming NCCL 
towards a better organisntion. 
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7.4.7.l Innovation through Reflective Learning 
Information systems development should be considered as a learning process in which 
organisational premises should be questioned (sec Robey, Boudreau & Rose, 2000; 
'\.F_lood, 1999; Newman & Noble, 1990; Scngc, 1990; Argyris, 1982; Argyris & Schon, 
1978; BatCS()_n, 1972). Leaming is an important clement in innovation in information 
' systems deve~9pment because social behaviour of individuals is expressed through 
social rules and practice that sustain in social culture ofa society (Stacey, 1996). These 
expressed thougbt represent the Ub'TCCd upon truth of social bch~viour of people in that 
society. The social rules of meaning arc the tacit knowledge operating within socio-
cultural lifeworlds in a society. By allowing participants to critically reflect upon 
through a process of learning, the true and rational knowledge could be found. 
Participants in a society could be motivated to learn more productively in the generation 
of technological innovation if changes were made in critical nspects of their social 
surrounding that generated the learning of new behaviours propagating continuous 
improvement in living conditions (Corea, 2000). 
'1 Habefmas's communicative actions enable participants to engage in a critical 
" 
assf'Ssment of technology being intro:.lueed while innovating new knowledge for 
~,.-.,· ', ,' 
information systems development becJusc the process involves reflective learning and 
creative thinking (Williams, 1996). It allows participants to learn new ways of 
conceptualising existing activities and identify new potential information systems 
supported work structures (Torvinen & Jalonen, 2000). It enables participants to 
cooperatively aware tacit knowledge in the socio-cultural lifeworlds in Sri Lanka. 
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Whtn participants arc ungagcd in reflective learning, then the content becomes part nf 
their own individual systems of thought, enriching and widening it. It stimulates 
participants' own thinking processes. l'm1icipants would lean relating lo lhc world 
around them. They undcrslaml the hnlis1ic nature of information systems development. 
New 11ucstions. new ideas. new perspective arise in their minds and leaning bcC(Jmc an 
active and alive process of knowledge creation /Steier, 1991). Once the social 
environment is created favouring such Jcaming, thinking process works spontaneously 
in the minds of people and they can know more deeply. Rcllcction must remain an 
ongoing process. 
Cooperative learning by participants allows to critical understa1,d and reflect upon 
mental construction of c.ach individual. In this way, the generated knowledge becomes 
"forward-looking" (Murray & Ozanne, 1991 ). It allows truth to be emerged and liberate 
peop\c from power, politics, domination, illusions, false beliefs, alienation. and 
dehumanisation at workplace. Such critical thinking facilita!es lifcworlds to be evolved 
as true knowledge tacitly operating in societies. Flood (1999) writes: 
./ 
If successful, the process may at some stage bring about changes to 
orgPnisntional rules and practice. Changes might be considered an 
emergence resulting from spontaneous self-organisation of 
interpretive beings around an issue. The dynamic is not directed by a 
central authority and docs not result from formal rules and practice 
(Flood, 1999, p. 87). 
Hence, notwith~.atnding critquc from other persu, '' "C:, (e.g. Founcault ( 1982)), it may 
be argued that there is a compelling basis for usu1g principles of communicative action 
in information systems development in organisations in Sri Lanka. 
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7. S Critique of the H11b<=<masi11n Pcrspeclivc and Rcfiections on Problems of Applying 
Communlcath·e Actions 
Communicative uction is nn approach that seeks to incorporate multiple interests of 
participants in II rational way. When applied to information systems development, the 
approach requires negotiation and debate between lhc participants regarding <lesigi1 
ideals of information system>. This is done through an ideal speech situation. Although 
the traditional cultural n1lucs in Sri Lanka support the use of communicative actions, 
some existing cultural, economic, social, and linguistic barriers limit t! ~ application of 
the principles ofidcal speech situation. 
7.5.1 Cultural Probl~·ms 
I. Respect. At a debate, stakeholders are required to criticise existing management 
ideology and issues regarding information systems development to find out true and 
rational knowledge. TI1is means, debate involves dashing of Western and Sri 
Lankan cultural values. Such a debate, if conducted in Western societies, can be 
considered as constructive and beneficial (Moores & Gregory, 2000). They may 
consider that a debate may help the trulh to emerge and be considered as beneficial 
to all the parties. But the social standing in organisations in Sri Lanka does not 
support such a debate. For example, systems analyst said," I didn't want to create 
conflicts with my superiors, bcc~.use our culture is to respect them" (p. x). 
2. High Power Distance, Related to respect is high power distance between superiors 
and subordinates in organisations in Sri Lanka. This was evidenced in NCCL case 
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analysis. In such a situation, management expects subordinates to carry out their 
decisions rather than changing them (p. X "people carry out orders ... "). These 
social relations have become fixed through the history or interactions (Clegg, 1989; 
Foucault, 1982). !n such a context, realising agreed upon truth and rational 
knowledge through a critical debate i~ problematic because debate involves 
changing established power relations of supi:riors in fovour of disadvantaged 
groups. Case analysis revealed that many senior managers did not want to loose 
their power. 
3. Social Attitudes. Another aspect of ideal speech situation is its aim of changing 
social attitudes of people so that principles of criticism and logical analysis are 
elevated above social nonns of confonnity and acceptance of customs and traditions 
(Klein & Hirschheim, 1996). The problem is whether these principles of criticism 
and logical analysis could be implemented in the present context of organisations in 
Sri Lanka. If successful, the change involves, changing the way of understanding 
the world by people. It involves radical transformation of social behaviour of 
human. At present NCCL is managed by a multinational organisation. Majority of 
senior management comprised of people from Western counties. TI1eir thinking is 
guided by the positivist ideology. This ideology has been influenced in fonning 
lifeworlds understanding and thinking process of the people in those countries. 
4. Agreed Upon Trnth. In ideal speech situation, participants arc required to critically 
reflect upon the design ideals of infonnation systems development. This is done 
through an open debate. For Habennas, the outcome of the debate is an agreed upon 
truth by all the participants who take part in the debate. Rational design includes an 
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inclusion of this agreed upon truth, the value choices of participants, as de~ign ideals 
of the infonnation systems being developed. However, there arc few questions arise 
from this agreed upon truth. 
(a) Different Realities. of the World nod Knowledge. What is being reflected in 
the agreed upon truth1 How do we know whether the agreed upon knowledge 
represents the truth of the reality; true representation of the minds of people in 
the debate? Western managers and local people understand the reality of the 
world differently. If the outcome ,:,f th.:: debate represents the reality of the 
world, how do we know this reality represents true knowledge in the service of 
a!l Ute parties? Toulmin (1982) acknowledges that "all of our scientific 
explanations and critical readings start from, embody, and imply some 
interpretive standpoint, the question is which of our positions are rationally 
warranted, reasonable or defensible - that is, wel!-founded rather than 
~roundlcss opinions" (p. I 09). 'Illis meUtodological dilemma appears in 
Habennas's theory of communicative actions when applying to organisations 
managed by multinational companies operating in Sri Lanka. 
(b) Power Reinforcement. Another question is, how do we know the agreed upon 
truth by participants is in the benefit of all the people in organisation~ Or 
whether the agreed upon truth and the designed system would reinforce the 
power of some people those whu already control and dominate the work force? 
It is revealed that the designed of maintenance infonnation system reinforced the 
power of engineers. It strengthen bureaucracy and scientific rational control 
exerted by engineers over other employees and employees (p. x). 1l1e agreed 
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upon truth by engineers and systems analysts to design maintenance system did 
not resonate with the broad agenda of libcrntion of repressed munagcrs, mu! 
employees. Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1992) ar1,'llc that "all premisses arc ultimately 
based on sunniscs which serve the purposes of a metalanguage for grounding 
and dosing an argument. Related to this issue is the emancipation of human 
being from physical (natural or technical), psychological, or social conditions nr 
forces. 
(c) Emancipation. Majority of Sri Lankans understands emancipation as full 
realisation of the truth of the life. It is the awaken of the mind; the 
enlightenment, which involves the liberation from all the suffering of human 
life. It is achiev"d in once in the life. It is really an achievement of 
supramundane status ofhuman life. Once this is achieve<l it will not be changed. 
NCCL case revealed that agreed upon truth by engineers and systems analyst 
had been changed. 111c managers changed it for their advantages (episodes X 
and X). Therefore, this agreed upon truth can not be considered as true 
emancipation of people. Sri Lankan people understand the concept of 
emancipation broadly than Habennas. As Tsoukas {1992). argues Habennas's 
approach has failed to provide an adequate metaphysical platform for 
emancipating people in organisations. 
5. Profits over Social Values. Another situation is whether Goldcnbank management 
would change their values in favour of employees at NCCL. At NCCL, these 
managers represent as employees of Go!denbank group of companies. The aim of 
the Company is to make profits, Consider the ful\owing statements made by three 
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senior managers. ·nw vr Finance: "foreign investors are coming here mainly for 
making profits than StJcia! services". llle Factory manager: "this Company has to 
make profits In alive". ·n1c v1~ Manufacturing: "manufacturing process of Cement is 
as same as everywhere in Goldcnbank group of companies and Sri Lanka has no 
option". 
6. Stiff Attitudes. The above assertions are not simply the assertions of individuals' 
concerns but the multinational Company itself. The senior managers at NCCL 
implement the decisions of multinational Company but not the decisions of 
managers themselves. Changing altitudes of a multinational Company is extremely 
difficult, because it has its own records of experience in J, ,i,1g; business in the world. 
Ifthe Company does not make progress in profits, ;l may close down operations at 
NCCL A project manager revealed that "if people do nut change their attitudes 
towards the Company and adjust their behaviour to suit the needs of the Company, 
the Company would have nothing but to close the factory". In such a situation, it is 
hardly to believe that a multinational Company would change its rational plans and 
purposive rational actions. 
7. Change of Knowledge, Another situation is that the rational and true knowledge, 
supported by the forces of better argmnent may not remain constant. This implies 
the fact that communicative actions can transfer between communicative actions and 
strategic actions. Episodes X and X provide empirical supports to show that an 
agreed upon knowledge represent an agreed best understanding of what has been 
produced at a particular point of time. This knowledge is changed when participants 
get more infonnation. Similarly, liberated people become rcvictimised from later 
instrumental and strategic actions of management. This difficulty exists in applying 
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Habennas's communicative actions in systems dcvclupmcnt in organisations in 8ri 
Lanka. 
7.5.2 Economic Problems 
I. Economic Problems and l<"car of Criticism. Related to cultural barriers are the 
economic and political environments in Sli Lanka. Case analysis revealed that one 
of the reasons for resistance to computerised infonnation systems was related to 
economic problems of employees. Generally, in Sri Lanka, getting a job is difficult 
due to high unemployment rate. On average, standard of living is very low 
_ compared to developed countries. There is a high-income disparity. Poverty level is 
very high. Economy i!l slowly progressing. In these contexts, local managers, and 
employees would not criticise senior management's actions openly because of the 
fear of loosing their jobs and income. Rather than criticising management actions 
they carry out orders of management (seep. 9). In the worst case they decide to 
leave the organisation (seep.). 
2. LMug and Poverty Alleviation than Emancipation. Though Sri Lankans are 
aware that they are being controlled and suppressed their social behaviour by the 
management, their economic problems such as poverty, and unemployment arc 
considered as important detenninants in living and maintaining tbeir families. These 
ideas were empirically supported. In episode X: "I am working here because, I can't 
find a similar job. My doctors advised me not to work unde1· sever pressure .... ". 
Even though employees didn't like the way information systems were developed 
(positivist approach), they did 1;ot continue their strike prolong periods because they 
were aware that it would affect to their employment and family income. ln episode 
'" 
X:" .... We 11rc poor people seeking extra money for our living. We really only 
/' 0
work here rJmoncy .... We want.:d to work and cam hut not that way". In this 
_',_("~ . 
.. co)l,ext, they remain in the organisation even though they tlo not positively 
contribute to the implementation of the rntional plans of companies through 
infonnotion systems development. 
'i; 
3. Forced Social Ch,-.~ae and Control. Goldenbank aware of all of these situations. 
Employees also aware that they were being suppressed and alienated by the strategic 
and°;instrmnental actions of management. Employees wanted management to 
consider their \ifrworld and economic problems. In spite of the opposition of 
employees towards the development of information systems, Goldenbank 
management forced employees to use their techniques and methods (p.). Habennas 
\l .:· 
has poorly understood the way multinational companies operate in developing· 
' 
countries and the way they control the social behaviour of people in organisations 
(( and the whole community in Sri Lanka. These situatioos can not be easily changed 
,\ 
through a rational debate. 
7 .5.3 Habermas's Intcrprcb-.tion of Power: Power as External Force and 
Dominalion of Lifeworlds 
Habermas's framework assumes that someone or some group is thought to have power 
and to use it for some particular purpc.se. This means power is conceived as a rcso11r.::C; 
' 
to be possessed, a capacity, a property of actors. At NCCL, employees had the minimal 
power to change the decisions of some politicians and management. This means power 
used consciously as an external force and allowed domination to occur over socio-
"' 
cultural lifcworlds. It Uistorlctl socin-culturnl lifcworlds of employees at NCC!... 
Employees experienced unin1cmlcd cunSCl[UCnccs such apathy, anomic, depression, 
ps}'.chopathological dicscs, and alienation at work. These social rcprod!.lctions were 
,, ' 
['' 1 
rCS,..,t~d from the covert strategic and inslrumcnta! actions of management. Jn sum, at 
NCCL there was and still is c,;isted an um .. -qual distribution of power relationships 
between management and employees. Thus NCCL case supported Habcnnas's 
interpretation of power in organisations a_nd societies. However, some other aspects of 
power also discovered from the case analysis. 
7.5.3.1 Some Problems of Power - Other Variants of Power Including Critiques of 
the Habermasian perspective 
' \\ I. Power In Social Relations. In all the three phases of NCCL's ov.nership,\~1 
management employed sufficient resources for innovating successful information 
systems. However, the NCCL case analysis revealed tlmt employees often vented 
their agitation towards the development through their trade union actions. 
Computerised information systems changed the rules of tacit knowing of employees 
resided at the deepest \eve! of their understanding of the world; the socio-cu\tura\ 
lifeworlds. It can be argued that the opposition of employees acted as a major barrier 
to develop successful information systems at NCCL. They opposed because 
computerised information systems development changed their ways of 
understanding the world and relationship between work and the life. Jn other words, 
the computerised systems challenged the locus of their knowledge; the world they 
drew meaning for their daily actions and interactions. These kinds of power 
relations are recognised by Clegg (1989) in his "Circuits of Power" who asserts that 
,, 
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changes in the technology or production and discipline can alter the balanoi·OJ 
empowerment and discmpowcrmcnt (pp. 211-39). 
,, 
2. Power for Mutual Coovt~icncc. The fact that power is not only external but also 
an attribute of specific relationship is also recognised by Giddens (1985) who says 
that power relations arc inherent in soda! relationships and may provide for mutual 
convenience of association. Similarly, Foucault (1982) and Clegg ( 1989) assert that 
power relationships in organisations may be conflictual and co-operative as well as 
both restrictive and enabling. For Foucault power always resides in the system or in 
· the culture we have inherited, and that power necessarily influence and controls us, 
albeit often in deleterious woys (Giddens, 1985). 
3. ~owcr and Traditional Culture. Giddens's and Foucault's interpretation of power 
relationships also supported from the case analysis. These kinds of power re\atlons 
exist in trade union activism in organisations in Sri Lanka. In Sri Lanka, particularly 
the leadership ofnational trade unions represents people from the elite groups. They 
are either related to major political parties or representators of the government. 
Organisations' unions are related to these national unions. Trade unions are 
representing as vehicle for social and economic justice, in the workplace's 
problems, they also provided for access to political and exercise of traditional 
kingships. The exercise of kingship is tooted from the traditional culture of Sri 
Lanka. 
4. Micro Politics and Power. The existence of micro power and politics in 
organisations also discovc1ed t'rom the case analysis. In NCCL, people use 
I( 
infonuation as power and that power was intimately connected tu knowledge. There 
existed eonllicts between inter departments interactions: hctwccn the infonnation 
technology staff in the head otlicc and thal of in the foctory, between internal and 
cxtcrnnl information technology personnel, between user departments and internal 
infornmtion technology personnel, and between user departments and external 
infonnation technology personnel. Connicts a!so exi~t~xl intra (within) departments: 
between information technology personnel and the VP of Finance and infonnation 
technology, between information technology personnel in user departments and their 
superiors. These power conflicts arc resulted from the interactions of people. 
5. Power and Historical Roots of Organisations. The power struggles appeared at 
NCCL are rooted from the historically established bureaucratic, techno-scicntific 
and rational planning approaches. Consider the assertion of management 
information systems manager: "we need certain amount of power which others don't 
have ... ". As Introna (!996) ar!,'UCS that individuals and societies arc mutually 
constituted and all the heather to known social types are social formations have been 
marked by central organising principles which inevitably entail certab power 
relationships. This means power in social relations can not be removed and resided 
within the systems. Such identifications are essential in the analysis of power in 
organisations. Foucault (1982) writes " ... there cannot be a society without power 
relations is not to say either that those which are established are necessary, or ... 
that power constitutes n fatality at the heart of societies" (p. 223), 
6. Power and Entrenchment of Relationsilips. At NCCL, user departments were 
given power to initiate their own information systems. Many user departments 
,, 
"' 
welcomc<l this idea. However, the intniduction of information systems in certain 
user departments reinforced already exercised power by mam1gcrs over other 
departments and employees (episode 10). Westrup (1995) notes that the 
actunlisation ofHabcnnas's ideas to over come communicative distortion may lead 
to entrenchment of specific power relationships which arc further reinforced by the 
fonns of technology already deployed within the organisation. 
7. Change of Power. Hnbermas'5 approach is aimed at changing the status quo in 
more radical way to empower the disadvantage groups. However, changing power 
· altogether is not easy. Establishing such power-independent social relationships that 
encourage ideal communication is problematic due to the existing organising of 
work at NCCL. It is unlikely t~i have to deal with the power resistance of those 
benefiting from the current situ!!'.tion (Mingers, 1992). Therefore, understanding 
power in social relations is crucial. It requires understanding of Clegg's (1989), 
Giddens's (1985), and Foucault's (1982) analysis in addition to Habennas's 
explanation of power in social relations. 
7.5.3.2 Education-Problems 
I. Level of Education. Related to power are educational levels of the participants. 
Critical debate requires participation of a wider membership. Generally, this 
' 
includes participants from multinational Company, politicians, managers, 
employees, customers and the community members. If successful, the idea of such a 
debate is to get wider community participation so that their value choices can be 
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included as design ideals of information systcms. However, achieving such an 
agreement is imprneticnl due to level of education of participants in a debate. 
2. Literacy and knowledge. Although Sri Lanka has the second highest literacy rate 
in the South-Asian region, it can not be taken for granted in information systems 
development. High literacy docs not imply that all the people arc highly 
knowledgable in information technology. Due to the advaocement of the 
information technology, designing relevant infonnation sysiems for organisations 
has become a challenging task. Its approaches, methodologies, methods, techniques, 
- systems, and tools are highly developed and can not be understood to average 
people. Knowledge about these aspects is essential at a debate to emerge the true 
knowledge. As outlined in chapter three, most of the people in Sri Lanka do not 
aware of the modern infonnation technology. In such a context, the outcome of the 
debate may not represent the genuine truth agreed by all the parties. 
3. Genuine Interests. On the other hand, most of the people arc suffering from 
economic hardships and malnutrition. In order to debate, first they must understand 
what their genuine interests arc or should be. Education levels of these community 
members are different from that of the people representing from elite groups. 
Economically and socially they are disadvantaged. In such a context, debate can not 
take place in a perfectively symmetrical manner. People will not argue all possible 
objections and implications of information systems. At best they breed confonnity. 
Therefore, realising true and rational knowledge could be problematic under these 
circumstances. Rather it may preserve the status 4uo. Related to education are some 
linguistic baniers of people in Sri Lanka. 
3% 
" 
7.5.4 Linguistic Problems 
According to Habermas linguistic barriers exist because the rationality of human 
communication tends to suffer from conflicting and ambiguous meaning, difficulty in 
expressing complex matters, limits of the human brain to comprehend lcn!,'1hy reports 
and other factors which impede mutual understanding (Klein & Hirschheim, 1996). 
I. Meaning and Understanding. At NCCL, many employees could not understand 
the meaning of various concepts related to information systems development ('"we 
heard the term 'fiel-ds' in our paddy fields ... "). Majority of employees could not 
understand the various concepts introduced by management through steering media. 
These concepts were originated from Western societies and disseminated to 
I.\ 
developing countries. These steering media carried cultural values embed in 
Western societies of the modernity. 
2. Language and Understanding. At NCCL, majority of employees could not 
understand English language as a medium of communication, because they had their 
education in national lan!,•lmges such as Sinhala and Tamil. As n result, they could 
not understand the meaning of various concepts carried through steering media. 
Even a translation of the meaning of these concepts into national languages did not 
make much difference in understanding those concepts by employees, because those 
meaning comprised of entirely new meaning emanated from the Western countries. 
These meaning did not resonate with the way NCCL employees understood the 
world. Brietly, these meaning clashed with the way those NCCL employees 
understood the constitutive of the world; their socio-cultural lifcworlds. 
3. Language, Thinking and Expression. Due to lack ofundcr5tanding of the meaning 
of concepts carried through steering media, employees could not fully express their 
views at training progrnms ond communication. This created a gap between 
understanding the actual meaning of concepts and expressing their thoughts. For 
example Whorf ( ! 956) asserts that the language one uses will detenninc the breadth 
and depth of ideas that can be communicated. This means that what one can think of 
· is constrained by the language that one has to express these thoughts. The intimate 
connection between language and thought is also central to Wittgenstein (1953). 
Maturana (1988, !978) and Maturanna and Varela (1987, 1980) show that 
perception and cognition are inevitably subject dependent, but that language is 
intcrsubjectivc - based on common experience and implicit agreement (Mingers, 
1995, 1989; a!so see Winorgard, !987, Winograd & Flores, 1986). 
4. Mutual Understanding and Language. Thus use of person's own language of 
understanding and expressing thoughts is vital in human communication. At NCCL 
the language difficulty exists in designing ideals for infonnation systems 
development, because people can not fully express their thoughts using English. As 
a result, there exist problems in reaching mutual understanding of participants in 
communicative interactions. This problem was and still is remained as a major 
barrier in transfonning NCCL towards a better organisation through infonnation 
systems development. 
5. Langunge as a Medium Power. Another factor that discouraged debate at NCCL 
wa5 fear to talk with senior managers. 'CT!is means that the existing environment 
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docs not encourage discussions. for example, an operation manager stated that "lhc 
freedom to talk wilh people had withdrawn here. Employees carried nut orders with 
fear psychosis". Habcnnas's asserts that repressed parties can be free only through 
the use of language, hccausc nrgumcnts presented at discussions arc checked against 
the four validly claims. However, at NCCL, senior managers used language itself as 
a medium of power. At present, the situation is complicated because NCCL is 
controlled by a multin.ational organisation. 
7.6 Conclusion 
7.6.1 Recommendations for Sueccssfnl Information Systems Development 
I. Cooperation. Collaborative work of politicians, govemment·officinls, senior 
and middle level managers, information technology staff, other employees, and 
other beneficiaries such as customers is essential to share their knowledge for 
systems development. Information systems development is a group effort than 
an individual ooe. It involves much more than designing a technical system. 
Group spirituality must be encouraged within organisations and their value 
choices must be included as design ideals of infonnation systems development. 
Once group spirituality is recognised and become institutionalised practice, 
people develop loyalty to each other. People don't see differently between 
themselves and the NCCL. 
Information systems development should be understood as "problem-posing" 
activity (Friere, 1986). In problem-posing activity, "individuals develop their 
power to perceive critically the way they exist in the world with which and in 
which they find themselves; they come to sec the world not as a static renlity, 
)09 
but as a reality in process, in transformation" (ibid, pp. 70-l). Then on!y 
individuals sec themselves as conscious beings able to act and change the 
existing views regarding systems development. TI1cy can reflectively understand 
the reality of infonnntlon systems development and trnnsform thoughts through 
actions. 
2. Socio-cultural Lffcworlds and Tacit Knowledge. Socio cultural values such as 
working collectively, sharing knowledge with others, mutual understanding, 
informal communication, trust and respect arc part and parts of Sri Lanka's 
socio-culture. What is necessary is to understand the importance of this socio-
cultural knowledge and include that tacit knowledge in information systems 
development. Mana;;ement can make use of such tacit knowledge to innovate 
successful infonnation systems. Once these social values have been introduced as 
institutionalised practice, they become built into human actions. Most of the 
problems outlined in the previous sections can be over come if infonnation 
systems arc developed following societal nonns, expectations, and values which 
arc used to engage in a search for understanding {Golcs & Hirschheim, 2000'1. 
The true representation of mindsets of individuals in infonnation systems is an 
essential aspect of success in any infonnation system because knowledge only 
has value if it is applied considP.ring the local : ,:iditions that make up that 
knowledge - thus people must be able to use that knowledge. 
3. Local Knowledge. Infonnation systems must incorporate local knowledge. This 
means, infonnntion systems must be designed to meet the local conditions 
considering the locally available, knowledge, resources, techniques, method~. 
and approaches to suit the needs of the people in that country. 
(( 
4. 
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Inslitutiooal Arrangements for Reflective Learning. Opportunities for rcllcctivc 
learning through social intcrnction must be introduced. Once socio-cultural lifcwor!ds 
ore introduced ns institutional planning and decision making, creative thinking 
becomes active autonomous part in human minds. It is necessary that NCCL 
management to remove all the barriers that inhibit tacit knowledge to emerge out by 
employing communicative actions. This requires not only listen to the words but also 
listen to the problems of people. 
s._ Attitudinal Change of Managers. This involves educating managers about the 
implications of their current approaches {Nord & Jcrrnir, 1992), and changing their 
attitudes towards the use of communicative actions. However, the end aim of this 
endower is to incorporate tacit knowledge in socio-cultural lifeworlds in systems 
development to create new information system that benefit to large stakeholder 
groups. The history of information systems development at NCCL revealed that they 
were failed because information systems development was not developed according 
to the needs of socio-cultural lifoworlds . 
• Learning from Failures, The present management can learn lessons from the past 
failures of information systems and reflect upon them (see Lyytinen & Robey, 
1999). It is really the breakdown of communication and the intelligence systems at 
NCCL. The present problems are the reproduction of the wrong application of the 
positivist approach in information systems development in the past. In contrast to 
the positivist approach, problem-posing approach to systems development involves 
forward looking, imaginative, and practical (Murray & Ozanne, 1991). This 
approach helps NCCL to develop relevant information systems that fits with the 
mindsets of people in Sri T,anka. 
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m,sodo-culturally Rclcv11nt Information Systems. Since the inception of 
information systems development at NCCL, whether they were manual or 
computerised, management used as an external force to control work and 
dehumanised the workplace relationships. If the present management is truly 
seeking to transform NCCL towards an effective organisation through the 
application ofinfonn.ation technology, then they must first understand the problems 
of the positivist approach and changed their attitudes and approaches according to 
the needs of socio-cultural lifcwurlds in Sri Lanka. 
· NCCL must adequately include socio cultural norms, expectations, values that 
represent mindsets of people. It also requires use of locally available information 
systems methods, techniques, tools, and expertise, which are valued and understood 
by people in Sri Lanka. Real change through infonnation systems needs to spring 
from social contexts and historical experience of Sri Lanka. NCCL must understand 
the holistic nature of infonnation systems development. Such an understanding 
supports management for both the transfonnation of NCCL and socio-economic 
('\_ development of Sri Lanka through the development of innovative infonnation 
systems. 
8. Use of Languages. Use of local languages in systems development process 
encourages participants to think and express their views as they occur within their 
minds (see, p. X and 7.5.4 above). 
9. Academic and Training Institutions. Collaborative work by NCCL management 
with academic and training institutions to change of academic curricula in training 
institutions both in the public and private sectors. This involves changing the 
dominant mode of teaching; i.e. positivist approach to communicative actions. So 
"' 
those trainees become creative thinkers because their training involves reflective 
learning (if introduced). Rc11cctivc learning involves an illumination of the truth of 
the world. It involves the true understanding of the self of a person. 
7.6.2 Conclusion about Research Questhms: Implication for Information 
Systems Research 
" 
This research empirically studied five research questions: 
' 
Firstly, What impact the state co/Jira! policies had on Information Systcmfdevelopment 
and practice in the orga11isa1ional socio-c11lt11ral /ifcwor!ds? The implications of state 
control policies (phase Ja) on infonnation systems development have been discussed 
and analysed in episodes 1-3 and state control policies with open economic policies 
(phase lb) in episodes 4-5. These implications are further summarised in section 7.1. 
The research discovered that governments' policies often innuenced in shaping 
institutional planning at NCCL and in tum these policies were included as objectives of 
information systems development. In all the five episodes, development of information 
systems emerged from the consideration regarding political and management 
accountability of funds towards the public through parliament. 
NCCL introduced information systems as steering media of techniques and strategi..:s to 
formally control workplace relationships and improve the efficiency and effe:tivcness 
of performance. Generally, information systems as steering media (means) did not 
resonate with the needs of lifeworlds. R~thcr, information systems engendered and 
clashed with historically established soc " cultural lifeworlds of employees. As a result, 
'°' 
employees, through their unions, often resisted governments' rcfonns. Therefore, 
NCCL could not transfonn towards a better organisation through information systems 
development. Therefore, it can be concluded that state control policies had clear 
implications for information systems development at NCCL. 
Setondly, What impac/ the 1wo-classical economic policies had on Information Systems 
development and practice in the orgo11isational socio-cultural lifcwor/ds? The impact 
of privatisation of NCCL and introduction of open economic policies have been 
discussed and analysed lc-nb>thY in episodes 6-10 and summarised in pp. XX. In episode 
6, · information systems were emerged from the considerations regarding change of 
ownership from the government control to an individual business entrepreneur; namely,, 
Yawakkal (phase 2a). In episodes 7-10, information systems were emerged from the 
considerations regarding the change of ownership from Yawakkal to Go!denbank 
Company (phase 2b). Under the both ownerships, NCCL focused on improving 
efficiency and effectiveness while changing social behaviour of employees. 
Yawakkal introduced computerised information systems as steering media to achieve 
economic rational objectives. These rational objectives represented as objectives of 
information systems development. Goldenbank transferred various management 
techniques, methods, steering media and corporate culture to NCCL. Goldenbank vision 
and objectives were taken as objectives of information systems development. In both 
cases, lifeworlds needs were not included as objectives of information systems 
development. 
In both cases. information systems development could not assist to improve efficiency 
and effectiveness of NCCL due to the resistance from employees. They opposed 
information systems development. As steering media, information systems engendered 
nnd clashed with the socio-cultural !ifeworlds of employees at NCCL and did not 
resolve employees· economic problems. As a result, NCCL could not transform 
" towards a better organisation through information systems development. Thus, it can t,C 
concluded that neo-classical policies and change of ownership of NCCL from the state 
control to a single owner and a multinational Company had clear implications for 
information systems development. 
,, 
Thlrd1y, What approaclles taken by the management'/ into consideration when 
developing and implememing Information Systems in the oi}anisation? The ten 
episodes discussed and analysed in chapter six and consequently summarised in section 
XX revealed that information systems development at NCCL followed non-reflective 
positivist approach. Information systems, methods, techniques, tools, and expertise wer,;-· 
transferred to NCCL from the Western countri<:s. It can be concluded that these Western 
techno-scicntific, economically rational approaches, rntiooal bureaucracy, and 
instrumental and strategic rationalities inhibited transferring NCCL towards a better 
1.1 ,'• 
organisation through effective information systems development. This non-refleL1ive'' 
" positivist rationality often contradicted with the rntionality emanated from the 
conditions in the social context of Sri Lanka. 
i•, 
Fourthly, How much are c11/tura/, social, economic, a11d orga11isatio11a/ con/e.>:/s taken 
by the ma11ageme111 in/o cons1deratio11 /11 Information Sys/ems developme/11 and practice 
in the organisation!' And Why? The ten episodic analyses revealed that information 
4()5 
systems development did not consider within broad social contcxL~ of Sri Lanka. 
Nonethclcs.s, the section 7.3 explains how social contexts of Sri Lanka influenced and 
shaped infonnation systems development at NCCL 
In both phases of socio-economic development, information systems development were 
subject to the domination of those who were in power. lnfonnation systems were used 
as external forces to control and dehumanise workplace relationships. Therefore, it can 
be concluded that information systems development within stalli control phase (phase I a 
and lb) supported to maintain state capitalism and information systems development 
wfthin open economic policies (phase 2a and 2b) supported to maintenance of market 
capitalism. In both phases, information systems development supported to the 
preseivation of the status quo. NCCL could not change towards a successful 
organisation through effective information systems development. 
Finally, How do such findings contribute to the theo1y and pl'acticc of lnfor\~iation 
Systems developme1J1? The case analysis revealed that ignorance of social contexts led 
to unintended dilemmas and consequences. It led to the growth of bureaucratic 
infighting, objectification of lifeworlds, the maintenance of the status quo, increased 
expression of alienation, personal anomie, depression, apathy, psychopathological 
decease, strikes, withdrawal of motivation to work, failures of information systems, 
poor performance, losses in operations and conflicts at NCCL. If I were look back 
reflectively, these unintend::d ~·onsequenccs of information systems development and 
practice resulted due to the inability ofmanagement to develop successful information 
systems considering the tacit knowledge of socio-cultural lifoworlds of employees al 
NCCL, 
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As explained in section 7.4, Habermas's critical social theory can be used as a theory, 
though it has some prohlcms, out1in6d in section 7.5, to overcome or to minimise the 
occurrences of above mentioned unintended consequences of NCCL. Generally, his 
theory can be used to guide information systems developers, managers at NCCL, policy 
makers in the government, owners nfGoldembank, and infonnation systems researchers 
to innovate successful infonnation systems considering the social soci! context of Sri 
Lanka. In particular Habennas's theory can be u~cd helped other organisations in Sri 
Lanka and organisations in other developing countries since his theory focuses on 
holistic nature to informati.,m systems development and practice in organisations (sec 
section 7.3). 
Haberrnas's critical social theory helps policy makers in the government, managers and 
other employees in the organisations, and researchers in information systems to 
understand the wholeness of information systems development and practice within 
broad socio-cultural, economic and political contexts of a country rather than just 
focusing only on organisational level analysis. Thus, findings of this re-search sheds 
new light in infonnation systems research and addresses a long felt need and lacuna of 
information systems development research both in the developed and developing 
countries. 
7.6.3 Research Contribution to Knowledge In General 
In this research I investigated infonnation systems development and practice in a 
privatised state owned industrial enterprise (NCCL) in Sri Lanka over a period between 
1958-2000. Objectives in my st11dy were: I. To understand the approaches used by 
organisations in Sri Lanka for information systems development. 2. To understand how 
these approaches contradict with organisational, socio-cultural, economic and political 
realities of organisations in Sri Lnnka. 3. To provide a theory to understand infonnation 
systems development practice in Sri Lanka. 4. To make recommendations for successful 
infonnntion systems development and practice in organisations in Sri Lanka. 
Making contributions to the knowledge of information systems practice and usage in Sri 
Lanka, and by readers' generalization to developing countries in general, the research 
discovered that infonm,tion systems development at NCCL existed within broadly 
related b:.!t interlocking socio-cultural, economic, and political and administrntive 
structures. These social structu1cs formed the contexts for NCCL and infonnation 
systems development. The analyses revealed how information systems development 
was shaped by and shaped NCCL reality through socio-cultural, economic, and political 
contexts in Sri Lanka. 
Both the state control policies and the neo-classical economic policies had impacts on 
information systems development and engendered socio-cultural lifoworlds of 
employees. Information systems development followed positivist approach with values 
embedded in the Western societies. The techno-scientific, economic and purposive 
rational approaches together with highly institutionalised bureaucracy and political 
apertures contradicted with the social reality of NCCL. These consequences prevented 
NCCL becoming successful organisation through immvative information systems 
development. 
40R 
As little ur no prior research as has done, to the author's knowledge, this study has 
found that :nt:,nnation systems development requires rcprcs1:.1tation of the mindsets of 
people in the country. This representation can be achieved if information system~ arc 
developed foll_.wing socio-cultural norms, values, and expectations which arc used to 
guide the lhinkin.~ process and understanding the reality of the world by the people in 
that country. Lift:worlds of peopl;, represent such socio-cultural values, norms, and 
expectations. They represent the mindsets and tacit understanding of the world by the 
people. Misn,'Presentation of lifcwot!ds's knowledge or understanding in information 
systems lead to clashes and difficulties such as those manifested in the episodes 
sketched in chapter six and management tend to experience difficulties in realising their 
objectives in organisations. 
Making a substantial contribution to research in dL·ve\oping countries, it is clear from 
the case analysis that Western positivist-based knowledge, related to information 
systems devolopmcnt and usage, can not be directly transferred to organisations in Sri 
Lanka and that such knowledge alone can not be considered as adequate for information 
systems development. It is also evident that information systems, its technology, tools, 
methods, and expertise are socially construcu.•d from the experiences emanated from 
social contexts of Sri Lank than imposed upon from the experiences of Western 
positivist thinking of modernity. The NCCL case revealed that information systems 
development becomes effective only when it is truly appropriated by the knowledge of 
participants in the social contexts in Sri Lanka. 
NCCL must take their employees more seriously. It must understand the mindsets of 
people. Understanding of mir1dsets of people means understanding the socio-cultural 
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\ifcworlds of people in Sri Lanka. Thnt knowledge represents the best available 
knowledge for information sy~lcms development to innovate successful information 
system~. !fin formation systems were developed using such knowledge, then employees, 
management, NCCL itself and the whole society would benefit from the developm~nt of 
infornmtion systems. Such an endeavour would enhance the socio;'.feonomic 
development by alleviating poverty and increasing living standards of pc~Ple in Sri 
Lanka. Such findings would enhance the theory and tbc practice of information systems 
development in organisations in developing countries. 
7.6.4 Future Research Opportunities 
Several issues discussed under the limitations (sec section 4.2 of chapter one) are seen 
as possible extensions and opportunities for future research. 
Firstly, further research could be undertaken to change social attitudes of managers and 
other employees to make them critically aware of the problems of current informatioo 
systems development und practice and change into communicative actions. In this 
research setting, the researcher is required to activity involve in the infonnation systems 
·development projects and change the socinl attitudes of participants. The aim would be 
to use communicative actions in information systems development o.nd to incorporate 
tacit knowledge of participants in information systems development projects. 
Secondly, more in-depth and cross sectional research design can be included 
participants representing from owners of the multinational company, customers, 
suppliers, managers other employees at NCCL end cr,mpetitors and studied within the 
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historical and social contexts of Sri Lanka. Paral!cl conclusions for success or failures or 
infom1ution systems development am\ practice cun be made comparing the results with 
similar type of organisations. 
Thirdly, more in-depth case studies could be undertaken in other privatised industrial 
organisations, service oriented organisations such as insurance and hotel industries. !t is 
also possible to study information systems development and practices in privately 
owned companies. All these research need to study within historical and social contexts 
of Sri Lanka employing critical social theory. The aim of such holistic researches 
would be to find out whether there arc real differences within the industry and inter 
industry pertaining to information systems development and practices. Additionally, 
within these research, problems (such as cultural, economic, J",wer, educational, 
linguistic and so on) of the application of Habennas critical social theory could be 
further studied and analysed. 
Fourthly, another possible extension of future research would be to critically study 
organisations that have succeeded in both developing and implementing infonnation 
systems across social contexts in Sri Lanka. Apparent successes in infonnation systems 
development and implementation can be made by iterating theory with empirical data in 
the studied organisations and these success stories can be used to enhance the 
productivity offailed organisations both in the privatised and private organisations. 
Fifthly, the socio-culture as national culture as stated in the limitation can be further 
explored and analysed. Is it uniquely national socio-culture or a blend of Asian and 
Western? Is it uniquely the national ~ocio-culture or socio-culture embedded in 
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organisational values nnd practices? How these socio-cultural clement truly make 
impact on success on organisations and how is it powerful as teams b innovating 
infonnation systems dcvdopmcnt'l These areas could be explored further in future 
research. 
Finn!ly, a further research can be conducted in other developing countries using the 
similar framework and thus conclusions can be made whether conclusions made in this 
study replicate in other developing countircs. 
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